Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Scopus||Web of Science®||Altmetric|
|Title:||Should we replace disabled newborn infants?|
|Citation:||Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011; 8(3):390-414|
|Publisher:||Brill Academic Publishers|
|Abstract:||If a disabled newborn infant dies, her parents may be able to conceive another child without impairment. This is sometimes referred to as 'replacement'. Some philosophers have argued that replacement provides a strong reason for disabled newborns to be killed or allowed to die. In this paper I focus on the case for replacement as it relates to decisions about life support in newborn intensive care. I argue (following Jeff McMahan) that the impersonal reason to replace is weak and easily outweighed. I assess and reject several possible ways in which the impersonal reason to replace could be defended. I then address an alternative justification for replacement – as an individual-affecting benefit. The strongest justification for replacement may be the interests of parents. In the latter part of the paper I look at a related question. What role should replacement play in decisions about the funding of newborn intensive care?|
|Rights:||© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011|
|Appears in Collections:||Aurora harvest 2|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.