Identical preferences lower bound for allocation of heterogenous tasks and NIMBY problems
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2013
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Yengin, D.
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Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013; 15(4):580-601
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Duygu Yengin
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We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in an hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.
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© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.