Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Scopus||Web of Science®||Altmetric|
|Title:||Intentionality lite or analog content? A response to Hutto and Satne|
|Citation:||Philosophia, 2015; 43(3):723-729|
|Gerard O'Brien, Jon Opie|
|Abstract:||In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. What’s needed is a species of intentionality distinct from both the industrial-strength version beloved by philosophers and the intentionality lite recommended by Hutto and Satne. We briefly motivate and sketch this alternative, and say a few words about the account of cognition that it spawns.|
|Keywords:||Analog; cognition; intentionality; mental content; representation|
|Rights:||© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.