Should we replace disabled newborn infants?
| dc.contributor.author | Wilkinson, D. | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | If a disabled newborn infant dies, her parents may be able to conceive another child without impairment. This is sometimes referred to as 'replacement'. Some philosophers have argued that replacement provides a strong reason for disabled newborns to be killed or allowed to die. In this paper I focus on the case for replacement as it relates to decisions about life support in newborn intensive care. I argue (following Jeff McMahan) that the impersonal reason to replace is weak and easily outweighed. I assess and reject several possible ways in which the impersonal reason to replace could be defended. I then address an alternative justification for replacement – as an individual-affecting benefit. The strongest justification for replacement may be the interests of parents. In the latter part of the paper I look at a related question. What role should replacement play in decisions about the funding of newborn intensive care? | |
| dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Dominic Wilkinson | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011; 8(3):390-414 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1163/174552411X591348 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1740-4681 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1745-5243 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/89424 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Brill Academic Publishers | |
| dc.rights | © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 | |
| dc.source.uri | https://doi.org/10.1163/174552411x591348 | |
| dc.subject | Impersonal reasons | |
| dc.subject | Newborns | |
| dc.subject | Replacement | |
| dc.subject | Utilitarianism | |
| dc.subject | Withdrawing treatment | |
| dc.title | Should we replace disabled newborn infants? | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| pubs.publication-status | Published |