Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/97841
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dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, G.en
dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.en
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophia, 2015; 43(3):723-729en
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893en
dc.identifier.issn1574-9274en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/97841-
dc.description.abstractIn their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. What’s needed is a species of intentionality distinct from both the industrial-strength version beloved by philosophers and the intentionality lite recommended by Hutto and Satne. We briefly motivate and sketch this alternative, and say a few words about the account of cognition that it spawns.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGerard O'Brien, Jon Opieen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015en
dc.subjectAnalog; cognition; intentionality; mental content; representationen
dc.titleIntentionality lite or analog content? A response to Hutto and Satneen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.rmid0030038124en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11406-015-9623-5en
dc.identifier.pubid218761-
pubs.library.collectionPhilosophy publicationsen
pubs.library.teamDS05en
pubs.verification-statusVerifieden
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]en
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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