Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Type: Thesis
Title: The significance of shareholder right limiting provisions during merger waves: an empirical investigation.
Author: Obaydin, Ivan
Issue Date: 2014
School/Discipline: Business School
Abstract: The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with shareholder right limiting provisions are time-varying. During merger waves, I find evidence in line with the managerial self-interest hypothesis. This theory argues that managers use shareholder right limiting provisions to facilitate entrenchment and to pursue non-value maximising agendas. The results show that shareholder right limiting provisions significantly reduce the likelihood of receiving a bid and are unlikely to enhance either initial or final offer premiums. The long run performance of poor corporate governance firms, conditional on having successfully defended against an unwanted on-wave takeover bid, is also significantly lower when compared to firms regarded as having strong shareholder rights. Similarly, both announcement period bidder returns and long-run post-acquisition performance is inversely proportional to the number of anti-takeover defences a firm has in place during merger waves. When takeover activity is considered normal, however, these same provisions do not appear to impede the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. They are also no longer related to bidder announcement period returns. These novel findings are largely consistent with the notion that merger waves may foster agency driven behaviour, and therefore, prompt managers to use shareholder right limiting provisions to pursue sub-optimal operating and investment decisions. The additional insights offered by this thesis should be of significant value to both investors and policy makers alike.
Advisor: Zurbruegg, Ralf
Glabadanidis, P.
Dissertation Note: Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2014
Keywords: shareholder right limiting provisions; corporate governance; corporate takeovers; merger waves
Provenance: This electronic version is made publicly available by the University of Adelaide in accordance with its open access policy for student theses. Copyright in this thesis remains with the author. This thesis may incorporate third party material which has been used by the author pursuant to Fair Dealing exceptions. If you are the owner of any included third party copyright material you wish to be removed from this electronic version, please complete the take down form located at:
Appears in Collections:Research Theses

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
01front.pdf431.41 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
02whole.pdf1.74 MBAdobe PDFView/Open
  Restricted Access
Library staff access only564.26 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
  Restricted Access
Library staff access only2.23 MBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.