Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/81867
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Type: Journal article
Title: Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme
Author: Kish, L.
Abbott, D.
Granqvist, C.
Citation: PLoS One, 2013; 8(12):e81810-1-e81810-15
Publisher: Public Library of Science
Issue Date: 2013
ISSN: 1932-6203
1932-6203
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes G. Granqvist
Abstract: Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.
Keywords: Computer Security; Algorithms; Research Design
Rights: © 2013 Kish et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
RMID: 0020133777
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081810
Appears in Collections:Electrical and Electronic Engineering publications

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