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Type: Journal article
Title: Should we replace disabled newborn infants?
Author: Wilkinson, D.
Citation: Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011; 8(3):390-414
Publisher: Brill Academic Publishers
Issue Date: 2011
ISSN: 1740-4681
Statement of
Dominic Wilkinson
Abstract: If a disabled newborn infant dies, her parents may be able to conceive another child without impairment. This is sometimes referred to as 'replacement'. Some philosophers have argued that replacement provides a strong reason for disabled newborns to be killed or allowed to die. In this paper I focus on the case for replacement as it relates to decisions about life support in newborn intensive care. I argue (following Jeff McMahan) that the impersonal reason to replace is weak and easily outweighed. I assess and reject several possible ways in which the impersonal reason to replace could be defended. I then address an alternative justification for replacement – as an individual-affecting benefit. The strongest justification for replacement may be the interests of parents. In the latter part of the paper I look at a related question. What role should replacement play in decisions about the funding of newborn intensive care?
Keywords: Impersonal reasons
Withdrawing treatment
Rights: © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011
DOI: 10.1163/174552411X591348
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 2
Paediatrics publications

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