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Type: Journal article
Title: Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant
Author: Cullity, G.M.
Citation: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1999; 2(3):277-294
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Issue Date: 1999
ISSN: 1572-8447
Statement of
Garrett Cullity
Abstract: Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.
Keywords: virtue ethics; ethical theory; moral epistemology; moral judgement
Rights: © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers
RMID: 0030028051
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009903128864
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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