P-Consciousness presentation/A-consciousness representation
Date
1997
Authors
Gamble, D.
Editors
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Type:
Journal article
Citation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997; 20(1):149-150
Statement of Responsibility
Denise Gamble
Conference Name
Abstract
<jats:p>P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an
immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw
experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to
objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable”
contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself
representational, at least in terms of some concepts of
“representation.” Block's arguments fall short
of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of
cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to
account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes
beyond “representational” content. <jats:italic>BBS</jats:italic> discussion
reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a
representationalist thesis of P.</jats:p>
School/Discipline
School of Humanities : Philosophy
Dissertation Note
Provenance
Description
Copyright © 1997 Cambridge University Press
Please see page 149 of PDF for this article.
Please see page 149 of PDF for this article.