ROSITA: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis Leakage in Ciphers
Date
2021
Authors
Shelton, M.A.
Samwel, N.
Batina, L.
Regazzoni, F.
Wagner, M.
Yarom, Y.
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Conference paper
Citation
Proceedings of the 2021 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2021, pp.23137-1-23137-17
Statement of Responsibility
Madura A. Shelton, Niels Samwel, Lejla Batina, Francesco Regazzoni, Markus Wagner, Yuval Yarom
Conference Name
Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS) (21 Feb 2021 - 25 Feb 2021 : virtual online)
Abstract
Since their introduction over two decades ago, sidechannel attacks have presented a serious security threat. While many ciphers’ implementations employ masking techniques to protect against such attacks, they often leak secret information due to unintended interactions in the hardware. We present ROSITA, a code rewrite engine that uses a leakage emulator which we amend to correctly emulate the micro-architecture of a target system. We use ROSITA to automatically protect masked implementations of AES, ChaCha, and Xoodoo. For AES and Xoodoo, we show the absence of observable leakage at 1 000 000 traces with less than 21% penalty to the performance. For ChaCha, which has significantly more leakage, ROSITA eliminates over 99% of the leakage, at a performance cost of 64%.
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Copyright © 2021 by the Internet Society. All rights reserved. This volume is published as a collective work. The Internet Society owns the copyright for this publication and the copyrights to the individual papers are retained by their respective author[s].