Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/74031
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Type: Journal article
Title: The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
Author: Roberson, B.
Kvasov, D.
Citation: Economic Theory, 2012; 51(2):397-433
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Issue Date: 2012
ISSN: 0938-2259
1432-0479
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Brian Roberson and Dmitriy Kvasov
Abstract: The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes his fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players’ resources are “use it or lose it” in the sense that any resources that are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This article examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game that relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players’ budgets is below a threshold, then there exists a one-to-one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players’ budgets exceeds the threshold, this relationship breaks down and we construct a new equilibrium.
Keywords: Colonel Blotto game; all-pay auction; contests; mixed strategies; multi-dimensional contest
Rights: © Springer-Verlag 2011
RMID: 0020122172
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0673-z
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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