Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/88030
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dc.contributor.authorGuo, M.en
dc.contributor.authorNaroditskiy, V.en
dc.contributor.authorConitzer, V.en
dc.contributor.authorGreenwald, A.en
dc.contributor.authorJennings, N.en
dc.date.issued2011en
dc.identifier.citationInternet and Network Economics: Proceedings of 7th International Workshop, WINE 2011, Singapore, December 11-14, 2011, 2011 / Chen, N., Elkind, E., Koutsoupias, E. (ed./s), pp.158-169en
dc.identifier.isbn9783642255090en
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743en
dc.identifier.issn1611-3349en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/88030-
dc.description.abstractMany scenarios where participants hold private information require payments to encourage truthful revelation. Some of these scenarios have no natural residual claimant who would absorb the budget surplus or cover the deficit. Faltings [7] proposed the idea of excluding one agent uniformly at random and making him the residual claimant. Based on this idea, we propose two classes of public good mechanisms and derive optimal ones within each class: Faltings’ mechanism is optimal in one of the classes. We then move on to general mechanism design settings, where we prove guarantees on the social welfare achieved by Faltings’ mechanism. Finally, we analyze a modification of the mechanism where budget balance is achieved without designating any agent as the residual claimant.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityMingyu Guo, Victor Naroditskiy, Vincent Conitzer, Amy Greenwald, and Nicholas R. Jenningsen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.rights© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011en
dc.titleBudget-balanced and nearly efficient randomized mechanisms: public goods and beyonden
dc.typeConference paperen
dc.identifier.rmid0020135602en
dc.contributor.conferenceInternational Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE) (11 Dec 2011 - 14 Dec 2011 : Singapore)en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_14en
dc.publisher.placeUKen
dc.identifier.pubid16063-
pubs.library.collectionComputer Science publicationsen
pubs.library.teamDS01en
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
Appears in Collections:Computer Science publications

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