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|dc.identifier.citation||Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012; 11(3):403-414||-|
|dc.description.abstract||Fred Adams (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4): 619–628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition (EC) which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: (1) EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; (2) EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; (3) relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and (4) EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond to Adams that: (1) EC is not committed to an implausible criterion of meaningfulness, though it may be committed to holding that comprehension admits of degrees; (2) EC does have its claimed advantages over rival views; (3) the data do make a strong case for constitutive involvement and (4) a broad and comprehensive EC approach probably can account for the comprehension of abstract concepts.||-|
|dc.rights||© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012||-|
|dc.title||In defence of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams||-|
|dc.identifier.orcid||Letheby, C. [0000-0002-6293-7873]||-|
|Appears in Collections:||Aurora harvest|
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