Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83719
Type: Conference paper
Title: The cognitive reflection test: how much more than numerical ability?
Author: Welsh, M.
Burns, N.
Delfabbro, P.
Citation: Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2013 / M. Knauff, N. Sebanz, M. Pauen, I. Wachsmuth (eds.), pp.1587-1592
Publisher: Cognitive Science Society
Publisher Place: Germany
Issue Date: 2013
ISBN: 9780976831891
Conference Name: Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (35th : 2013 : Berlin, Germany)
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Matthew B. Welsh, Nicholas R. Burns & Paul H. Delfabbro
Abstract: Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a 3- item task shown to predict susceptibility to decision-making biases better than intelligence measures. It is described as measuring ‘cognitive reflection’ - a metacognitive trait capturing the degree to which people prefer to reflect on answers rather than giving intuitive responses. Herein, we ask how much of the CRT’s success can be explained by assuming it is a test of numerical (rather than general) intelligence. Our results show CRT is closely related to numerical ability and that its predictive power is limited to biases with a numerical basis. Although it may also capture some aspect of a rational cognition decision style, it is unrelated to a metacognitive, error-checking and inhibition measure. We conclude that the predictive power of the CRT can, largely, be explained via numerical ability without the need to posit a separate ‘cognitive reflection’ trait.
Keywords: cognitive reflection; heuristics and biases; individual differences; numerical ability; intelligence
Rights: Copyright status unknown
RMID: 0020137076
Description (link): http://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2013/index.html
Published version: http://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2013/papers/0296/index.html
Appears in Collections:Australian School of Petroleum publications

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.