Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/91928
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dc.contributor.authorHill, L.en
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.identifier.citationAustralian Journal of Political Science, 2015; 50(1):61-72en
dc.identifier.issn1036-1146en
dc.identifier.issn1363-030Xen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/91928-
dc.descriptionPublished online: 09 Jan 2015en
dc.description.abstractIt is sometimes claimed that compulsory voting violates a particular right not to vote. For some, this assumed right is as fundamental as the right to vote. The existence of such a right, however, has attracted little sustained scholarly attention. This article explores from a political theory perspective whether the alleged ‘right not to vote’ is deserving the same legal and moral protection as the right to vote. I argue on two broad grounds that it is not. First, not all rights are capable of being legally waived and voting is one of them. Second, voting is a right but it is also a duty; it is a duty-right. Therefore, even though many people do fail to vote, doing so does not seem to constitute the exercise of any particular right, nor should it be legally recognised as such.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityLisa Hillen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherRoutledgeen
dc.rights© 2015 Australian Political Studies Associationen
dc.subjectVoting; rights; duties; compulsory voting; representative democracyen
dc.titleDoes compulsory voting violate a right not to vote?en
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.rmid0030025255en
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/10361146.2014.990418en
dc.identifier.pubid178573-
pubs.library.collectionPolitics publicationsen
pubs.library.teamDS15en
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.orcidHill, L. [0000-0002-9098-7800]en
Appears in Collections:Politics publications

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