Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
Files
(Restricted Access)
Date
2014
Authors
Bose, S.
Renou, L.
Editors
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Type:
Journal article
Citation
Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 2014; 82(5):1853-1872
Statement of Responsibility
Subir Bose, Ludovic Renou
Conference Name
Abstract
This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.
School/Discipline
Dissertation Note
Provenance
Description
Access Status
Rights
© 2014 The Econometric Society