Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
Type: Journal article
Title: Legalization of bribe giving when bribe type is endogenous
Author: Oak, M.
Citation: Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015; 17(4):580-604
Publisher: Wiley
Issue Date: 2015
ISSN: 1467-9779
Statement of
Mandar Oak
Abstract: A recent paper, Basu argues that for a class of bribes, called harassment bribes, legalization of bribe giving, but not bribe taking, will reduce bribery. We examine the applicability of Basu's insight in an environment in which the type of the bribe—harassment or nonharassment—is endogenously determined, and it is not feasible to legalize the giving of nonharassment bribes. We find that in such an environment Basu's proposal, in and of itself, yields mixed results: in one case it reduces even the prevalence of nonharassment bribes, and improves social welfare. However, in another case it is shown to be counter-productive, i.e., it reduces social welfare while failing to eliminate bribery. Our analysis finds parameter values that determine which of the two cases will prevail, and points to additional policies aimed at strengthening the legal institutions which, in conjunction with Basu's proposal, will help reduce bribery.
Rights: © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
RMID: 0030032799
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12149
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
RA_hdl_94226.pdfRestricted Access463.58 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.