Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
Type: Conference paper
Title: Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
Author: Naroditskiy, V.
Guo, M.
Dufton, L.
Polukarov, M.
Jennings, N.
Citation: Internet and Network Economics: Proceedings of 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Liverpool, UK, December 10-12, 2012., 2012 / Goldberg, P. (ed./s), pp.323-336
Publisher: Springer
Publisher Place: UK
Issue Date: 2012
Series/Report no.: Lecture Notes in Computer Science; 7695
ISBN: 9783642353109
ISSN: 0302-9743
Conference Name: International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE) (10 Dec 2012 - 12 Dec 2012 : Liverpool, UK)
Statement of
Victor Naroditskiy, Mingyu Guo, Lachlan Dufton, Maria Polukarov, and Nicholas R. Jennings
Abstract: Redistribution of VCG payments has been mostly studied in the context of resource allocation. This paper focuses on another fundamental model—the public project problem. In this scenario, the VCG mechanism collects in payments up to n−1n of the total value of the agents. This collected revenue represents a loss of social welfare. Given this, we study how to redistribute most of the VCG revenue back to the agents. Our first result is a bound on the best possible efficiency ratio, which we conjecture to be tight based on numerical simulations. Furthermore, the upper bound is confirmed on the case with 3 agents, for which we derive an optimal redistribution function. For more than 3 agents, we turn to heuristic solutions and propose a new approach to designing redistribution mechanisms.
Rights: © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
RMID: 0020135598
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_24
Appears in Collections:Computer Science publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
RA_hdl_88033.pdfRestricted Access229.98 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.