The unintended cost of data breach notification laws: Evidence from managerial bad news hoarding
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(Published version)
Date
2024
Authors
Obaydin, I.
Xu, L.
Zurbruegg, R.
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Journal article
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Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2024; 51(9-10):2709-2736
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Ivan Obaydin, Limin Xu, Ralf Zurbruegg
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Abstract
We investigate how nonfinancial disclosure laws exacerbate agency issues in firms. Our analysis focuses on the staggered adoption of state-level notification laws that require firms to disclose data breaches. Our findings reveal that the introduction of these laws increases the risk of stock price crashes. Managers appear motivated to accumulate unfavorable news in an effort to prevent market overreactions associated with the mandatory disclosure of data breaches. Cross-sectional analyses also reveal that the impact is stronger when managers have a greater incentive, or greater ability, to hoard information. Our results highlight that nonfinancial disclosures can have unintended consequences for firm information asymmetries and potentially adverse market impacts in cases where the regulation is unable to consider all stakeholders.
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First published: 06 March 2024
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© 2024 The Authors. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.