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dc.contributor.authorLetheby, C.-
dc.identifier.citationPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012; 11(3):403-414-
dc.description.abstractFred Adams (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4): 619–628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition (EC) which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: (1) EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; (2) EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; (3) relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and (4) EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond to Adams that: (1) EC is not committed to an implausible criterion of meaningfulness, though it may be committed to holding that comprehension admits of degrees; (2) EC does have its claimed advantages over rival views; (3) the data do make a strong case for constitutive involvement and (4) a broad and comprehensive EC approach probably can account for the comprehension of abstract concepts.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityChristopher Letheby-
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlands-
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012-
dc.subjectEmbodied cognition-
dc.subjectsymbol grounding-
dc.subjectlinguistic meaning-
dc.subjectperceptual symbols-
dc.titleIn defence of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.orcidLetheby, C. [0000-0002-6293-7873]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest
Philosophy publications

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