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Type: Journal article
Title: Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis
Author: Neugebauer, T.
Pezanis-Christou, P.
Citation: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2007; 63(1):55-72
Publisher: Elsevier Science BV
Issue Date: 2007
ISSN: 0167-2681
Statement of
Tibor Neugebauer, Paul Pezanis-Christou
Abstract: We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on bidding behavior and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). We observe an important overbidding in all but the last stage of a sequence, no matter whether supply is certain, and a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain. Yet, the data qualitatively support most stage-to-stage bid predictions and the price trend predictions for risk neutral bidders. © 2006.
Keywords: Sequential first-price auctions
Independent private values
Supply uncertainty
Price trends
Rights: ©2006 Published by Elsevier B.V
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.011
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Economics publications

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