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Type: Journal article
Title: In defence of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams
Author: Letheby, C.
Citation: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012; 11(3):403-414
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Issue Date: 2012
ISSN: 1568-7759
Statement of
Christopher Letheby
Abstract: Fred Adams (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4): 619–628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition (EC) which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: (1) EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; (2) EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; (3) relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and (4) EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond to Adams that: (1) EC is not committed to an implausible criterion of meaningfulness, though it may be committed to holding that comprehension admits of degrees; (2) EC does have its claimed advantages over rival views; (3) the data do make a strong case for constitutive involvement and (4) a broad and comprehensive EC approach probably can account for the comprehension of abstract concepts.
Keywords: Embodied cognition
symbol grounding
linguistic meaning
perceptual symbols
Rights: © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-012-9263-1
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest
Philosophy publications

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