Framing the Veil:

From the Familiar to the Feared

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

Girls Will Be Girls
Kunz, A 2007

As much as the veil is a fabric or article of clothing, it is also a concept. It can be illusion, vanity, artifice, deception, liberation, imprisonment, euphemism, divination, concealment, hallucination, depression, eloquent, silence, holiness, the ethers beyond consciousness, the hidden hundredth name of God, the final passage into death, even the biblical apocalypse… Yet the veil can also be a symbol of resistance (Heath 2008).

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Acknowledgements

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Abstract

This thesis, *Framing the Veil: From the Familiar to the Feared* is about representation and the limits of representation. The foremost aim of this thesis is to examine the multiple meanings of the veil. This research is a critique of Western representations of the veil. It examines the way in which 'frames' have worked to reduce the veil to a one dimensional screen onto which stereotypes and misgivings have been projected in contemporary Western discourse. It considers how the attributes assigned to the veil in Orientalist discourse have persisted to inform and confine representations of the veil in contemporary media, political and cultural realms.

The thesis incorporates two main aims. The first explores the strategies that determined the framing of certain knowledge formations regarding the veil within the parameters of 'familiar' from its early beginnings to contemporary moments. In addition it draws attention to the cultural-political shift in representations of the veil throughout Western discourse from the 'normalcy' of cultural practices and religious modesty, to the tenets of representation established by Orientalism. The second brings into focus the way in which Orientalist ideologies and imagery, vastly corresponded to and became increasingly consistent in the representations of the veil following the attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11 2001. Through an exploration of post September 11 political and media discourses, this research exposes the way in which the framing of the veil became situated in the Western world as 'strange' rather than 'familiar' and therefore feared. Although the representation of the veil, in the international realm of the media, political and public debate, since September 11 2001, has been considered, the focal point for this thesis is Australia. The case studies considered for analysing the inherent anxieties over the veil and veiling are located in the wake of 9/11, the Bali bombings and the Cronulla riots. These case studies have brought into view how the veil and veiled bodies circumscribed through a barrage of hegemonic discourse frames were represented as an unspoken form of terrorism, and by extension as a 'threat' against the cultural milieu of 'white' Australia.

Declaration

I declare that:

- This thesis presents work carried out by myself and does not incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university

- To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis does not contain material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signed…………

Dated ……14 September 2010……

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This thesis is dedicated to three very special people:
My late mother Alberta whose love, wisdom and enduring spirit has and continues to be a guiding light in my world; and
My grand-daughter Amelie and my grand-son Thomas whose love and imaginary worlds have given me time and space to rest and re-energize during the pursuit of this research.

Introduction

Framing the Veil

> Veiling – to *Western* eyes, the most visible marker of the differentness and inferiority of Islamic societies became the symbol …of both the oppression of women and the backwardness of Islam (Ahmed1992).

Introduction

The topic *Framing the Veil: from the Familiar to the Feared*, derived from a growing concern at the unprecedented degree of public physical and verbal hostility toward Australian women wearing the veil[1] following the September 11 2001 World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks. To understand how this phenomenon materialised, the research necessitated, in the first instance, a departure from the contemporary moment of September 11, to an analysis of various historical positionings of the veil within religious, cultural and political discourses. This approach has revealed that while in recent years the veil has emerged as a prominent contentious site of debate in politics, the media and in community interchange, veiling neither originated in nor is unique to Islam and has existed among countless cultures and religions from time immemorial (Heath 2008). This thesis has not intended to provide a defence or criticism on the veil and veiling. Its aim has been to provide a critique of Western representations of the veil, and thus bring about an understanding of how multiple meanings of the veil has, in the main, been reduced to a one dimensional screen onto which stereotypes and misgivings have been projected (Heath 2008).

In attempting to untangle the collectivities of the historical and contemporary representation of the veil, a crucial consideration has been to avoid embracing a strategy of 'Othering'[2], by joining the '...chorus of uniformed and disturbing voices' (Abood 2002, pp.169-170), of concerned white academic women who have continued to silence and disempower 'Muslim women's' voices (Abood 2002). Moreover, the researcher is cognizant of the issue that in using the category of 'Muslim women' as a homogeneous term, denies the complexity and specificity of identities and experiences of the women in their religious affiliation. As Limia Ben Youssef Zayzafoon (2005, p.2) has argued the semiotic subject of the 'Muslim woman'…has been produced and reproduced by

Orientalist, Islamic, feminist and nationalistic discourses'. The terminology, 'Muslim woman' that is most often constructed within the binary of the West and Islam, has inevitably arisen within the process of researching the veil. Therefore, the application of this term has been included with an understanding of how it has been produced to serve historical and contemporary dominant political and ideological discourses.

Most importantly, this research has not attempted to deny Muslim women's agency and resistance against dominant hegemonic discourses. As Anne Aly (2009, p.18) discerns, many Muslim women are taking the position of 'semiological guerrillas' '…in the struggle to define themselves in ways that reflect the true reality of Muslim women's lives'. This is not necessarily within forms of organisations or activist networks but increasingly within '...everyday forms of individual resistance', where Muslim women collide and diverge incessantly with hegemonic communication processes (Aly 2009, p.18).

Jennifer Heath (2008, p.6) claims in the early twenty first century, the practice of veiling is rarely treated as a traditional sacred custom or a signifier of devotion, '…but is perceived almost entirely politically'. As an attested symbol of and ideologically fundamental to Catholic religiosity, nursing professionals and brides world wide, the veil has come to be overwhelmingly associated with Islam and the East and as an indisputable symbol of 'Muslimness' (Hoodfar 2003).

Faegheh Shirazi (2003, p.180) notes that following a historical trajectory of thousands of years, the veil has been framed within specific political, religious and cultural significance. Its characteristics have had '…different meanings to different people in different cultures and even in the same culture'. The research for this thesis has revealed that no single historical juncture can be determined as heralding a major *shift* in which interpretations of the veil metamorphosed from the realms of Western religious and cultural traditions as familiar, to an enclosure bestowing it synonymously with cultural and religious 'difference' inferiority and therefore feared. This thesis has argued, however, that the persistent links between the racial hierarchy philosophies of the Enlightenment era and the continuum of this discourse through a lens of what Edward Said (1978; 2003) called *Orientalism* was substantially influential in and assisting its expediency. Edward Said's (2003) notion of *Orientalism* endeavoured to illustrate how seemingly neutral forms of concepts and descriptive practices, translated by Orientalist

records, generated an illusionary, homogenous inert terrain of backwardness in the 'East' against which to measure the 'progress' of the 'West'. This thesis maintains that the negative aspects of veiling, shackled by the baggage of ethnocentric and racist framing and reframing Orientalist ideologies, have became a foundational component by which contemporary debates regarding veiling and the veil have been determined, in particular in the aftermath of September 11 2001.

A principle goal of this thesis is to ask how the representation of the veil has come to be symbolically framed beyond that of a religious symbol, but interpreted within the context of fundamentalist terrorism in the decade leading up to and after September 11 2001. Enabling a broad understanding of the discursive events and instances of political and social cultural practice that act to engender the veil as a symbol of terrorism, the questions that direct this research include but are not limited to the following: What have been the defining historical moments that have inscribed the multiple cultural inscriptions of the veil? How have images and knowledges been advanced in the West to manifest the veil as an indisputable symbol of women's subjugation, backwardness and Otherness? How do historical representations interplay with contemporary representations of the veil in Western discourse?

The study of the veil in the context of historical and contemporary religious, cultural and political discourse is a vast and complex endeavour. The meanings and the conceptual entanglements associated with the veil are enmeshed in an apparatus of assumptions that have relied on textual materials and images within certain historical and contemporary moments and cultural settings. Defined within cultural and religious settings, the veil as part of dress discourse, has been established in ways that have been acceptable/non acceptable within a particular cultural milieu. Heath (2008. p.1) notes '…veiling has become politically polarizing, a locus for the struggle between Islam and the West…,' which has been deployed through a network of knowledge frame systems in the globalised realm of post 9/11 Western world. Within the political climate of a West versus East binary, the transnational phenomenon of the 'normalisation' of bodies has gained semiotic resonance that cuts across and runs parallel with an emergent 'ascendancy of whiteness'. Jasbir Puar (2007, p.161) has argued that ascendancy of whiteness has permeated the biopolitical frame and '…has constituted the normalisation, control and regulation of 'perverse populations'. As part of the process of constructing meaning in a field characterised by Puar (2007) as the 'normalisation of bodies', the

framing of the terrorist corporeality of veiled women has generated anxiety in the observer. This has become a centripetal force which denotes '…something being out of place and out of time, of incomprehensibility' (Puar 2007, p.181). In the aftermath of September 11 2001, xenophobia or more specifically 'gendered Islamophobia' against the visual trope of the veil has become grounded in a discourse built on a discourse of fear and panic (Gale 2005). During this historical juncture in Australia, the interlocking of a nexus of power grids, have acted to frame veiled bodies as a 'fracture' in the precept of normalisation. Signalling a primacy of 'the prohibited', depictions of veiled bodies have been disseminated as not only as a threat against the cultural milieu of 'white Australia but as terrorist corporealities.

Although recent debates regarding the veil and veiling have occurred in France, the United Kingdom and elsewhere the focus for this study is contemporary Australia, in particular in the wake of September 11 2001. Tanja Dreher and Christine Ho (2009) note in post 9/11[3] Australia, 'hijab debates', have become intrinsically associated with questions of gender, race and religion. The following section outlines the content of the individual chapters that make up the thesis.

Chapter One: Framing and Meaning Making Practices

The chapter covers the key framework and argument presented throughout this thesis. In the first instance, it maps the diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives of framing and frame analysis. In doing so it brings to view an understanding of how dominant discourse framing of text and images, guide a particular perception and representation, that become transformed and thus embedded into widely held assumptions shared by people in a given society. Further, it applies a frame-critical approach to analyse the constructed representations of the veil in historical and contemporary political, social and media discourses.

This has included a frame analysis of both textual and visual aspects of the veil to highlight the way in which the dominant discourse 'framing' and 'reframing' processes have worked to produced particular knowledge formations about the veil within the parameters of both the 'familiar' and the 'feared'. In addition this chapter has included a discussion of literature that highlights the way in which modes of knowledge about the veil have been framed within *Orientalist* and whiteness discourses. The chapter then moves into a discussion that maps the way in which the extremities of this framing

continuum became implicated with processes of surveillance in Australia prior to and after September 11 2001.

Chapter Two: The Veil: From Early Beginnings to Contemporary Moments

Having outlined the literature that brought to view the concept of frames and framing, this chapter introduces literature that focuses specifically on the way in which the framing of the veil in Western Christian discourse, has transcribed it into a 'familiar' symbol. The first section explores the strategies that determined the framing of certain knowledge formations regarding the veil within the parameters of 'familiar' from its early beginnings. It considers how the veil for women religious[4], as part of their habit has remained a symbol of the oldest sisterhood institution, and until recently, veiling in church has been a longstanding practice in Roman Catholicism (MacDonald 2006). The inclusion of visual images has formed a central part of this chapter as it has intended to highlight the way in which knowledge frames that guide 'recognisability' depend in part on how social norms are developed through both visual and discursive frames (Butler 2009). This chapter argues that through a historiographical framing process of repetition, the construction of an imaginary tableau of veiled images has acted to form part of the discourses and knowledge/power paradigms that have organised and regulated social practices and understandings. Stuart Hall (1997) has been instructive for the research into the study of images of the veil as his analysis shows '…visual images are used to express meaning' (Hall 1997, p.3), and form part of the interrelated systems of representations that construct and instruct individuals in making sense of the world around them. A critical analysis of the veil therefore necessitates not only a study of images, but the particular practices that relied on images to inform particular ideas within given cultural and historical settings.

The second section of the chapter highlights how the discrimination toward the habit worn women religious during the Age of Enlightenment, in particular during the French Revolution created the Diaspora of nuns from Europe arriving in many parts of the globe, including Australia. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the role many of the Orders of women religious who settled in Australia was to' 'Christianise' and 'civilize' Indigenous Australians. This chapter has used the Sisters of St John of God at Beagle Bay Mission in the Kimberly's, as an example of the significance of the veil as a symbol of white Christian 'civilization' and 'morality'. It argues that although the role of the nuns was an integral part of the colonial, religious and political discourse that

reflected Western Christian values, they were very much controlled by dictates of the patriarchal ideologies of the Catholic Church.

The final section of this chapter includes a discussion regarding the conceptualisation of the Western Christian representation of the veil. Using examples of veils adopted by nurses, brides and within millinery in general, this chapter argues the way in which the 'normalisation' of the veil and veiling in Western Christian discourse, has made its visibility so familiar that it is rendered 'invisible.

Chapter Three: Framing Orientalism

The body of this chapter is based around an analysis of Edward Said's (1978) concept of *Orientalism* and literature by various authors who have extended his work. The analysis of this literature has formed an important framework for exploring how representations of the veil made a fundamental shift from the 'familiar' to the 'feared' in Western discourse. This chapter maintains that from the seventeenth century, most prominent European writers, including philosophers, encyclopedists and historians, who depicted Islam as inferior to the West, drew of interpretations that had been formulated from the Medieval period. This chapter analyses the work of French writer Montesquieu (1689-1755), to illustrate the way in which concepts of the Orient[5] and Oriental women[6], which had been formulated during the Medieval period, were framed and reframed as authoritative representations. In addition, an analysis of European Orientalist artistic representations has been a necessary component of this chapter, as it has brought into view how these works, as a system of meaning, were particularly influential in shaping the world inhabited by the colonisers and colonised. This chapter argues that through transformational framing processes Orientalist tropes have been constantly reinvented in an arbitrariness of codes that have positioned the veil as irredeemably 'Other'. This perspective and view has been most apparent in political, media and public discourse since 9/11.

Chapter Four: Smouldering Tensions

The first section of this chapter provides a broad overview of the arrival of Muslims in Australia. It highlights how the introduction of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* resulted in a reduced number of Muslims living in Australia. It also explains the difficulties faced by the few Muslims who remained in Australia during that period and

also those who arrived after 1972 when the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* was formally removed as a policy. The chapter then discusses Islamophobia as a form of 'new racism' and the way in which it inevitably becomes gendered in times when a nation is insecure about the unknown 'Other'.

The second part of this chapter is based around an analysis of the processes of hegemonic discourse framing, during certain events that occurred in the decade leading up to September 11 2001, including the 1991 Gulf war, the so called Sydney gang rapes and the *Tampa* incident. It identifies key themes and images that constantly reverberated in political and media discourses in the representation of Islam and Muslims, in particular veiled Muslim women. It highlights the way in which the prominence of conservative politics in Australia during this period formed an integral part in the reshaping of ideas about the 'Australian nation', 'values' and 'way of life', which fuelled debates about who 'belonged' and who should be 'excluded'. Moreover, it presents a view that the strong adherent of reframing the concept of a 'white' Australia by the conservative realms of federal politics, acted as a catalyst for triggering deep seated anxieties about the nation being under threat from non white 'Other'. Additionally this chapter attests that the marginalising of those who were represented as a threat to the ethos of white Australian culture, came to prominence when various disconnected events that occurred prior to September 11 2001, were interlinked with Australian Arabs and/or Muslims. This chapter argues that the racialised discourse framing processes, that linked events of war, crime and asylum seekers to a homogeneous descriptor of 'Middle Eastern' Australians, perpetuated a rise in a pattern of vilification directed towards Muslim women wearing the veil. The continued processes of racialised framing, acted to engender a moral panic about the presence of the 'Muslim Other', which was dramatically increased after September 11 2001.

Chapter Five: A Veil of Terror in the Wake of 9/11

The tensions towards Muslim Australians that had been smouldering in the decade leading up to September 11 2001 became vehemently increased in the aftermath of 9/11. This chapter argues as the discourses of race, gender and religion became framed in terms of terrorism, women wearing the veil became the main recipients of a heightened level of physical and verbal aggression (Poynting 2002). This first part of this chapter situates the veil within the parameters of dress discourse. This has brought into perspective the way in

dress, as a non-verbal medium of communication, acts to engender a sense of what is 'permitted' and what is perceived as 'prohibited'.

As had been the case with the asylum seekers aboard the *Tampa*, after September 11, the Australian government consistently repeated the claim that Australian borders needed to be protected against 'illegal' refugees. The notion of protecting Australian borders became a formidable narrative in the speeches delivered by Prime Minster John Howard in the lead up to the 2001 federal election. The next section of the chapter continues an analysis of hegemonic discourse framing processes with a focus on the way in which the intensified regimes of surveillance that were enforced by government policies perpetuated an increased level of physical attacks on women wearing the veil. This chapter also analyses how the reframing of Orientalist tropes regarding the unveiling of women, emerged as a reason for the legitimisation of the US military and its allies involvement in the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. An analysis of images most representative of those portraying veiled women during the Afghan war, have been included in this chapter.

Chapter Six: Bombs and Burqas

The chapter is attentive to the way in which regimes of surveillance, enforced by the state after the 2002 Bali Bombings, perpetuated a heightened increase in physical and verbal abuse against veiled Muslim women in Australia. It argues that statements connecting the veil to women's oppression and terrorism by political elites added to the growing panic and anxiety toward veiled Australian Muslim women. In addition it brings to view the debates about the veil in a Western global context and the connectedness to these debates in Australia. The chapter highlights how the media representations of Muslim Australians during the period of heightened state surveillance strategies, were repeatedly fixated on veiled images. In addition, it argues that the ambiguity of the various surveillance initiatives implemented by the Commonwealth government in its attempt to identify the suspicious 'terrorist enemy' perpetuated a visual regime of racial profiling that was persistently directed toward veiled Muslim women. The chapter maps the way in which political debates concerning national identity and values were consistently underpinned by gender ideologies. It attests that the framing of national identity and values with gender ideologies in official discourse perpetuated a conceptualisation of 'difference' based on the perceived notion of acceptable/non acceptable dress codes. It identifies a distinct theme of discriminatory practices, intolerance and racists threats toward

Australian Muslim women as an outcome of the residual effects of Orientalist ideologies. In addition this chapter highlights the various ways Muslim women have intervened and challenged the dominant modes of visual representation of Muslim women.

Chapter Seven: Bikinis, Burqinis and the Beach

This chapter aims to illustrate the way in which dominant discourse framing of the veil as an anathema to the concept of an aesthetic gendered normativity became intrinsically linked to the eruption of racist violence on a beach in Cronulla in December 2005. This chapter proposes that the politics of fear, perpetuated by politicians and media populists that connected crime, border protection and terrorists with Muslim Australians was perniciously interwoven with ideologies about gender equality. It shows the way in which hegemonic discourses that framed whiteness and the Australian flag as representative of particular Australian values, became circumscribed as a distinguishing boundary marker, denoting a difference between 'us' and 'Others' at Cronulla beach. Moreover, it brings into view how the residual influence of Orientalism grounded in colonial ideologies of the West and its 'Others', was ultimately reduced to narratives about veiling and unveiling during the riot. In addition the chapter argues that the bikini, framed as a symbol of freedom, liberation and Australian values was contrasted against the veil, which was perceived as antithesis to the Australian way of life.

This chapter indicates that the imperative to protect the 'normalisation' of beach dress codes became intimately connected to the protection of 'white' Australian women. It argues that much of this anxiety gained currency as a result of dominant discourse framing of the 'Sydney gang rape case' in 2000, which asserted that 'white' Australian women were potential victims of Muslim Lebanese males (Poynting 2006). Importantly this chapter has brought to view the way in which Australian Muslim women's agency has problematised the concept of national identity and dress codes.

Chapter Eight: Disrupting Frames: A Conclusion:

The conclusion draws together the key themes and ideas presented in the thesis. It weaves together the main arguments in a way that highlights the influence of dominant Western discourse framing processes in creating binary oppositions between the Christian and Islamic veil. This argument suggests that Western representations have and continue to perpetuate a formidable discourse that renders an 'invisible' conspicuous normativity of

the Christian veil. It further attests that the lingering potency of Orientalism continues to shape dominant discourse frames in contemporary debates about national identity and the rights of Muslim women to veil. This chapter allows for an understanding that the immense diversity of Australian Muslim women's perspectives and experiences are rarely represented in hegemonic discourses.

Notes

[1] Within culturally disparate Western and non Western world, styles of veiling and the reasons for it are distinct. The veil can be identified in many modes -as part of the nun's habit and wedding attire. The veil can also apply generally to the modest dress of Muslim women. The headscarf - 'hijab' the 'niqab' as a veil covering the face, the 'chador' as a full length over-garment which covers the head and body, and the 'burqa' as a garment which covers the entire body including the hands, feet and face. , Is important to note that because Muslims are a very diverse group, there are many different terms used to refer to different types of Islamic religious dress depending on country of birth or region. (Ismaɛ – Listen HREOC 2004).
In post 9/11 the image of Afghan women shrouded in a blue chadri became the universal symbol of women's oppression internationally in Western communities. See Ayotte, K J and Husain, M E 2005, Securing Afghan Women: NeoColonialism, Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil', *NWSA Journal*; Volume 17, Number 3, pp.112-133.

[2] Arising from colonial discourse, the process of white/Western culture being contrasted against the marked 'Other' cultural categories, has acted to naturalise the dominant cultural category, while further marginalizing those who are perceived outside of it. See Tascón, S. 2001, *Australia's New Other: Shaping Compassion for Onshore Refugees*, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, WA

[3] The 9/11 appellation, has become a multipurpose signifier for September 11 2001. A combination of both descriptions will be included in this thesis.

[4] The term 'women religious' as opposed to religious women, includes both 'nuns' who take solemn vows and live as contemplatives and 'sisters' who take simple vows and work in the world. Roman Catholic Nuns and those in non cloistered orders prefer to be called women religious. See Michelman, S 1997, 'Changing Old Habits: Dress of Women Religious and Its Relationship to Personal and Social Identity' in *Sociological Inquiry*, Volume 67, Issue3, pp.350-363. Also See Smyth E, 2007, *Changing Habits: Women Religious Orders In Canada*, Novalis Publishing Inc, Toronto.

[5] The concept of the Orient was a construction of a region, geographical sector and locale that was given a reality and presence in and for the West. See Said, E 2003, *Orientalism*, reprinted with 2003 Preface, *Penguin Books*, London.

[6] The concept of the 'Oriental' woman' was an essentialised stereotype, invented by and for the Western imagination. See Lewis, R 1996, *Gendering Orientalism: Race, Femininity and Representation*, Routledge, London.

Chapter One

Framing and Meaning Making Practices

> …framing has value far beyond just knowing what is in the news: it also determines the types of information that ultimately contribute to public opinion… (Stout & Buddenbaum 2003).

Introduction

This chapter aims to contribute a critical analysis of the veil, by disrupting the dominant, discursive knowledge schemas that have acted to frame the veil as a contemporary sign of terrorism. The orientation of this study has been to apply a frame-critical approach that seeks to explore the relationship between strategic framing of the veil in historical meaning-making practices and the reframing of the veil in contemporary hegemonic discourses. This chapter draws on Michel Foucault's concept of surveillance and the gaze which became central to processes of surveillance in Australia prior to and after September 11 2001. In addition it explores the way in which particular knowledge formations have been transformed into local utterances, becoming mobilised as binding discursive facts. Addressing the ways in which the representation of the veil has travelled from the familiar to the feared as symptomatic of continuous [re]framing and manipulation through religious, cultural and political discourses, this chapter maintains that the attributes assigned to representations of the veil in contemporary Western discourse can be only properly understood by including an historical perspective.

The inclusion of the historical draws attention to the cultural-political *shift* in representations of the veil throughout Western discourse from the 'normalcy' of cultural practices and religious modesty, to the tenets of erotic imagery established by Orientalist invention, and in the post 9/11 West, the association of veiling with militant political Islam and terrorism. Given the vast scope of time covered in regard to the imbricated and complex histories of the veil, the examination of various texts and images can only serve to highlight some of historical processes that functioned to frame inclusionary and exclusionary boundaries of iconic and deeply embedded veiled symbols. While including the historical foundation, this thesis is not primarily a historical study and the historical data for the research includes both primary and secondary sources.

This chapter provides an overview of some of the diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives of frames and framing. Further, it explores the frame formations that have been constructed as meaningful categorisations of the veil in historical and contemporary social, media and political discourses in both textual and visual aspects. While framing as a process to transmit information in which meaning making can be shaped is most often expressed in text, Paul Messaris and Linus Abraham (2003) suggest the visual aspect of framing techniques deserves elaboration. They argue framing processes used in drawings/paintings, photographs, cartoons and indexical images, enhance interpretations of an event as '...the syntactic implicitness of visual images makes them effective tools for articulating ideological messages' (Messaris and Abraham 2003, p.220). Within the rapidly emerging environment of computer technologies, the framing of visual images has become an important aspect of dominant communication media. According to Messaris and Abraham (2003) visual images are capable of producing documentary evidence to support claims of ideology, at the same time camouflaging the constructed historical and social roots of ideology. In this way, visual images can be '…effective for ideological exposition and manipulation' (Messaris and Abraham 2003, p.220). This has been most apparent in the use of visual images to frame messages about the veil. Myra MacDonald (2006) suggests that:

> The capacity of images of the veiled Muslim female body…provokes reactions both from Muslims and non-Muslims and eclipse[s] Muslim women's own diversity of voice and self definition (MacDonald 2006, p.18).

In the aftermath of 9/11 the image of the veil, has '…continue[d] to exercise discursive power over perceptions of Islam and Muslim' (MacDonald 2006, p.19). The reconstruction of 'difference' transported by hegemonic images of the veil, have been most often intertwined with and reframed from the lingering potency of Orientalism. Anne Aly (2009) proposes '…today's media culture is characterised by …image manipulation and the construction of news items'. She argues the Australian popular media have developed an interest in the hijab based on the historical backdrop of Orientalist discourses. Aly (2009, p.20) discerns that since 9/11, the enduring Orientalist inspired image of the veil has become '…the most potent symbol not just of Islam but also of the cultural threat to the West posed by Islam'.

In the context of Australia, post 9/11, the framing of the veil within an Orientalist discourse, has thus circumscribed it as 'out of place' and 'alien' to the concept of an idealised Australian national identity. Tamar Mayer (2000) proposes that narratives about nation and national identity are constructed by members who believe in their common

origins and history. The origins that keep the communal conception of the nation are sustained based on shared memories and myths, which Mayer (2000, p.3) argues, following Etienne Balibar (1991) are based on 'fictive ethnicity'. According to Mayer (2000, p.10) the ideal of the nation not only functions by the sharing of national symbols like customs, language and religion, but how its 'model members' are represented in every medium through which the idea of the nation is mobilised. This includes the arts, literature, media, in public speeches and the speeches of the nation's leaders. These representations have a tendency to define 'proper behaviours' for its ideal members of the nation and thus assist in helping to construct the 'us' versus 'them' distinction and the exclusion of the 'Other'. Most specifically, Mayer (2000) maintains the interplay between the construction of the 'Other', nation, and national identity is inevitably gendered. Mayer (2000) contends that:

> When a nation is constructed in opposition to the 'Other', there emerges a profound distinction between not only between us and them but also more pointedly, between our women and theirs. Our women are always 'pure' and 'moral' while their women are deviant and immoral (Mayer 2000, p.10).

In Australia, representations of veiled Muslim women have become imbued with structures and meanings within reductive interpretive frames. This has been mainly due to the limiting political discourse that has surrounded debates questioning whether Muslims can be and are willing to be integrated into Australian society and adopt 'Australian values'. As Randa Abdel Fattah (2007) argues these debates have not been a general debate about Australian values, but one that '…primarily focused on women's dress and attitudes to certain social norms…' (Abdel Fattah 2007, p.52). The framing of Australian identity and values, which emerged as intimately connected to gendered national narratives, firmly centred on a dualism of 'our' women and 'their' women (Abdel Fattah 2007; Ho 2006; Leishman 2007). To enable an exploration of the historically linked knowledge schemas and prominence of transformational frames that have gained legitimacy and currency in contemporary contexts of the veil, a frame analysis has been adapted as an approach of discourse analysis.

Frame Analysis

Frame analysis overlaps in important ways with critical discourse analysis as it discerns how culturally dominant frames have been created by various social actors with the intention to establish a pattern of recognition through the framing of texts and images in historical and contemporary contexts (Tannen 1993). This methodological approach allows a mapping of the ways in which the confluence of frames of the veil has been

disseminated along historical polarities and the motivation, power and strategies that have sought to establish a conceptual pattern of dominant cultural assumptions in contemporary social, political and media contexts. James Hertog and Douglas McLeod (2003, p.130) have suggested, framing in official historical records '…creates the illusion of a comprehensive history by limiting the universe of possible social meanings contained in each previous frame'. The creation of an illusionary history, through the reliance on successive framing, whereby narratives of specific moments, places and symbols lose their authentic meanings, are implemented to frame contemporary meanings (Hertog and McLeod 2003). This chapter provides an overview of some of the diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives of frames and framing. Further, it explores the *a priori* frame formations that have been constructed as meaningful categorisations of the veil in social, media and political discourses in post 9/11 Australia.

Frame/ing refers to the interpretive construct of communication - how language, images, symbols and messages are encoded with meaning, which become embedded in the widely held assumptions shared by people in a given society (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998). Framing and frame analysis is most often associated with Erving Goffman, who introduced the concept to sociological research in the 1970s. Drawing on the concept of framing introduced by Gregory Bateson in the 1950s, Goffman's primary interest was examining the organisation of experience and the way in which people construct the social world through language and interaction (Goffman 1974). In his definition of the term 'frame' and 'frame analysis' Goffman (1974) stated:

> I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organizations which govern events…and our subjective involvement in them: frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify…my phrase 'frame analysis is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience (Goffman 1974, pp.10-11).

Goffman (1974, p.21) proposed that cultures generate 'primary frameworks' or 'schemata of interpretations' as structures by which people comprehend information allowing individuals to '...locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences…'. These frameworks act as knowledge systems which structure the experience of individuals. Primary frameworks vary in degree of organisation, that is, some present a system of entities and rules, while others provide only an approach or perspective. An important aspect of frames discussed by Goffman (1974) was that individuals are:

> …likely to be unaware of such organised features as the framework has and unable to describe the framework with any completeness if asked, yet these handicaps are no bar to an [individual] easily and fully applying it (Goffman 1974, p.21).

As frames guide the perception and representation of one's world view, they are most often unconsciously adopted and selected by a pre-existing conception. In their review of Goffman's *Frame Analysis* (1974), Norman Denzin and Charles Keller (1981, p.52) argue that Goffman's work '...must be read from a 'structural perspective'. They suggest that within this interpretation it is impossible for Goffman to provide concepts useful for studying social interaction. They contend that Goffman's *Frame Analysis* offers only '…peripheral aspects of everyday experience' (Denzin and Keller 1981, p.53). Goffman (1981, p.61) ardently argued against their contentions in a paper 'A Reply to Denzin and Keller' (1981), explaining that his use of the term 'structure' differs from that of French structuralists. He further argued that if a writer attempts to deviate from a classic source of thought, by treating a matter as a system in its own right and at its own level, those who subscribe to a particular doctrine and have a vested interest in promoting and defending their membership to a particular perspective, (in this case Denzin and Keller) '…will allow only one train of thought to be traced through them, their own' (Goffman 1981, p.61). Gary Fine and Philip Manning (2003, p.58), argue Goffman emerged as a precursor to critical social theory and postmodern symbolic interactionism, making him one of the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century. Similarly Charles Battershill (1990, p.180) contends that Goffman was a precursor of post modernism and argues that Goffman predicated ideas that are most often associated with French philosopher Michel Foucault. For Battershill (1990, p.180) Goffman's concept of framing analysis serves to '…question the official normal versions of reality' and the types and levels of framing as a process through which societies produce meaning. The objective of the following discussion is to select aspects of framing/frame analysis which bear relevance for the visual and textual representation of the veil in both historical and contemporary contexts.

Approaches and Interpretations of Frame Analysis

As previously noted, many researchers implementing frame analysis in an attempt to deconstruct the dominant frames of reference through which people interpret their world and communicate about it, have tapped into the vein of Goffmanian frame analysis. Although the concept of the frame and frame analysis has been frequently only loosely connected to Goffman's original formulation, spanning a number of disparate approaches

with a variety of interpretations, it has been developed as a tool for analysis by scholars from a range of disciplines including media studies, academic literature, social sciences and arts genres.

Kimberly Fisher (1997) has examined a range of framing literature from the writings of a plethora of authors to evince the positive and negative aspects of framing as a theoretical foundation and methodological approach in discourse analysis. Fisher's (1997) main interest is to explore a less developed concept of framing, which she defines as 'cultural frames'. According to Fisher (1997, p.2) cultural frames are '…loose, socially generated structures in discourse which people use to organise information and around which groups develop ideological and policy arguments'. As a culturally determined schema of interpretation, frames/framing selects and highlights some aspects of events, issues, images, objects/symbols '…and mak[es] connections among them as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution' (Entman 2004, p.5). Fisher (1997) suggests that in his study of macrostructures linguist Teun van Dijk (1980) identifies discursive structures as frame analysis. van Dijk (1980, p.2) argues that the way in which '…social participants, perceive, interpret, know, memorise, evaluate, plan and produce their discourse and interactions…are determined by *interpretations* and *representations* of social reality'. For van Dijk (1980) frames organise conceptual knowledge derived from conceptual structures in memory, and:

> …specify what members of a given culture expect to find in a particular situation; what objects should be present, what may be present, which properties they have, what the relations between them are, how they have been categorised… (van Dijk 1980, p.234).

The processes involved in conceptual structures of knowledge in memory frames may be organised when a person constructs not only a representation of an event/s that has actualised but also a '…representation of a fragment of the [event]' (van Dijk 1980, p.241). Framing as a process influences thinking and shapes public dialogues about political issues and has widespread consequences as it influences how people understand, remember, evaluate and act upon a problem (D'Angelo 2002; Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira 2008). Although framing is often used as a method by theorists exploring media hegemony and media effects, and the mobilization of social movements, Stephen Reese (2006) proposes that positioning frames in some static feature of media texts or individual psychological elements should be avoided. Reese (2006) suggests that the concept of a frame needs to go beyond its containment within 'message/story packages', but to reflect frames embedded in the symbolic environment. For Reese (2006)

> Frames are organising principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world (Reese 2001 cited in Reese 2006, p.150).

Reese endeavours to highlight the 'principle' aspects of frames by arguing that frames are '...structures of meaning made up of a number of concepts and the relation among those concepts with rules for processing new content' (Reese 2006, p.150). Stephen Riggins (1990) argues the contribution Goffman's frame analysis made to the field of social science is significantly relevant to contemporary issues, but is '…distinct from other extra linguistic discourse forms, including myths and ideologies'(Riggins 1990, p.2). Drawing on Goffman's illustration of how people use primary frames to make sense of events even as they construct those events, Deborah Tannen and Cynthia Wallat (1993, p.60) identify this type of framing as 'knowledge schemas' where '…participant's expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world…can only be understood by reference to a pattern of prior knowledge'. Tannen (1993) categorises the various theorists and studies within the broad range of fields that have adopted the concept of framing and states that all of the studies reflect the notion of what she identifies as the 'structure of expectation'. Tannen (1993, p.14) suggests for people to function in the world, '…they cannot treat each new person, object, or event as unique and separate'. To make sense of the world people need to see connections between present things and things previously experienced or heard about. For Tannen 'structures of expectation', are learned within a given culture and a 'new perception' is measured against what is known from a previous experience (Tannen 1993, p.15).

Robert Benford and David Snow (2000) have implemented the role of frames in their collective action research. Bedford and Snow (2000) draw on Goffman's 'interpretive function' of frames by applying it to ways '...that are intended to mobilise potential adherents and constituents to garner bystander support and to demobilise antagonists' (Snow and Benford 1988 cited in Benford and Snow 2000, p.614). Benford and Snow (2000) identify beliefs and meanings that underscore injustice in a social condition and also to redefine it through the legitimatisation of pursuits of social action movements. Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston (2000) recognise certain incongruities in applying framing, as a line of theorizing, as discerned by Benford and Snow (2000). They suggest that a central problem in Bedford and Snow (2000) applying a frame theory into the functions and constraints on social movements, is that it has been adopted from literature that is grounded in ideological concepts and renamed as framing. Acknowledging framing as extraordinarily productive in new research pointing to processes in social movements,

Oliver and Johnson (2001, p.1) suggest however, that frames need to be sharply distinguished from ideology. This distinction is necessary, Oliver and Johnson (2001) argue:

> As ideology is of central importance in understanding social movements and other political formations it is trivialised when it is seen only as a frame (Oliver and Johnson 2001, p.1).

For Oliver and Johnson (2001) the concept of frames cannot serve all purposes but need to be interrelated with the study of ideologies. Nevertheless, they recognise frame and framing processes as a way to link '...social constructions of ideas with organisational and political process factors' (Oliver and Johnson 2000, p.1).

In his frame analysis of political culture and news reporting in American society Robert Entman (2004; 2007) provides a recent study that is concerned with political news reporting in the wake of September 11 2001. Entman (2004) points out that frame analysis offers a tool for deconstructing the dominant frames that have been generated through the media and political actors. In his study of news reporting of political events Entman (2004) suggests that framing can be defined as:

> Selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation or solution (Entman 2004, p.5).

Entman (2004, p.9) argues that framing is an inescapable feature of representation in news reporting, stating the way in which political elites frame ideas in their initial public expression about an event, creates a 'cascading activation model'. Within this model nodes of knowledge are activated by the political elites, cascade downward to influence other elites, news organisations, the text they produce and the public (Entman 2004). Entman (2004, p.25) discerns '[f]rames in the news as typically a part of the reporting process of three different classes of objects: political events, issues and actors'. The primacy of words and images that make up the dominant frames in news coverage that have the capacity to stimulate support or opposition to the sides in political conflict, are often difficult to dislodge. The framing function of information, often neglects to provide explicit evaluations of the event or related event or issue. When news is framed in this way, the audience does not have the opportunity to develop 'counterframes'. When counterframes are poorly developed, the schemas of interpretation from an individual's prior beliefs and interpersonal communication as well as from media's words and images make it difficult for some individuals to develop an independent interpretation of an event or issue.

Centring his case study on the US political reporting of the attacks of September 11 2001, Entman (2004, p.2) acknowledges that although 9/11 has been clichéd as the significant event that changed everything, '…one thing that did not change was the news media's traditional promotion of patriotic rallies around presidents when America appears under attack'. According to Entman (2004) in the main, the news tended to reflect only government-sanctioned interpretations of the event, which productively located even the mildest dissent to condemnation. This was mainly due to the then President George W Bush framing 9/11 and the 'war on terror' in simple terms '...as good versus evil' (Entman 2004, p.1). When conformity of uniting the country against 'evil' became widespread within public approval, dissenting speech against the 'war on terror' was perceived as an assault on the 'non-evil' United States. Formulating the concept of frames/schemas to 'knowledge networks', Entman (2004, p.7) argues the news coverage engendering the dominant frame initiated by political leaders in the aftermath of September 11, tapped into a node of connected ideas and feelings stored in a person's prior beliefs. The connections promoted by the administration's frame of events, were likely to '…encourage the public to make connections leaping from an event like 9/11 to apparently similar matters…' from the past (Entman 2004, p.26). For Entman (2004), the selectively framed political and news reports of September 11, gained widespread public adherence because they were activated through the associations between information highlighted by news frames (eg. plane hijackers, Islamic extremists, Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, axis of evil, war on terror,) and by interpretations and concepts already stored within an individual's knowledge networks. Moreover, in the aftermath of September 11, Entman (2004) contends that:

> [The] cascading activation model between those who governed and the citizenry was strengthened by the framing of visual images. The framing of non-verbal visual images in post 9/11 news reporting activated associations between images and concepts already stored in the audience members memory (Entman 2004, p.26).

These framed images, in turn encouraged the public to make connections from images of the current event to comparable images of the past. Visual frames developed within conceptual structures of knowledge in memory serves as a useful concept for investigating framing as a process in relation to visuality. According to Entman (2004, p.14), in the wake of September 11 2001, the dominant frames activated by political and media elites were those '…fully congruent with schemas *habitually* used by most members of society'.

Frames Agenda-Setting and Priming in News Media

Entman (2007) has argued that framing in news media is a '...process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlight connections among them to promote a particular interpretation (Entman 2007, p.164). Framing works to influence and shape public opinion by emphasising certain issues over others through 'priming' (Entman 2007). Frames introduce or raise the salience of certain ideas, activating schemas that 'prime' the target audience to think and decide in a particular way. The amount of media salience devoted to certain issues consequently influences what the public thinks about and the degree of public concern for these issues (Entman 2007). Agenda-setting according to Entman (2007) can be seen as another name for successfully performing the first function of framing, defining problems as worthy of public and government attention. Similarly, Dietram A Scheufele and David Tewbury (2007) examine the key dimensions along which framing, agenda-setting and priming used in news media provides a conceptual understanding of '...how messages are created, how they are processed and how the effects are produced' (Scheufele and Tewbury 2007, p.12). They argue that frames are invaluable tools used by journalists for presenting complex issues in a way that resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience. Agenda-setting, refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences. As an extension of agenda-setting, priming occurs when news content suggests to the audience that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and the government (Scheufele and Tewbury 2007). Entman (2007) has suggested that as agenda-setting, framing and priming in the media fit together as critical tools for promoting political power, 'media bias' can place an issue on the public agenda and that public agenda can be adopted as an agenda by politicians.

Michael Emmison and Philip Smith (2000) argue that frames, in context within which an image is presented, have the potential to be '…cultural packages that help to deploy conventions and common sense understandings to decode a particular visual item' (Emmison and Smith 2000, p.67). Moreover, linking frames to text, genres, identification, narrative, reading, signs and subject position as useful concepts for analysing images, Emmison and Smith (2000) note that as deeper structural messages are framed in images, they have considerable influence on shaping shared beliefs and ideologies. Moreover, Emmison and Smith (2000) contend that visual inquiry needs to go

beyond the study of the image as purely illustrative, but to a study of the seen and the observable. They suggest the reconstruction of visual research allows for fruitful interchange between isolated fields of social science and cultural theory. Tapping into the vein of Goffmanian interactionism, the main objective by Emmison and Smith (2000) is to bring to the centre, the study of the image by including issues of visibility, invisibility, surveillance and presentation of the self. Stephen Reese (2003) further explicates the importance of visuality in the framing paradigm by stating:

> Framing is concerned with the way in which interests, communicators, sources and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding the world, which are developed using all available verbal and visual symbolic resources (Reese 2003, p.11).

This has been particularly evident in the visual representation of the veil where the connection between present events and what has been experienced before or heard about rely heavily on what Titus Ensink (2003) has described as 'transformational frames'. Expanding the notion of 'structures of expectation' and 'perceptions', Titus Ensink (2003, p.71) discerns a transformational frame, '…as a frame which is *added* to the frame already in operation'. For Ensink (2003) transformational frames work to influence people's perceptions by using knowledge of reproduction techniques.

Historical Transformational Framing

The transformational framing that has been most resolute in the systematic framing and reframing of 'Orientalist' discourse is explored by Deborah Cherry (2000), who probes the complex interplay between framing, visual culture, politics and imperialism. Cherry (2000) states that much of the Western artists' visual representations were framed and shaped by a prior knowledge procured through a predilection for European guidebooks, and a penchant for antecedent imagery and colonial histories. Focusing on artistic imagery that extends Edward Said's (1978)[1] concept of 'Orientalism', Cherry (2000) highlights the manner in which artistic systems of representations were framed during the mid-nineteenth century. Cherry (2000, p.86) contends that artistic and literary protocols that were regulated by 'rules of recognition', offered authoritative visual and textual frames of reference, portraying the 'strange' within the 'familiar'. Identifying the framing process of paintings in the colonial context as assisting in the dissemination of sexual and racialised formations, Cherry (2000) argues that this process 'entailed a double framing' where:

> The formal presentation which made the image into art object for aesthetic contemplation, and the visual framing of land within western visual systems and artistic protocols…could be transported 'into other fields' (Cherry 2000, p.99).

The abundance of visual imagery of veiled women generated through Western artistic conventions and framing processes, advanced 'difference' to an excess beyond representation. Cherry (2000, p.1) argues that with the increased exposure of the artistic visuality of veiled/unveiled/unclothed women, from paintings, sculpture, graphic and decorative art, photographs, postcards and illustrated magazines, the '...visual became the domain in which difference could be visibly registered, minutely discriminated and authoritatively judged' (Cherry 2000, p.74). The inquiry into the framing of stereotypically devised representations of visual imagery created by artists and photographers during the mid-nineteenth century, offers an insight into how images framed in the distant past have the capacity to form a corollary in current Western depictions of Eastern cultures.

Examining the Western image-making of illustrated travel accounts, paintings and photographs during the mid-nineteenth century in North Africa, Todd Porterfield (1994) suggests that it has long been accepted that the most characteristic aspect of the Orientalist subject is Muslim women and the harem. Over the years these images have continued to be constructed as a scientific and ethnographic portrayal of an 'exotic' culture. Although Porterfield does not include the concept of *framing* in his analysis of Orientalist visual imagery of 'Oriental women' he notes:

> Western images of 'Oriental women' established a paradigm of function and purpose that is visible well into the 20th century – presenting a contrived reality to satisfy preconceived expectations (Porterfield 1994, p.63).

Porterfield's (1994) statement illustrates the way in which the continuum of 'preconceived expectations' have been generated through a mode of knowledge framed through Orientalist artistic imagery. Most importantly the culmination of Orientalism, as a framing dogma, forged through a process historical and cultural inclusion and exclusion, is contingent upon the disqualification of veiled 'Others' from contemporary national imagery.

The extremities of this framing continuum are highlighted by Doutje Lettinga and Sawitri Saharso (2008) in their analysis of contemporary 'headscarf debates' and regulations. Doutje Lettinga and Sawitri Saharso (2008) address the role of framing in their analysis of public debates and regulations concerning Muslim women's head and body covering in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2006. Arguing that the framing and regulating of Muslim women's head and body covering is determined by national ideas on citizenship

and the nation, Lettinga and Saharso's (2008) analysis aimed to establish whether shifts over time in the framing and regulating of the headscarf have occurred and if so, how. Lettinga and Saharso (2008, p.6) suggest that frame analysis is method that allows a searching for frames that is, 'symbolic interpretive constructs' (consisting of beliefs, images or symbols), shared by people in a given society that give meaning to the world in one's present environment, '...yet at the same time shaping it by inscribing meaning to it (Lettinga and Saharso 2008, p.6). Implementing a quantitative and qualitative methodology of frame analysis, Lettinga and Saharso's (2008) aim was to locate the different actors (politicians, feminists, minority organisations, religious spokesmen) who compete over various interpretations of the headscarf. In addition they endeavoured to bring to light 'counter frames' from those who support the right of Muslim women to cover. Most importantly Lettinga and Saharso (2008) suggest the initiation of a frame analysis will confirm their assumptions that:

> …national specific traditions of interpreting and practicing citizenship will shape the way people understand and discuss the headscarf issue, because people tend to order reality by relating it to an already known pattern (Lettinga and Saharso 2008, p.10).

Lettinga and Saharso (2008) reveal that the conception of what constitutes citizenship and nationhood in the headscarf debate, is mired in the already known pattern of identity-registers, where particularistic identities, e.g. a religious identity, transcends the concept of a nation as a culturally homogeneous community.

In a similar vein, Mieke Verloo and Emanuela Lombardo (2007) build on the methodology of critical frame analysis for assessing prejudices and exclusion in the formulation of contemporary gender equality policy making processes. Working as part of the collaborative research team involved in the research project, *Policy Frames and Implementation Problems: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming* (MAGEEQ)[2], Verloo and Lombardo (2007) map the multiple meanings of gender in/equality. Verloo and Lombardo (2007) suggest that the adoption of critical frame analysis provides a theoretical and methodological framework for providing insights into the conceptual prejudices, inconsistencies and gender bias that have shaped gender equality policies and practice across Europe. The key concept of their frame analysis is that of a 'policy frame', which acts as an:

> [O]rganising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included (Verloo 2005 cited Verloo and Lombardo 2007, p.32).

Policy frames act to identify the various dimensions in which a policy problem can be represented, originate in both discursive and practical consciousness and '…have concrete and material consequences that set the conditions for future actions and realities' (Verloo and Lombardo 2007, p.2). Implementing the concept of 'conditions of understandings', Verloo and Lombardo (2007, p.32) suggest policy frames are always filtered via 'prejudices' whereby actors act through routines and rules, which have been influenced by social and cultural biases. The conceptual schemas, that engender certain aspects of an actor's understanding of the world, can result in gender or 'race' bias in the formulation of gender policies. As policy frames are most often constructed by policy makers through cultural filters, dimensions of 'intersectionality', that is, the way in which policy discourses represents structural inequalities (class, ethnicity, race, age, sexuality), are extremely limited. In this way, the power relations that are used to perpetuate dominant ideology are frequently sustained by framing whiteness discourse in a way that establishes meanings about social reality. A broader examination of framing veiled bodies, whiteness and its interlocking with a nexus of power is explored by Jasbir Puar (2007) and this theme is investigated further in the following section.

Whiteness and Heteronormative Framing

The framing of the veil as 'an unspoken form of terrorism' (Decker 1991, p.179), does not resonate in a single discourse, but rather is signified through a barrage of dominant politically and culturally framed discourses, which have been given an authoritative authenticity in the aftermath of September 11. In her examination of 'race' and sexuality within 'contemporary moments' post 9/11 in the United States, Puar (2007) highlights 'snapshots' and 'flashpoints' in which the primacy of 'sexual exceptionalism', 'regulatory queerness' and the 'ascendency of whiteness' have operated and been implicated in the propagation of heteronormative framing. Puar's (2007) discussion of the framing of whiteness is specifically relevant for this research as she highlights the way in which the global ascendency of whiteness is connected to the dissemination of the United States as empire, and is implicated in the construction of American women as 'saviours' of 'oppressed' Afghani and Iraqi women and Muslim women in general. For Puar (2007, p.6) the 'rescuing' of veiled Muslim women by Western feminists has generated many forms of 'gender exceptionalism'. Expanding on the discussion put forth by Inderpal Grewal (2005 cited in Puar 2007, p.5), who perceives the 'naturalization of human rights frames', generated by 'hegemonic US centric feminists', as a tokenistic liberal apology, Puar (2007, p.6) suggests that within the framing of human rights, 'gender

exceptionalism' works as a missionary discourse to 'rescue' Muslim women from their male counterparts. This form of gender exceptionalism '…positions the American feminist as the feminist subject par excellence' (Puar 2007, p.7). Drawing on Rey Chow's (2006) concept of 'racial frames', Puar discerns that since 9/11, creating veiled 'Muslim' bodies goes beyond forms of neo-Orientalising or racialisation of religious affiliation, to positioning '…the Muslim [as] an emergent incipient Race, the Muslim Race' (Puar 2007, p.160). The ascendency and dominance of whiteness, which has permeated the biopolitical frame '…is complemented and supplemented by the Muslim as race' (Puar 2007, p.161). Puar (2007) argues that during the current historical juncture the seemingly unrelated framing of queer sexuality, white racial privilege and terrorist bodies foreshadow each other and function to build on taken for granted knowledge formations (Puar 2007). The historical framing and subsequent reframing of the veil has produced knowledge formations relating to the veil, that have persisted as central ideas guiding and facilitating the classification and understanding of messages, in accordance with dominant political and media discourses.

Framing the Muslim 'Other' in Australia

Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar and Jock Collins (2004, p.13) have explored the Australian media's coverage and political debate of events from the late 1990s to 2002 that involved the presence of people from '…what might be broadly identified as 'Middle Eastern'. Emphasising that although 'the media' are not a single entity that promotes a single identity of the world, Poynting et al. (2004, p.13) argue the production of news stories '…function according to certain techniques and values'. The way in which stories are constructed can be categorised as 'discourse frames' as they '…give order to [a person's] perceptions of social reality' (Poynting et al. 2004, p.13). Following John Hartley and Alan McKee's (2000) notion of 'narrative accrual', Poynting et al. (2004, p.14) explain how discourse frames, shape the way stories are told from ongoing myths or histories, which assists in shaping public attitudes. In this way the media and its interaction with politicians are able to maintain hegemony by fostering dominant cultural frames that generate '…a kind of 'common sense' of the world which naturalises that reality and the relations of power which structure it' (Poynting et al. 2004, p.14). This framing most often works by marginalising certain groups, '…via oppositions of us and them, good and bad, victims and villain, right and wrong' (Poynting et al. 2004, p.14). According to Jock Collins, Greg Noble, Scott Poynting and Paul Tabar (2000) the process of racialisation is the explicit creation of '...a racialised 'other': a 'them' against whose

difference a dominant national 'us' is defined' (Collins et al. 2000, p.18). This type of racialised framing has been most evident in recent events, where the homogenised figure of the 'Arab Other' has been framed in terms of crime and terrorism on a local, national and international level. Moreover, they suggest the framing of the 'Arab Other', within the dimensions of criminal practices, has produced the 'criminalising' of a range of cultural practices. The process of racialised framing, around certain events concerning the purported link between the 'Arab Other', crime and terrorism, within media representations and Australian political discourse, act to constitute a broad climate of fear and anxiety concerning the 'stranger'. As Poynting et al. (2004) elucidate, when these anxieties solidify around particular events and objects they are given materiality, whether it is Osama Bin Laden or the appearance of a women wearing hijab. 'This tangible thing is something to aim for, to avoid, to blame, to capture, to fight, to imprison, and to exclude'(Poynting et al. 2004, p.235). The conjunction of racialised framing, fear and anxiety that is internalised and thus becomes materialised around a particular object, has been most evident in the emergent incidences of racist attacks against '…Muslim women and girls wearing the hijab' (Poynting et al 2004, p.161). The racialised framing in contemporary Australian political and media discourse that has perpetuated incidences of racist attacks against Muslim women and girls wearing hijab will be explored further in subsequent chapters.

In David Altheide's (1997) discussion of news media and framing, he identifies the concept of a 'problem frame', which he suggests is used by and dominates news media in promoting messages that stress fear and danger. The 'problem frame', according to Altheide (1997) implies:

> Something that exists that is undesirable; many people are affected by this problem, it can be changed or fixed; there is a mechanism or procedure for fixing the problem; the change or repair agent and process is known (usually the government) (Altheide 1997, p.655).

Altheide (1997) suggests that in mass media the 'problem frame' incorporates a particular temporal/spatial relationship to make it relevant to the audience. The 'problem frame' promoted by news media, which is often used to inspire fear against the most powerless groups in society, provides politicians with agendas and thus solutions to make 'us' safe. Altheide (1997) further notes that the messages of fear are transmitted in conjunction with images and targets of what and who is to be feared.

Since September 11 2001, the threat of Islam to Australia has gained momentum in Australian print media articles (Aly and Walker 2007). The inclusion of visual images in print media representing Australian Muslims as the 'problem' has found expression in the representation of Muslim women with the image of the Islamic veil as the singular most compelling image of Islam. Constructing the veil within the 'problem frame' and an anathema to the ideals of Western liberal democracy became the standard in many news items about Muslims (Aly and Walker 2007).

Advancing a similar view, Samina Yasmeen has suggested that knowledge systems engendered from agencies such as the media, the government and various groups in society, have portrayed a negative picture of Muslims and have identified directly or indirectly Muslims as the 'problem'. Samina Yasmeen (2008) has examined the ways in which 'knowledge formations' produced post 9/11, have created various patterns of inclusion and exclusion for Muslims in Australia. Central to Yasmeen's discussion has been to question *how* these knowledges have been generated.. Yasmeen' (2008) line of inquiry also explores under what conditions/ideas these notions have emerged and questions the validity of the voices talking about Islam and what it means to be Muslim. Yasmeen (2008) argues that in a post 9/11 environment, 'knowledge systems' that have been developed in international discourses have impacted on Australian national discourses. She contends since 9/11 a plethora of 'terrorist studies' and 'counter-terrorist studies' have emerged, and in the main have been written by people who have had no previous knowledge of Islam or are new to the field of study. Most importantly, Yasmeen (2008) suggests, this has created a 'knowledge base' with very little actual 'knowledge base'. The circulation of this incomplete knowledge as authoritative knowledge has generated a pool of knowledge formations in Australia that has shaped the way government, media and other groups perceive Muslims and non-Muslims. Yasmeen (2008) further explains that the process by which the creation of knowledge formations have taken place, '…at least in the Howard[3] era, has forced unwittingly or wittingly the creation of conditions for Muslims which most find unpalatable'.

The work of Poynting et al. (2004), Altheide and Yasmeen (2008) highlights the process of racialised framing, as part of discourse frames and the subsequent knowledge formations that have been affirmed by media representations and political debate during recent events. The basic element of this manipulative discourse framing has been to depict Muslim Australians as the quintessential inferior 'Other', unable to assimilate,

without respect for Western laws and values and sympathetic to terrorism (Poynting 2004, p.2). The techniques involved in racialised framing act to produce panic, fear and anxiety in the realm of the social sphere of the everyday. The consequence of this is that governments and media run the risk of being unable to contain fears and anxieties. As the links between criminality, terrorism, lack of civilisation and humanity and the Muslim Other is woven into wider social discourse, the materiality of the veil is instantiated as the ultimate aesthetic of the feared 'Other' and thus needs to be excluded.

Exploring the disparate theoretical and methodological perspectives on framing and frame analysis has provided an essential foundation for examining the way in which the veil has been framed and reframed by culturally dominant discourses. It has brought into view how the processes of framing and reframing of the veil, created within historical political, religious, cultural and artistic terms, has established a pattern of 'recognition' that has been manifested in contemporary political, media and public frames. The expansive processes of dominant framing of veiled bodies however, has and continues to be resisted by Muslim women's agency. Within their differing lived realities, Muslim women have activated strategic, counter-hegemonic frames, through various organisations, activist networks and within everyday forms of individual resistance, which collide and intersect with hegemonic framing processes (Aly 2009; Abood 2009; Imtoual 2009). A more detailed discussion of counter-hegemonic voices, contesting and, to varying extents, transforming the power relations of hegemonic discourse, is undertaken in the following chapters.

Theoretical Framework

While adopting a frame analysis, this research adapts Stuart Hall's (1997; 1999) work on Representation and 'Otherness' to demonstrate the historical reality of veiling styles, customs and practices and the way in which the veil has been inscribed in a play of power by the specific institutional apparatus in which knowledge was produced. In the course of analysing the veil and veiling practices in the discourse of colonialism and consequent manifestations in terms of Neo-colonialism, this thesis has also drawn on Hall's (2003) interrogation of cultural representation based on underlying stereotypical messages or 'myths'. In 'The Spectacle of the 'Other' Hall (2003) argues that stereotypes:

> ...get hold of a few simple, vivid, memorable, easily grasped and widely recognised characteristics about a person, reduce everything about that person to those traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them without change or development to eternity (Hall 2003, p. 258).

Hall (2003) contends that stereotyping has been used to mark and signify the essentialising difference of the racialised 'Other'. This racialised discourse, which is structured by a powerful opposition between the civilised 'us' and 'non-civilised' 'them' is ultimately connected to regimes of power, '...including the power to represent someone or something in a certain way – with a certain regime of representation' (Hall 2003, p.259). The connection between representation and power/knowledge has also been recognised in Michel Foucault's (1972; 1980; 2003) theorising of the 'history of ideas', power/knowledge, governmentality and surveillance and the re-working of his theories by contemporary writers. In addition, work by cultural critics such as Richard Dyer (1999; 2000) and his writings on whiteness and its invisibility and Edward Said's description and critique of *Orientalism* has been examined. The studies of American philosopher Charles Peirce (1991) have also been considered for this thesis. The work by Peirce (1991) contrasts the work of Foucault, which focuses on how the representational formation of images are grounded in the operational forces of power/knowledge, which situates '…in form rather than content, the signifier rather than the signified (Hutton 1993, p.161). However, the studies in semiology by Peirce (1991) postulate a correlation between the signifier, the signified and the sign. The significance in drawing attention to the seemingly dichotomous forms of analysis are, according to Webb Kean (2003), crucial in order to situate material things within the dynamics of social analysis, by exploring '…the interconnections among different modes of signification at play within particular historical and social formation' (Kean 2003, p.410). In making an attempt to overcome this dichotomization, Kean (2003) proposes that the rethinking of representational economies reflecting a Peircean (1991) model of signs, points to the significance of Peirce's notion of '…indexicality [which] has a direct determinative influence on the sign' (Kean 2003, p.413) This research considers the inclusion of an analysis of indexicality within the discourse of veil representation, as timely and necessary in the wake of September 11, the Bali bombings and the Cronulla riots.

The work of the above-mentioned theorists provide an insight into how the mechanism of power has operated to dictate the 'norms' and values of the ruling groups, while constructing the excluded veiled body as 'Other'. Stuart Hall (1980) suggests the manner in which the process of a group's differentiation is always already demarcated, requires the distribution of visual codes constituted by a set of dominant power operations. Hall (1996) argues that representation is possible because it is always produced within codes

that have a history, and is articulated within the discursive formations across different spaces and at particular moments. Drawing on Michel Foucault's (1980) notion of power/knowledge and Edward Said's (1978) concept of *Orientalism*, Hall (1997) argues that within the 'regime of representation', there is a connection with stereotyping, difference and power. An influential role in the cultural understanding of the veil within historical specificities lies in the system of representation that produces relations of power through images. Hall (1997) points out that although representation through language is crucial to the process by which meaning is constructed, visual images are also used to express meaning and form part of the interrelated systems of representations that construct and instruct individuals in making sense of the world around them (Hall 1997). The historical shaping of images formed and maintained by a repetition derived from the past, has been a central tenet of Foucault's inquiry, as he considered them as crucial to discourses and knowledge/power paradigms that have organised and regulated social practices, influenced conduct and have had real practical effects. Hall (1999, pp.310-311) argues that 'seeing' as a social practice is explicitly linked to '…the symbolic and psychic level of unconsciousness'. The 'meaning' of an image cannot be seen as '...fixed, stable or uni-vocal across time and cultures', (Hall 1999, p.311) as how the subject 'sees' and how the field of vision is constructed is implicated in power and the limits of seeing that power implies (Hall 1999).

Decoding Whiteness

The power play involved in 'seeing' racialised positionings and the questions of visibility and invisibility, are crucial in the understanding of whiteness, as it raises questions of power and relationality. Richard Dyer (1999) argues dominant power operations in contemporary societies work in seductive ways with whiteness because of the way it seems embedded in common sense thought in things other than ethnic 'difference'. In 'White', Dyer (1999) implements an investigative lens that particularises whiteness within the realms of film and media. Dyer's (1999) goal is to open up a discussion that seeks to dislodge the invisibility of whiteness and its unacknowledged source of power. This, he suggests is a difficult endeavour as '[t]he colourless multicolouredness of whiteness secures its power making it difficult for white people and their media to 'see' whiteness'(Dyer 1999, p.459). Dyer's focus is on the possession of whiteness as a source of representational power, which he contends colonises '...the definition of what is being normal' (Dyer 1999, p.459). Writing within a somewhat different framework, Joseph Pugliese (2002) attempts to problematise the debates on whiteness, grounded in work

such as that of Richard Dyer. Pugliese (2002, p.151) advocates that work primarily interested in mapping the 'visual representations' of whiteness in Western culture needs to be challenged, deconstructed and decontextualised in order to open up other ways of understanding whiteness. Arguing that the work on whiteness and representation by Dyer (1999) needs reconsideration, as it erases historical differentials of situated ethnicities, Pugliese (2002) draws attention to the manner in which whiteness has manifested in '…geopolitical locations of historically situated and discursively embodied subjects' (Pugliese 2002, p.153). Situating his work in the 'topos of borderlands', Pugliese (2002) observes that the contemporary configuration of whiteness is not necessarily:

> …a type of homogeneous thing in itself, rather it is located in the …historically marked corporeal borders where 'race', ethnicity and identity intersect (Pugliese 2002, p.153).

The particularities attached to historical representations of whiteness, in the schema of imperialism, colonisation, and Orientalism, as a coherently recognisable yet invisible category, has taken on a particular urgency in the wake of 9/11.

Presenting a similar focus on the historical contingency of whiteness as offered by Pugliese (2002), Goldie Osuri and Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee (2004, p.152) examine the way in which the historically marked definitions of whiteness have been expressed and coded by governmental leaders and mainstream media discourses in the wake of 9/11. Osuri and Banerjee (2004) argue that:

> …in the representation of a global media event like September 11, local ideas about national belonging and international kinship of whiteness was coded in words such as the 'West; and 'non-West' or 'civilised' versus 'non-civilised' (Osuri and Banerjee 2004, p.153).

The mobilisation of these terms, articulated along a West – non-West axis by Western political leaders, particularised the very identity of 'white' Western countries, which Osuri and Banerjee (2004, p.167) discern, effectively and discursively drew on the historically determined Orientalist boundaries of 'us and them'. The coding of whiteness, in the context of systems of 'difference', is most often the unrecognised and unnamed medium of racism discourse.

Sanjay Sharma and Ashwani Sharma (2003) interrogate and explore how contemporary Orientalism, as inscribed in globalised Western culture, is tied to the production of a paranoid white subjectivity. Sharma and Sharma (2003, p.302) argue that in the wake of 9/11, the representational schema of Islamic culture, which '…has been discursively

produced by Orientalist systems of representation, based the absolute difference against the 'Other', has been unleashed – and Islamophobia rationalised'. Sharma and Sharma (2003, p.314) further argue that the original suspicion of the racialised 'Other' as an external threat to the security and culture of the West, has materialised into a paranoid reality. The profiling and surveillance of Orientalised bodies, Sharma and Sharma (2003) contend, has become a nexus for new forms of biopower. Offering a similar view, Mark Kelly (2004) draws on Michel Foucault's consideration of 'biopolitics' and 'state racism' as identified in Foucault's lectures at the College de France in 1976 and applies it to post September 11 politics. As a technology of power, biopolitics '…deals with populations at a level of multiplicity' (Kelly 2004, p.59), and is deployed to centralise power and normalise knowledge. Foucault (2003) argued that state racism, as a discourse that functions to protect the biological and ethnically homogenous people of the nation, is bound up with techniques of power that enables biopower to work (Foucault 2003). Sharma and Sharma (2003) argue that in the contemporary global sphere, '…the tracking and control of Oriental bodies has become the universal technological white gaze of a global Islamophobia'. Paralleling the writings of Sharma and Sharma (2003) Ghassan Hage (2003), brings into view the reworking of Orientalism, whiteness and paranoia in an Australian context. Hage (2003) sets out to critically interrogate the renewed primacy of Australia's sense of white panic. Hage (2003) suggests the historical threads of white Australia, which continue to surface when [an]Other appears on the horizon as a threat to the integrity and safety of white/Australian culture, acts to '…shackle the nation into a space which is stagnated by the Orientalist legacy of colonialism' (Hage 2003, p.67). Following September 11, the political dynamic in Australia and much of the West, was centred on championing an historical racialised colonialist discourse as the impetus for which the force against the looming 'terrorist Other' was propelled and enacted (Hage 2003). The attempts to reconstitute Australia's 'threatened whiteness', have had the ability to shape a conscious and unconscious xenophobic potentiality amongst society. According to Hage (2003) the post 9/11 obsession with Australia's 'white fortress' being swamped, indicates that:

> …the historically favourite Asian 'Other' ...has made a shift in recent years to the global threat of the Muslim and Islam[ic] Other and has sealed the Muslim as the unquestionable Other in Australia today (Hage 2003, p.67).

This arousal of fear and anxiety within the milieu of 'White Australia' has materialised to such an extent that even a single Arab is perceived as a threat, especially, if she is a veiled one (Hage 2003).

The particularity of subject construction and white hegemony in the context of 9/11 has also been explored by Ruth Frankenberg (2005). Frankenberg (2005) examines the 'semiotic frames' by which September 11 was named and '...the impact of a white hegemony upon those articulations (Frankenberg 2005, p.553). The question of September 11 as a terrain of 'unnameability' is central to Frankenberg's analysis. Suggesting that although 'the event of September 11 2001', is a phrase written and spoken often now, for the most part, the year 2001 is not attached to it. It has become a term that does not need to be explained. Frankenberg (2005) asserts that the 9/11 appellation, used to signify September 11 2001, has become a multipurpose signifier for '…the United Statesian 'self' and the non-United Statesian 'Other', [which] is exemplary of the always-feared implosion of the imperialist relationship' (Frankenberg 2005, p.560). The official discourse on 9/11 combines a number of contradictory elements. While 9/11 turns centrally on foundational national and racial constructs imbued with 'whiteness' and 'Americaness', '…understood in terms of Judeo-Christian notions of goodness, innocence, fairness and justice, [it also creates a]…fragile sense of nationhood which senses danger' (Frankenberg 2005, p.568). Comprehending 9/11 in the shadows of the imaginary nation and the hegemony of whiteness in Australia, Cassie Plate (2002, p.3) suggests that Australia's historical white/fear parallelisms, have been functionally re-crafted as tools to position 'whiteness' as pivotal to Australia's national identity against the 'Muslim menace'. Shaped through a lens of increasing national paranoia around difference and terrorism, the idea of Australia as a White Christian nation, has taken centre stage since the event of September 11, 2001 (Hage 2003). The reductive interpretive frames that have served historical white hegemonic agendas have been given shape by contemporary discursive repertoires used in association with '9/11'. Frankenberg (2005) argues what the moment of 9/11 has made inevitable, is that certain consequences, with apparently no need of full explanation of the implied relationships between cause and effect, have occurred. One of these consequences has been the construction of a seemingly impassable boundary between whiteness, framed in terms of Judeo-Christian notions, and the religious dress codes worn by Muslim women. According to Sara Ahmed (2000), the operational effect of historically situated notions of whiteness, constructs an aesthetic body register as constitutive not only of what is familiar, but also what is 'strange'. Circumscribing the veil as strange and therefore feared in the post 9/11 realm was readily and easily appropriated, as a fragile sense of 'white' nationhood '…sensed danger everywhere' (Frankenberg 2005, p.568).

Whiteness and Surveillance

The predominant strategic functioning of whiteness discourse appropriates and dominates those perceived as the social 'Other', that is, those who are perceived as dangerous and resistant to the normalising rules and orders constituted by the state in the form of what Foucault discerns as biopolitics. According to Foucault (2003) the mechanisms of governmentality in a political sense, are techniques of power that function to protect the biological and ethnically homogenous people of the nation and are deployed to 'normalise knowledge'. In *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison,* Foucault (1979) devotes a significant part of his inquiry to the procedures by and through which individuals constitute themselves as subjects. In his examination of Bentham's Panopticon[4], as a generalised model for institutions to organise various technologies of observation and discipline, he argues that '...society has become one of surveillance… [where] the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies' (Foucault 1979, p.217). Further Foucault (1979) suggests whenever a particular form of behaviour needs to be imposed; the Panopticon schema is used as an 'inspection function' ceaselessly ensuring an observing gaze. The 'inspecting gaze', as a controlling function, is related to various technologies of power. The reforming ethos of Panopticism centres on visibility and visual representation that circulates in the social field '…and is exercised on and by individuals over others as well as themselves' (Sawicki 1986, p.30). Those perceived as the social 'Other', that is, those who are resistant to the normalising rules and orders, are subjected to 'the space of exclusion' which brings into play a form of 'disciplinary partitioning' between the 'normal and abnormal' to which fear gives rise (Foucault 1979, p.199).

Nahid Kabir (2006) suggests that in the wake of September 11, surveillance regimes were initiated against Muslim Australians by the former Howard Government through anti terrorist legislation and the 'Be Alert Not Alarmed' campaign (Morris 2002). This campaign was intended to inform an increasingly insecure nation on how to report about potential terrorist activities and monitor behavior by identifying anything they considered 'suspicious'. Diana Bossio (2005, p.5) argues the determination of the state to frame security around what was deemed 'out of place' or 'suspicious' was left to an individual's experience, judgement and interpretation. The state's enlisting of 'ordinary Australians' to provide authorities with information relating to anything considered suspicious, set in motion regulatory mechanisms grounded in the discourse of surveillance and biopolitics. According to Kabir (2006) members of the wider Australian community viewed Muslims

as the ‘enemy’ of the state. Those perceived to be the most visible symbol of suspicion and an embodiment of the social ‘Other’ were women wearing the *hijab* or *chaddor*, who were ‘…verbally and physically abused and called terrorists’ (Kabir 2006, p.194). As the mandating of surveillance by the state reflected the need for individual vigilance, it set in motion an authoritative national gaze administered by pseudo-syndic officials, who functioned as regulators and supervisors of those whose visuality was perceived as a threat to the white, Christian notion of ‘traditional’ Australian values (Hage 2003). The aftermath of September 11 2001 and the enduring ‘war on terror’ sanctioned the state to protect the cultural integrity and the unity of a [white] homogenous community (Hage 2003). Within this discourse, the instruments and mechanisms instigated by the state to ‘…defend the life and welfare of its dominant population’ (Foucault 2003, p.256), had the ability to activate vilification against veiled bodies who were circumscribed as a threat, both internally and externally to the population.

Osmotic Framing: The Veil in the Wake of September 11 2001

The events of September 11 2001 marked a crucial moment when key stereotypical framing of the veil in Western media and political discourse became both the signifier for an entire social and religious order, most often linked with Western portrayal of the Orient (Aly 2009). When Edward Said, wrote *Orientalism* in 1978, he argued during Britain’s imperial expansion, the pre-existing beliefs, stereotyping and fixed images of the ‘Orient’, invented by Orientalists justified and rationalised colonial rule. Said (1978, p.3) maintained that ‘…because of Orientalism, the ‘Orient’ was not (and is not) a free subject of thought and action’. In turn, the ‘Orient’ became and continues to be a contrasting ‘Other’ against which European identity can be constructed. Edward Said’s (1978) notion of *Orientalism* endeavoured to illustrate how seemingly inert concepts and descriptive practices, translated by Orientalist records, generated an illusionary, homogenous inert terrain of backwardness in the ‘East’ against which to measure the ‘progress’ of the ‘West’. The negative aspects of veiling, reinforced by social descriptions produced by Orientalist ideologies, became a foundational component of the spatial and moral ordering by colonialist officials and Christian missionaries of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their obsession to regulate veiled bodies was integral to the rhetoric of racial hierarchies and gender dynamics prominent during this period. The conquest of power played out across the bodies of women, sought to distinguish Western femininity and white women as a benchmark against which to measure veiled women, who were constructed as intrinsically ‘different’, ‘strange’ and therefore dangerous.

The framing and reframing of Orientalist ideologies has become a foundational component in contemporary debates concerning the veil and veiling. Alia Imtoual (2009, p.166) argues that '[d]espite recent attempts on the part of researchers to overturn years of entrenched 'orientalist' research conducted about Muslims', Orientalist framing as a process for embedding mediated codes, has continued its sphere of influence. This has become most apparent within the locations of antagonisms in post September 11, where the trope of 'oppressed Muslim women' and 'the Muslim terrorist', '…can be linked to a long historical trajectory of Orientalist research' (Imtoual 2009, p.166). Interpretations of the cultural tradition of the veil, have created influential currents of thought in the West, which have been reframed by neo-Orientalist discourse to position it not only as a symbol of the 'Other' but as a symbol of the 'terrorist Other'. The deployment of Orientalist framing of the veil, as stimulus for contemporary manifestations of racism/Islamophobia, has been noted by Neil MacMaster and Toni Lewis (1998). MacMaster and Lewis (1998) explain how the European stereotypical representations of the veil, which received powerful expression in the nineteenth century through Orientalist paintings and the literature of travel, became subverted by decolonisation in the mid-twentieth century and elevated to a new emphasis as '…the signifier of political danger and terrorism' (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.125). Central to this process has been the careful construction and manipulation of the veil in text and image in the Western press in general, where a type of fabrication has been able to draw upon and reframe an older tradition of Orientalism.

The frequent use of mostly unnamed and therefore 'silenced' veiled women, to accompany press reports on 'fundamentalist regimes', has been an editorial preference for photographs '…which show the maximum or contextually most bizarre dress forms or hyperveiling' (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.128). After 9/11 hyperveiling underwent a 'new' mode of reframing to fit the political objectives of western politics. Images of black burqa clad women, paralleling stereotypical Orientalist images, became ubiquitous in Western media, and were presented as the universalisation of a collective cultural identity (Aly 2008). Like MacMaster and Lewis, Shahira Fahmy (2004) identifies her study of AP (Associated Press) wire photographs of Afghan women during and after the Taliban Regime, as '…intimately linked with Western portrayal of the Orient' (Fahmy 2004, p.92). Fahmy (2004) argues in the general portrayal of Afghan women, the 'unsaid' features of visual imagery, whether intentional or unintentional, engender inevitable

implications of subtle and indirect racism. Fahmy (2004, p.92) notes '…even if images are not staged, they still need to be selected into a frame'. Fahmy (2004) suggests that the way in which visual selections shape interpretations of the world to create shared perceptions, in turn affect and condition real life understanding and meaning making. In this way, the selections made by journalists who typically find symbols that match with dominant Western ideals are '…framed into the existing paradigm reinforcing stereotypes and existing political and social agendas' (Fahmy 2004, p.93). In a similar vein to Fahmy, Peeka Rantanen (2005) examines the way in which non-documentary pictures, including drawings of women wearing burqas in Afghanistan became a prominent feature on the Internet after 9/11. Rantanen (2005) notes that non-verbal and symbolic aspects of burqa pictures were used within a framework of women's oppression and non-visibility, forming part of Western representations of bodily ideals and discourses. Rantanen (2005) argues that in most cases:

> …non-documentary pictures of burqas are either placed in a context where they do not seem to belong or are used in a way that reveals something other than documentary pictures (Rantanen 2005, p.336).

Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2007) and Kecia Ali (2008) consider how media cartoonists have depicted caricatures of Muslim people through the framing of popular stereotyped symbols. Ali (2008, p.282) notes that occasionally someone wearing a headscarf appears in a cartoon, '…as a shorthand way of making clear that the woman depicted is Muslim…', but most prominent are veiled figures wearing a flowing *burqa* or *abaya*, which are used to symbolise Islam and its applied links to oppressiveness and terrorism. This type of hyperveiling depicts the veil, and not the women, as a device to call attention to something else entirely. Hall's (1981) insights into representation in photographs can be applied to the analysis of the veil in both historical and contemporary images and photographs as he argues:

> The ideological concepts embodied in photos…in a newspaper do not produce new knowledge about the world. They produce *recognitions* of the world as we have already learned to appropriate it (Hall 1981, p.239).

The characteristic of news photos as visual transcriptions of the 'real world' disguises and displaces the '…ideological sign that connects a mythical schema to history', (Hall 1981, pp.241-242), thus reinforcing and amplifying the ideological message. Hall's (1981) argument indicates that media photographs work in a multi-layered and mutually reinforcing ways, as the image plays an authenticating role when accompanying news reports. The reinforcement of an ideological message in news reporting can be also emphasised by the indexicality of the sign, which is understood by its relationship to

what it refers (Hansen Cottle Negrine & Newbold 1998). The indexical layering of visual descriptions in news reporting is discussed in next section.

Indexicality: Effects and Possibilities

The indexical layering in visual descriptions deserves considerable attention when considering visual representations of the veil in print media. Drawing on the Peircean model, Kean (2003, p.413) suggests '…the relationship between sign and object can be iconic (resemblance), indexical (causal or proximal linkages) or symbolic (evident in arbitrary social conventions)'. The significance of indexical signs is their logical imposition on persons and their social world. Kean (2003, p.417) observes, '…for indexical analysis to be useful it must be understood…to face towards possible futures as well as towards the past'. Indexical drawings, their signification and causality used in news reporting have been explored by Anders Hansen, Simon Cottle, Ralph Negrine & Chris Newbold (1998). Following Charles Peirce's (1991) view of signs, Hansen et al. (1998, p.201) view indexical drawings as '…neither a direct resemblance (icon) nor a total convention (symbol) but work in terms of a relationship with, or causal connection to that which it refers'. Hansen et al. (1998) suggest that the way in which indexical drawings, as framing resources are used in the news, most often convey unavoidable racist cues. This frequently occurs as visual representations are commonly used to maintain stereotypical conceptions of spectacular 'otherness' (Rantanen 2005). Hansen et al. (1998) argue that a news picture depends for its effects upon the symbolic value of the image and can deploy or engage with deep-seated feelings, hopes and fears. The performativity of an image, for example the veil, when transposed into an indexical drawing has the ability for a layering of both ambiguity and certitude.

Messaris and Abraham (2003, p.217) suggest that a viewer's perceptions about particular events, objects can be shaped as a consequence of the framing of indexical images. They discern that the particular quality of indexical images is their ability to articulate ideological messages. Most specifically, they are often used to frame subtle messages '…especially messages that may be socially risky if stated explicitly' (Messaris and Abraham 2003, p.220). Avoiding the social risk or fear of being branded racist, news reporting in the media often uses implicit visual information as a subtle form of racism (Messaris and Abraham 2003). In this way, the visual information assists in creating racial subtexts of meaning, which have not been explicitly stated in the accompanying text.

In his discussion of contemporary information politics and terrorism Shuddhabrata Sengupta (2007, p.95) suggests 'unofficial secret acts of the state' have the ability to bind the lives of citizens. Sengupta's inquiry is not to investigate the secret documents locked up and filed away, but in unofficial secrets that 'act' under the shadow of official secrets. Sengupta reveals that the complex processes by which unofficial information is harnessed by the state and by quasi agencies of the state, contain by and large 'absences in the record' and are linked to operations of knowledge/power relations. In his discussion of the 'production of terrorism' in various contemporary moments, Sengupta (2007, p.115) argues '[t]he fear that terrorism generally induces is not so much by way of the actual violence…but by the indexical images that are interlaced with the production of images'. He further claims that in almost every society:

> [T]he production of certain images is linked to a certain climate, one that gives credibility to the production of seemingly self-evident truths about terrorism' (Sengupta 2007, p.115).

Indexical images are often framed to engender expectations about a particular topic, as they function at both the material level and the mythic level of signification. In this way the mythical construct of images materialise as a repository for identification and classification, establishing knowledge frames which are communicated within the broader community.

Summary

The data and argument for this thesis has drawn on a collection of diverse materials to provide a methodological framework for unpacking the interconnections needed to trace how the representation of the veil, in Western historical and contemporary moments, has activated a continuum of symbolic interpretive constructs. The implementation of a methodology in the analysis of the veil and veiling is centred on notions of 'representational practice' (Hall 2003, p.225), in particular Western representations. It is Hall's (1997; 1999; 2003) insights into the formation and representation of cultural identity through a concept of 'difference,' 'Otherness' and stereotypes that an uncovering of how imposed and simplified cultural representations of the veil and veiling practice has evolved. This has been conceptualised from the early beginnings of veiling in the thirteenth century BCE, its association with Christian women religious, to its colonial and Neo-Colonial manifestations. Hall's (2003) theorising of stereotyping as part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order, which sets up a frontier of 'us' and 'them', is

particularly important to the research objective as it brings to view the connections between representation, difference and relations of power. Additionally, this thesis has employed Hall's (2003) theorisation of visual representations as a technique for encouraging the acceptance of stereotypical images of the veil and veiling practices as 'authentic' within media representations.

Following Foucault's (1972; 1980; 2003) archaeological approach to the history of ideas and his notion of surveillance and the gaze, this chapter has explored various data in an attempt to ascertain the way in which certain codes of knowledge have acted to frame acceptable modes of knowledge within a given epoch. It has attempted to unsettle the single line of the imaginary tableau of history, to identify the way in which the heterogeneous ensemble of historical discourses, both in written work and in visual imagery, has pervaded contemporary Western thinking about the veil. In addition, it has attempted to illuminate the way in which the veil has been constantly framed and reframed from within the realms of Christian tradition, to the precepts of Orientalism and to the highly charged political debates linked to a West versus East binary as fore-grounded by Edward Said (1978; 2003). The racialised framing of the veil as 'Other', within particular events and their specific contexts, has embodied a range of social anxieties as it intertwines into wider social discourses. In this way the veil as 'Other' has been framed not only as an object of hostility, but as a threat against the cultural milieu of 'White' Australia, in which fear has been manifested.

Recognising that the ability to objectively research '…is inevitably limited, partial and selective' (Fairclough 2004, p.15), this chapter has been mindful of the counter-hegemonic frames that have sought to challenge Western European hegemonic framing processes. The myriad of expressions and conceptualisations provided by Muslim women's counter frames, as acknowledged by Alia Imtoual (2009), provide reclamation of historically subordinated knowledge frames, and thus provide an integral point of discussion in this thesis.

The following chapter provides a survey of the veil and veiling from early beginnings to contemporary moments. It aims to present an overview of most common features of representation of the veil during certain fragments in time, alternating between chronological and episodic modes of representation. In addition it highlights the way in

which systems of power have authorised certain knowledge frames representative of the veil, while blocking, prohibiting or marginalising others.

Notes

[1] When Edward Said, wrote *Orientalism* in 1978, he argued that during Britain's imperial expansion, the pre-existing beliefs, stereotyping and fixed images of the 'Orient', invented by 'Orientalists justified and rationalised colonial rule. Drawing on several centuries of Western representations, Said (1978, p.3) observed that 'because of Orientalism, the 'Orient' was not (and is not) a free subject of thought and action'. In turn, the 'Orient' became and continues to be a contrasting 'Other' against which European identity can be constructed. See also Reina Lewis 1996, *Gendering Orientalism: Race, femininity and Representation*, Routledge, London. Lewis attempts to explore how the interaction between culture and imperialism was played out in connection to gender through an examination of white European women artists/authors as cultural agents in the formation of imperial relations.

[2] MAGEEQ conducted a three year (2003-2005) comparative research project on the framing of gender inequality as a policy problem in Austria, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and the European Union level. See Verloo, M and Lombardo, E 2007, 'Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing A Critical Frame Analysis Approach', in *Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality: A Critical frame Analysis of Gender Politics in Europe*, M Verloo (ed), CPS Books, Central European University Press, Budapest, pp.21-49. Also see online http:www.mageeq.net.

[3] John Howard was the Prime Minster of Australia from 1996 -2007. In November 2007, the Liberal Coalition Party was defeated by the Labor Party and John Howard lost his own seat of Bennelong to Labor Member Maxine McKew. See ABC *ABC Elections*, 2007, 'Australia Votes', 24 November, <http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2007/guide/benn.htm>.

[4] Disciplinary power is epitomised in Foucault's description of the Panopticon, an architectural device advocated by Jeremy Bentham towards the end of 18thcentury. This enclosed segmented space enabled individuals to be observed at every point and where power was exercised without division according to a continuous hierarchical figure. See Foucault, M 1979, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison* Vintage Books, NY. Also see Bentham, J 1995, *The Panopticon Writings*, M Bozovic (ed), Verso, London: p.29-95. <http://cartome.org/panopticon2.htm>.

Chapter Two:

The Veil: From Early Beginnings to Contemporary Moments

> Veiling of women, men and sacred places and objects has existed among people of countless cultures and religions from time immemorial. Yet the veil is vastly misunderstood (Heath 2008, p.1).

Introduction

This chapter examines the way in which Western framing schemas have operated to embody the veil as 'familiar' in dyadic opposition to the 'unfamiliar' in the East. The concept of framing has been used to indicate how certain aspects of the veil and veiling have been made salient, in such a way as to promote a particular interpretation of it as 'familiar'. Frame analysis has illuminated the way that certain pieces of information about the veil have been made more noticeable, more meaningful and more memorable to certain cultural groups by associating it with culturally familiar symbols (Entman 2004). The power of framing has worked by selecting and highlighting certain common elements of veiling while simultaneously directing attention away from other aspects. In particular, frame analysis has highlighted the transformational nature of normative framing, including speech, utterances and images, which have become self-reinforcing, acting to exert influence over most people in a social grouping (Entman 1993). This research considers how the interpretation of the veil as 'familiar', which has been constituted by normative framing schemas, has been interlinked with operations of power. Michel Foucault's contribution to the historical fields of knowledge and his concept of nodes of power has been significant to this analysis. Foucault's theorising of the way in which the 'traditional' history of ideas relies upon a linkage of continuous history, provides a framework for interrogating how limiting normative frames have been sustained to define and construct the veil during various periods of time (Foucault 1972). An integral part of the modes of operation that define and construct truth and knowledge is according to Foucault (1980) based on '…the relations of power not relations of meaning' (Hall 1997, p.43). The power structures that have acted to contain the attributes of the veil in the realm of the 'knowable', established a conceptual frame pattern of 'recognisability' within dominant cultural norms. Goffman (1971) emphasised that individuals are guided by knowledge frames, which dictate rules of conduct and generate perceived social

norms. The knowledge frames that guide 'recognisability' depend in part on how social norms are developed through visual and discursive frames (Butler 2009). Patrick Hutton (1993) contends that through a historiographical method of repetition, the construction of an imaginary tableau of images form part of the discourses and knowledge/power paradigms that have organised and regulated social practices. The nexus between the construction of visual frames and veiling, which have been maintained by a prominence of repetitious transformational frames, is a central tenet of this inquiry. This has necessitated providing a collection of visual images to illustrate the way in which images have been inscribed in a play of power by the specific institutional apparatus in which knowledge frames have been produced (Hall 1997). The images included in this chapter are a few among the many illustrating the veil worn by secular and religious women in both historical and contemporary periods. They have been chosen as being most representative of depictions of veiling as part of women's dress modalities during various historical moments. In critiquing these images, both primary and secondary sources have been utilised to aid the research[1].

The study of the veil in the context of historical and contemporary moments in religious and/or cultural tradition is a vast and complex endeavour. Jennifer Heath (2008, p.5) argues that although much has been written about the history of the veil and veiling, the 'whens' and 'whys' of veiling are mostly speculation and certainly subject to argument. Heath (2008, p.5) contends, however, historically '…the veil has signified, rank, religion, and marital status…or belonging to a specific ethnic group'. Heath (2008) further argues that there is not one unified historical formula for veiling in Abrahamic, pre-Judaic, Hindu and other traditions. Following a historical trajectory of thousands of years, the veil has been framed within specific political, religious and cultural significance. Its characteristics have had '…different meanings to different people in different cultures and even in the same culture' (Shirazi 2003, p.180). Despite the veil being part of both Western and Eastern cultures for millennia, this has not diminished its association with contemporary Islam and the East (Health 2008). The next part of the chapter traces the diversity of the veil from its early beginnings. It draws attention to the way the veil has been shaped by linguistic tropes and visual imagery within culturally dominant frames, which have established a pattern of recognition shared by a large proportion of people in a given society.



Fig 1 Gravestone with funerary banquet, 2nd–3rd century
Excavated at Palmyra, Syria
The Metropolitan Museum of Art 2009.

Veiled Beginnings

Iranian anthropologist Homa Hoodfar (2003) argues most Westerners perceive the veil as a static uniform, consisting of a 'black cloak that covers the whole body including the face, which is designed to prevent women's mobility' (Hoodfar 2003, p.11). In reality it has had many variations throughout history as well as in modern times. Following a historical trajectory of thousands of years, the semantics of the veil have been framed within specific political, religious and cultural significance. Although the veil is most commonly associated with Islam, it has existed longer outside Arab culture than within it, originating in non-Arab Middle Eastern and Mediterranean societies (Hoodfar 1997). Drawing on various studies that have traced the multidimensional roots of the veil, Daphne Grace (2004) contends that '…the veil pre-dates Islamic and Christian cultures' with its origins associated with slavery. According to Elizabeth Kuhns (2003) and Nikki Keddie (2004), the first known reference to veiling was made in an Assyrian Legal text of the thirteenth century BCE[2]. Amongst the earliest visual depictions of head to toe veiling, is a bas-relief from Palmyra, Syria in the second or third century CE.[3] (Fig 1 c.f *The Metropolitan Museum of Art*, 2009).

Exploring the history of the veil from a range of diversified paradigms, Fadwa El Guindi (1999) notes that Assyrian law dictated which women could or could not veil. Veiling was '…a highly stratified social system built on class, moral and marital status and respectability' (El Guindi 1999, p.15). Noble women were compelled to veil, as were their servants when accompanying noble women. Prostitutes and women who were slaves, however, were prohibited from veiling (Shirazi 2003; El Guindi 1999). According to Kuhns (2003, p.54) the records from Assyrian Law state that married women were instructed to cover their heads when in the public sphere. Although the wives and daughters of high ranking men were required to veil, these women enjoyed high status

legal rights and many privileges not afforded to women of lower ranks. More importantly many women of all classes were trained as scribes, while others were involved in a plethora of divergent enterprises, some '…owning and managing properties in their own name' (Ahmed 1992, p.15). As a form of dress, the veil stratified classes of women, symbolising exclusivity, status, privilege and privacy. The ideological foundations of veiling and women's status in Assyrian society did not resemble those in classical Greek society (El Guindi 1999).

Veiling in Greek society, El Guindi (1999) contends, was highly determined by Aristotle (384-322 BCE), whose influence was widespread and has endured through the ages pervading contemporary Western thinking. The Aristotelian premise, which codified social values and practices into cultural constructs of gender '…took root in Christianity as it developed into the Byzantine Empire [and]…penetrated medieval Arabic, Muslim and Jewish thought' (El Guindi 1999, p.17). Aristotelian theories conceptualised women as being biologically inferior to men, both physically and mentally. Moreover premised by Aristotle's reasoning, women were perceived as innately more implicated in physicality and sexuality than men (Ahmed 1992). Consequently women were expected to confine themselves to their homes and '…their clothing conceal them from the eyes of strange men' (Ahmed 1992, p.28). Kuhns (2003) notes how respectable women in Roman, Jewish and Greek cultures kept their hair covered in an attempt to '… remove their sexuality from public display' (Kuhns 2003, p.58). Hoodfar (1997) attests that despite the widely held assumptions of the veil as a static unchanging symbol of inferiority in the West, veiling as a lived experience has contradictory and multiple meanings. Hoodfar (1997) further suggests that while veiling has certainly been a mechanism of patriarchy and a means of regulating and controlling women's lives, Muslim women as social actors, have used the same social intuitions to free themselves from the bonds of patriarchy. Furthermore, it could be argued, veiling as a mechanism of controlling and regulating women's lives and their resistance to these mechanisms is symptomatic to the history of both Christian and Muslim women, who have been '…employing, reforming and changing existing situations, often creatively, to their own ends' (Hoodfar 1997, p.250). Aristotle's main philosophical concepts, which exemplified women's inferiority, formed part of a broader negative ethos of women's bodies and arguably became part of the common motif that influenced Christian and Islamic scholarly thought. Aristotle's beliefs were foundational in influencing rules for women's apparel, in particular the practice of veiling in early Christian doctrine, which is most notably in the scriptures established by St Paul.



Fig 2 Livia CE 20 Antiquarium Pompeii
c.f De La Croix, Tansey, & Kirkpatrick, 1987.

Foundations of Christian Veiling

In her history of Catholic women's clothing including the habit, Elizabeth Kuhns (2003) suggests the veil and veiling for women, as propagated by the Apostles, was fundamental to early Christian doctrine as well as practical areas of Christian living. (Kuhns 2003). The marble image of *Livia* (second wife of Augustus) CE 20, is reminiscent of veiling in the early Christian period[4] (Fig 2 c.f De La Croix, Tansey, & Kirkpatrick, 1987). In the Scriptures I Corinthians 11, St. Paul discusses 'headship' (1 Cor. 11:3-10) advising veiling for Christian women, as '…the veil signified the hierarchy that God established in the universe' (Kuhns 2003, p.55). St. Paul, in his First Letter to the Corinthians (11:4-5)[5] established the importance of veiling in women's lives. Laurene Lafontaine (2008, p.79) points out that St. Paul's instructions on veiling have been '…the primary rationale for the subjugation of women throughout the history of Christianity'. What is most problematic is that '…Paul equated veiling with a symbol of authority: not God's authority, but man's authority over women' (Lafontaine 2008, p.79). Paul's view on veiling for women gave concrete enforcement of a gender order and Christian women largely accepted it, perceiving the instruction as directly inspired by the Word of God (Kuhns 2003). St. Paul's instructions on veiling have been the topic of discussion, in particular amongst some feminist scholars. While there are many meanings of St. Paul's veiling instructions, the Catholic Church officially required women at Mass to wear head covering in church until the instruction was abandoned by the '1983 Code of Canon Law' (Kuhns 2003, p.55).

Rules for the Apparel of Women

By 100 CE, when there were an estimated twenty thousand Christians, the church customs began to become formally unified (Kuhns 2003). By the second century, rules for the apparel of Christian sisters intensified. The embodiment of Christian sisters, who had freed themselves from the responsibilities of their prescribed gender roles, were summoned by the various male church hierarchies to conform to modest dress attire (Kuhns 2003). With the recognition of Christianity by the first Christian Roman Emperor Constantine (280-337CE), the numbers of supporters dramatically increased (Brown 2002, p.86). During the second and third centuries, prolific author of early Christianity, Church Father Tertullian (140-230), began to implement rules for the apparel of women, including clothing, hair and makeup (Kuhns 2003). Tertullian, from Roman Carthage (modern-day Tunisia), emphasised the importance of modesty and commanded Christian women to veil in all circumstances. Drawing on the enormity of Eve's mistake, Tertullian instructed women that their apparel needed to be of 'a penitential nature' and be distinguishable from 'the clothing worn by pagans' (Kuhns 2003, p.58). Recommending that women should avoid decorative dress and don the veil, Tertullian advised:

> Arabia's heathen females will be your judges, who cover not only the head but the face also so entirely that they are content with only one eye free, to enjoy half the light rather than to prostitute the entire face (Tertullian cited in Kuhns 2003, p.58).

Tertullian expounded in great detail the veiling of virgins as he regarded women as the 'devil's gateway', expressing a concept '…that women act as temptresses through their choice of dress' (Kuhns 2003, p.58). According to Kuhns (2003) the concept of women's dress choices rendering men unaccountable for predatory or even violent actions has been sustained through contemporary times. Tertullian, who was determined that every Christian matron and maiden of North Africa be veiled, recommended that the apparel of women, should be '…your modesty [and] that it may flow from the mind to the garb' (Kuhns 200, p.60). Jo Ann McNamara (1996) suggests that although the virgins and honorary virgins were often subjected to regulatory authority, the critique of Tertullian's orders, by the virgins of his church in Africa, lead to their refusal to veil themselves, '…arguing that St. Paul's command laid upon women did not apply to them' (McNamara 1996, p.42). A generation or so after Tertullian's attempt to enforce the veil on to the virgins of the African church, Cyprian of Carthage argued that the impudent virgins needed to:

> …dress and act as became true virgins…to stop flaunting their bodies among men [and] to refrain from abusing their freedom from the mastery of husbands and the burdens of children (McNamara 1996, p.44).



Fig 3. Portrait of deceased woman Catacomb of Vigna
4 CE, Rome.
c.f Brown 2002

The argument that the veil gave virginity and widowhood institutional definition, resulted in most of the virgin's dress code being enforced. Until the introduction of Vatican II in 1963[6], the Catholic Church continued to enact universal legislation to regulate clothing for women religious* (Michelman 1997). The veil as part of the habit played a critical visual role in situating the symbolic relationship between dress, religious commitment and social identity. The regulation of apparel for women religious was also extended to clothing worn by secular women (McNamara 1996). A fourth century portrait of a deceased woman found at the Catacomb of Vigna Massimo Rome[7] indicates the practice of veiling was in place for some secular women during this period (Fig 3 c.f Brown 2002). As the organisational structure of Christianity began to take shape, women occupied a special place in the establishing structure.

Following the Acts of the apostle Paul, who preached a series of beatitudes noting that there '…is no salvation without chastity' (McNamara 1996, p.25), numerous women, pursued a life of chastity. Evolving as agents of rebellion many women undertook the preservation of virginity or the renunciation of conjugal union against the tyranny of husbands or fathers plotting to pursue marriage for their daughters (McNamara 1996). Despite the state enforced power of parents that '…put women into marriage beds' (McNamara 1996, p.26), groups of women from every walk of life left their homes, parents, and husbands to make a place for themselves in Christian churches. Offering both the visual symbol of consecration and physical protection, the habit set these religious women apart from the world. Transcending the limitations of gender, Christian women could join men in public life that was forbidden to most married women. Some married women however, who were from the privileged classes, aided the rapid spread of the Christianity, due to their religious influence on their high status husbands (Kuhns 2003).

During the fourth and fifth centuries CE the work of St. Augustine (354-430) provided much of the foundations for theological and philosophical viewpoints concerning women (Brundage 1990). Augustine considered women inferior to men both physically and morally and argued women were a source of sexual temptation and stated '…I fail to see what use woman can be to man if…one excludes the function of bearing children' (Brundage, 1990, p.85). Defining his religious teachings based on the foundational views espoused by Tertullian, Augustine's work influenced much of the social religious structures and conduct of civic life within the medieval world view (Brundage 1990).

According to Peter Goodrich (1998, p.711) the regulation of apparel and appearance has a lengthy history and is linked to a theological and moral concern for the presentation of the self within the community. The Tertullian and Aristotelian premise, which influenced the governance of apparel for women, was extended to the sixteenth century when the work of the humanist Jan-Luis Vives (1526) elaborated on the principles for the training of Christian women (Goodrich 1998, p.715). Goodrich (1998) recounts the draconian rules regarding women's apparel put forward by Jan-Luis Vives who decreed:

> …all forms of bodily ornament, painting of the face, or even exposure of the eyes to the gaze of others were to be treated as dangerous vanities …the woman should either be veiled or 'shamefaced' and her apparel as discreet and plain as possible (Vives 1562 cited in Goodrich 1998, p.715).

The regulation of enforced dress codes put forward by hierarchical discourses, in particular the jurisdiction of the Church, established a pattern that played a crucial role in defining structures and disciplines for the apparel of women religious.

In the formative years of Christianity, The Blessed Virgin Mary became the model for consecrated Christian women and the Church authorities to shape the habit's initial form (McNamara 1996; Kuhns 2003). The women of this period, who donned the habit '…to follow Christ, did so of their own free will' (Kuhns 2003, p.45). However, over the following centuries, the reinforcement of rules concerning the wearing and aesthetics of the habit, were constructed by specific 'knowledges' within religious and/or state discourses. According to Kuhns (2003, p.66), from the earliest beginnings, '…the Catholic Church was a monarchical and patriarchal system which has remained unchanged to this day'. The construction of the disciplinary rituals associated with the habit, in particular the veil, became part of the normalizing force for many of the women

who became ‘Brides of Christ’, distinguishing themselves from secular society (Kuhns 2003).

In her insightful and comprehensive discussion of the historical complexities of Catholic nuns through two millennia, Jo Ann McNamara (1996) contends that while the internal lives of early Christian women has been largely silenced, they were first in an ongoing tradition of sisters who endeavoured to manifest the teachings of Jesus into new forms of life on earth (McNamara 1996). The earliest initial shaping of the habit began late in the second and third centuries (Kuhns 2003). For Christian women, the habit offered ‘…a visual symbol of consecration [and]…served to hide the contours of their bodies, acting as sort of armour against sexual advances’ (Kuhns 2003, p.43). The symbol of the habit, which was constructed to import meanings to its observers as a universal representation of holiness, chastity and obedience, has lasted for nearly two thousand years. Kuhns (2003, p.6) suggests that the habit, which emanates from the first Christian women who came to Jerusalem with Jesus, has been manifested as ‘…a seamless link from the past to the present’. However, McNamara (1996) contends that although the habit has been conceptualised as an embodiment of spiritualty, the ‘enveloping veil’ of the habit has been the symbolic representative of the oldest sisterhood institution. Despite the changes and variations of the habit that has emanated from its early beginnings, it has been framed to symbolise and conveyed a certain image and ideal. Kuhns (2003) suggests that although the habit is perceived by some feminists as a ‘…Christian analogue of the Moslem burqa [it is]…something so radical, we cannot help but to react with awe and reverence or with suspicion and distain’ (Kuhns 2003, p.7). While for some the habit may epitomise oppression, for others it embodies religious purity, peace and the ultimate dignity of the religious vocation and has continued to endure as a representation of Christian spiritual life. Offering both the visual symbol of consecration and physical protection, the habit, which set these religious women apart from the world, was depicted in many numerous artistic works. The reconstruction of the past through a continuous recollection and repetition of images gave shape to the framing of the veil through the modes of representation in various stages of power structures. Margaret Miles (1985), argues the inclusion of visual images when deconstructing Christian historical ideas, offer a depth of material when used in addition to verbal texts. Miles (1985) further agues the largest group whose history can be approached by using visual images is women. The next section demonstrates how hegemonic framing through artistic imagery has enhanced western perceptions of the veil as familiar.



Fig 4 *Hortus delecairum.* Nuns of the abbess Herrad of Hohenburg, late twelfth century. c.f Hamburger & Marti 2008

Visualising the Veil

Utilizing a Foucaultian framework for his analysis, Hutton's (1993) concern within the new spectrum of historiography is the art of memory and its relationship to the history of images. The traditionally conceived mnemonics, or the art of memory, '…was based upon associations between a structure of images easily remembered and a body of knowledge in need of organization' (Hutton 1993, p.29). This was constructed as an imaginary tableau that could be recalled at will. Recognising the difficulties with the interpretation of historical images can result in the 'perspectival bias' of the viewer. Miles (1985) contends that:

> Evidence, whether textual or visual can be interpreted only by relating a particular text to the discourse that gives it significance, weight as a symbol and intensity value as language – in other words meaning (Miles 1985, p.29).

Miles (1985), following Foucault, suggests the exclusive attention of using textual materials in reconstructing Christian history, has understood itself on a model of a history of philosophy and the development of these ideas across time, which has led to their assumed validity and continuity. The philosophy and social doctrine of Christianity developed along side artistic features, which characterised it, giving birth to a form of religious art (Ettinghausen and Grabar 1987). The study of medieval women's spirituality, in particular the veil and crown was highlighted by a recent exhibition of *Krone and Schleir: Kunst aus mittelalterlichen Frauenkloster – Crown and Veil: Art from Medieval Convents*, held in Bonn and Essen in 2005. From the exhibition an edited text emerged examining the nexus between medieval religious culture, gender and 'visual arts' (Walker-Bynum 2008). Focusing on the visual imagery of female monasticism and other forms of women's religious life, during the medieval period, Caroline Walker-Bynum (2008) notes how the visualization of women either commissioned by artists or achieved by the nuns themselves, provide a rich background necessary to understand the everyday world of medieval nuns. In his investigation of Christian visual imagery, Jeffrey Hamburger (1998) recognises the historical effectiveness of art work generally known as

Nonnenarbeiten put forward by nuns themselves in the late medieval period (Fig 4 c.f Hamburger & Marti 2008). Hamburger (1997) suggests these drawings form an insightful and meaningful component of current inquiries into the interaction between text and image, allowing an understanding of spirituality, sexuality, gender and the gaze (Hamburger 1997). Jan Gerchow, Katrinette Bodarwe, Susan Marti and Hedwig Rockelein (2008, p.13) suggest that '…[f]rom the beginnings of monastic life in the West (a period spanning from 500-1200 CE)…veil and crown have served as signs and symbols of women leading a religious life'. Gerchow et al. (2008) argues that until the sixth century women usually met for prayer in the house of their parents.

These women, who were involved in charitable and devotional work, were expected to veil (McNamara 1996). Gerchow et al. (2008, p.26) note from the period spanning the sixth through to the twelfth centuries, images of nuns were almost exclusively made and passed down by abbesses. In contrast to abbesses, a relatively small number of representations of nuns before the twelfth century have survived. One of the few exceptions however, which depicts a community of nuns in the twelfth century is the *Hortus deliciarum* (Garden of Delights) (1176-96). According to Fiona Griffiths (2007, p.1) Herrad (d after 1196) abbess of the Augustinian monastery in Hohenburg, Alsace, oversaw the production of the *Hortus deliciarum.* Most significantly Griffiths (2007) contends the *Hortus deliciarum* manuscript was composed and written by and for women. This provided a rich selection of text an image of the spiritual and intellectual culture of a female monastic community at the close of the twelfth century. During the Middle Ages the veil came to represent '…both the outer requirements and the spiritual significance of the life of religious women' (Gerchow et al. 2008, p.13). The dress of women religious in the medieval times was a distinctive version of the secular dress of the average married or widowed women of that time. While it is not possible to define with complete accuracy the dress of secular women of this period, fragments of original clothing found in gravesites provides a source from which to present a reasonable representation.

A reconstruction of the dress worn by secular women during this period is demonstrated by Gale Crocker-Owen (2004) by drawing on archaeological evidence from grave sites as a source of information regarding Anglo Saxon women's dress during the fifth and sixth centuries. Gale Crocker-Owen (2004) suggests that women's costume in secular society



Fig 5 Reconstruction of Anglican women's dress sixth century. c.f Crocker-Owen 2004

[3]

was appropriated by the garments worn by Christian women religious[8] (Fig 5 c.f Crocker-Owen 2004).

In her review of the salient ideals relating to women in the Mediterranean Middle East in the fifth and sixth centuries, Leila Ahmed (1992, p.35) claims misogyny was a '…distinct ingredient of Mediterranean and eventually Christian thought in the centuries preceding the rise of Islam'. The attitude of the church that the shamefulness of sex was focused on the female body, formed part of a broader ethos which deemed a women's body needed to be fully covered. These ideas, Ahmed (1992) suggests, enforced the wearing of concealing clothing, including the veil, which became increasingly emphasised. At the time of the rise of Islam in the seventh century CE, the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions were dominated by the disciplines of the Christian church. Much of the already developed scriptural misogyny that was embedded in Christianity was incorporated seamlessly into to Islamic religion. However, the rules created for the apparel of women, including the wearing of the veil, were not readily observed in the social mores of Arabia. Ahmed (1992) attests that:

> Veiling was apparently not introduced into Arabia by Muhammad but already existed among some classes, particularly in towns, though it was probably more apparent in the countries that the Arabs had contact with, such as Syria and Palestine (Ahmed 1992, p.55).

Ahmed (1992) suggests that veiling and seclusion was only observed by Muhammad's wives during his lifetime. Ahmed (1992, p.56) reveals that while it is unclear when the custom of veiling became adopted among the general community, Muslim conquests of areas in which veiling was commonplace most probably brought about its general adaption. Within ten years of Muhammad's death Arab conquests had carried Islam to lands fundamentally different from Arabia. These societies, according to Ahmed (1992, p.67) '…were more restrictive toward women and more misogynist in their modes of

controlling women by law and custom.' During the Abbasid age, Muslim scholars such as Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) determined that men in both the spiritual and material realm '…should expect to surpass the most gifted and percipient of women' (Ahmed 1992, p.68). Al-Ghazali nurtured the foundations of Christian Scriptures (Ghazanfar 2000). Ahmed (1992) elucidates that Al-Ghazali's sentiments towards women were far closer to the patristic literature developed by Tertullian or Augustine than that found in the Qu'ran. The attitudes towards women inherent in much of Mediterranean Middle Eastern lands formed part of a cultural continuum influenced by scholars such as Tertullian, Augustine and Al-Ghazali. Through its conquests, Islam developed an acculturational foundation, which gave shape to Muslim law and scriptures over the next centuries (Ahmed 1992). Furthermore, the interactions between territories brought various influences in styles of apparel for secular and women religious.

During the Middle Ages, as thousands of Christians began to live in Eastern monasteries and journeyed to the Holy Lands, various changes in clothing for secular and women religious became apparent. During these pilgrimages a constant exchange of ideas and artefacts occurred, which resulted in Eastern clothing having a great influence on Western costume, in particular the wimple and veil (Kuhns 2003). As the travellers brought fabrics and dress styles from Eastern journeys, European consumers eagerly purchased them. Kuhns (2003) notes:

> Arab turbans inspired similar styles of headdress in the West and it became fashionable for Western ladies to wear the Muslim wimple that concealed the lower part of her face (Kuhns 2003, p.90).

Désirée Koslin (2008) suggests that during the twelfth century the wimple became an accompaniment to the veil. The wimple, which was most probably adopted from Eastern cultures by European secular and religious women, is described by Koslin (2008, p.165) '…as a separate relatively fine textile in linen or silk, which covered the throat, chest and often part of the chin'. Kuhns (2003) emphasises how the symbolism of the veil and wimple became a powerful metaphor for one's sacred purpose. During the medieval period women who could be considered religious including '…consecrated virgins, nuns, deaconesses, wives of men from religious orders and widows', adopted various versions of modest dress, which included the veil and wimple (Kuhns 2003, p.87).

The miniature painting from the thirteenth century of *Hildegard of Bingen* depicts one of the most influential medieval German Benedictine abbesses who lived from 1098-1179. As a composer, herbalist, philosopher, physician, poet and scientist, *Hildegard of Bingen*

was best known for her visions, which were set down and illustrated by the nuns of her community (Fig 6 c.f Kren & Marx 2009). The painting portrays Hildegard, dressed in a black and red habit, writing down her visions with the assistance of the nun Richardis on the right and to the left, the monk Volmar (Kren & Marx 2009). Koslin (2008, p.165) notes the c. 1238 description of Hildegard's wimple in a Cologne Chronicle (Brussels BR 467; 64), in which the rich folds of the fully detached wimple are anchored to the headband under a black veil. According to Kuhns (2003) in spite of ecclesiastical legislation that required certain codes of religious apparel to be observed, Hildegard and her nun's habits often resembled secular aristocratic dress, '…with brilliant red and purple veils' (Kuhns 2003, p.81).

Many variations of the wimple and veil were adopted by women as illustrated by the Effigy of Eleanore of Aquitaine (1122-1204)[9] (Fletcher 2009). As both Queen of France and later England, when she married Henry 11 in 1154, (Owen 1996), her wearing of the wimple and veil would have been most likely embraced by high ranking women during this period (Fig 7 c.f Fletcher 2009). The depiction of two Franciscan Saints, St Clare (1193-1253) and St Elizabeth of Hungary (1207-1231) by artist Giovanni Di Paolo (1399-1482) details the gray Franciscan habit worn by both of the saints (Fig 8 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). The painting of Saint Anne (1477-89) by German artist and sculptor Viet Stoss (1438-1533), depicts one of the scenes of the High Altar of St Mary in Cracow, Poland (Fig 9 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). Placed at the crossroads of important East-West and North-South trade routes, throughout the ages, people of many different cultures and religions have enriched the spirit of the city of Cracow (Wasik 1999). During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Cracow became a centre of science, culture and art. The cosmopolitan nature of the city is reflected in the artist's depiction of the veil worn by St Anne, which represents a cross cultural adaption of veiling influenced by both Eastern and Western culture.

Koslin (2008) notes that images depicting secular women, nuns and saints that were commissioned by artists from the late medieval to the Renaissance period would have been indicative of that worn by many women across European countries. In Koslin's (2008) discussion of the veil and veiling, she highlights the various colours and styles of veils and wimples that were established in the medieval and early modern period (Figs 9 - 13). Rogier Van Der Weyden's (1445) portrait of 'Lady wearing a Gauze Headdress', illustrates her extensive Flemish winged veil, made of fine linen, which fills almost the

Veiling from the Middle Ages to Renaissance



Fig 6 Hildegrad von Bingen. (Miniature painting). c. 1230; Lucca, Biblioteca Statale. c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 7 Effigy of Eleanore of Aquitaine. b. 1122, d. 1204. Fontevraud Abbey, Anjou, France. *Photo © Adrian Fletcher, www.paradoxplace.com.*



Fig 8 Giovanni Di Paolo. Sts Clare & Elizabeth of Hungary. c. 1445; (Oil on panel). c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 9 Stoss, Veit. High Altar of St Mary - St Anne 1477-89. (Wood). Church of St Mary, Cracow. c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 10 Weyden, Rogier van der. Isabella of Portugal. c. 1500; (Oil on panel). J. Paul Getty Museum Los Angeles. c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 11 Weyden, Rogier van der. Lady Wearing a Gauze Headdress. c. 1445; (Oil on oak panel). Staatliche Museen, Berlin c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 12 Holbein, Hans the Younger. Darmstadt Madonna. c. 1526-28; (Oil on lime wood). Schloss museum, Darmstadt. c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 13 Vermeer Johannes. Young Woman with a Water Jug. c. 1660-62; (Oil on canvas). Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. c.f Kren & Marx. 2007

entire panel (Fig 11 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). The regulation of clothing for women religious and women in secular society was continuously regulated by sumptuary legislation[10] (Goodrich 1998). Kren and Marx (2007) note that styles of veiling were adapted and modified, and during the sixteenth century married women '…utilised turbans, bee hive shaped hats, mantilla and linen caps with long side lappets' to cover their heads' (Fig 13 c.f Kren and Marx 2007).

The Veiled Gaze

Paola Tinagli (1997) highlights how the presence of women in religious life was an important aspect of the Renaissance period and was reflected in the various modes of representation. During this period, many artists revived the orientation of medieval dress in their artistic endeavours. Anabel Thomas (2003) suggests the original motivation behind the creation of certain images and '…in particular the extent to which they served the internal/external gaze indicates a variety of aims and objectives' (Thomas 2003, p.3). However, Thomas (2003, p.14) claims '…there can be little doubt that the production of art aided public projection' as it reinforced the '…presence and identity of the religious establishment within lay society'. While many paintings were commissioned for the public gaze, some were used to influence everyday life and spirituality within the convent complexes. One example of this is an alter piece, showing the *sacra conversazione* (the Sacred or Holy Conversion) painted in 1470 by Pier Francesco Botticini[11] (Tinagli 1997, p.71). St Monica, the mother of St Augustine of Hippo is sitting on the throne, surrounded by Augustinian nuns (Fig 14a & 14b c.f Kren and Marx 2007). St Augustine, who had founded a community of nuns under his patronage, had set down guidelines for the sisters' monastic lives, instructing them '…to dress modestly, to be veiled and take their clothing from the common store at random' (McNamara 1996, p.85). Despite the death of St Monica occurring approximately one thousand years before this work was commissioned, the objective and aim of the church may have been to emphasise an 'orthodox past' in the history of Christian dogma by depicting the women in religious apparel reminiscent of the medieval period (Thomas 2003, p.3). Depicting the nuns in a 'traditional' habit can also be viewed as a distinctive image to reinforce the power of prayer to the women religious living in the convent, as St Monica was considered the model of Christian motherhood, due to her timeless prayers for the conversion of her son St Augustine to Christianity (Forbes 1998). Many paintings, and altar pieces, which reflected a familiar theme, were selected from an existing repertoire of images ratified by the Church.

St Monica and Augustinian Nuns



Fig 14a Botticini, Pier Francesco (also credited to Verricchio Andrea del). Saint Monica, c 1470
(Panel)
Santo Spirito, Florence.
c.f Kren & Marx. 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 14b Detail of Augustinian Nuns with Saint Monica, c 1470
(Panel)
Santo Spirito, Florence.

Horst De La Croix, Richard Tansey, and Diane Kirkpatrick, (1987) note that from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance period the church dominated the lives of European artists. In an attempt to edify new adherents to the Christian religion, Christian churches fashioned their walls with a tapestry of monumental mosaics and images (De La Croix et al. 1987). Similarly, David Morgan (2005) suggests that the majority of artistic commissions during the Middle Ages to the Renaissance period were of Christian subjects. The capacity to mobilise and shape the understanding of Christianity through visual images including saints, Mary, scriptural or apocryphal figures became an integral part of '…the primacy of seeing' (Morgan 2005, p.3). Morgan (2005) designates the way of seeing that invests an image, a viewer, or an act of viewing with spiritual significance as a *sacred gaze*. While acknowledging the importance of theoretical interpretations of the gaze that have materialised over the last three decades, Morgan (2005) suggests that most often the meaning of the gaze has been reduced to a singular negative, limited to ocular forms of manipulation. For Morgan (2005, p.4) '…[a] gaze is a projection of conventions that enable certain possibilities of meaning, certain forms of experience, and certain relations among participants'. In this way the gaze signals an entire range of 'ways of seeing', not only in the unconscious promptings that are exerted in images but the manner in which:

> [E]ach configuration carries particular assumptions about what is visible, the conditions under which the visible is visible, the rules governing visibility and the credibility of images, and what power an image may assert over those who see it (Morgan 2005, p.5).

How one is socially positioned and how these positionings shape the parameters within which interpretations are made, are in constant negotiation with the visual. The veil, as part of the holy habit was so esteemed that it was all but worshipped and became centripetal in the visual imagery represented by the Christian church (Kuhns 2003). Moreover, the veil became a powerful medium for conveying and constructing sensibilities of belief as '[s]eeing…was a fundamental…aspect of believing' (Morgan 2005, p.11). One of the most distinctive features of Christian devotional imagery about women or by women has been the iconic symbol of the Virgin Mary.

The Cult of Mary

In the formative years of Christianity, the Blessed Virgin Mary became the model for consecrated Christian women (McNamara 1996; Kuhns 2003). Jaroslav Pelikan (1996, p.83) notes that the profound and persistent significance of the Virgin Mary throughout various ages and places has been sustained, as in every century she has '…served as the

model of patience, passivity and unquestioning obedience'. By extension of Roman Catholic Mariology, the Virgin has been translated through poems, works of art and icons. Fatima Carvalho (2005) highlights the way in which representations of Mary in artistic works have universalised and over coded her image. Assigning Mary, as 'sliding signifier' Carvalho (2005) suggests Mary has been understood in various ways through artistic depictions, including '… the mother of Jesus, the virgin, the daughter, the queen, the leader, the patron, the path towards Jesus, a goddess, a mere human…'(Carvalho 2005). Pelikan (1996, p.215) argues the centrality of the Virgin Mary in the history of Western art is an indispensable interpretive key that has maintained its prominence in the Western world, providing special significance in formulating a social history of Western spirituality.

Arthur Voyce (1977) contends the visual images produced throughout the early medieval and Byzantine period[12] (fourth–fifteenth centuries), were an integral part of its members' consciousness of the world. The characteristics of Byzantine painting were developed in mural decorations, on miniatures in manuscripts and small panel paintings, which were known as known as icons (De La Croix et al. 1987). These icons were intended as potent symbols '…that spoke directly to the man in the street…' (Brown 2002, p.181). The characteristic of iconographic imagery, dealt with religious subjects only and was rigorously formulated and prescribed by the rules of the Church (Voyce 1977, p.13). Consequently, the development of iconic images of Mary during this period was dictated by rigid iconographic and aesthetic rules imposed by the ecclesiastical authorities (Abbate 1972). The image of the Virgin holding the infant Christ on her left or right arm became one of the most common subjects of icons (Galavaris 1981, p.12). The iconic images were designed to instruct the viewers and many were displayed in peoples' homes, often forming home altars (Kren and Marx 2007). The image of the *Madonna and Child with Saints and Crucifixion* (1260-70) by Italian painter Bonaventura Berlinghieri represents one of the early examples of iconographic depictions of the Virgin Mary influenced by Byzantine design (Fig 15 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). This model was used for portable household altars and became increasingly popular and widespread until the end of the fourteenth century (Kren and Marx 2007). Representative of church dogma and influenced by Byzantium, the deterministic religious iconic compositions of the Virgin resulted in the evolving of characteristic types, which once established, were copied over and over again (Voyce 1977). The Byzantine characteristics depicted in the configuration of the Madonna's face and the positioning of the veil flowed into the art of Russia and the

The Cult of Mary Iconographic Images



Fig 15 Berlinghieri, Bonaventura
Madonna & Child with Saints & Crucifixion
c 1260-70
(Tempera on wood)
Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence
State Historical Museum Moscow
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 16 The Vladimir Madonna
Twelfth century
(Painted wood)
State Historical Museum Moscow
c.f De La Croix, H Tansey, R & Kirkpatrick, D 1987.



Fig 18 Dionysius
The Mother of God Hodigitria
c 1502-03
(Egg tempera on panel)
Russian Museum, St. Petersburg
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 17 Akotantos, Angelos
The Virgin Cardiotissa
c 1400-50
(Tempera & leaf on panel)
Byzantine & Christian Museum, Athens
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art

West (De La Croix et al. 1981). De La Croix et al. (1981, p.296) present a famous example of this icon, the *Vladimir Madonna,* which they suggest was most probably painted by a Byzantine artist in the twelfth century and taken to Moscow in 1395 to protect the city from the Mongols (Fig 16 c.f De La Croix et al. 1981). The artistic 'migration' of this image is represented by *The Virgin Cardiotissa* (1400-50) by Greek artist Angelos Akotantos (died before 1457), (Fig 17 c.f De La Croix et al. 1981). It is also depicted in the tempera on panel of *The Mother of God Hodigitria* (1502-03) by Moscow artist Dionysius (1440-1510) (Fig 18 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). According to one legend this icon was a talisman for the Greek emperors during their military campaign (Kren and Marx 2007).

During the eighth century the new faith of Islam had spread with unprecedented speed throughout the Middle East (Gordon 2005). In his inquiry into the processes of figurative interpretations of the Virgin Mary, Pelikan (1996) makes a claim that there is a 'fundamental ignorance' by Westerners about the place of Mary (Miriam) in the Islamic faith. Pelikan (1996) states that as one of the longest of the 114 chapters in the Holy Qur'ān, the sections sūrah numbered 19 titled 'Maryam' (meaning Mary in Arabic), bears reference to Mary where she is revered for her purity, her devout faith and her virgin conception of Jesus. Pelikan (1996, p.215) argues the domination of 'the history of ideas' in the West has chosen to ignore explanations about Mary in the Qur'ān. Robin Cormack (1985) notes that during the eighth century the Christian church attempted to prohibit figurative religious art (Iconoclasm). Cormack (1985, p.95) states that during the period of Byzantine Iconoclasm, the neighbouring Islamic world developed an enduring style of art for the mosque which entirely omitted representations of the human figure. Cormack (1985) suggests that within broader discussion concerning the reasons for the rise in Iconoclasm, a view is offered that suggests Iconoclasm represented a response to the rise of Islam and the Arab Empire and to the subsequent changes in Middle Eastern culture. Thus Christian Iconoclasm is seen as part of a 'reformation' in Byzantine Christianity stimulated by the threat of a new religion. However, by the ninth century the use of icons as a 'silent script' were considered essential in confirming doctrines and codes of behaviour in the teaching of Christian history (Cormack 1985, p.156). Similarly, Pelikan (1996) suggests the reestablishment of iconography by the Christian church can be located in the context of the changes taking place in relation to the rise of Islam as the iconic representation of the Virgin Mary became a patron of victory. Her images were carried on banners by armies going into battle '…particularly against those who were

perceived to be enemies of the Christian faith, such as the Muslims' (Pelikan 1996, p.27). Miri Rubin (2004) argues that Mary's image:

> …was the secret weapon of missionaries…of those whom they aimed to Christianise, it accompanied merchants and friars on their [journeys,] and as a global image has been made and remade out of the dream of her beholders and the suggestions of her purveyors. She was often the first image put forward as conquest ceded a space to mission, an image of love and inclusion after the trauma off conquest (Rubin 2004, p.1).

Rubin (2004) highlights how the power of Mary's image, which has been woven into peoples and cultures across boundaries, elicits attentiveness and pleasure even from those who know little about Christianity or European art (Rubin 2004). The magnitude of images of the Virgin Mary framed and reframed by the imagination of painters has acted to emphasise the physical and emotional aspects of Mary's life to wide audiences for centuries (Pelikan 1996). Images created during the Renaissance period, gave rise to a new establishment of artistic imagery devoted to the Cult of Mary. Michel Pastoureau (2001) notes the colour blue was sought by painters to display the Virgin during the twelfth century. The specifics of blue associated with the veil of the Virgin Mary continued as a tradition to evoke both the folds of the fabric of the Virgins' veil and the sanctity of the subject (Pastoureau 2001). The right panel of the Wilton Diptych (1395-99), which is a late medieval panel painting by an unknown author, depicts the Virgin with angels in the universally recognised blue garments[13] (Fig 19 c.f Kren & Marx 2007). Reportedly this portable diptych was painted for King Richard 11 of England and followed him on his travels so he would be transported among the timeless company of the Virgin Mary and the angels (Kren and Marx 2007). Framed within religious precept, the symbolic value of blue became associated with Mary's veil and continued to be a defining representative of purity and virginity.

During the Renaissance period paintings of the Virgin were often symbolised by the colour blue. Goodrich (1998, p.715) argues that signs and symbols produced within images were governed by strict codes of representation and were a key component of 'aesthetic communication' in the public sphere. Images of the Virgin symbolised in the colour blue were depicted in alter pieces, paintings and panels. *The Death of the Virgin* (1308-11) by Duccio di Buoninsegna draws on the work from the Byzantine model, depicting the Virgin in a traditional iconic image (Fig 20 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). In addition the Virgin Mary with *Christ on the Road to Calvary* (1415-20), highlights the blue veil indicative of paintings representative of Mary during the renaissance period (Fig 21 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). Similarly the *Annunciation* (1430-32) from the main



Fig 19 Wilton Diptych
c1395-99
c.f Pastoureau 2001



Fig 20 Duccio di Buoninsegna
Death of the Virgin
c1308-11 - Tempera on wood
Museo dell'Opera del Duomo, Siena
c.f Kren E & Marx D 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 22 Angelico Fra
The Annunciation
c1430-32 - Tempera on wood
Museo del Prado, Madrid
c.f Kren E & Marx D 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 21 Andrea Di Bartolo
Christ on the Road to Calvary
c1415-20 - Tempera on wood
Fumdacion Coleccion Thyssen-Bornemisza, Pedralbes
c.f Kren E & Marx D 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 23 Bellini Giovanni
Madonna with the Child
c1460-64 - Tempera on panel
Accademia Carrara, Bergamo
c.f Kren E & Marx D 2007
Web Gallery of Art

painting of the Prado Altarpiece, represents a continuum of medieval imagery with its use of blue to represent the Virgin (Fig 22 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). In the fifteenth century, Renaissance artists continued to produce works depicting the Virgin Mary, such as Giovanni Bellini's *Madonna with the Child* (1460-64). These representations were framed and reframed by a plethora of images, which were bound up with the material semiotics of community identity (Fig 23 c.f Kren and Marx 2007).

As a culturally determined schema of interpretation, the framing of images of veiled nuns and the Virgin Mary continues to endure, transmitting the material work of art to promote spiritual significance. The implementation of this framing schema has manifested 'knowledge of reproduction techniques', guiding and shaping the public's perceived expectations (Ensink 2003, p.71). These expectations serve to confer details of events or objects as part of a certain frame which has been built from prior knowledge. The universalizing proclivities, that have given shape to the foundations of the concepts of the veil though Western art, has acted to shape the formulation of the veil through discourses of representation mobilised and maintained by 'symbolic interpretive constructs' (Lettinga and Saharso 2008, p.6). These symbolic constructs, have engendered knowledge networks that have been framed to guide aspects of one's everyday experiences. Constituting a visual mediator between laypeople and Christianity, the meaning of religious artistic depictions of the veil has been situated within a transformational framing schema, which has formulated the reframing of artistic depictions within historically and socially situated conditions. This 'universal affectivity' (Miles 1985, p.30) has deployed deeper structural messages acting to shape shared beliefs and ideologies regarding Christian veiling.

Veiled Threats

As part of public discourse, images provide an interconnecting network of signifying codes (Goodrich 1998). The material semiotics of the veil, which offered spiritual comfort to many in the realm of the everyday, bore the seeds of condemnation during the French revolution (Kuhns 2003). According to Kuhns (2003) dress became a powerful tool in the period of social and political upheaval during the French revolution (1789-1799). The French nuns were perceived as deeply connected to the aristocracy and were accused of counter revolutionary behaviour. Nuns became key targets of the revolution and the habit and veil worn by the nuns was viewed with suspicion. They were verbally and physically abused and forced to discard their habits and wear street clothing (Kuhns 2003). The nuns who refused to conform to the rules concerning their dress apparel were

imprisoned and some were sent to the guillotine. According to Kuhns (2003, p.114), the philosophical ideals that emerged in the Age of Enlightenment, pitted '…man against religion and the Revolutionaries' Reign of Terror (1793-1794) committed itself to secularizing society'. In the domain of appearance, the symbolic visual descriptor of the veil was viewed with disdain by the revolutionaries, as it was deemed an anathema to their secular ideology. In a broader sense, the argument of protecting a secular state by banning the veil worn by women during the Enlightenment age has re-emerged two hundred years later, with the French Legislators banning the headscarf/veil and all 'conspicuous' religious symbols from state schools on 10 February 2004 (Ezekiel 2005). A more detailed analysis relating to this contested issue will be dealt with in Chapter Five.

Kuhns (2003) emphasises the way discrimination against the nuns' apparel escalated throughout Europe. In 1794, the French revolution had advanced to Belgium and the Benedictine nuns were forced to leave the city, replacing their habit with garments at hand, including table cloths and cloaks. English Benedictine nuns assigned to monasteries across Europe faced imprisonment and death (Kuhns 2003). As a result many nuns looked to forming new communities in countries outside of Europe. After the turmoil of the French revolution, many Orders of nuns regrouped and expanded. By the nineteenth century hundreds of new communities had formed. According to Kuhns (2003, p.117) '…[t]he habit served as the rallying point, binding new communities together'. The debates about the role of nuns and convents perceived as aligned with the 'Old' regime of politics and society during the French Revolution necessitated some of the Orders migrating beyond European borders (*Jamberoo Abbey* 2007). This eventually resulted in nuns from many Orders arriving in Australia during the mid-nineteenth century. The role of many early Orders of women religious who arrived in Australia was as missionaries whose quest was to evangelise Indigenous Australians (HREOC 1997; Choo 2001). Influenced by the missionary journeys of St Paul, nineteenth and early twentieth women religious were motivated by the belief that they were answering God's call to bring salvation to all people (Sherlock 2008). The next section explores the interconnections between the representation of the veil as a defining symbol of care and Christian spiritual belief, cultural imperialism and the mission to Christianise' and 'civilise' Indigenous Australians during the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century.



Fig 24 Sisters of St John of God at Beagle Bay Mission with babies and toddlers born at the Derby Leprosarium
c. 1930s c.f Lewis c. 2003

Courtesy Sisters of St John of God Heritage Centre Broome WA.

The Veil, Nuns and the Christianising Mission in Australia

While an in depth analysis regarding the symbolic materiality of the veil for Indigenous Australians is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is relevant to provide the context of the symbolism of the veil worn by women religious who lived and worked on Catholic missions during the early and mid-twentieth century. The first part provides an overview of the role of the Sisters of St John of God who lived on the Beagle Bay mission in the Kimberly region of Western Australia from the early twentieth century. This discussion, which provides a regional focus, echoes the role of nuns in missions across Australia during the early twentieth century. Stefano Girola (2003) and Christine Choo (2001) have noted although the Catholic missions across Australia were established by different Orders, their primary purpose was an attempt to 'civilise' and 'evangelise' Indigenous Australians. As part of this discourse the flowing veil became a representative symbol of Christian spiritual perfection that was framed within the norms and values of religious and state instrumentalism.

The Beagle Bay mission was originally established by the Trappist monks in 1890. From the early 1900s it was under the control of the Pallotine Order. According to Choo (2001):

> The Pallotine approach to Evangelisation was to …settle the people and remove the children. [This] was actively pursued and encouraged by the missionaries and was to influence the development of policy and practice in relation to Aboriginal affairs in Western Australia over the next fifty years (Choo 2001, p.59).

As the numbers of children attending the mission steadily increased the Pallotine priests sought the assistance of female missionaries (Choo 2001). In 1906, nine Sisters of St John of God[14] came from Ireland to Beagle Bay mission. Under the leadership of Mother Antonio O'Brien, the sisters at Beagle Bay mission supervised and cared for the children (Choo 2001). Although their lives were difficult, the Sisters of St John of God worked hard to establish a religious community under the dictates of the patriarchal ideologies of the Catholic Church (Choo 2001). According to Choo (2001, p.61) the highly structured gendered role divisions entrenched in the Catholic Church ensured that the Sisters would be 'housekeepers' to the priests and brothers and 'mothers' to the Aboriginal adults and children . The nuns' role was to become 'surrogate mothers' to the children at the mission and this was critical to the overall plans of the Pallotine priests to evangelise the Indigenous people (Choo 2001). The overarching patriarchal European Catholic perspective regarding the sexuality of women in the church and Western society during this period was profound on the missions (Choo 2001, p.86). Patricia Grimshaw (2008) asserts:

> The influence of the gendered ideology of nineteenth-century evangelicalism was profound on early mission outreach, in Australia. Missionaries preached to non-Christian populations whose gender arrangements they found uniformly disturbing given their rigid attachment to western family forms…..prescriptions of appropriate ways of expressing masculinity and femininity, of performing courtship, sexuality and marriage, of gender divisions of labour, parenthood and childrearing, were major components of the mission agenda (Grimshaw 2008, p.4).

The core of gendered Catholic ideology set in motion a process to '…redefine the role of Aboriginal women from a particular European Catholic perspective' (Choo 2001, p.86). The contact between Asian labour[15], employed in the pearling industry in Western Australia and Aboriginal women, became a concern for the missionaries at Beagle Bay. The missionaries strongly disapproved of sexual contact between Asians and Aboriginal women, in particular the Malays (Choo 2001). The missionaries' focus, which was to transform 'promiscuous' Aboriginal women into collaborative 'good mission women', was used as justification for missionary intervention into Aboriginal women's lives. From the beginning of the twentieth century to the post World War II period, '…the control of Aboriginal women's sexuality became a factor precipitating the transfer of women and children to the mission' (Choo 2001, p.99). The Catholic ideology fuelled the moral imperatives of missionary nuns[16] to play an active role in the missions' agenda for Aboriginal women to become 'good Catholics', by imposing the morality and values of 'respectable' European women (Grimshaw 2008; Choo 2001). Girola (2003, p.27) notes how '… the embodiment of the virtue of chastity adopted by the mission Sisters', was not

only used to confirm the position of superiority enjoyed by the missionaries', but also to debased the role of Aboriginal women in 'primitive' societies. The attempt to control Aboriginal women's sexuality was perpetuated by collusion between the State and the missions. The missionaries' intervention was based primarily on the ideology of Christian and moral values. As the numbers of children who were classified as of 'mixed-decent' began to increase, the State's imperative, to keep Aboriginal women under surveillance on the missions, was driven by concerns about miscegenation and the retaining of white 'racial purity' (Choo 2001). Fiona Paisley (2004) states that given the perceived urgency of merging the 'mixed-decent' population, the potential of the children became a focus of officials and experts'. Most of the children deemed as 'mixed decent' were taken from their mothers and placed in the care of the missionaries and State institutions. The issues concerning miscegenation will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century various State and subsequent federal Acts[17] were passed to allow and justify the removal of Aboriginal children from their families (Choo 2001). Sister Pat Rhatigan (2004) has stated that '…although the nuns were not instrumental in the removing Aboriginal children from their families, they were involved in the care of the children who were removed[18]' (Rhatigan 2004 cited in *Sisters Pearls and Mission Girls* 2004). Many of the 'Stolen Generations'[19] were placed in the mission (HREOC 1997; Choo 2001). Choo (2001) notes the way in which Aboriginal women's reflections of their lives in the Beagle Bay mission environment have been considerably varied. The narratives of these women are reflective of those expressed by many members of the Stolen Generation who were sent to missions under various 'protection' Acts (HREOC 1997). While for some it had positive outcomes, for others it was a harsh experience. Christine Choo (2001), who interviewed some of the women from the Beagle Bay Mission, has argued:

> Some women reflect on these times with a deep sense of gratitude and fondness as they realise the missionaries gave them…an opportunity to participate in the community beyond the mission. Others grieve for their Indigenous languages, culture and spirituality, which have been lost over three to four generations (Choo 2001, p.142).

Margaret Zucker (2005) has noted that some of the men and women who were raised on the mission have recalled that the Sisters were like mothers to them. Having been separated through official policy, being cared for by the nuns was a more positive outcome rather than being sent to a government institution. A significant feature of the Sisters' role was the provision of health care. This was particularly evident with the outbreak of Leprosy (Hansen's disease). In the account of her life at the Derby

Leprosarium, Sister Alphonsus Daly (n.d) states that the first patients to be diagnosed with the disease in the region of the Kimberley were isolated and treated at Beagle Bay mission by the nuns. By the 1930s, the Sisters of St John of God took over the care of all the patients at the Leprosarium based at Derby[20]. Sister Pat Rhatigan (2004) has noted how the babies born at the Leprosarium were often weak as the mothers had to take various drugs for the disease. When the children were healthy they were then sent to one of the missions as nominated by the mother to be cared for by the Sisters (Fig 24 c.f Lewis 2003). In her study of the role of the church in dealing with leprosy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Anne O'Brien (2008) suggests that the relationship between the nuns and those in their care '…is tightly woven, highly charged and full of contradiction' (O'Brien 2008, p.40.1). For some members of the Stolen Generation, the women religious who became implicated in colonising regimes were perceived as 'cultural imperialists', forming an integral part of the ideological assumptions and values of religious and state instrumentalism (Kosambi 2000). As the numbers of 'half caste' children removed from their parents increased during the early to mid-twentieth century, the veil became one the most identifiable symbols of the civilising mission (O'Brien 2005). O'Brien (2005) has argued that during the mission to assimilate and 'Christianise' Indigenous Australians, in particular the 'half caste' children, the veil was imbued with eugenic ideas and cultural absorption. The early Sisters that arrived in Australia formed an integral part of the colonial, religious and political discourse that reflected Western Christian values.

According to O'Brien (2005), the establishment of early Orders of women religious, paved the way for successive generations of nuns to establish their authority as religious sisters, social reformers, voluntary workers, and as educators. As the numbers of nuns increased in Australia the regulation of their apparel was strictly enforced by the Church. This edict brought about a 'recognisable' visual presence of veiled women religious in Australia. The next section brings into focus how the representation of the apparel worn by women religious has and continues to be framed as a 'familiar' representation of veiling in Australia.

O'Brien (2005) suggests that during the middle to late 1800s, as the education of Catholic children became integral to the work of religious sisters, many followed the spread of population in rural areas, resulting in country convents flourishing. One of the most notable Orders established in Australia was the Sisters of St Joseph, founded by Mary



Fig 27 Nuns at Jamberoo Abbey
c.f *Jamberoo Abbey 2007*

MacKillop in 1867 (Figs 25 & 26 c.f *Sisters of Saint Joseph of the Sacred Heart*). Mother Mary MacKillop, (also known as Mary of the Cross) arrived in Petersburg, South Australia (now known as Peterborough) in 1876, to organise the setting up of schools in the surrounding areas (*Peterborough Centenary 1876-1976).*

From the late 1800s to the early 1900s the Sisters of St Joseph had established many schools in South Australia. As Robert Dixon (2005) notes by 1880, there were a total of 815 sisters from all Orders teaching in schools; by 1910 the number exceeded 5000 (Dixon 2005). Focusing her study on the history of religious sisters in New South Wales, O'Brien (2005, p.167) indicates that '…[i]n 1890, with the exception of Grafton, there were more nuns per head of Catholic population in every rural diocese than in Sydney'. From the early colonial period to the 1950s the number of religious sisters in Australia gradually increased. During the 1950s as the number of Australian Catholics grew rapidly, many parishes were established and the number of women religious continued to expand (Dixon 2005).

In the realms of the everyday, the presence of increased numbers of nuns brought in to view the visual manifestation of the veil as a familiar symbol of religious expression, which was fostered as part of the 'normalcy' of White Judeo-Christian Australia. During the 1960s, however, after the introduction of Vatican II, the presence of nuns wearing the habit and veil in Australia began to decrease (Lafontaine 2008). Although by the 1970s most Orders had discarded the habit and veil, some nuns continued to wear the 'traditional' apparel (Fig 27 c.f *Jamberoo Abbey* 2007). The deeper structural messages regarding Christian veiling have been framed in language, religion, the arts and public

Nuns in Australia



Fig 25 Blessed Mary MacKillop
and Sister Josephine McMullen
c 1869
c.f *Sisters of Saint Joseph of the Sacred Heart*
Used with permission of *the Trustees of the Sisters of St Joseph*



Fig 26 Blessed Mary MacKillop in Adelaide
c late 1800s
c.f *Sisters of Saint Joseph of the Sacred Heart*
Used with permission of *the Trustees of the Sisters of St Joseph*



Fig 28 Rolevink Judith 2009
Sculpture of Mary MacKillop
Mary MacKillop Plaza
Adelaide, South Australia

and official speeches, which has influenced the shaping of shared beliefs and ideologies (Mayer 2000).

In Australia, this has been highlighted most recently by paintings, photographs and sculptures, representing Mary MacKillop and also by speeches given by Prime Minister Rudd, to mark a hundred years since Mary's death and also as a promotion towards her sainthood[21] (Tasker 2009). This framing is most apparent in the sculpture of the Blessed Mary MacKillop by Adelaide artist, Judith Rolevink, which was 'unveiled' at the Mary MacKillop Plaza, Adelaide, South Australia in March 2009 (Fig 28 c.f Rolevink 2009). This image has the potential to deploy conventions and common sense understandings of a woman who is wearing a veil as a familiar symbol, determined by interpretations and representations of a social reality framed within a paradigm of cultural Western norms. Through the complexities of dominant culturally meaningful discourses, veiling has been framed as familiar in European secular and religious apparel for many centuries. Central to the production of the veil as familiar has been the available images by which people construct ideological representations. Marc Steinberg (1998) argues the available repertoires allow fluidity in the ways in which these representations can be constructed. Through discursive constructions of meaning, the familiarity of the veil has been framed through an expectation of normative social and cultural processes, inherently tied to '…white representation [in] narrative structural positions, rhetorical tropes and habits of perception' (Dyer 1999, p.543). The connectedness to white representation and thus its normativity and neutrality, provides the potency of the familiar to render the veil's aesthetic visuality as 'invisible'. The ubiquitous invisibility of the veil most often resides in taken for granted Western representations including the wedding veil and as a part of the apparel worn by nurses.

Nursing Habits

Patricia Donahue (1996) suggests that the history of nursing, becomes continuous with the beginning of Christianity. Early Christian idealism promoted the care of the sick as an activity '...through which an individual might inherit eternal life' (Donahue 1996, p.74). The care of the sick, undertaken by deaconesses, widows and nuns, enabled a systematic development of organised nursing (Kuhns 2003; Donahue 1996). As various Orders began to emerge, variations of the rudimentary elements of the traditional robes of the nun's habits were adopted. During certain periods, religious women who worked in hospitals wore a distinctive dress of black or brown, or white habits. The work of caring

for the sick by consecrated nuns was highly respected by the church and they were often '…distinguished by a white veil' (Donahue 1996, p.83).

During the sixth and seventh century, the women entering monastic houses grew in number. The main function of the women who entered the monasteries was to care for the sick. The monastic ideal of humility '…led to the use of plain, coarse materials for clothing' and this distinctive dress for religious women caring for the sick, became a custom (Donahue 1996, p.103).

> The veil, as part of the convent dress symbolised humility, obedience and service, was a part of the prescribed habit and …were always white during the probationary period of the novice (Donahue 1996, p.103).

From the beginning of the thirteenth century many women religious dedicated their lives to assisting patients in hospitals connected to their convents (Kuhns 2003). In the fourteenth century, the Brigittine Order was established by a Swedish princess, Birgitta (1303-1373). Birgitta enforced the design of the habit for the nuns, which she reported was an instruction from Christ.

The strictly enforced habit was '…decorated with five red circles to symbolise five drops of blood from Jesus' wounds' (Kuhns 2003, p.93). Various interpretations of the habit were initiated for the sisters who attended the sick. In the seventeenth century St Vincent de Paul and St Louise de Marillac founded the Sisters of Charity in France (Kuhns 2003, p.110). Despite debates occurring regarding the design of the habit the sisters should adopt, eventually the white cornet with starched folded wings became the mandated standard design. According to Kuhns (2003, p.110) this design was adopted in the mission territories and '…Muslim hospital patients referred to the sisters as the 'swallows of Allah'. Kuhns (2003) suggests as communities of sisters established themselves in foreign lands the veil was used to maintain the rigid social hierarchy important to the times. The symbolic image of the white veil which became a vital feature affiliated with the care of the sick, developed from the original sisters' Orders founded by the church.
It played an important role in circumscribing a visual descriptor emblematic of spirituality, humility and care. The early Christian tradition of women religious who cared for the sick donning a white veil, continued for many centuries. In his analysis of the origins of the 'sister title' in nursing, Timothy Wand (2004) states during the nineteenth century the colony of Australia turned to Britain for guidance when establishing training for nurses. The notion of 'sisterhood', which had placed restrictions on the lives of the sisters in the early Christian orders, extended to the establishment of



Fig 29 Nurses Uniform
Calvary Hospital Adelaide
C 1900
SA Medical Heritage Soc n.d.



Fig 30 Mulligan J 1927-1996
St Vincent Hospital Nurses 1967
National Library of Australia
Nla.pic-an24381327

the nursing profession in Australia. Initially, modifications made to nurse's uniforms were heavily influenced by those of women in religious orders (Wand 2004, p.36). This is demonstrated in the illustration of a nurse's uniform in 1900 the Calvary Hospital, Adelaide (Fig 29 c.f *South Australian Medical Heritage Society n.d*). The veil has been continuously in a state of appraisal and change, ranging from a shorter version of the veil to a cap. The image from the John Mulligan photo collection (1960-1976) demonstrates the variations of the veil worn by two nurses from St Vincent Hospital in 1967 (Fig 30 c.f *National Library of Australia*). Donahue (1996) notes, however, the cap of the modern nurse, which was a modification of the white religious veil that stemmed from early Christian nurses, has always '…been associated with humility and the rendering of service to mankind' (Donahue 1996, p.104). The nurses' caps, '…which were referred to as 'veils', were only discontinued in the last twenty years' (Wand 2004, p.36). Rafat Jan (1996) argues the concept of modern nursing has been most often attributed to Florence Nightingale who became dedicated to the treatment of the injured during the Crimean war in the nineteenth century.[22] However, nursing orders involved in the care of the injured during the event of war is more likely to be traced to the Crusades. During 1096 and 1291, the religious sanctioned Crusades, waged by much of Christian Europe against the '…heretics of the Near East', resulted in the establishment of new nursing Orders to care for the sick and wounded (Donahue 1996, p.115). As many new Orders of nuns and associated sisters assisted the Knights who took part in the Crusades, a variety of habits were adopted. Kuhns (2003) suggests the emblem of the cross, which was incorporated into the clothing by many of the Knights involved in military life during the Crusades,



Fig 31 A Nun of St John of Jerusalem nursing Order during the Crusades. The Bettmann Archive, New York. c.f Donahue 1996:122

was adopted by the sisters who assumed a female version in their habit (Kuhns 2003, p.91). Donahue (1996) provides an image depicting one of the Sisters who did hospital work for the Order of St John of Jerusalem, whose habit consisted of a black robe with a white linen Maltese cross embroidered on the left breast (Fig 31 c.f Donahue 2003, p.122). Later a white cross on a red background was adopted. The cross of St John survived the Crusade period and became a part of the insignia of many groups caring for the sick (Donahue 1996). The women involved in nursing during this period entered under the military ideal of discipline, combining religion and charity in their dedicated services. Mary O'Brien (2007) suggests that the military nursing orders, which were founded specifically to care for fallen and injured Crusaders, were indeed the forebears of contemporary military nurses throughout the world. O'Brien (2007) argues that during the Crusades, members of the military nursing orders, as military nurses do today, '…took an oath of obedience and promised willingness to risk their lives in order to care for those wounded in war' (O'Brien 2007, p.29). The nursing profession also flourished in Saudi Arabia during this period. Jan (1996) notes, the not widely recognised Muslim nurse, Rufaida Al-Asalmiya[23], provided care to the Muslim army in battle. Al-Asalmiya also developed a nursing code of conduct and ethics '…many centuries before the concept of modern nursing was introduced in the Western world by Nightingale' (Jan 1996, p.267). Under her guidance, many nurses were trained in all aspects of nursing, including physical and emotional care and comfort (Dieckmann 2006). The seeds of nursing, which were planted in preceding centuries, influenced the ongoing nursing movements involved in the events of war. One of the most significant symbols circumscribing nursing and war was the distinctive headdress of the white veil.

The Veil, Nurses and War

Australia's commitment to fight in overseas wars before and after federation relied on the involvement of nurses. Images of nurses were used as a symbol of comfort and care to the soldiers. According to Robyn Birchenough (2008) the involvement of Australian nurses in war began in 1898 when a group of nurses rallied to support troops in the Boer War. They served with the New South Wales Medical Corps units in British hospitals or on hospital ships and trains (Birchenough 2008). The photograph of a group of *Six Patriotic Nurses* shows the long veil as part of the uniform worn by the nurses who participated in the Boer war (Fig 32 c.f *National Archives of Australia* 2009). Nurses were an integral part of the operations of the Australian forces in the First World War. Birchenough (2008) notes that the nurses in their veils and uniforms were as recognisable as the Diggers in their slouch hats. Nurses were called on to work in Egypt, Lemmos, England, Belgium, Greece, Salonika, Palestine, Mesopotamia, India and France. Many nurses were identified by their uniforms as shown in the photograph of the group of nurses who worked in a hospital in Beziers France in World War 1. The group of nurses were known as 'Bluebirds' because of their distinctive blue uniforms (Fig 33 c.f *Australian War Memorial* 2009). Many nurses served the injured in hospitals in Australia, in particular to care for permanently incapacitated men. The photograph of nurses and patients at a hostel originally known as *Kamesburgh* (later became known as ANZAC Hostel) at Brighton, Victoria, was opened in July 1919 and had the capacity of twenty five beds and employed seven nurses to care and give comfort to the men who were out of action (Fig 34 & 35, *Australian War Memorial* 2009). Many nurses also worked in overseas hospitals. Members of the Australian Army Nursing Services (AANS) working in the Victoria Hospital in Bombay gave care and comfort to a wide variety of patients including '…British Prisoners of War (POWs), Turkish prisoners and British Troops' (Fig 36 c.f *Australian War Memorial* 2009). Highlighting the significance of the veil as part of the nurses' uniform is demonstrated in the photograph of Staff Nurse Frances Mary Byron MacKeller who embarked from Sydney NSW in 1917 to work the Welsh General Hospital in Deolali, India, (Fig 37 c.f *Australian War Memorial* 2009).

During World War 11 nurses became an integral part of the military structure. Their work, which included nursing the wounded soldiers and also offering care and comfort as an aid to the soldiers' recovery, was viewed with admiration and respect (Donahue 1996, p.374). During this war, a heightened awareness of the nation's dependence on nurses to meet the crisis of wounded soldiers intensified. According to the *Australian Government*

Culture Portal (2009) the number of Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS) who served in World War 2 was 3,477, with 71 not returning, as they lost their lives during active service overseas. The 'spirit of nursing' was acknowledged by the soldiers and military officials (Donahue 1996, p.353). Images of women wearing the white veil became a rallying symbol representing care and comfort to wounded soldiers both overseas and in Australia. (Figs 38, 39, 40, 41 *Australian War Memorial* 2009). The photographer who captured the image of nurses on duty at an operational base in the Pacific added the following comments:

> According to all the boys they have done a wonderful job. Sister Gillander (second from left) has been here for fifteen months and she is a second Florence Nightingale (Fig 42 c.f Australian *War Memorial* 2009).

The theme of care and comfort was portrayed in images before and after the war. This is shown in The *Red Cross of Comfort*, by artist John Morton-Sale which was commissioned at the beginning of World War 11 by the Queen Mother in 1939, with the intention of auctioning it to raise money for the Red Cross. (Fig 43 c.f Donahue 1996). Representations of the theme of care and comfort has also been recognised in the *World War Two Memorial* located at ANZAC Square Brisbane, Queensland, which depicts a wounded Australian soldier being comforted by a nursing sister (Fig 44 c.f *Art in Public Places*).

As patriotism became prominent during times of war, images of veiled nurses were used to capitalise on this phenomenon in Australia and internationally (Donahue 1996). This was most apparent in the visual imagery used for recruitment posters in World War 1 and World War 11. The poster by Maurice Bramley (1943) *Join Us in a Victory Job* (Fig 45 c.f *Australian War Memorial* 2009) and *The Spirit of America* (1919) (Fig 46 c.f Donahue 1996) acted as cultural packages that assisted in circumscribing common sense understandings of the veil in everyday discourses.

Richard Dyer's (1997, p.541) underpinning paradigm of the concept of normalcy and invisibility in his discussion of whiteness can also be attuned to the 'norm', the 'ordinary' or the 'standard' as ascribed to the veil worn as part of the nurse's uniform. Within the broader culture, the 'normalcy' of the nurse's veil, resides in its 'invisibility' that is, its conspicuous absence of almost any reference to it in speech, writing or images.



Fig 32 'Six Patriotic Nurses'
National Archives of Australia D4477,425



Fig 33 A group of Australian nurses, known as 'Bluebirds' who served in Beziers France 1916.
Australian War Memorial P02298.006



Fig 34 Nursing Staff at ANZAC Hostel
Brighton, Victoria Australia
c 1919
Australian War Memorial P03098.003



Fig 35 Nurse and residents at ANZAC Hostel
Brighton, Victoria, Australia
c 1919
Australian War Memorial P03098.005



Fig 36 Bombay India
Two Members of the Australian Nursing Service
Victoria War Hospital Bombay, India.
c 1917
Australian War Memorial P02523.004



Fig 37 Staff Nurse Frances MacKellar
c 1917
Australian War Memorial P04115.001



Fig 38 Melbourne - Departure of Empress of Japan
A Group of AIF Nurses
1939-12-11.
Australian War Memorial 000400



Fig 39 Gaza Ridge, Palestine – Nursing Sister B. Morrisby of Hobart with Sergeant J.W.Philip a Patient in the 2/6th Australian General Hospital
1942-08-30
Australian War Memorial 024927



Fig 40 Milne Bay, Papua. RAAF Nursing Sisters Young (left) and Perger of No 2 Medical Clearing Station RAAF
c 1944
Australian War Memorial OG1473



Fig 41 113th Australian General Hospital - 'Early morning hospital'
c 1943
State Library of Victoria
H99.201/928: an006290



Fig 42 Nurses on Duty at an advanced Operational Base in the Pacific.
All four Sisters are from Queensland
Australian War Memorial
012718



Fig 43 John Morton-Sale. *The Red Cross of Comfort*, 1939. Photogravure of the original painting. Copyright Roysia Romanelli.
c.f Donahue 1996.



Fig 44 Artbusters 1992. World War II Memorial, Nurse and Soldier.
Anzac Square, Anne Street, Brisbane.
c.f *Art in Public Places.*



Fig 45 Bramley, Maurice [Department of National Service]
'Join us in a victory job'
1943 Poster: Colour photolithograph on paper
48.2 x 60.4 cm
Australian War Memorial
ARTV00332



Fig 46 Christy, Howard
'The Spirit of America'
c1919
Red Cross Poster
Library of Congress, Washington, DC
c.f Donahue 1996: 353

Stuart Hall (1997, p.259) notes in the context of a 'regime of representation', the circulation of power administered by the ruling group, fashions a world view, value system and ideology that has the ability to render certain concepts as 'natural'. The effectiveness of this concept functions in everyday interaction evoking a consensus of general agreement.

As noted earlier, the adoption of certain beliefs and behaviours are produced and shaped by powerful organisations, individuals and groups who adopt certain beliefs that permeate the culture, further disseminating and reinforcing certain 'cultural frames' as social reality (Hertog and McLeod 2003, p.145). The symbolic nature of frames, as cultural structures are conveyed in and through symbols and in the broadest sense, '…it is the ubiquitous nature of frame representation that makes them seem 'natural' and 'obvious' to the members of society' (Hertog and McLeod 2003, p.142). The unexpressed but shared knowledge among society's members, which has been generated and activated by the framing of a core set of concepts, is most notable in the symbolic framing of the wedding veil in the West.

The Wedding Veil

Helen Foster and Donald Johnson (2003) suggest the continuing obsession with the white veil as part of the wedding dress in Western culture '…may reflect current societal values or the individuals personal tastes' but most often the choice of dress by the bride '…follows the spirit of her cultural traditions and worldview' (Foster and Johnson 2003, p.3). The symbolic values that reflect commonalities in wedding dress customs inherent in the West stem from a complex web of history. Kuhns (2003) suggests the tradition of brides wearing a veil in secular and religious circles stems from the Greek Goddess Pandora, who donned a richly embroidered veil for her marriage, setting a wedding dressing ritual, which has been repeated for centuries. Foster and Johnson (2003, p.2) note that although the symbolism of the 'traditional' colour of white for the bride's wedding costume seems almost universal, they suggest that using the term 'traditional' assumes the customs are static. They argue, however, bridal wear is constantly evolving to reflect the traditions, symbolism and values of a particular society. Painter and comic book artist Sarah Bell (2008, pp.171-173) adopts a visual essay form to illustrate the similarities between the Christian and non-Christian bridal veil in 'Nubo: the Wedding veil'. Bell (2008, p.173) states that the word '…nuptial comes from the Latin word meaning *Nubo* – I veil myself' and argues there are many different ways women have and do veil

themselves for marriage. Bell (2008) poses the question why 'liberated' Western brides still wear the veil? This may be linked to Queen Victoria's marriage in February 1840, which is often cited as the marker that began the white wedding dress and veil tradition (*The Ohio State University* 1998). Prior to the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901) the colour chosen for women's wedding dress traditionally was cream or ivory. The white wedding costume worn by Queen Victoria incorporated an eighteen foot long veil secured by a wreath of orange blossoms to represent purity and set a precedent that has continued to influence wedding gowns worn by royal and non-royal brides in the West (Fig 47 c.f Gregory 2009). Foster and Johnson (2003) attest that this tradition in the West is an indication of the pervasive power of English Victorian society promulgating its moral codes and value system throughout many parts of the world.

Among the many wedding veils worn by royal brides, several are most notable. In 1947, Queen Elizabeth II wore a wedding costume designed by Norman Hartnell (Fig 48a c.f Grice 2007). Hartnell derived his inspiration for the design of the dress and veil from the painting *Primavera* (Spring) by Italian Renaissance painter Sandro Botticelli (Fig 48b c.f Kren & Marx 2007). The images of Queen Elizabeth's wedding gown portray the veil as the most dominant feature, highlighting in particular the intricate working of flower garlands adopted from Botticelli's painting. In 1956, when the movie actress Grace Kelly married Rainier III, Prince of Monaco, her wedding costume consisted of a wedding veil made from 90 yards of tulle decorated with seed pearls and orange blossoms. The veil adopted by Grace Kelly drew on a theme similar to that chosen by Queen Victoria (Fig 49 c.f. Thomas 2009). The wedding of Lady Diana Spencer (Princess of Wales) and Prince Charles in 1981 symbolised a hallmark for royal brides (*BBC News* 2001) Princess Diana's veil, which was almost eight meters (twenty five feet) in length, brought a revival of fantasy to wedding ceremonies (Fig 50 c.f *Mylifetime* 2009).

Although the symbolism of the veil as part of wedding attire has commonalities largely attributed to dominant Western values and world views, Ashwani Sharma (2007) notes in recent years the practice of the globalised fashion industry to create objects of 'ethnic fashion', have been mobilised explicitly for the consumption of a white audience. Sharma (2007) argues:

> …it is the authentic 'Other' as reified object that is being consumed. The universal empty signifier of Whiteness is in fact ambivalently 'marked' at the site of the white body by ethnic difference (Sharma 2007).



Fig 47 Portrait of Queen Victoria on her wedding day
10 February 1840
c.f Gregory 2009



Fig 48a Portrait of the wedding of Queen Elizabeth 11 and Prince Philip
20 November 1947
c.f Grice 2007



Fig 48b Botticelli, Sandro b1445 d 1510
Primavera
C 1482 Tempera on panel
Galleria degli Uffizi Florence
c.f Kren & Marx. 2007 *Web Gallery of Art*



Fig 49 Princess Grace of Monaco on her wedding day
18 April 1956
c.f Thomas 2009



Fig 50 Princess Diana's wedding veil.
c.f *Mylifetime.com* 2007



Fig 51 Bridal Gown
Christian Lacriox
The Age 2009



Fig 52 'Fascinators'
Galleries Melbourne Cup Colour
c.f *Herald Sun 2009*

Sharma (2007) suggests that the fashion industry seeks to emphasise that these models are white models who, through the wearing 'Oriental' clothing, are almost the same, but not 'Oriental'. Sharma (2007) further argues that '…what is important to sustaining Western hegemony is the authority that the white designers have over 'Oriental' creativity'. A bridal costume showcase by the French designer Christian Lacriox in July 2009 (Fig 51, c.f *The Age* 2009), was presented as a mimicry of the idealised 'Oriental Other'. The representational symbol of the wedding veil was transformed into and transmitted as its own familiar discourse, sustained by white Western hegemony. The realms of the everyday are most often where the veil presumes it normality and neutrality.

In the banality of the everyday, self-enclosed, white cultural space, the veil as familiar is most often fostered and internalised and thus perceived as part of hegemonic cultural norms. This is illustrated by the now very fashionable 'fascinator', a head piece derived from veiling origins (Fig 52 c.f *Herald Sun* 2009). Framed through dominant interpretive schemas, the fascinator has evoked certainties and perceived constructs of the veil that are intertwined and resonate with the norms and values that prevail within the dominant social order.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to consider how the comprehensive Western representations of veiling, embedded in Western gender discourse in general, have been framed as 'familiar' in certain cultural, religious, historical and contemporary junctures. Within the historical presence of veiling, it has signified class, religion, medical care, marital status and belonging to a specific cultural group. The early Christian fathers who founded the monastery of nuns, established rigid rules regarding the practice of veiling based on St. Paul's instruction, which included the necessity for women to cover their heads for worship and prayer (Lafontaine 2008). This instruction was part of the misogyny that was a distinct ingredient of Christian thought in the centuries preceding the rise of Islam (Ahmed 1992, p.35). Arising in the seventh century CE, Islam inscribed some of the already developed scriptural Christian misogyny into its socio-political universe. As Ahmed (1992) highlights, however, throughout Muhammad's lifetime, the practices of veiling and seclusion, were observed only by his wives. Alia Imtoual (2004) notes that the way Christianity overtly dominated European thought from the Middle Ages until the Enlightenment, was by means of 'framing traditions' (Sharp 1998 cited in Imtoual 2004,

p.82), '…through which Islam was interpreted' (Imtoual 2004, p.82). In post Enlightenment periods the concept of Western veiling has been informed by the historical relationship between Christian modes of thought and is '… inseparable from, and therefore inherent in concepts of whiteness' (Imtoual 2004, p.83). Through a complex assemblage of visual imagery, the veil worn by women religious, saints and the Virgin Mary has been framed as 'familiar,' thus sustaining the hegemonic order of white Western dominance and superiority. The meanings and the conceptual entanglements that associates the veil with women religious, nursing and weddings in Western discourse, is enmeshed in an apparatus of framed assumptions, ambivalently marked at the site of the white hegemony, which is perceived as totally abstracted from 'Islamic culture'[24]. Therefore, the familiarity of the veil in Western discourse is never seriously challenged.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the representation of the veil and veiling by the West underwent a fundamental shift as '…the Muslim orient fell deeper and deeper under European domination' (Hoodfar 1997, p.255). The Western world's preoccupation with the veil in Muslim culture set in motion the broad enterprise of entrenched tropes of Orientalist thinking, that underpinned the representation of the feared veiled 'Other' in European thought (Said 1978). The following chapter attempts to unravel the complexities of cultural hegemony and the relations of power that constructed a common body of knowledge relating to the veil in Islamic culture through strategies of differentiation grounded in colonial political, textual and artistic framing schemas.

Notes

[1] Background research on the history of veiling by Fadwa El Guindi (1999), *Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance*; Homa Hoodfar (1997), *The Veil in Their Minds and on Our Heads: Veiling Practices and Muslim Women*; Leila Ahmed (1992), *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*; Daphne Grace (2004), *The Woman in the Muslim Mask: Veiling and Identity in Postcolonial Literature*; Jennifer Heath (2008), *The Veil: Women Writers on its History, Lore and Politics*; Elizabeth Kuhns (2003), *The Habit: A History of Clothing of Catholic Nuns*; Laurene Lafontaine (2008), *Out of the Cloister: Unveiling to better serve the Gospel* and Jo Anne McNamara, (1996), *Sisters in Arms: Catholic Nuns Through Two Millennia*, amongst others, have proved useful for my historical analysis.

[2] Dates are cited to indicate 'Before Common Era' (BCE) and Common Era (CE) which are numerically equivalent to Christian BC and AD. See Rippin, A 2005, *Muslims: Their religious beliefs and practices*, Third edition, Routledge, London.

[3] The image depicting head to toe veiling comes from the bas relief in the temple of Ba'al in Palmyra. Syria. The temple which was constructed by the Palmyrenes in the first century CE contains a series of large-scale funerary monuments. These structures, some of which were below ground, had interior walls that were cut away or constructed to form burial compartments in which the deceased, extended full length, were placed. See 'Gravestone with funerary banquet', excavated at Palmyra, Syria, in Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, 2000–2009, *The Metropolitan Museum of Art*, New York, [viewed 28/10/08] <http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/ho/05/wae/ho_02.29.1.htm >.

[4] The portrait bust of Livia, the second wife of Augustus and mother of the emperor Tiberius, shows how veiling was customary for women, especially highly ranked women during early Christian Rome. See De La Croix, H Tansey, R and Kirkpatrick, D 1987, *Art Through the Ages*, 9th Edition, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, p236.

[5] 1 Corinthians 11; 2-16. 'Now I commend you because you remember me in everything and maintain the traditions even as I delivered them to you. 3 But I want you to understand that the head of every man is Christ, the head of the woman is the man, and the head of Christ is God. 4 Every man who prays or prophesies with his head covered dishonors his head, 5 but every woman who prays or prophesies with her head uncovered dishonors her head—it is the same as if her head were shaven. 6 For if a woman will not be covered, then let her be shorn! But since it is disgraceful for a woman to be shorn or shaven, let her be covered. For indeed a man ought not to cover his head, being the image and glory of God; but woman is the glory of man'. See Marlowe, M 2007, 'The Woman's Head Covering', *Bible Research*, <http://www.bible-researcher.com/headcoverings.html>.

[6] The Second Vatican Council, also known as Vatican II, was the most significant twentieth century event in the Catholic Church. Held in Rome from 1962 to 1965, the Council was made up of the Pope (at first, John XXIII, and after his death in 1963, Paul VI) and all the bishops of the world. In1962 Pope John mandated a challenge to religious Orders to renew themselves through critical examination and experimentation with alternative structures. This included a change in the wearing of habits for women religious. After Vatican 11, modified versions of the habit varied from Order to Order. While many Orders distanced themselves from wearing the 'traditional' mode of dress, some continued with the established practice of wearing the 'traditional' habit. See Michelman, S 1997, 'Changing Old Habits, Dress of Women Religious and Its relationship to Personal and Social Identity' in *Sociological Inquiry*, Volume 67, Number 3, August, pp. 350-363.

[7] The image of 'A Portrait of a Deceased Woman' comes from the Catacomb of Vigna Massimo Italy, dated Fourth Century CE. Source (Old Records) Wilpert Joseph Malerelen der Katakomben, Roms, 1903. Plate 175. See Brown, P 2002, *The World of Late Antiquity: AD150-750*, p. 48.

[8] These photographs represent a reconstruction of secular dress worn by Anglo Saxons during the early Middle Ages. See Crocker-Owen (2004).

[9] Eleanor Aquitaine was one of the most influential figures of the twelfth century. She was heiress of the duchy of Aquitaine. Aquitaine was like a separate nation with lands extending in south Western France to the Pyrenees. Her first marriage to King Louis V11 of France ended during the Second Crusades. In 1152 she married Henry of Anjou, who became Henry 11 King of England in 1154. Heavily influenced by the

Spanish courts of the Moors, she gave patronage to poets and the arts. See Owen, D 1996, *Eleanor of Aquitaine: Queen and Legend*, Blackwell, Oxford.

[10] The sumptuary legislation denoted laws that limited private expenditure on food and personal items.

[11] In *Women in Italian Renaissance Art: Gender Representation Identity*, Paola Tinagli (1997) credits Pier Francesco Botticini with the painting of St Monica. However some resources credit this work to Italian sculpture and painter Andrea del Verrocchio. As Botticini studied under Verrocchio the initial design and perhaps some guidance of the art work may have been initiated by Verrocchio. In some instances, students were able to produce copies of the master's work. Therefore identifying which artists painted St Monica with absolute accuracy remains problematical. See Paoletti, J and Radke G 2005, *Art in Renaissance Italy*, Laurence King Publishing, third edition, UK.

[12] Byzantine art was the art of the Eastern Roman empire which endured from 330 CE until it was conquered in 1456 by the Turks. The term Byzantine refers more to a style associated with Byzantium than its area. Early Byzantine art is also referred to as Early Christina Art. The heart of the Byzantine Empire dominated the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean, in Asia Minor, Cyprus and Greece from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries. The capital city was Constantinople (renamed Istanbul in the 1930s). After 1453 most regions of the Byzantine Empire were occupied by a new empire with different religious and political beliefs See Cormack, R 1985, *Writing in Gold: Byzantine Society and its Icons*, George Philip, London. See also De La Croix, Tansey, and Kirkpatrick, 1987, *Art Through the Ages*, 9th Edition, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego.

[13] Although the artist of the diptych is has not been identified, Kren and Marx (2007) suggest that because of the quality of the work, it must have come from an artist of the highest rank. While critics disagree whether he was English, French or Italian, the work is representative of International Gothic style during the fourteenth century. See 'Wilton Diptych' Virgin and Child with Angels, Kren and Marx 2007, ©Web Gallery of Art, <http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/html/m/master/yunk_fr/yunk_fr1/06wilton.html>.

[14]. From their arrival in 1907, St John of God Sisters remained in the Kimberley for more than sixty years. See Zucker, M 2005, *From Patrons to Partners: A History of the Catholic Church in the Kimberley*, 2nd Edition, University of Notre Dame Australia Press, Fremantle, WA.

[15] The men who were brought to Western Australia from the mid-nineteenth to work in the pearling industry were most often referred to as 'coloured labour' These included men from Koepang (West Timor), Malays, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese and a small number from India. See Choo, C 2001, *Mission Girls: Aboriginal Woman on Catholic Missions in the Kimberley, Western Australia, 1900-1950*, University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, WA.

[16] In the 1997 National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, the nuns from various Orders acknowledged how their services enabled the polices of removal of children from their families to be implemented. The Kimberley St John of God Sisters became the first group of women religious to apologise for what they termed the misunderstandings and hurts over the years. See Zucker, M 2005, *From Patrons to Partners: A History of the Catholic Church in the Kimberley*, 2nd Edition, University of Notre Dame Australia Press, Fremantle, WA. Also see Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC) 1997,'Bringing them Home Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families', April [viewed 10/07/08]
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/Social_Justice/bth_report/report/ch19.html>.

[17] The first Aborigines Protection Act was legislated in 1869 in Victoria. This Act and subsequent Protection State Acts which were legislated during the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century were premised on racial superiority. These Acts were prescribed through the reference of 'blood quantum' to sanction divisions between Aboriginal People giving the idea that some people were 'more Aboriginal' than others. The idea of protection meant many Aboriginal people sent to areas away from their own country. In particular, the implementation of these Acts resulted in the separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families by compulsion, duress or undue influence. See Indigenous Law Resources, n.d, 'Bringing them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families', 1997,
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/stolen/prelim.html>.

Also See Bourke, E 1998, 'Australia's First Peoples: Identity and Population' in *Aboriginal Australia: an introductory reader in Aboriginal studies*, C Bourke, E Bourke and B Edwards (eds), 2nd edition, University of Queensland Press, Queensland, pp.38-55.

[18] When the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission conducted hearings in Broome in 1996, the Sister of St John of God apologised for their part in the forcible removal polices and practices of the Stolen Generation. They stated (in part) '…we are mindful of the role our order played in the devastation that is now known as the removal of the Stolen Generation and we are endeavoring to come to terms ourselves with the hurt and pain….' See Australian Human Rights Commission (1997) 'Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Report: Bringing Them Home – Part 4 Reparation Chapter 14, John of God, Submission 521, p6.
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/bth_report/report/ch14.html>.

[19] The generally used term 'Stolen Generation', has been used by HREOC to include children who were taken from their families by government and welfare bodies to be brought up in institutions, missions or fostered out to white families. Most often the children then lost contact with their parents and were unable to repair the broken parent/child bond after years of separation. Removing children from their families was official government policy in Australia until 1969. See Hollinsworth, D 1998, *Race and Racism in Australia*, Social science Press. Australia.

[20] The Sisters of St John of God continued to work at Bungarun (Leprosarium), Derby until its closure in 1986, and their efforts, as well as being appreciated by the patients and their families, were recognised through the award of Honours to individual sisters. See Heritage Council of Western Australia, 2000, 'Register of Heritage Places –Assessment Documentation- Bungarun (Leprosarium) Derby',
<http://register.heritage.wa.gov.au/PDF_Files/B%20-%20A-D/Bungarun%20(P-AD).PDF>.

[21] In July 2009, Prime Minster Kevin Rudd met with Pope Benedict XV1 to discuss the canonisation of Mary MacKillop. See Tasker, B 2009, 'Kevin Rudd talks up would-be saint Mary MacKillop to Pope', *Daily Telegraph*, [viewed 30/07/09]
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/world/kevin-rudd-talks-up-would-be-saint-mary-mackillop-to-pope/story-e6frev00-1225747993056>.

[22] Inspired by a Christian divine calling, Florence Nightingale and a staff of thirty eight women went to the British camp in the Crimea to care for the injured soldiers. She promoted sanitary conditions as essential to the healing of patients. The introduction of Nightingale trained nurses provided a foundation on which a non-religious sisterhood of nurses was modelled. See Donahue, P 1996, *The Finest Art: An Illustrated History*, Second Edition, Mosley –Year Book Inc, St Louis, MO, p. 197.

[23] The spelling of 'Al-Asalmiya' has been taken from the article by Jan, Rafat1996, 'Rufaida Al-Asalmiya, the First Muslim Nurse', *IMAGE: Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, Volume 28, Number 3, Fall, pp.267-268.

[24] Islam as culture worldwide offers both similarities and elements of diversity. In the context of the thesis the term 'Islamic culture' is used to refer to the Western construction of Muslim cultural markers including veiled Muslim women. Broad categorisation of the concept of Islamic culture by the West has acted to reinforce the widely held misconception of Islam as a timeless and monolithic entity. This concept was significantly identified by Edward Said (1978) in his critique of *Orientalism*. Cultural, national, and linguistic differences among Muslims have resulted in markedly divergent ideas of Islam. Moreover, Islamic culture is relative and circumstantial, constantly shifting and adapting to evolving social environments. See Saeed, A and Akbarzadeh, S 2001, 'Searching for Identity: Muslims in Australia', in *Muslim Communities in Australia*, UNSW Press, Sydney, NSW, pp.1-11.
Islam in Australia is culturally and theologically plural by virtue of its diverse social and geographical origins, which has brought together Muslims from some sixty-five different cultural linguistic and national backgrounds. See Humphrey, M 2001, 'An Australian Islam?: Religion in a Multicultural City' in *Muslim Communities in Australia*, A Saeed and S Akbarzadeh (eds), UNSW Press, Sydney, NSW, pp.33-52.

Chapter Three:

Framing Orientalism

> The familiar and much analysed Orientalist gaze through which the veil is viewed as an object of mystique, exoticism and eroticism and the veiled woman as an object of fantasy, excitement and desire is now replaced by the xenophobic, more specifically Islamophobic, gaze through which the veil or head-scarf, is seen as a highly visible sign of despised difference (Donnell 2003).

Introduction

In the aftermath of September 11, various authors have claimed that the framing of the veil and veiling within political and media discourses, in Australia and internationally, have been embedded in Orientalist paradigms (Aly 2009; Imtoual 2004; Zine 2006; Sardar 2003). The debate concerning veiling by Muslim women in Australia and elsewhere, has stirred a response that draws on longstanding Orientalist discourse. This discourse has been reworked in the current climate of the war on terror, where veiled women are perceived as not like 'us', as failing to assimilate and are therefore perceived as a 'threat' against the cultural milieu of 'white' Australia. In an attempt to understand how the veil and Muslim women in general have become represented by the historical legacies of Orientalist political and cultural dimensions in post 9/11, this chapter undertakes a genealogy, a looking back to various historical moments, where the tenets of Orientalist transformational frames, influenced knowledge schemas and were disseminated from one epoch to another. Edward Said's (1978; 2003) work on *Orientalism,* which draws attention to racist colonial representations of the Middle East from the eighteenth to early twentieth century, forms an important framework for exploring how representations of the veil made a fundamental shift from the familiar to the feared in Western discourse. This chapter does not identify or discuss the breadth of writers, artists, travellers, texts, schools of thought or institutions that have influenced Orientalist conceptual representations of the veil. Rather, the chapter attempts to identify hegemonic discourses constantly reinventing an arbitrariness of codes encapsulating the veil as irredeemably 'Other' in the context of political, cultural and artistic interpretive paradigms. Edmund Burke and David Prochaska (2008, p.10) have identified 'a second meaning of Orientalism' that is, the creation of a supposedly exotic culture in the artistic and photographic works by various European artists and photographers. An examination

of European Orientalist artistic representations has been a necessary component of this inquiry, as it brings to view how these works, as a system of meaning, were deeply imbued with colonial representations and were instrumental in shaping the world inhabited by the colonisers and colonised (Benjamin 2003; Dobie 2001; Makhoul 1998; Nochlin 1991). The images included in this chapter are considered most representative of the vast Orientalist art and photographic genre.

Orientalist Interpretive Frameworks

Burke and Prochaska (2008) Edward Said (2003) and Zachary Lockman (2004), have highlighted the abiding representational force of the Middle East, Islam and Muslims in general that is grounded in Orientalist traditions that have become most prominent in the wake of September 11 2001. Burke and Prochaska (2008, p.1) claim in post 9/11 '…Orientalism as discursive practice linking culture and power, is more important than ever…[t]oday the United States peers at the Middle East through orientalist spectacles'. Adopting a similar view, Lockman (2004) suggests the Orientalist interpretive frameworks, which have informed the histories, politics and culture of the Middle East and Islam, have acted to justify US political involvement in the Middle East over the past six decades. Lockman (2004, p.5) contends the 'knowledge' and 'truth', which has been embedded in Orientalist systems of meaning, by those in power, can no longer be trusted blindly. Therefore, Lockman (2004, p.1) suggests in the wake of September 11 2001, an investigation of the implications and consequences of how the Middle East and Islam have been perceived and depicted '…seems to be more important than ever before' Ziauddin Sardar (2003, p.27) suggests that since the events of September 11 2001, the age old interpretations of Islam embedded in historic and contemporary Western representations of Islam and Muslims '…seems to have acquired a pathological strain'. Historical interpretations of Islam, Sardar (2003, p.28) contends are either 'frozen or ossified' depictions of long ago or as perceived in 'romanticised contexts' that have not actually existed in history. Sardar (2003) suggests for the projected defining power of Western forms of knowledge about Islam and Muslims to be undermined and resisted, an intellectual and cultural space for the non-West to describe themselves with their own concepts and categories needs to be encouraged (Inayatullah and Boxwell 2003). A challenge to the historical Western discourse for depicting the backward, exotic, violent and barbarous nature of Islam was affirmed by Said in 2003. Twenty five years after Said published *Orientalism* (1978) he stated:

> I wish I could say that general understanding of the Middle East, the Arabs and Islam in the United States has improved somewhat, but alas it really hasn't (Said 2003a, p.2).

This claim by Said (2003a) was reflective of his perception of the post 9/11 US led war against Afghanistan and Iraq, in which he argued the so called 'experts' of the US government and national security '…re-cycled the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations' about the 'Arab threat' and 'Muslim menace' so as to stir up 'America' against the 'foreign devil' (Said 2003a, p.4). According to Said (2003a) the discursive structures that promoted demeaning generalisations about the Middle East, the Arabs and Islam, implied that these people were not like 'us' and didn't appreciate 'our' values, which was the very essence of traditional Orientalist ideology (Said 2003a). The issue for Said was to provide a sharper sense of how the *representation* of the Orient could reclaim a reality in the realm of post 9/11. Said (2003a) suggested that the demonization of the supposed Muslim enemy for whom the term 'terrorist' has served a general purpose of instigating fear and anger amongst the broader population post 9/11, must be opposed. To gain a sharper sense of how Orientalist discourse has been reframed in contemporary modalities, in particular in the debates regarding veiling and unveiling, various scholarly works that have identified the overlapping enterprises in the history of Orientalist discourses within the tenets of *Orientalism,* as explored by Said (1978) and extended by various authors, have been reviewed.

Since the landmark work of *Orientalism* by Edward Said was published in 1978, lines of enquiry into Orientalist discourse have been opened up by other scholars who have deepened, extended as well as contested his original work (Burke and Prochaska 2008; Oldmeadow 2005; Sardar 2003; 1999; MacKenzie 1995). Burke and Prochaska (2008) cite Said's publication of *Orientalism* (1978), as marking a paradigm shift in thinking about the differences between the 'the West, 'us' and the non-West, 'them'. Burke and Prochaska (2008, p.2) argue Said's (1978) essentially Foucaultian insight brought to attention the relationship between power discourse and colonial representations and colonial forms of knowledge, which has continually been reproduced in racist stereotypes. Offering a similar view to Burke and Prochaska (2008), Harry Oldmeadow (2005) suggests Said's work identified the complex set of dominant discourses that were instrumental in generating a series of stereotypical dichotomies that posited 'West' as 'rational democratic and progressive' and the 'East' as 'irrational, backward and despotic' (Oldmeadow 2005, p.137). Although Oldmeadow (2005, p.139) recognises that Said's thesis '…has produced a magnetic pole around which much recent debate about

Orientalism has gravitated', Oldmeadow's (2005, p.133) criticism of Said's model of Orientalism is that it '…exposes certain fundamental weaknesses'. According to Oldmeadow (2005) Said's primary argument, which is centred on European encounter with Islam and the Middle East, does not take into account the West's encounter with the religious traditions of Asia. In 2003 Said pointed out that *Orientalism* was a book tied to the dynamics of contemporary history. Said (2003) made evident that he did not intend for his work to provide a grand theory or methodology to be universally applied in exploring the systems of representation that formed ideas about the Orient in the West. As Said (2003, p.24) argued, *Orientalism* was far from a complete history or general account of *Orientalism*, but a step toward an understanding of the formidable structure of cultural domination of colonised peoples. The modern history of *Orientalism*, which Said (2003, p.76) argued, coincided with '…Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, in 1798', was jettisoned by the Western will to govern over the Orient. The essentialising colonising view of the Orient, which '…has remained fixed in time and place for the West' (Said 2003. p.108), has continued to influence contemporary Orientalist attitudes. Thus in his discussion of Said's *Orientalism* and the controversies and trends it generated, Lockman (2004, p.214) argued that Said's work can and should be seen '…as playing a crucial role in undermining the long established conceptualisation of the modern world …by offering an alternative vision of how to think about it and operate in it'. Despite the important political and intellectual achievements of Said's (1978) work, an avenue of criticism has emerged concerning his failure to provide a deeper engagement of the historical contexts in which colonial representations developed (Burke and Prochaska 2008, Lockman 2004; Sardar 1999). The next section attempts to unpack how the philosophical ideals that emerged during the Enlightenment era were instrumental in manifesting an overarching opposition to veiling by women in the 'East'. In addition its attempts to highlight how the legacy of the Enlightenment was integral in shaping European colonising imperatives during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lockman 2004; Dobie 2001; Sardar; 1999).

The West and the Construction of the Orientalist 'Other'

Ziauddin Sardar (1999) and Shahrough Akhavi (2003) contend neither the 'West' nor the 'Orient' are monolithic entities, but entail complex, varied traditions and experiences, which are both 'ambiguous' and 'heterogeneous'. The concept of the 'Orient' by the West, was a geographically determined destination of all civilizations 'East of the West', which grew out of the fact that '…the civilizations of the East were a lure to the desires

of Western civilization' (Sardar 1999, p.2). Through encounters of Christendom and Islam, a 'constructed ignorance' about the 'Oriental Other' was encapsulated in forms of story telling by the West (Sardar 1999, p.1). Sardar (1999, p.2) cites the Crusades as both laying the foundations and perpetuating the representation of Muslims as '…evil, depraved, licentious, barbaric, ignorant and stupid, unclean and inferior, monstrous and ugly, fanatical and violent.' For Sardar (1999) the constructed representations of Eastern cultures by the West that found prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cannot be understood outside the historical context that gave it framework and meaning. Sardar (1999) argues *Orientalism*, as a practice of representing the 'Other', became a fabrication of pre-existing Western ideas, reformulating itself in an attempt to contain and manage Eastern cultures and civilisations.

Exploring how the constructed nature of the West-East dichotomy emerged whereby the concept of a 'West' was deemed essentially different from an 'East', Zachary Lockman (2004) argues that early Western Christian images of Islam '…did not come out of nowhere or develop in a vacuum' (Lockman 2004, p.8). Lockman (2004) does not suggest that there was a continuous monolithic attitude toward the East or Islam stretching from the medieval era to the modern period, but that at various historical points, spanning a long period of time, European writers and others appropriated certain notions about the East and Islam, which were refashioned and propagated to suit their particular agendas. Lockman (2004) suggests from the period onward, the growth and dissemination of Western knowledge about the Islam and Muslims was generated by European power over neighbouring Muslim lands and peoples. Lockman (2004) also indicates that with the emergence of Islam in the seventh century and the consequent expansion of the Muslim empire, the dominant faith of Western Christendom became threatened. Advancing a similar view, Sardar (1999) contends that the notion of the 'Orient':

> …dates back to the sixteenth century [and] before that there was Christendom. And it is in the encounters of Christendom and its closest neighbour, Islam that the origins of Orientalism and much of its history can be traced (Sardar 1999, p.2).

The Western European knowledge of Muslims or the character of this new threat to Christianity was most often communicated orally, transmitted from person to person, over long distances that extended many cultural boundaries (Lockman 2004). This usually resulted in a great deal of distorted knowledge and misinformation about Muslims. Lockman (2004) asserts from the eleventh century onward, this distorted knowledge was

promulgated by Western European scholars, chroniclers, poets and story tellers who generated and spread '….bizarre notions about Islam and Muhammad…'(Lockman 2004, p.29). According to Sardar (1999, p.2) the early encounters with Islam by the Christian West, are where visions of the 'Orient' as '…unfathomable and exotic and an erotic place [of] mysteries…' became established. According to Akhavi (2003), prior to the Crusades there was an exchange of ideas between Islamic and Christian philosophers. Akhavi (2003) has suggested that Islamic philosophers, such as Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), engaged with and were significantly influenced by Jewish and Christian scholars. Moreover, the writing of influential Muslim philosophers '…made a significant contribution to the development of philosophy in the Western World' (Watt 1973 cited in Akhavi 2003, p.560). However, as the series of invasions by the Crusaders occurred between 1095 and 1291, various European scholars began to abandon their interest and fascination with great Muslim philosophers. medieval interpretations of Islam were then re-iterated by major writers, who used this misinformation to fuel hostility toward Islam. Akhavi (2003, p.551) identifies scholars such as Albertus Magnus[1] and Thomas Aquinas[2], '…both of whom had taught at the University of Paris…as attacking Arab philosophy and Islamic theology'. This signalled a shift in the parameters that had defined the interaction of European and Islamic theology in previous years.

The introduction of the printing press from Germany in the 1460s[3] was critical for the diffusion of ideas concerning political and religious issues in the West after the mid-fifteenth century (Akhavi 2003; Eisenstein 1980). In particular the Western Christian Church officials hailed the new technology '…as a providential invention which proved Western superiority over the ignorant infidel forces' (Eisenstein 1980, p.303). The effectiveness of the printing press, as a useful instrument in disseminating the West's spiritual and cultural superiority, '…was not introduced in the [Ottoman] Empire until 1721' (Akhavi 2003, p.551). During the fifteenth and sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire became a formidable threat to various countries in Northern Europe. However Western ideas during the Ottoman ascendancy rarely influenced Muslim society (Akhavi 2003). During the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, Europe's geographical and cultural horizons were expanded by the voyages of discovery (Lockman 2004). As European states were moving toward a position of global hegemony, the exercising of political and economic power over non-Western States and peoples began to manifest (Lockman 2004). During the mercantilist (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) period of Western domination, the reconceptualisation of European identity began to emerge,

marking a sharp contrast between Western and non-Western concepts (Akhavi 2003). According to Akhavi (2003) during this period, most Muslims were mostly unaware of the momentous consequences that the developments of Western political and economic power would have for them. From the seventeenth century, most prominent European writers, including philosophers, encyclopedists and historians '…began to level polemical attacks on Muslim thought' (Akhavi 2003, p.552). Orientalist scholars and imaginative writers most often portrayed Islam as lacking the qualities that made the West great. Lockman (2004) notes that many of the writers who created a contrasting construct of Western and non-Western cultures, drew on misinformation and interpretations, which had been formulated during the medieval period. According to Lockman (2004):

> Europeans deployed this contrast to explain what they were coming to see as a profound difference, which distinguished their own societies from those of their neighbour Ottoman Empire other Muslim states and more broadly, all Asian and African societies. In this conception, the West came to see itself as the domain of freedom and of law as opposed to the Ottomans and other 'Oriental' societies (Lockman 2004, p.57).

Lockman (2004) further explains that European political thinkers in Europe and British colonies in North America writing about Islam and the Orient during the Enlightenment period, were greatly influenced by the French writer Montesquieu (1689-1755), in particular his concept of 'Oriental despotism'. In *De l'Esprit des lois* (*Spirit of the Laws* 1748) Montesquieu argued that human character and thus social and political mechanisms were largely determined by the earth's physical features and weather conditions (Lockman 2004). Montesquieu (1748) determined that:

> …people in warmer colder climates, like Europe were naturally active and brave and could therefore preserve and extend their liberty, while those who lived in hot climates were naturally effeminate and servile, this is why power in Asia was always despotic (Montesquieu 1748 cited in Lockman 2004, p.47).

Lockman (2004) claims Montesquieu's concept of Oriental despotism was accepted and deployed as a fundamental premise by prominent European thinkers, a concept that would live on and flourish through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, helping to explain why '…an economically and dynamic 'West' had come to dominate the world' (Lockman 2004, p.48). While Lockman's (2004) analysis provides an overall discussion of Montesquieu's concept of Oriental despotism in the context of the 'self' and 'Other', which is dependant on climate and environmental conditions, it somewhat fails to address the prescriptions of gender that figured predominantly in Montesquieu's writings. Ziad Bentahar (2009), Madeline Dobie (2001) and Pauline Kra (1984) for instance, have commented on Montesquieu's portrayal of Oriental women in the *De l'Esprit des lois* (*Spirit of Laws* 1748) and *Lettres persanes (The Persian Letters* 1721).

Dobie (2001) suggests the publication of *De l'Esprit des lois* (*Spirit of the Laws* 1748) was among the first historical documents to offer a universal theory circumscribing a firm separation of the concept of Europe and the 'Orient', 'self' and 'Other'. Dobie (2001, p.4) acknowledges that although the concepts of the 'Oriental woman' began to coalesce in the travel literature of the late 1600s, *Spirit of the Laws* (1748) needs to be considered as the starting point in which a radical paradigm shift representing Oriental woman occurred. The *Spirit*, according to Dobie (2001):

> …contains the most detailed and systematic exposition of the theory of Oriental culture that runs throughout the fiction and political literature of this period (Dobie 2001, p.35).

Dobie (2001) suggests Montesquieu's (1748) *Spirit of Laws*, which linked human temperament with climate and geography, transmitted misunderstandings and distortions about the passive and submissive nature of the Oriental woman. The passivity of women, Montesquieu argued, equated to the 'misogynistic nature' of Islamic cultures due to the warm climate conditions in which they lived (Dobie 2001, p.42). Montesquieu suggested that because of these climatic factors:

> Women become nubile and lose their physical charms while they are still relatively young the period of their beauty never coincides with their intellectual maturity, with the result that they are always subordinate to their husbands (Montesquieu 1748 cited in Dobie 2001, p.42).

Montesquieu's essential idea that the character of women was created by environmental conditions is reflected in his *Lettres persanes*, (*Persian Letters*), in which contrasts between the customs and the condition of European and Oriental women are continually implied (Kra 2003; Dobie 2001).

Lettres persanes: Persian Letters 1721

Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes*, (*Persian Letters*) was first published anonymously in Holland in 1721[4] and within a year there were at least ten editions published (Betts 1993). It is not the intention here to discuss at length the complete story of the *Persian Letters*, but to probe Montesquieu's perception of the seraglio[5] (harem), and the veiling and unveiling of the 'Oriental woman', which frames the central trope of his work (Dobie 2001). In addition, the intention is to demonstrate how the *Persian Letters* formed an essential part of framing interpretive knowledge schemas within the tropes of Orientalist discourse during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To clarify, the *Persian Letters* presented a fictional narrative describing the experiences of two Persian noblemen,

Usbek and Rica as they travelled across the Ottoman Empire to Italy and Paris (McWilliams 2003; Dobie 2001; Betts 1993). Through the writing of a series of letters to their Persian friends, family and servants, Montesquieu's characters , Usbek and Rica, detail European life and institutions through the lens of an 'alien culture' (Dobie 2001, p.63). In 1754 Montesquieu published a quarto edition of the *Persian Letters.* In his introduction of 'Some Reflections on the Persian Letters' Montesquieu (1754) stated:

> The Persians who wrote those letters lodged at my house, and we spent our time together. They looked upon me as a man belonging to another world, and so they concealed nothing from me. Indeed, people so far from home could hardly be said to have secrets. They showed me most of their letters, and I copied them….I am therefore nothing more than a translator … (Montesquieu 1754 cited in Schechter 2002).

Giving the appearance of an innocent translator who recounted the letters written by two Persian travellers, Montesquieu's intention was to depict French identity in opposition to the 'alien Other' (Dobie 2001). Kra (1984, p.272) asserts that Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* were written as a 'feminist manifesto' tracing the subordination and abuse of women to their path of liberation. Conversely, Dobie (2001, p.61) claims the *Persian Letters* embodied without question '…a staple of the eighteenth century canon', and like that of many Enlightenment representations of 'cultural outsiders', its fundamental core was to depict Oriental women, as the 'Other'. Dobie (2001) notes throughout Montesquieu's novel the staging of veiling and unveiling served as a schema by which the 'Otherness' of the Oriental woman was identified and controlled. The subject of the veil is mentioned in one of the early narratives of the letters, when Usbek writes to his friend Ibben while arriving in Livorno, Italy. Usbek stated that in Italy:

> The women here enjoy much liberty: they are allowed to look at men through a species of window called *jalousie*: they have permission to go out every day in the company of some old women: they wear only one veil (LXXIII cited in Schechter2002).

In an end note to the letter, Montesquieu reminds the reader that the Persian women wear no fewer than four veils (LXXIII cited in Schechter 2002). Dobie (2001) discerns that by representing the veil in this context in the early writings of the Letters, it immediately assumed the role of the cultural marker, casting a line of demarcation between:

> Europe and the Orient and Christianity and Islam, secular and religious society [and] a powerful emblem of cultural difference that fostered the perception that to unveil the woman [w]as to penetrate the culture (Dobie 2001, p.65).

Montesquieu's aim to combine fiction with Enlightenment social commentary was most resolute in his depiction of the veiled Oriental woman and the harem, drawing parallels with Oriental difference and mystery. Dobie (2001) has characterised Montesquieu's narrative of *unveiling* as located in the realms of voyeurism and the male gaze. This is exemplified in Letter 135, when Zachi, one of the wives whom Usbek has left behind in

the harem, recollects a scene in which Usbek's wives and concubines, are '…adorned in all the clothes and ornaments that the imagination can conceive' (Letter 135 cited in Dobie 2001, p.66). Unable to choose between them, Usbek commands them '…to appear… in the simplicity of nature' (Letter 135 cited in Dobie 2001, p.66). As the concealed bodies of the Oriental women become unveiled the '…most secret recesses of their femininity are exposed to the penetration of Usbek's gaze' (Dobie 2001, p.66). The crucial point made by Dobie (2001, p.67) is what Montesquieu depicts as a personal memory by Zachi, is in reality a 'topos of Oriental writings', gleaned from a range of European travelers from Sir Paul Rycaut[6] to Lady Mary Wortley Montagu[7]. While the representation of Zachi's unveiling attained the impossibility of the position of truth or objectivity, the *Persian Letters* opened the world of the Orient to many Western readers (Dobie 2001). Feigning the innocence of a simple travel diary, the *Persian Letters* played a pivotal role in disseminating distorted and stereotypical representations of the construction of the 'foreign' and the 'exotic' Oriental woman. In addition it became the cornerstone by which a vast body of Western knowledge about the 'Orient' was manifested through a progression of transformative framing schemas during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lockman 2004; Dobie 2001). Dobie (2001, p.75) claims *The Persian Letters* operated not only to highlight differences between Islam and Christianity, but also to represent the 'foreign veiled body' of the Oriental woman, not only as the 'Other' but as quintessentially the 'Other's Other', which continued to exercise a strong hold on the social imaginary. Akhavi (2003) discerns Montesquieu's imaginative story, which depicted exotically dressed Muslims with strange habits travelling to Europe, was fortified in the work of composers and artists '…who portrayed Muslims in fantastic stories of harems, repressive rulers and flying carpets' (Akhavi 2003, p.553). Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* can be considered a notable work that aided the perpetuation of a perceived iconic Oriental woman, embedded in ancient cultural traditions of the exotic and sexual. The examination of the *Persian Letters* has proved useful in stimulating an investigation not only into the validity of the novel itself, but in the historical reconstructions that it has perpetuated in the categorizing and framing of the 'veiled Oriental woman'. Moreover, it has sharpened awareness of how the European narratives about the veiled Oriental woman as 'Other' became inevitably formulated in the field of Orientalist art and photography, which became extraordinarily abundant during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Lockman 2004). These representations were derived from an ensemble of works affiliated with the:

> …philological study of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, travel books, [and] of Oriental fantasies whose presence in time, in discourse and in institutions [gave] it strength and authority (Said 2003, p.20).

As Said (2003) discerned, the text created not only knowledge, but also the very reality they seemed to describe. It is plausible to draw a clear analogy between Said's (2003, p.94) tenet of 'textual' repetition, from which Western artistic representations of Oriental women derive, to the concept of transformational framing processes. The 'preconceived expectations' that were generated through the framing and reframing of literature by European travellers, explorers, ambassadors and philosophers, were disseminated in Orientalist visual discourse, a domain in which 'difference' could be visibly determined and authoritatively appraised (Cherry 2000). The next section attempts to discern to what extent the role of Orientalist artistic imagery played in framing Western knowledge about the 'Orient' and in particular 'the veiled Oriental woman'.

Imagined Inventions: A Copy of Another Copy

Burke and Prochaska (2008, p.10) suggest that while Said's view of *Orientalism* revealed the racist implications of the Enlightenment and the European discourse of control and domination of the non-West, they argue that the history of 'visual orientalism', that is the 'romantic' and 'exoticising impulse' of nineteenth century European artistic culture, deserves examination. A critical study of artistic representations with an Orientalist referent, ranging from painting to photography, has been explored by various authors who have expanded Said's work (Benjamin 2003; Dobie 2001; Makhoul 1998; Lewis 1996).
In order to understand how the advent of Orientalist painters emerged during the nineteenth century, it is necessary in the first instance to briefly highlight the circuits of production by which Orientalist art came in to being.

Lockman (2004) contends that scholarly Orientalism began to develop around the time the French General Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798. Akhavi (2003) notes that it was after Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, that the ideologies of the Christian European civilizing efforts to destroy Islam that manifested during the Crusades, re-emerged. Similarly, Albert Boime (2004) suggests that Christian religion and the missionary impulse which were called upon to rationalise colonisation '…tapped into the conservative side of medieval revival presenting intervention as the unfinished business of the Crusades' (Boime 2004, p.348) The French invasion of Egypt inaugurated a new era in which the lands of the Middle East and North Africa would be increasingly subject

to European encroachment and eventually European colonial rule (Lockman 2004). Akhavi (2003) suggests, a consequence of this incursion, was that Muslim thinkers promoted an emulation of ideas garnered from previous generations as a way to protect the Islam faith. This resulted in the Islamic system of ideas entering an extended period of stagnation that was to last until the nineteenth century (Akhavi 2003). Napoleon's body of knowledge about Egypt was acquired prior to the invasion from accounts of the travels to Egypt by prominent Orientalist writer of the period, Comte de Volney (Said 2003). Volney's (1787) work constituted a documentation of his travels to Egypt and Syria which were '…canonically hostile to Islam as a religion and as a system of political institutions' (Said 2003, p.81). Napoleon's preconceived ideas about Egypt, which were based on his reliance on the work of Volney, would have ultimately influenced the team of scholars who accompanied Napoleon's forces to Egypt, who perceived themselves as '…bringing science and civilization to the benighted Orient' (Lockman 2004, p.71). By 1801, the French occupying Egypt were forced to withdraw, surrendering to the British and the allied forces of the Ottomans. In 1882 the British imperial imperative to occupy Egypt was realised (Lockman 2004). In 1830 the French invaded Algeria and in 1831-83 Tunisia came under French control (Lockman 2004). While the occupation of Egypt by the French lasted only a short time, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt can be recognised as a catalyst for inaugurating a new era in which the land of the Middle East and North Africa would come to occupy a central trope in the field of Western Orientalist scholarship and the formalisation of an endorsed Orientalist society (Lockman 2004; Said 2003).

In 1821, French linguist Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838) founded and became first president of the Société Asiantique (The Asiatic Society), a national organisation dedicated to the study of Asia and Islam (Lockman 2004; Said 2003). Sacy brought together a group of Orientalist scholars and officials, whose work manifested a proliferation of scholarly studies relating to Oriental (including Islamic) history and culture, both nationally and internationally (Lockman 2004). During the nineteenth century Britain and France dominated Orientalism as a scholarly discipline, which was embodied in institutions and in numerous scholarly publications (Said 2003). The new scholarly institutions '…coincided with and contributed to a growing interest in – sometimes an obsession with the Orient' (Lockman 2004, p.68). Western knowledge about the 'Orient' that was disseminated by many of the Orientalist thinkers and writers during this period greatly influenced many of the artists. It was in this context that the production of an Orientalist scholarship of painting emerged.

Roger Benjamin (2003, p.25) claims 'the term Orientalist', as a category referring to group of artists, first appeared in a writing by a French art critic and politician, Jules-Antoine Castagnary in 1864. Although this term had been previously used to describe nineteenth century scholars (for example linguists, philosophers and historians), Castagnary used the term 'Orientalist' to define a group of artists developing an art form that he considered '…failed to capture the beauty of France and its people' (Benjamin 2003, p.25). Refusing to describe exoticist paintings in detail, Castagnary discerned that the 'beauty' and 'truth' of French art was the affirmation of true European identity (Benjamin 2003, p.25). In his xenophobic opinion, the French Colonial Empire consisted only of:

> …the desert, palm trees and camels [and] did not produce the emotion given by the sight of cows and meadows and therefore did not qualify as a subject for painting (Benjamin 2003, p.24).

Despite Castagnary professing a view that the work by Orientalist artists was '…outside the hexagon of true France' and should be discouraged, the first society for French Orientalist painters emerged in 1893 (Benjamin 2003, p.25). The society was formed by French artist Étienne Dinet and art historian Léonce Bénédite who established its institutional power to depict and endorse certain premises and assumptions about the colonial 'Other' (Benjamin 2003; Lockman 2004). As president of the society, Bénédite aimed to assemble works of major nineteenth century Orientalist artists. Benjamin (2003) has suggested that Bénédite was aware that literary texts chronicled from the past such as the baron de Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes*, had been a common source for painters to depict the 'exotic' nature of distant civilizations rather than by direct experience. Furthermore, Benjamin (2003, p.61) contends Bénédite also recognised the 'lure of the exotic', manifested in the writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, would impel young artists to travel in an attempt to gain direct experience and knowledge of the Orient. Working with the government of larger colonies, the Ministry for the Colonies assisted in establishing scholarships for young artists from the metropole to work in the French Colonial Empire (Benjamin 2003). While these travelling scholarships made Orientalist art productive, this enterprise resulted in the Society becoming '…a visual propaganda-development wing of the Ministry of the Colonies' (Benjamin 2003, p.7). John MacKenzie (1995) states that although during this period Orientalism as a genre of painting was pioneered by the French, it was also developed by artists from Britain and several other European countries. The artists from Britain however, did not engage in the grandiose artistic endeavours initiated and pursued by French artists as they assumed a 'more pragmatic' and 'low key' approach (MacKenzie 1995, p.51). The nineteenth

century French and British colonising imperative shaped and was shaped by Orientalist artistic discourse. This perpetuated a certain image or 'representation' of the Orient, a representation that had little to do with what the parts of the world so depicted were actually like (Lockman 2004; Said 2003).

In her analysis of the 'Imaginary Orient', Linda Nochlin (1991) argues that a key issue in any discussion of Orientalist images is to consider the power structures in which the work materialised. Positing her argument from a Saidian model, Nochlin (1991) argues many of the art works produced by Orientalist artist were embedded in ideological assumptions of Western power:

> One about men's power over women; the other about white men's superiority of and hence justifiable control over inferior darker races, precisely those who indulge in …lascivious commerce (Nochlin 1991, p.45).

Nochlin's (1991) statement draws attention to the way in which the images produced by Orientalist artists did not exist in isolation, but were part of a complex node of power structures. According to Nochlin (1991) the Western trope of unveiling the Oriental woman and penetrating the harem provided a powerful visual metaphor for Western Orientalist power over the Orient, which became commonplace themes in a vast amount of artistic and photographic work (Nochlin 1991). Oliver Richon (1996) however, offers a view which is connected to, but distinct from Nochlin's viewpoint. In his discussion of nineteenth century Orientalist academic painting Richon (1985 cited in Richon 1996) aim is to show:

> …to what extent Western representations of the Orient address the West itself as if the Occident attempted to project itself and look at itself from an imaginary vanishing point, represented by the Orient (Richon 1996, p.242).

Richon (1996, p.242) argues that far from being just words, the Orient and the Occident were names that '…construct[ed] identities which became territories'. Without the Orient, the Occident as a category could not exist. Richon (1996) argues that nineteenth century Orientalist painting was tied to colonising conquests and ideology. The knowledge gained about the Orient, was brought to the West by travelers, writers and diplomatic circles. Richon (1996, p.251) asserts that whether the knowledge about the Orient was true or false does not matter. What matters is that the knowledge constructed about the Orient provided as a 'textual attitude' which was transformed into artistic representations. Richon (1996) brings into view how the early representations of the Orient, constructed by artists, were created from within the realms of their studios. Richon (1996) locates the French artist, Baron Antoine-Jean Gros (1771–1835) as the

main initiator of Orientalist art in France. According to Richon (1996) Gros, who was commissioned to glorify the Egyptian expeditions of Napoleon Bonaparte , '…created for one century the prototype of Oriental landscapes, costumes and faces, without having set foot in Egypt' (Richon 1996, p.243). Gros, who created his paintings using costumes, furnishings and artifacts brought from the East to his studio, constructed a 'realism' of the Orient that foregrounded and became interwoven in to successive artistic works (Richon 1996). Identifying the English painter Richard Parkes Bonington, who worked with Gros, as one of the first specialist painters of Odalisques and harem scenes, Richon (1996) states that Bonington's work was also an imaginary representation of the Orient as his travel escapades did not extend beyond Italy (Richon 1996). Using various props to anchor scenes in his paintings within the 'realm of the exotic', Bonington's intention was to use a technique which would produce an illusionary realism to make visible what was hidden from the West. Orientalist artists such as Gros and Bonington ushered in a conforming model of representation that was subsequently reproduced by nineteenth and twentieth century Orientalist artists. They set in motion artistic representations of the Orient that were not a copy of an original model, but '…always already a copy of another copy' (Richon 1996, p.245). Following Richon (1996) Frederick Bohrer (2003) maps the terrain and settings of 'exoticism as process' which was transformed in visual discourses. Bohrer (2003) contends that the representation of exoticism was not '…a limpid transmission, but one of representational *transformation*' (Bohrer 2003, p.12). Bohrer (2003) contrasts Oliver Richon's 'model of exoticism' and Linda Nochlin's 'imaginary Orient' to highlight the way in which an 'imaginary realism' was encoded in the processes of artist imagery. Bohrer's (2003) main criticism of Nochlin's (1991) analysis is that:

> …her focus is on the artists who visited the East but misrepresent it…which ignores the work of [Orientalist] artists who never left Western Europe' (Bohrer 2003, p.21).

Bohrer (2003) suggests what becomes apparent from an analysis of the work of Nochlin is that it presents Orientalism as a way in which the West managed and produced the East, forged through the binary of 'self' and 'Other', which is a characteristic feature of Said's approach articulated in *Orientalism.* This feature in particular has led MacKenzie (1995) to offer what he designates as a critical re-evaluation of Nochlin and other exponents of the Said model of *Orientalism.* MacKenzie (1995) argues that the problem with the work produced by Nochlin (1991) and Said (1978) is that '…they write about imperialism but they are not imperial historians' (MacKenzie 1995, p.47).

However, in *Culture and Imperialism* Said (1993) explained his use of the term 'imperialism' signified:

> …the practice, theory and the attitude of the metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory…which linger[ed] in a kind of cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic and social practices (Said 1993, p. 8).

Said's (1993) salient point was to highlight the set of cultural forms and structures that were embedded in certain forms of knowledge affiliated with imperial domination. Said (1993) maintained the vastness of imperialism conveyed a conceptualisation and representation of those in dominated territories as 'inferior', which gained currency in the West in complex ways that intertwined and overlapped. Although Said (2003) was little concerned with the visual image, he made reference to the work of nineteenth century British and French painters in which he argued '…the Orientalist genre tableau carried representation into visual expression and a life of its own' (Said 2003, p.118). Said's reference to artistic representation, although only minimal, is revealing as it shows how the representations of 'strange' and 'inferior' colonised peoples, which were widely accepted and prevalent discourses in British and French imperial processes, played an inestimable role in the artistic forms engendered by French and British artists. Locating European imperialism as a coherent mobilised system of hegemony developing from the conquests under Napoleon, Said (1993, p.69) suggests that the '…European traveller, merchant, scholar historian, novelist and [artist]' was given a new authority. Although MacKenzie (1995) acknowledges that it may be true that French Orientalism was inspired first by Napoleon's expedition of 1798, he argues:

> …during the high point of 'new imperialism (the period between 1890 and 1914), a shift occurred in Orientalist painting, which was not so much associated with imperial ideology as with new craft based anti industrialism of the western arts (MacKenzie 1995, p.5).

Speaking from the standpoint of an imperialist historian, MacKenzie (1995) puts forward the notion that '…there is little evidence of a necessary coherence between the direct imposition of imperial rule and the visual arts' (McKenzie 1995, p.51). Aiming to engender positive connotations of the work by large number of various Orientalist artists between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, McKenzie (1995, p.46) rejects the idea that visions of the Orient were created as a '…reflector and tool of imperialism', through which the 'Otherness' of Eastern peoples was easily identified. MacKenzie (1995) acknowledges that although Orientalist artists were not immune from intellectual, economic, social and political forces, their objective was to portray '…not the strikingly different but the oddly familiar' (MacKenzie 1995, p.55). MacKenzie (1995) suggests

that towards the last decades of the nineteenth century some painters of this period began to recognise Eastern art, architecture, design, music and theatre, once considered significantly 'different' and alien to Western artistic practices, as being embraced by and significantly influential in Western art, crafts and design. MacKenzie (1995, p.65) argues that far from offering an artistic program for imperialism, there can be no doubt that the East offered for artists a 'technical liberation' through their experience with other climates and artistic traditions. Moreover, McKenzie (1995, p.58) further argues that although there can be no doubt that countless paintings '….celebrated the separating of male and female spheres in the Arab world', these depictions were an attempt by European painters to recreate the 'chivalric image' of the ritualised gender and sexual relations of the Middle Ages. These statements, McKenzie (1995) asserts, may seem fantastical to those of Said's ilk, whose work on Orientalism is primarily concerned with aesthetic and positivist approaches to representation, inexorably rooted in hegemonic modes.

Mackenzie's (1995) counter argument calls into question the Saidian model of Orientalism and the Western domination over the East. Refuting the ideology of Orientalist visual culture being tied to imperialism, MacKenzie (1995) attempts to construct an alternative paradigm that posits Eastern artifacts as being liberated from the conceptualization of the exotic 'Other', but embraced and revered by Western artists '…paralleling historical and religious familiarly, rather than true Otherness' (MacKenzie 1995, p.52). Recognising that the creators of artistic experience are implicated in the transmission of a particular message, which may be intended differently to the receiving audience, MacKenzie (1995) suggests that the deciphering of messages are done in terms of the meanings of their own age. Mackenzie's (1995) notion of the interaction generated between the coloniser and the colonised in artistic fields, however, fails to recognise what Bohrer (2003, p.33) identifies as a 'reception theory'. Bohrer (2003) point out that the complex forms and meanings accrued in relation to Eastern artistic fields in the West, were appealing to the viewer within the '…prevailing knowledge, belief, ideology etc', and thus were dependant on the authoritative discourse itself for its process of transmission, recognition and response (Bohrer 2003, p.37). Far from being 'pure' or 'ideal specimens', these artifacts were '…removed from any 'original' context in the process of transmission' (Bohrer (2003, p.37). This was most apparent with many Western travelers during the nineteenth century, who often had their portraits painted depicting them in Eastern costume (Tromans 2008).

Nicholas Tromans (2008, p.15) has noted that the image of the conqueror 'going native' as he developed his empire into the East has a longstanding history within European culture. Tromans (2008) suggests during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, cross cultural dressing was adopted by men and women for a range of varying reasons. The subject of Eastern dress being adopted by many Western travelers has been explored further by Christine Riding (2008), who examines the interplay between cross cultural dressing and European portrait painting. Investigating the positioning of the costumed bodies within the Orientalist art portraiture genre, Riding (2008) has suggested that the agendas and strategies of both the sitter and artist, was not to accord an act of solidarity with the Arab citizens, but a Western Orientalist desire to appropriate power and control over the Orient. Implementing an argument to parallel that of Bronkhurst (2006), Riding (2008) suggests that the genre of cross-cultural dressing and art that developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:

> …also represented an Orientalist's desire for power over a Western audience, as a visual expression of his or her distinct experience and authority (Riding 2008, p.48).

The paradigm of the 'desire for power' is underlined in the work of artists who were both the 'sitter' and the artist (Riding 2008). It is not the intention here to investigate the genre of Orientalist portrait painting[8], rather it is an attempt to recognise the way in which the complexities of using Eastern costume and artifacts as props in Orientalist paintings, resonated in many of the depictions of Muslim women, providing the viewer/audience with an imaginary guise of the 'East' via the identification of the artists' view. In this way the artists were able to '…radiate a sense of assertion and domination over the complexities of Oriental life' (Said 2003, p.196). Orientalist painters such as Delacroix (1798-1863) Ingres (1780-1867) and Lewis (1804-1876) amongst others played a prominent role in deploying stereotypical images of Muslim women. As will be shown in the next section, the realm of the 'veiled exotic Oriental woman' was constructed within an imaginary space in which masquerade and role-playing constituted an integral part of the artists' work.

The Realm of the Exotic

As mention previously, the Western image of the Orient and Oriental women had been impressed upon European consciousness by a wide variety of sources for several centuries before the nineteenth century. These representations became an essential source for much of the work depicted by Orientalist artists, who drew on and further developed '… much older European depictions of Muslims' (Lockman 2004, p.69).



Fig 53 Ingres, Jean-Auguste-Dominique
The Grand Odalisque 1814
Musee du Louvre, Paris
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 54 Ingres, Jean-Auguste-Dominique
Odalisque with Slave 1839-1840
Fogg Art Museum, Harvard
University, Cambridge.
Grenville Withrop Bequest
c.f Boime 2004

Fascinated by what they imagined took place in the private quarters of the harem, many Orientalist artists produced paintings of nude and semi nude Muslim women in the harem even though '…in most cases they had little or no contact with Muslim women' (Lockman 2004, p.70). The depiction of exotic imagery, which had been well established during the eighteenth century through writings like Montesquieu's *Letters Persanes*', received its most powerful expression in the nineteenth century, through the literature of travel, but most particularly through Orientalist paintings (MacMaster and Lewis 1998). Paintings of the harem and the odalisque[9] by French Orientalist artist such as Jean Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780-1867) who never travelled to the Near East were depicted purely from imagination (Boime 2004). This imaginary realism created by using props and artifacts is most evident in Ingres' Odalisque paintings. In *The Grand Odalisque* (1814) (Fig 53 c.f Kren and Marx 2007), Ingres utilises Oriental artifacts, such as a turban and peacock fan, which he had observed from the collections of artist Baron Antoine-Jean Gros, to create an illusionary realism of the Odalisque (Kren and Marx 2009). Twenty five years later, however, Ingres incorporates copious amounts of props and artifacts in *Odalisque with Slave* (Fig 54 c.f Boime 2004).



Fig 55 Ingres, Jean-Auguste-Dominique
The Turkish Bath 1862
Musee du Louvre, Paris
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art

According to Boime (2004):

> In *Odalisque with Slave* (1839) [Ingres] uses every imaginable harem character and prop, including a lute-playing slave, black eunuch, hookah, [water pipe] silken cushions, incense burner, peacock feather fan, parquet floors and balustrade, ornate Islamic tile work, and above all an explicitly sexual harem woman (Boime 2004,p.381).

The imaginary depictions of the Odalisque by artists such as Ingres were an attempt to parallel the West's idea of the nude Odalisque who inhabited the harem. These women were not only portrayed as either 'abject or angry', or 'virginal and victimised' but always as an 'oppressed creature' (Kahf 1999, p.6). In 1862, at the age of eighty two, Ingres painted *The Turkish Bath* (Fig 55 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). This depiction of swarming nudes in the interior of a harem was derived not only from imagination but '…between two cultural moments separated by time' (Bohrer 2003, p.12). Bohrer (2003) points to *The Turkish Bath* (1862) by Ingres, as paramount in elaborating how the representational transformation from the text to the image was eternalised through both time and space. The imaginative artistic visions depicted by Ingres in the *Turkish Bath* were drawn from the letters written by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762), recounting her visits to harems, during her travels to Asia and Africa (Lockman 2004). Reported to be the first English woman to travel to the Ottoman lands, Montagu's writings describing the freedom and social empowerment of the veiled Ottoman women she met and befriended, were in sharp contrast to those of earlier male travel writers and Orientalist scholars (Lockman 2004). Despite Montagu's writings offering an alternative perspective than had been previously available to writers and artists, misunderstandings and distorted perspectives about women as exotic and mysterious in the East, were fostered by most artists throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Lockman 2004).



Fig 56 Delacriox, Eugéne
Woman with a Parrot 1827
Musée des Beaux-Arts, Lyons
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art



Fig 57 Delacriox, Eugéne
The Women of Algiers 1834
Musée du Louvre, Paris
c.f Kren & Marx 2007
Web Gallery of Art

As Bohrer (2003) notes, Ingres transformed Montagu's descriptions, not only from text to image but from a transcript of a women's experience to '…an unbounded and perverse erotic imagination of a male artist who never set foot in the land he depicted' (Bohrer 2003, p.13).

Orientalist artists such as Ferdinand Victor Eugène Delacroix who did travel to the East for their inspirations were however, greatly influenced by the work of artists such as Ingres and Bonington. In 1827, Delacroix painted the *Recumbent Odalisque*, also known as the *Woman with the Parrot* (Fig. 56 c.f Kren and Marx 2007). 'Using one of his favourite models, Laure, the style and thematic presentation owed much to the work of Delacroix's friend Bonington' (Néret 2000, p.33). Between 1831 and 1832 Delacroix spent six months in North Africa, furnishing him with '…a repertoire of themes that he developed and elaborated throughout his lifetime' (Boime 2004, p.360). During his stay in Algiers, it is alleged that he gained access for a short period of time to a harem and made sketches for his future studies (Boime 2004). Given the Muslim law that prohibited Christian males from entering the harem, the accounts of Delacroix's encounter remain problematical. Boime (2004) suggests, that because Delacroix titled his picture *Women of Algiers in their Apartment* (1834) and not *Women of Algiers in their Harem*, indicates that he most probably entered the terrain of a '…Jewish convert to Islam' (Boime 2004, p.361). Moreover, Boime (2004) suggests this would seem most likely as Delacroix consistently employed Jewish models as Arab surrogates for his paintings. *The Women of Algiers* (Fig 57 c.f Kren and Marx 2007), purportedly painted from the sketches Delacroix produced in the harem, implements, props such as a hookah, jewellery, and glass decanters to support the image of three sumptuous women, whose '…intoxicated gaze,

languid postures and want of activity suggests a life of perpetual indolence' (Boime 2004, p.363). Most significantly, Boime (2004) suggests, is that although Delacroix's painting operated on the level of documentary realism it is '…a study in voyeurism targeted at the French public on the threshold of colonial enterprise' (Boime 2004, p.363). The circulation of exoticism by Orientalist artists such as Ingres and Delacroix nourished a mechanism of image making about the harem and Oriental women in general, which became a prototype for many artists' imaginative visions (Tromans 2008). The transformative nature of these representations was filtrated into the Orientalist genre of art and also into the field of European public vision and consciousness (Benjamin 2003). Subsequently these paintings made manifest the Orientalist gaze, described by Said (2003, p.3) '…as a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient'. According to Saná Makhoul (1997, p.41) in 1883, Delacroix's painting of *The Women of Algeria* was considered by French Critic Philippe Burty '… as of the modern ethnographic school' and thus accepted as a as a true and scientific image of Algerian women. Presenting romantic exoticism within the guise of documentary realism engendered an evolving synthesis between Orientalist art and imperial ideologies. As the harem incarnated a boundary between the coloniser and the colonised, a fantasised construction of it became '…a decisive element in colonial relations since it represented the coloniser's victory over an environment of resistance' (Bentahar 2009, p.34). In particular, the assertion of *The Women of Algiers* having a '…scientific perspective suited the French Colonialist agenda in Algeria of unveiling Algerian women' (Makhoul 1997, p.41). The images of the nude Odalisque residing in the harem conveyed in the Orientalist art genre, were interpreted and translated by the West as a space between the '…familiar/civilised and the unfamiliar/uncivilised, between self and Other' (Makhoul 1997, p.40). For many of the artists, those who travelled to the Orient and the stay at home alike, a key aspect of their work was in the representation of veiled Muslim women. Although the images bore little if any relationship to any social reality, they formed part of the interrelated systems of representation that constructed and instructed individuals in making sense of 'veiled bodies' (Nochlin 1991; Lockman 2004). The next section attempts to bring into view how the power of veiled images promulgated by the Orientalist art genre corresponded to and replicated the homogeneous field of imperialist and colonial discourse.

Veiling/Unveiling: The West's Collective Preoccupation

The topos of the harem, the odalisque and the veil, which emerged as a centrepiece of the Orientalist art genre, concurred with the build up of French and British Empires in the nineteenth century (Kahf 1999). According to Neil MacMaster and Toni Lewis (1998) the central prominence of the veil in Orientalist text, paintings and photographs was strategically placed to signify a much wider field than the visible public marker of sexual segregation and cultural inferiority but became the key marker of:

> …the harem, polygamy, a repressive political order based on the subjugation of women, Oriental despotism, sadism and lasciviousness (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.121).

The prominent part of the West's collective preoccupation with the East played by the image of veiled women, was framed from prior knowledge schemas which incorporated misconstrued meanings of the customs of veiling practices (Ahmed 1992). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, colonial ideologies functioned to justify the attack on colonised cultures and supported the notion of the superiority of Europe (Ahmed 1992). As Europeans came to establish themselves as colonial powers in Muslim countries, the veil became a key focus in colonial ideologies and by extension in Orientalist paintings. According to MacMaster and Lewis (1998) the portrayal of veiled women by artists travelling to the Middle East was rarely based on observation. They argue:

> Muslim women, with the exception of prostitutes and some Jewish models would not pose under any condition. Artists frequently used models in their studio…keeping in hand bric-a brac of orientalia with which to adorn the set (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.123).

The Orientalist artists' 'staged tableaux' became an expression or projection of fantasy in Orientalist paintings (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.123). As the Orientalist art genre had its own established repertoire of locations and subjects, no in depth knowledge of Middle Eastern society was deemed necessary in order to produce a repetition of paintings that appeared authentic to the Europeans' observations of the Orient (Tromans 2008). These representations, which were most often far removed from reality, were a stark contrast to the culture and environment encountered by artists who traveled to the East. Tromans (2008a, p.78) points to Scottish Orientalist artist David Wilke, who was considered the '…superstar of the nineteenth early century London exhibition scene', as being frustrated by his inability to access the 'authentic Orient', in particular women, when he arrived in Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1840. Wilkie's desire to capture the 'real Orient' was however, perceived from the vast oeuvre of artistic and textual representations which had been positioned into an Orientalist location. Tromans (2008) states that:

> Once the artists had got over their initial disappointment in the problems posed by gender separation, they soon learned to make new narrative capital out of this challenge (Tromans 2008, p.17).

Drawing on Orientalist artistic and textual material to construct meaningful images is most apparent in the work by British artist John Frederick Lewis (1805-1976). Caroline Williams (2001) notes that although Lewis spent an entire decade (1841-1851) in Cairo, which gave Lewis an opportunity to paint from direct experience, apart from the Hhareem[10], all of his other works were produced in England from the six hundred sketches he made while in Cairo (Williams 2001). Intending to produce paintings that were 'windows of reality', Lewis relied upon not only his memories, sketches and photographs, but an archive of work by seventeenth century artists. In particular, Tromans (2008) suggests, Lewis drew on the text and illustrations from *An Account of Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians,* published by Edward William Lane in 1836. According to Tromans (2008):

> Lane's work was regularly referenced in exhibition catalogues by British painters wishing to lend their authority to their images of Egyptian life (Tromans 2008, p.14).

Through his writings, Lane provided the public with an interest in the manners and customs of the people of Egypt and Lewis was able to reflect this interest visually (Williams 2001). Attempting to produce a narrative of 'real' subjects through his art, Lewis works provided a visual story which paralleled Western perceptions about the Orient. In many of the paintings by Lewis, the models, lavish costumes, props, artifacts and architectural elements are replicated. The symbolic representation of veiled figures forms the centre piece in two of Lewis' paintings. In *the Seraff – the Doubtful Coin* (1869) (Fig 58 c.f Tromans 2008) and *The Street and Mosque of the Ghooreyah* (1876) (Fig 59 c.f the *Victorian Web* 2007), the models, their costumes and the architecture elicit overlapping themes. The connection between the two paintings, produced seven years apart, is that the costuming worn by the models is almost identical in fabric, style and colour. Tromans (2008) suggests that because male artists were unable to access the women's areas due to gendered separation, they adapted their imaginary representations of women in the spaces of the city. This strategy was also used by British artist William Holman Hunt in *The Lantern Maker's Courtship* (Fig 60 c.f Tromans 2008a). The principle couples in Hunt's painting are teenage fiancés at the lantern makers shop in Cairo (Tromans 2008a). The painting depicts the young woman pushing away her fiancé who is trying to lift her veil (Peltre 1998). Hunt's depiction, according to Tromans (2008) is entirely out of character for modern Egyptians as described by Edward William Lane's *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptian*[11].



Fig 58 Lewis John Frederick
The Seraff – The Doubtful Coin 1869
Birmingham Museums & Art Gallery
c.f Tromans 2008



Fig 59 Lewis John Frederick
The Street and Mosque of the Ghooreyah Cairo 1876
Forbes Magazine Collection
The Victorian Web 2007



Fig 60 Hunt William Holman
The Lantern Makers Courtship 1854-7
Birmingham Museums & Art Gallery
c.f Tromans 2008a



Fig 61 Lévy-Dhurmer, Lucien
Promenade du soir (Evening Outing)
Exhibited in 1935 in Paris
c.f Thornton 1985

In this case Hunt had preferred to provide his own pictorial evidence, '…not merely an illustrator to Lane's scholarly account' (Tromans 2008, p.16). Christine Peltre (1998) proposes that:

> This work [represents] more than an ethnographic curiosity; in effect it pictures the West's approach to the Orient, the attempt at unmasking incumbent upon all makers of Oriental images (Peltre 1998, p.195).

Peltre (1998) suggests that the symbolic intent in Hunt's painting to unveil/unmask not only the veiled woman but the Orient itself, should not be underestimated in its ability to legitimise and further reinforce the genesis of colonizing ideologies. The works by Delacroix, Lewis and Hunt and other artists of their ilk, used their paintings as an instrumental device to successfully structure an illusion of realism about Muslim women by means of using '…prostitutes, beggars and impoverished members of minorities and also [at times] European women as models' (Kabbani 2008, p.44). Using the masquerade of Oriental props to create the illusion of realism, was avoided by some artists during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An example can be seen in the work of French/symbolist artists such as Paris Lucien Lévy-Dhurmer (1865-1953) who chose to use an alternative medium for his work. In *The Promenade du soir* (*Evening Outing*) (Fig 61 c.f Thornton 1985) Lévy-Dhurmer used pastels to relay an impression of two veiled North African women '…in an aura of mysterious beauty' (Benjamin 2003, p.87). Although Lévy-Dhurmer travelled to Algeria and Morocco over a thirty year period, most of his paintings, as many Orientalist painters had done earlier, were based on visual notes

gathered on his travels and composed back in his studio (Benjamin 2003). This was also apparent in many of the paintings executed by women artists, whose artistic enterprise was based on the premise of capturing the 'essence' of the Orient in zones forbidden to European men (Bahramitash 2005).

'Saving' Muslim Women

By the middle of the nineteenth century the presence of women artists travelling to the East became more evident. Reina Lewis (1996) suggests, in contrast to the mostly exotic and imaginary depictions of women offered by male artists, representations by female artists, for whom the harem was not off limits, could offer first hand representations. Premised by the notion of pursuing a corrective to depictions of the 'Orient' made by the male dominated Orientalist art enterprise, artists such as Henrietta Browne (1829-1901) produced paintings of the harem from her own experience (Lewis 1996). In her investigation of how the interaction between culture and imperialism was played out in connection to gender, Lewis (1996) argued that although white European women artists did produce Orientalist images, women's gendered access to the positionalities of imperial discourse produced a contrasting gaze of the Orientalised 'Other' than had been enunciated by a colonial subject that was 'irredeemably male' (Lewis 1996, p.17). The approach used by Lewis (1996) attempts to delineate the homogenising male discourse of Orientalist representations of Islamic culture. What is important to note however, although the work by women artists was not always consistent with or supportive of male dominated Orientalist representations, many women artists also acted as cultural agents in transforming the underlying ideology and manifestations of Orientalism (Bahramitash 2005).

Mary Roberts (2007) acknowledges that although for British women artists and travellers the 'ways of seeing' the harem were within the parameters of their own particular fantasies, their engagement with the harem was orchestrated and controlled by Ottoman women. These women were not the yielding odalisques of Western myth, '…they were powerful women for whom visiting rituals facilitated an extension of their influence beyond the confines of the harem' (Roberts 2007, p.13). However, artists such as Brown created powerful new fictions of access to the exotic world, as their art continued to depict '…a timeless exotic world, [which] proved to have remarkable tenacity' (Roberts 2007, p.10). Tromans (2008b, p.131) suggests that one of the two paintings produced by Brown, *A Visit: Harem Interior, Constantinople 1860* (Fig 62 c.f Tromans 2008b),



Fig 62 Brown Henriette
Visit: Harem Interior, Constantinople 1860
1861
Private Collection– Courtesy of Marco Frignati Art Advisory, London
c.f Tromans 2008b.

depicts the 'bitter enunciation' of the harem professed by journalist and feminist Harriet Martineau who travelled to the East in 1847. The painting, according to Tromans (2008b, p.131) represents 'pure suffering' paralleling Martineau's view of the harem as 'vile in her eyes'. Similarly Roksana Bahramitash (2005, p.226) argues the work by artists such as Brown was steeped in 'feminist Orientalism'. Brown created her paintings from her 1860 visit to the harem during a two week stay in Constantinople with her diplomat husband. Brown was able to enter the 'forbidden zone' of the harem where the mysterious and inaccessible space of Oriental seclusion could be revealed (Bahramitash 2005; Tromans 2008). Brown's paintings according to Bahramitash (2005):

> …are perfect examples of the way the colonial world thought about Muslim women; as victims of cruel patriarchal practice of polygyny [and] the harem as a prison for women who had no control over their destinies (Bahramitash 2005, pp.226-227).

Brown's Orientalist depictions not only bolstered the appeal of the 'civilizing mission', to 'save' Muslim women, but through the medium of her art, presented the public with '…the essentialised binaries between the civilised West and the uncivilised East (Bahramitash 2005, p.227). During the nineteenth century, white middle class women artists, such as Brown, collectively provided 'evidence' for Western critics of the adverse treatment of Muslim women. This supposed evidence, gleaned from artistic works formed an integral part of the general 'knowledge' about the Orient, in particular the mistreatment of Muslim women. This was manifested throughout the colonial period, where the 'saving' of women from the backwardness of Muslim society by removing their veils, became a central focus of both British and French colonising domination (Bahramitash 2005).

Leila Ahmed (1992) indicates that the emergence of the 'discourse of the veil', in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, became entangled with issues of '…culture and class, imperialism and nationalism' (Ahmed 1992, p.6). Focusing her discussion on the British colonial occupation of Egypt, Ahmed (1992) suggests the theories forged in the colonial era by colonial British powers derived from beliefs and practices developed by middle class Victorian England. Within this schema, '…Victorian womanhood and mores with respect to women…were regarded as the ideal and measure of civilization' (Ahmed 1992, p.151). The discursive foundations of the inferiority of women and Islam and in particular the practice of veiling, was exemplified by Lord Cromer, British Consul General in Egypt from 1883-1907, whose emphasis on the de-veiling of women was premised by the British Orientalist ideologies prominent during that period (Ahmed 1992). Integral to the policies pursued by Cromer was for '…Egyptians to be persuaded or forced into the true spirit of Western civilization' (Ahmed 1992, p.153). This Cromer believed could only be achieved by changing the 'fatal obstacle' of veiling and seclusion (Ahmed 1992, p.153). Ahmed (1992) discerns:

> …veiling to Western eyes, the most visible marker of differentness and backwardness of Islam societies…became the open target of colonial attack and the spearhead of the assault on Muslim societies (Ahmed 1992, p.152).

Colonialist officials and Christian missionaries actively condemned the custom of veiling. Lord Cromer, for example argued that the practices of veiling of women exercised '…a baneful effect on Eastern society and it was essential that Egyptians be forced into imbibing the true spirit of western civilization', by abandoning the practice of veiling (Ahmed 2003, p.43). Although colonial patriarchs like Cromer believed that middle class Victorian mores represented the pinnacle of civilization, both Ahmed (1992) and Robinson Dunn (2006) have both pointed out that while Cromer pursued polices he considered beneficial to Egyptian society, in particular the unveiling of Egyptian women, he was hostile to the idea of women's suffrage in England, and founded and presided over the Men's League for Opposing Women's Suffrage. Bahramitash (2005) suggests Cromer's stance illustrates the double standards inherent in Western attitudes. On one hand Cromer was critical of the perceived mistreatment of Muslim women; on the other he took a stand against the suffragists campaigning for women's rights in England. During this period colonial ideologies, which functioned to justify the attack on colonised cultures, were influenced by the notion of the superiority of Europe, which was promoted by officials such as Cromer, missionaries and feminists (Ahmed 1992).

The perspective of European superiority was largely influenced by the misinterpretations of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection (Lockman 2004). The scientific rationale of Social Darwinism provided legitimacy for the West to be set at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of human evolution (Hollinsworth 2006). Under the apparently irrefutable conclusions of Social Darwinism, the superiority of the West was not simply a result of '…that civilization's superior values and institutions, but rather of the superior innate biological characteristics of the 'white race' (Lockman 2004, p.78). The division of 'races' into distinct biological groups that resonated throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries posited the inhabitants of Africa, Asia and the 'Muslim Orient' as belonging to biologically inferior 'races. Such ideas proposed that certain 'races' were effectively incapable of achieving the level of civilisation attained by the 'white race' (Hollinsworth 2006). Lockman (2004) asserts:

> …although many scholars and others denounced biological racism as unscientific, much of the Euro-American discourse about the world was to varying degrees infected by racial ideology (Lockman 2004,p.78).

The idea that the Western self was by definition, rational, normal and therefore superior and the Eastern 'Other' was irrational, abnormal and therefore inferior, provided the legitimacy for the political dominance by the West over the East (Said 2003). This political dominance, was viewed not only as natural but also inevitable. Said (2003) highlights the broad assumption of Western superiority in his examination of Arthur Balfour's speech to the British Parliament in 1910. Balfour argued that:

> …we know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it…you may look through the whole history of the Orientals in what is called broadly the East, and you never find traces of self government…we are in Egypt not merely for the sake of Egyptians…we are there for the sake of Europe at large (Balfour 1910 cited in Said 2003, pp.33-34).

The theme of Balfour's speech, Said (2003) discerned, was dominated by knowledge/ power nexus, as the justification for British occupation of Egypt for Balfour was based on the superiority of British, knowledge. Said (2003) further suggests this essential right for the British to dominate in Egypt for his/her own good came from hegemonic knowledge, which stemmed from a '…reservoir of accredited knowledge [within] the codes of Orientalist orthodoxy to which Balfour and Cromer referred everywhere in their writing and public policy' (Said 2003, p.39). The complex series of Orientalist ideologies that 'contained' and 'represented' the 'Oriental' in dominating frameworks, provided the argument that to fully 'civilise' the Muslim world, the unveiling of women was essential (Said 2003; Ahmed 1992).

These ideas gave expression to a French educated middle class lawyer, Qassim Amin whose publication of *Tahrir Al-Mar'a* (the liberation of women) in 1899 provoked intense controversy, as he advocated social and cultural transformation of the Egyptian nation and Muslim countries in general (Ahmed 1992). The key factor for Amin to achieve this goal was to centre on changing customs relating to women, in particular the practice of veiling. The significance of Amin reproducing colonialist ideologies is that it '…mark[ed] the entry of a colonial narrative of woman and Islam in which the veil and the treatment of women epitomised Islamic inferiority' (Ahmed 1992, p.163). With the commercialization of photography during the late nineteenth century, the dissemination of a vast amount of Oriental images, depicting veiled women and the harem made their greatest impact in Europe (MacMaster and Lewis 1998). The channel through which the harem image and the veil became most prolific was in the production of postcards (Fig 63a, 63b, & 63c c.f Bailey and Tawadros 2003). Between 1900 and 1930 the vast amount of postcards that were sent by tourists, soldiers and settlers to France '…reproduced the classic nineteenth century themes of the Orient - the erotic harem and the naked odalisques' (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.124). The photographers who began to establish themselves in the Middle East were influenced by artists and vice versa. Artists such as Delacroix assisted photographers in his studio while also using photographs as a base for his paintings. The photographic representations of veiling and the harem bore little or any relationship to social reality and were essentialised by a '…limited set of reified formulae' (Shohat 1992 cited in MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.125). The photographs depicting Muslim women, were in the main, '…studio reconstructions composed by the photographer' (El Guindi 1999, p.37). As with many of the reconstructions of Muslim women in paintings, models were also used for the production of images in colonial postcards (El Guindi 1999). As the production of postcards expanded during the early twentieth century, the constructed images of veiled women became more apparent (Figs 64 & 65 c.f Bailey &Tawadros 2003). The constructed imagery depicted in paintings, photography and postcards advanced and 'shaped outsiders understanding' of Middle Eastern women and their private lives (El Guindi 1999, p.38). Throughout the colonial period, two sets of imagery associated with the 'Muslim woman' were promulgated, either as a symbol of exotic fantasy or as a metaphor for the Orient's need for Europe's civilising mission (El Guindi 1999). The ideology of Western superiority resonated with French colonial ideologies. In Algeria the civilizing imperative and the unveiling of women was a deemed as vital to the French colonial project. As Franz Fanon (2003) explained:

th- early 20th century.



Fig 63a *Zorah, Aïcha, Fathma*
Late 19th- early 20th century.
Postcard. Collection Michket Krifa.
c.f Bailey, and Tawadros 2003





Fig 63c *Femmes Maauresques en promenade*
(Moorish Women Out Walking)
Late 19th- early 20th century.
Postcard. Collection Michket Krifa.
c.f Bailey, and Tawadros 2003



Fig 64 *Scènes et Types. Femmes Voilée*
(Veiled Woman)
Early 20th century.
Postcard. Collection Michket Krifa.
c.f Bailey, and Tawadros 2003



Fig 65 *Mauresque d'Alger Voilée*
(Veiled Moorish Woman from Algiers)
1926.
Postcard. Collection Michket Krifa.
c.f Bailey, and Tawadros 2003



Fig 66 Pontecorvo Gillo
The Battle of Algiers 1965
Film Still 35mm, 120 mins
Reproduced by permission of Zaphira Yacef
c.f Bailey, and Tawadros 2003

> …for the colonial administration to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the women; we must go and find them behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where men keep them out of sight (Fanon 2003, p.75).

Fanon (2003) demonstrated that the colonial imperative to 'civilise' Algerians could only be achieved by 'de-veiling' the women. In this way, Algerian women would be 'saved' and thus 'symbolically unveiled' (Fanon 2003, p.76). However, from the 1950s onwards the veil became a symbol of the rejection of French colonial rule. During this period, the perceptions of the veil as both an exoticised and oppressive symbol, made a significant shift to a new emphasis on 'the over veiled' as a signifier of 'political danger' (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.125). Drawing on the essay by Franz Fanon (1965) 'Algeria Unveiled' and Gillo Pontecorvo's film *The Battle of Algiers* (Fig 66 c.f Bailey and Tawadros 2003), MacMaster and Lewis (1998) state:

> During the Algerian War women became the focus of a struggle between contending colonial and liberating forces particularly as they were held by both sides to hold the key to the battle for the hearts and minds of the society (MacMaster and Lewis 1998, p.126).

For the French the symbol of the veil assumed a 'sinister' and overtly 'threatening' mode when Algerian women from the National Liberation Front (NLF) began to conceal weapons under the folds of their *haik* the (large outer wrap of the veil) to carry weapons past the controls of the French military (MacMaster and Lewis 1998). The new dialectic of the body, Franz Fanon (2003, p.83) argued was imbued: '…in the Algerian woman [who was] a link in the revolutionary machine.' To the enemy, every veiled Algerian woman became suspect. In 1962, the shooting of five veiled women on the streets of

Algiers was carried out by the terrorist group the Secret Army Organisation (ASO) (Shepard 2006; Boariu 2002). Thus the dynamism of the veil was '…stripped once and for all of its traditional dimension' (Fanon 2003, p.85).

Summary

This chapter has attempted to illuminate how a pivotal shift emerged in the field of representation of the veil '…as Europeans established themselves as colonial powers in Muslim countries' (Ahmed 1992, p.150). As a large body of Western knowledge about the Orient became *Orientalised* (Said 2003, p.67), the framing of the veil and the oppression of Muslim women became the centrepiece of the Western narrative of Islam (Kahf 1999). This distinct narrative, which represented the veil/veiling as part of Islam's immutable oppressiveness towards women, emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Monopolies of power created monopolies of knowledge and formed a central part of the dominant representation of the veil in contemporary Western discourse (Aly 2009). The historical Western narrative concerning debates about the veil and veiling has to a considerable extent, overtly or covertly, been enmeshed in a deleterious effect of power and knowledge. The transformational nature of these hegemonic discourses has been implemented to promote a particular disingenuous interpretation and perception of Islam and the veil during various historical junctures. The primary motivation for utilizing the general tenor of arguments furnished by Foucault and Said has been to highlight the intimate relationship between power and knowledge that was assumed in the Orientalist tradition of thought, vocabulary and imagery. In particular this chapter has brought to attention the complex ways in which Orientalist paintings and photography were instrumental in sustaining the fabled exotic, imaginary 'Orient'. The gathering and analysing of images of Muslim women in the formation of Orientalist specificity, was to confront and attempt to bridge the diffuse and wide ranging fields of Orientalist textual and visual discourses and to explore the terrain between and within their specific ideological meaning. The European writers and painters, who promoted a particular interpretation about Islam and the veil from the knowledge imparted by the travel writings that emerged during the West's encounters with Islam during the Crusades, set in motion a foundational narrative of misinformation about Islamic culture. The textual borrowing from these chronicles was reframed to constitute a key dimension of 'official' discourse and was propagated in the writings of Enlightenment scholars, such Montesquieu's *Persian Letters.* Writings of this genre were widely influential in the production of imaginary misrepresentations of Muslim women in paintings, and by extension in

photographs and postcards, as exotic odalisques confined and controlled in the space of the harem. The entanglement of Orientalist political and artistic discourses were consistently propelled like a Möbius Strip, endlessly rotating and reinforcing each other by a defined prescribed and fixed viewpoint.

The inaccuracies that plagued artists' depictions of Muslim women in the harem, within and beyond it, operated as a project of the imagination, a space or screen onto which the erotic fantasy could be projected with impunity (Nochlin 1991). The productiveness of Orientalist imagery that depicted 'exotic' Muslim women was intimately bound and located within the realms of voyeurism and the male gaze (Dobie 2001). The imperative to 'unveil' women, which was interrelated with artistic imagery and hegemonic colonial narratives, became part of the controlling civilizing imperative. This was enhanced by missionary and feminist agendas who reinscribed the narrative of 'saving' Muslim women from their subjugated lives. Muslim women's counter hegemonic discourses that inscribed a narrative of resistance to the essentialising and incorrect particularities about Muslim women became increasingly apparent during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). However, the struggles against the colonising forces by the Algerian women during the Algerian war, gave rise to a new offensive directed against the veil - as a symbol of 'political danger' and 'terrorism' (McMaster and Lewis 1998). Such discursive casting of the veil as a signifier of an 'Islamic threat' became connected to the broader systems of the historically negative representations of veiled bodies constructed in the Western imagination (Zine 2006).

The following chapter examines the way in which the tropes and effects of racialised knowledge production regarding veiled bodies, inscribed in Orientalist discourse, became reinvented in Neo-Orientalist paradigms in the decade prior to September 11 2001. More specifically it is attentive to the way in which veiled Muslim women's bodies and identities became scripted within a complex nexus of desire and disavowal - as exotic objects and victims of their misogynist culture and/or as a signifier of the dangerous feared 'Other'.

Notes

[1] Albertus Magnus was a noted thirteenth century Dominican scholar. See Hasse, D N 2008, 'The Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic Sources on the Theory of the Soul' in *Vivarium,* Volume 46, pp. 232-252.

[2] Thomas Aquinas was a philosopher and Christian theologian in the thirteenth century. He believed that reason and theology were always compatible because both came from God. This belief became the foundational assumption of the many writings he produced during his lifetime. McGill, S 2005, *Thomas Aquinas*, MAS ultra-School Edition.

[3] In 1440 the German inventor Johannes Gutenberg invented a printing press process that, with refinements and increased mechanization, remained the principal means of printing until the late 20th century. See Eisenstein, E 1980, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe: Volumes I and II*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[4] Christopher Betts (1993) suggests the anonymous publication of *Persian Letters* was standard practice at the time where there was a risk of official disapproval. See also Schechter, Ronald 2002, electronic files of Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* (1721) at *Montesquieu's Persian Letters* website. This edition was translated by John Davison and published by Gibbings and Company in London in 1899. <http://rbsche.people.wm.edu/teaching/plp/>.

[5] The seraglio is a royal dwelling. Montesquieu used the word as if it were synonymous with harem, a portion of the oriental house in which women are isolated and hidden away (Schechter 2002).

[6] Paul Rycaut travelled to Constantinople in 1660 as the private Secretary to the Ambassador of Turkey. Rycaut's (1665) first major work, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, gave an analysis of the Ottoman people and government in the seventeenth century. His work proved extremely popular and influential as editions continued to be published over the next hundred years. According to Linda Darling (1994) Rycaut's work provided a hostile view of the Ottoman Empire based on ignorance and fear. This stemmed from and reinforced an Orientalism, founded on the vast assumption of alienation between East and West. See Darling, L 1994, 'Ottoman Politics through British Eyes: Paul Rycaut's The Present State of the Ottoman Empire' in *Journal of World History*, Volume. 5, Number. 1 (Spring), pp.71-97.

[7] In 1717, English aristocrat Lady Mary Wortley Montagu arrived in Constantinople (Istanbul), Turkey, with her husband, Edward Wortley Montagu, who was appointed the British Ambassador at Istanbul. While in Turkey, Lady Mary Montagu wrote a series of letters to her sister. Using her privilege and power to enter zones prohibited by men, her letters provided accounts of the ways in which women occupied, managed and controlled the feminine spaces within the houses and harems of the Turkish elite in Istanbul. See Ahmed, L 1992, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

[8] See Riding C, 2008, 'Travellers and Sitters: The Orientalist Portrait' in *The Lure of the East; British Orientalist Painting*, N Tromans (ed), pp.48-75.

[9] Albert Boime, 2004, explains the term odalisque (comes from the Turkish word *oda*, meaning chamber) and by extension the harem attendant or concubine usually lying on her side in a sensual display. Boime, A 2004, *Art in an Age of Counterrevolution: 1815-1848*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

[10] John Frederick Lewis inaugurated his public career as an Orientalist painter in 1850 with his harem painting titled *The Hhareem*. In order to convey a sense of authenticity about the painting he used the double 'h' indicating the Arabic letter ح in the title

[11] In his catalogue note for the *Lantern Makers Courtship*, Hunt quoted from the *Account of Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, by Edward William Lane. See Tromans 2008, 'Introduction: British Orientalist Painting' in *Lure of the East: British Orientalist Painting*, N Tromans (ed), Tate Publishing, Millbank, London, pp.10-21.

Chapter Four

Smouldering Tensions

> The greater degree to which Muslim women suffer hate crimes is a reflection of their visibility as Muslims (Dunn 2003)[1].

Introduction

To enable a broader investigation of how the Orientalist inspired image of veiled bodies became a constituent component of hegemonic discourse frames in the wake of 9/11, a discussion of certain flashpoints that occurred in the decade prior to 9/11 is deemed critical. This chapter expands on some of the tropes and effects of the processes of Orientalist discourse regarding the veil and unveiling foreshadowed in the previous chapter. It examines the way in which the veil intersected with issues concerning religion and gender and as an identifying symbol of the feared 'dangerous Other' (Cunneen 1997). Tanja Dreher and Christine Ho (2009), Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason (2007) amongst others, have argued that during the decade prior to September 11 2001, the demonization of Arab/Muslim Australians'[2] religious and cultural practices were perpetuated by political rhetoric and adverse reporting in the mass media (Aly 2009; Imtoual 2005). These events include the 1991 Gulf War[3], the so called Lebanese gang rapes in Sydney 2000[4] and the 2001*Tampa affair*[5].

Scott Poynting (2002) has stated that it is highly probable that media and political discourses were causally linked to racist vilification against people of 'Middle Eastern appearance' during certain flashpoints prior to September 11 2001. Drawing on a plethora of instances of adverse reporting from tabloid Australian newspapers and talkback radio presenters, together with data obtained from various Australian Arabic Councils and Anti-Racism Organisations, Poynting (2002) highlights *why* the repeated vilification of 'Arabs' and 'Muslims' in media reporting during the abovementioned events, resulted in heightened occurrences of racial vilification. This chapter has attempted to expand on the findings by Poynting (2002), that is to bring into view *how* the historically linked knowledge schemas and prominence of transformational frames regarding Islam and Muslims were instrumental in gaining resonance within the context of the recurring cycle of Islamophobia. It argues that the dissemination of these reductive interpretive frames had a profound influence on public attitudes towards Muslim Australians. As historical

perceptions of Islam became symbolised by women's dress code, the act of veiling became highly politicised, resulting in women wearing the veil receiving the brunt of violence and intimidation, particularly in public spaces (Poynting 2002).

The distinct way in which hegemonic media and political frames represented Muslim women during this period, mobilised a continuum of Orientalist tropes selectively played out around myths and imaginary histories of the veil and veiling (Aly 2009). Anne Aly and David Walker (2007) have stated that it would be misleading to propose the hostility towards Muslims, in particular veiled Muslim women, which occurred in the late nineteenth century, formed a simple line of progression to those a century or more later. Aly and Walker (2007, p.203) claim, however, that '…there are nonetheless intriguing parallels and recurrent expressions of survivalist anxiety' and hostility towards Muslim Australians during various events in contemporary moments. Jasmine Zine (2006) contends that when particular global and local events intersect with issues of religious identification, anxieties and phobias in relation to historic forms of Islamophobia tend to move from the margins to the centre of discursive focus. As each temporal phase of Islamophobia resurges, the re-imagining of religious difference is most often generated through discourses of 'gendered Islamophobia' (Zine 2006, p.1). Connected to the system of gendered Islamophobia is the undue surveillance of veiled Muslim women's bodies. To enable a broader understanding of the manifestation of surveillance perpetrated toward women wearing the veil prior to September 11 2001, this chapter takes Michel Foucault's insights on the disciplinary regimes of surveillance, the gaze and the re working of his theories by contemporary writers. While a multitude of issues pertaining to the phenomenon of surveillance, the gaze and Panopticonics exist, this analysis has considered the disciplinary power and the nature of surveillance that functioned as a network of knowledge frames implicated in the management and normalisation of bodies and dress codes of Australian Muslim women during the decade prior to September 11 2001. To explore the implications of gendered Islamophobia and an understanding of how meanings attributed to the veil have been constructed as a cultural symbol representative of the feared Muslim 'Other' during certain flashpoints in years leading up to 9/11, this chapter provides an analysis of various parliamentary speeches, political comments, media reporting as well as utterances made by prominent social commentators that contributed to this phenomenon. The focus for choosing certain media representations of the veil for this and the following chapters was to draw on Australian newspapers that were most representative of a reaching a wide reader distribution, which included *The*

Advertiser, The Age, The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald, Herald Sun, Daily Telegraph, Gold Coast Bulletin and the *Courier Mail.* The data was assembled by using the electronic database *NewsBank*[6]. Seeking to examine the ways in which Islamophobia emerged and re-emerged from the margins to the centre of hegemonic discourses during particular global and local events, the historic dimensions of Australia's anxieties regarding the influx of 'non-white' people including fear of the influx of the 'Muslim Other' is considered in the first instance.

Muslims in 'White' Australia

Abdullah Saeed (2003) argues that the first Muslims to come into contact with Australia pre-date European history. Saeed (2003) suggests that around the 1750s onwards the Macassan fishermen visited the coast of Northern Australia, meeting and trading with Aboriginal people '…even influencing local languages' (Saeed 2003, p.3). For over 150 years Muslims visited Australia. After European settlement, however, controls were enacted to restrict Macassans entering Australian territorial waters (Saeed 2003; Cleland 2001). With the impact of European settlement the Muslim presence was greatly lessened. During the middle and late nineteenth century, a few thousand Muslim labourers came to Australia to provide a specific service. These various groups, made a significant contribution to Australia's economy and way of life (Jones 1993a). These included Malay pearlers, Indian traders and Afghan cameleers, who formed the major group (Jones 1993; Stevens 1993).

The majority of Afghans who came to Australia during the middle and late nineteenth century were employed as camel drivers, were largely unrecognised for their part in the major exploration and expeditions of the day (Saeed 2003). The Social Darwinist concept of a hierarchy of 'races' based on biological superiority and inferiority, contributed to the development of white exclusionist policies, strategies and popular beliefs (Hollinsworth 2006). The scientific rationale of Social Darwinism that justified the supremacy of the 'white race' and the subjugation of other non-white 'races', resulted in systematic patterns of exclusion for the Afghan cameleers. The early Muslim settlers, who were considered 'coloured aliens' during the colonial period, were most often marginalised, and considered inferior to the dominant Christian white Europeans (Kabir 2007; Saeed 2003). According to Cleland (2001):

> Clear cases of assault against Afghans, even murder, were dismissed by racist courts. In western Queensland in the 1890s there was a major campaign of racist vilification against the cameleers (Cleland 2001, p.17).

The issues of 'race' and religion, which fuelled anti-Afghan sentiment, maintained the marginalisation of the Afghan cameleers. As the vast majority of cameleers arrived in Australia alone, some found wives among marginalised groups of women. These included widows, deserted wives, and Aboriginal women[7] '…whose own cultural group were landless and fragmented' (Stevens 1993, p.53). Nineteenth century racist ideologies of white women as the lynchpin reproducers of the 'white race' played an important role in sustaining the imperative for white women to act as guardians of white purity (Grimshaw, Lake, McGrath and Quartly, 1994). As discussed in Chapter Two, the concerns regarding miscegenation of Aboriginal women and Malay pearlers also extended to concerns regarding Afghan cameleers and Aboriginal women. These issues of maintaining a 'white' Australia formed part of the widely discussed exclusionist immigration policies that dominated much of the political discourse during the later part of the nineteenth century (Kabir 2009). The determination of the nation builders to secure a white Australian Commonwealth was central to the movement towards Federation. Influenced by a conflation of racist scientific theories, which generated a view of Aborigines and 'foreign' non-European people as inferior, the framers who shaped the nation highlighted 'racial purity' as paramount to the success of Federation (Irving 1997). By 1901, the ideal of 'White Australia' was ratified with the introduction of the *Immigration Restrictions Act 1901*[8] (Kabir 2009). The legislation introduced to restrict all non-white immigration and citizenship also included a Dictation test in 50 words prescribed by the Immigration officer[9] (Kabir 2009; Saeed 2003). Kabir (2009) attests to the anti-Afghan sentiment implicated in the Dictation test, proposed by the then Attorney General Alfred Deakin. Deakin argued that the test would be most effective in excluding:

> ...the persons who annoy us most; the Syrians and Afghans who seek to make a living by peddling; the Polynesians, from whom there is little danger once the state legislation has been dealt with, and 99 per cent of the Chinese who come here (York 1997 cited in Kabir 2009, p.792).

After the implementation of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* the Muslim population in Australia declined rapidly, the number reduced to a few hundred (Kabir 2006; Saeed 2003). Some of those who stayed married 'white' Australian women. According to Kabir (2006) the wider community viewed the marriage of Afghans and 'white' women with disdain. When a small number of 'white' Australian women married Afghans, condemnation came from a large percentage of 'white' Australian men. Kabir (2006) illustrates the way in which media discourse during the 'white Australia' period drew on Orientalist tropes regarding the status of Muslim wives, depicting them as victimised,

oppressed and subjugated figures. The report in Western Australia's *Sunday Times* 21 November 1909 stated:

> Life as a Mohammedan wife will mean degradation and servitude…Among Mohammedans women are regarded as a very inferior being…Slavery is a mild term to describe the life of the average Mohammedan woman (Rajkowski 1995, cited in Kabir 2006, p.210).

The creation of an imaginary identification regarding the role of Muslim wives was discursively framed by an Orientalist system of representation. This maintained a rigid difference against the 'Muslim Other'. As Said (2003) alluded, through the discourses of Orientalism, Muslims were constructed '…as suspicious…and in everything oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo Saxon race' (Said 2003, p.39). The 'cultural hegemony' that gave Orientalism discourse its strength, became '…an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient…proliferating out into Western consciousness and…into general culture' (Said 2003, pp.6-7). As racial, religious and cultural oppression were part of the public discourse sanctioned by the state, racism against Muslim settlers pervaded the Australia's psyche during this period (Hassan 2005). Changes in Australia's immigration polices in the aftermath of the Second World War, resulted in the Muslim population in Australia slowly increasing (Akbarzadeh and Saeed 2001; Jones 1993). Mary Jones (1993, p.87) has argued that '…[d]uring these post war years 'White' Australia' still dominated Australia's thinking on migration'. Hanifa Deen (2003) notes, however, for those who stayed during the White Australia period, religion was not the main criterion for discrimination, prejudice and racism was constituted along 'colour lines'.

The demise of the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* during the early 1970s and the introduction of multiculturalism as the dominant theme of immigration and settlement policy resulted in a steady upsurge of Muslim immigrants to Australia (Jones 1993).During this period Australia's concern over the emergence of 'Arab terrorism' developed. As discussed by Anne Aly and David Walker (2007, p.207), the 1979 Iranian revolution captured the attention of the global media. The focal point of the international press was to invoke images of fanatical Muslims campaigning to annihilate Western liberal democracy. The perceived 'Islamic threat' to Australia that became a re-occurring theme in popular media during the 1970s and 1980s had the capacity to posit the increasing numbers of Muslim immigrants arriving in Australia as a 'cultural threat' to Australia's identity, 'way of life' and 'values' by many non-Muslim Australians

(Dunn2003). Gary Bouma, Joan Daw, and Riffat Munawar (2001) have attested that in 1947 the Muslim population in Australia was less than 0.01 per cent, however, by 1996 the Muslim population had increased to 1.1 per cent. As the visible presence of Muslims in Australia gradually increased, racial vilification based on religious difference became more prevalent. In particular, the Muslim women's religious dress was perceived as a symbol of contestation that challenged and fractured the concept of a white Christian Australia that had been constituted in the dominant national imaginary. Within the public arena, the increased visuality and visibility of Muslim women's religious dress became the object of an authoritative national gaze that '…operated as a general principle of surveillance' (Danaher, Schirato and Webb 2000, p.54). The next section attempts to locate the surveillance of Muslim Australians, using what Foucault (2003) identified as a mechanism of governmentality. Discussed later in this chapter are the various flashpoints where anti-Islamic sentiment manifested during the decade prior to September 11 2001.

The Veil, Surveillance and the Gaze

In *Discipline and Punish the Birth of the Prison*, Foucault (1979) devotes a significant part of his inquiry to the procedures by and through which individuals constitute themselves as subjects. In his examination of Bentham's Panopticon, as a generalised model for institutions to organise various technologies of observation and discipline, he argued that '…society has become one of surveillance [where] the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies' (Foucault 1979, p.217). Further Foucault (1979) suggested that whenever a particular form of behaviour needs to be imposed; the Panopticon schema is used as an 'inspection function' ceaselessly ensuring an observing gaze. The 'inspecting gaze', as a controlling function, is related to various technologies of power. The reforming ethos of Panopticism centres on visibility and visual representation that circulates in the social field '…and is exercised on and by individuals over others as well as themselves' (Sawicki 1986, p.30). Those perceived as the social 'Other', that is, those who are resistant to the normalising rules and orders, are subjected to a form of 'disciplinary partitioning' between the 'normal and abnormal' to which fear gives rise (Foucault 1979, p.199). As a technique of power, disciplinary power circulates through networks and individuals and is spread through techniques of surveillance in a way that constitutes and governs an individual subject's ways of knowing (Weedon 1987). The salient point for veiled subjectivities is that this normalisation is in collusion with mechanisms of power and domination that act to impose a form of cultural consensus. Through techniques of governmentality, the

disciplinary normalisation of veiled bodies as 'Other' has been perpetuated through '…a whole field of visibility [where] individual subjects emerge as objects of knowledge concurrently shaped and regulated by power-knowledge regimes' (Foucault 2003, p.242). Attempting to provide an understanding of how the complex intertwining of the veil, gender and identity intersected with mechanisms of surveillance, an exploration of racism, 'new racism' and the rise of Islamophobia in Australia is deemed necessary in that it provides a schema from which to recognise the way hegemonic framing discourses played an integral role in festering underlying xenophobia/Islamophobia prior to September 11 2001.

Racism, 'New' Racism and Islamophobia

In recent decades an extensive body of research has identified a form of racism which has been described as a 'new racism' (van Dijk 2000; Hollinsworth 2006). Collectively, the research detailing new racism has highlighted several pervasive features of contemporary discourses that have promulgated anti-Islamic feeling in Australia. David Hollinsworth (2006) has identified 'new racism' as negatively evaluating people on the basis of cultural/ethnic differences, rather than based on the European racial concept of a hierarchy of 'race'. Kevin Dunn, James Forrest, Ian Burnley and Amy McDonald (2004) suggest, however, that although people from non-Western origins have come to be distinguished on the basis of cultural difference, '…there is evidence of strong links between the old racisms (of supremacism and separatism) and the new racisms' (Dunn et.al 2004, p.422). Although the 'old racism' has not disappeared, Teun van Dijk (1992) has argued that new racisms that categorise the perceived differences of a group's language, religion, dress or customs, are more subtle than overt and blatant forms of racial discrimination. Van Dijk (2000) further argues the 'insidious' and 'symbolic' nature of new racisms are 'discursive' and as such are:

> …expressed, enacted and confirmed by text and talk, such as everyday conversations, board meetings, job interviews, policies, laws, political propaganda, scholarly articles, movies, TV programs, and news reports in the press, among hundreds of other genres (van Dijk 2000, p.34).

In this way 'new racisms' act effectively to exclude minorities, because they appear 'normal' to most members of the dominant group who engage in such discourse and interaction (van Dijk 2000). Similarly Etienne Balibar (2005) discerns the concept of difference in terms of new racism needs to be understood as part of an analogy of difference, otherness and exclusion. Balibar (2005) argues that 'differentialist racism' in terms of combined processes of discrimination and identification, places emphasis on the

'Other body', and is always attributed '…explicitly and implicitly to *race and gender* and *racism and sexism*' (Balibar 2005, p.27 emphasis in original). Balibar (2005) maintains that new racism, that targets populations in the name of cultural difference, emerges as bio-political processes assert social control over the 'body register'. Ghassan Hage (2003) suggests that the bodily register constitutes a racism which is often expressed in indirect ways by political and media elites. This in turn serves to reinforce and create racial stereotypes and thus '…accelerates the slide from differentiation to discrimination' (Jakubowicz 1994, p.30). Chris Cunneen (1997) argues that the lived experience of 'new racism', within the micro-level of day to day relations, is constituted '…in a world of small incidents' (Cunneen 1997, p.138). Cunneen (1997) suggests that the broad spectrum of 'small incidents', that can range from depictions in cartoons to fancy dress costumes:

> [M]ust be linked to the more recognisable racially motivated actions against cultural and religious objects, as well as racially motivated interpersonal violence including abduction, rape, assault and murder (Cunneen 1997, p.138).

In this way, the transformation of small incidents into racially motivated actions becomes socially defined as 'acceptable racism' and legitimised '…in a multitude of forms across a social landscape' (Cunneen 1997, p.138). A key aspect of 'acceptable' new racism has been based on stereotypical and generalised assumptions of religious 'difference'. Many of these constructions equate to Islam, which has been appropriated as an irrational, uncivilised, threatening and uniquely fundamentalist 'Other' (Poynting and Mason 2007; Maddox 2004). In recent times the neologism 'Islamophobia' has had wide currency as identifying a form of new racism associated with hostility and discrimination towards Islam and Muslim culture. The term 'Islamophobia' as a recognisable form of racism was first used in government policy in the United Kingdom in 1997, after the publication of the report 'Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All', by the *Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia*[10] in 1997. This seminal Report defined the term 'Islamophobia' as a '…unfounded hostility towards Islam and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims' (*Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* 1997, p.4). The Report also stated that Islamophobia refers to the practice of discriminating against Muslims by excluding them from the economic, social, and public life of the nation. As an example of discrimination based on religion, Islamophobia is connected to broader systems of racism based on 'race', gender, ethnicity and colonialism and has a history that pre-dates its current context. One of the members of the *Runnymede Trust's Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia,* Imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid (1997), argued that as hostility towards Islam and Muslims date back to the eighth century of the Common Era:

> It may be more apt to speak of 'Islamophobias' rather than of a single phenomenon [as] each has taken different forms, however, at different times and has fulfilled a variety of functions (Sajid 1997 cited in *Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* 1997).

The capacity of veiled corporealities, to evoke a renewed spate of Islamophobia, found fertile ground in Australia during the 1991 Gulf war.

Hage (2003) argues while the threat of invasion from 'Australia's historically favourite 'Other', has always been 'the Asians', since the 1990s '…[w]hite paranoia has shifted its gaze towards a more global threat [to] 'Muslims' and Islam' (Hage 2003, p.67). Hage (2003) asserts that although the emergence of Muslims as the Australian 'Other' did not really begin until the Gulf War in 1991, the apparent 'rise' of Islamophobia occurred within a legacy of colonialism where the framework of racist discourse had been maintained as part of the social and political processes regarding 'race' and whiteness discourse. In the briefing document *Australia Deliberates: Muslim and Non-Muslims in Australia*, Pamela Ryan and Claire McKinney (2007) reported that a notable re-emergence of Islamophobia towards Islam and Muslims in Australia was highlighted in 1990, when Saddam Hussein, the then leader of Iraq, invaded Kuwait and called for a war against the West (Ryan and McKinney 2007). In response to this threat, America and many Western nations, including Australia, allied against the threat of 'Middle Eastern extremism' (Ryan and McKinney 2007, p.14). For many Australians:

> [e]xtremism was represented in traditional Islamic dress, so that Muslims, even non-Middle Eastern Muslim could be marked as enemies of the West regardless of their political views (Ryan and McKinney 2007, p.14).

As aspects of this selective and simplified view of national identity became displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty, the politics of identity became inextricably bound up with the notion of who 'belonged' and who needed to be 'excluded' (Hage 2003).

Peter Gale (2005), Ghassan Hage (1998) and Chris Cunneen (1997) have noted the way negative generalisations that were perpetuated by political and media discourse regarding 'Muslim Australians' set in motion a 'moral panic' within the broader Australian milieu, re-activating an imperative to protect 'our' Australian traditions from the 'alien Other'. Hage (2003) has identified the re-emergence of this moral panic as explicitly tied to the assumption of a fixed, coherent and stable Australian white national identity, which has been framed by the legacies of colonial hegemonic discourse and invented traditions. Cunneen (2007, p.20) argues that these 'moral panics' most often '…tend to be fuelled by media and political interest'. Offering a similar view, Michael Humphrey (2001) cites the

media as a major source of victimisation and racism for Australian Muslims. Humphrey (2001, p.50) argues that the '…strategies in which symbols and signs are substitute[d] for comprehensive Islamic knowledge…[the] veil, beard, mosque, dress', are used by the media to imply Islamic presence with essentialising consequences.

The Politics of Exclusion

Hage (2003) argues an important issue that needs to be recognised as germane to the emergence of Islamophobia during the Gulf War period, is that it occurred in a climate when the then Federal Labor Hawke government had promoted a 'new' Australian identity, shifting from the old concept of an exclusive white Australia to the formulation of a multicultural society. The rubric of multiculturalism, embraced by dominant political and ideological forces, became increasingly less favoured by a sizable section of the population who '…found themselves for the first time on the margins of the debates that shaped Australian identity' (Hage 2003, p.58). While the then Labor Prime Minster Bob Hawke appealed for 'tolerance' towards Arab Australians, intolerance, prejudice and racism continued toward Arab Australians (Poynting 2002). Hage (1998, p.91) has argued that the continuance of racism occurred because the 'act to be tolerant' was perceived as forcibly implemented upon those who identified as the rightful managers and classifiers of the national space.

When the ideals of justice, equality and esteem that formed the original framework of multiculturalism became tied to immigration and economic polices, it aroused controversy from sections of conservative politics, in particular the then Opposition Leader John Howard[11] and various members of the New Right[12]. Their anti immigration views, in particular their criticism of increased Asian immigration, became the spotlight of much media attention and added to the underlying smouldering tensions regarding Australia as a multicultural nation (McMaster 2001; Hage 2003; Markus 2001). The perception of a non-Christian homogeneous Muslim group 'invading' and 'threatening' the Australian national space created a backlash against the concept and policies of multiculturalism (Jamrozik, Boland and Urquhart 1995). Arthur Saniotis (2004, p.52) argues '…during the period of the Gulf war, the politics of marginalisation became part of populist discourse for politicians and community leaders'. Sina Ali Muscati (2002) has attributed the denigrating of Islam and its followers among Western nations, during the 1991 Gulf war, to centuries of rhetoric and stereotyping. Muscati (2002) asserts that since the expansion of the Islamic Empire into Europe, the Crusades and the colonisation of the

Ottoman Empire, there has been a perpetuation of the Arab/Muslim as '…an 'evil' character in constant struggle with the civilised moral West' (Muscati 2002, p.134). The historical threat of the 'evil Other' as a threat to the Christian West, which was played out during the Gulf war, gave the perception that '…the Arab/Muslim exists in a manner devoid of space, time, and history that he/she is effectively de-historicised, and unchanging and without progress' (Muscati 2002, p.135). The authority of this discourse was profound among those who assumed the role of 'good white nationalists' (Saniotis 2004, p.52). For example, disturbing commentaries came from various politicians including former Treasury Secretary and National Party Senator, John Stone (1991) who argued that '…our ill-considered immigration policies and so-called multicultural policies', have allowed…many Arabs - and even more Muslims - into Australia'(Stone 1991, cited in Saniotis 2004, p.51). Media reporting of provocative and insensitive comments by public figures contributed to the exacerbation of racist stereotyping. Bruce Ruxton, the then Victorian President of the Returned and Services League, stated '…everyone knows that Iraq is the garbage heap of humanity in the Middle East…and how these people were allowed into this country in the first place is beyond me' (Ruxton 1990, cited in Asmar 1992, p.66). Perpetuating a politics of exclusion was the comment by former leader of the Australian Democrats Don Chipp (1990) who stated that he had entertained the thought of '…arrest[ing] the bastards and shipping them off to their beloved homeland' (Chipp 1990 cited in Saniotis 2004, p.52). During the Gulf War period, the representation of 'Arab Australians' as innately unassimilable to Australian culture and values '…posed poignant questions about their place in Australian society' (Goot and Tiffen 1992, p.2). Poynting, Noble, Tabar and Collins (2004); Poynting and Mason (2007) amongst others argue that the demonization of Muslim Australians' religious and cultural practices sustained by the symbiosis between various members within conservative circles and certain sections of mass media, influenced 'public opinion'. It could be argued that the political, social and media discourses, that were dominant during this period, had the ability to shape public opinion through the processes of 'transformational framing' (Ensink 2003). Imbued with 'structures of expectation' and 'perceptions', this framing process worked to influence people's perceptions about Arab and Muslim Australians that was understood by reference to a pattern of prior knowledge. As representations of Muslim Australians became imbued with social meanings that were constructed within reductive interpretive frames, the mobilisation of a national anxiety against the 'Arab Other' set in motion an increase of attacks on both Islamic properties and abuse and assaults on women wearing the veil (Poynting et.al 2004). As cases of

harassment against Australian Muslim women began to escalate, the processes of Islamophobia became profoundly gendered.

Gendered Islamophobia

> The discourses of the body polity and the public on how women are treated within and without the Islamic belief-system can be analysed as articulations of distinct political and gender ideologies (Kampmark 2003).

During the period of the 1991 Gulf War, Islamophobia became increasingly gendered as the Orientalist tropes that essentialised the category of veiled Muslim women re-emerged as an ideological fault line in the discourse of national identity and belonging (Poynting, et.al 2004; Mason 2004). Binoy Kampmark (2003) has re-iterated that when the ideology of the nation and national identity is constructed in opposition to the 'Other', it is inevitably gendered (Mayer 2000). Zine (2006) asserts the notion of 'gendered Islamophobia':

> …pertains to specific forms of discrimination leveled at Muslim women that proceed from historically contextualised negative stereotypes that inform and sustain the structural conditions of domination (Zine 2006, p.9-10).

Nahid Kabir (2007) states that occurrences of physical and verbal abuse towards traditionally dressed Muslim women were often reported, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne. These reports included:

> Incidents such as bus drivers not stopping at the bus stop to pick up veiled women, people pulling off the abaya, and yelling 'wogs', 'go home', 'towel heads', or 'ninja' at Muslim women, were not uncommon during the 1990s (Kabir 2007, p.1285).

The acts of assault and harassment aimed at Australian Muslim women wearing religious dress was committed not only because of their ethnicity, religion and gender but because the victims were perceived as '…the dangerous Other' (Cunneen 1997, p.77). Gary Bouma (1995) has also identified the increase in the incidence of gendered Islamophobia from the period of the Gulf War, as '…many documented cases of harassment, intimidation and name-calling, against Australian Muslim women, began to escalate' (Bouma 1995, p.296). According to Kevin Dunn (2003) an analysis of racist violence against ethnically/racially defined groups by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) Report of the National *Inquiry into Racist Violence Summary* in 1991, concluded that during the Gulf War, Arab and Muslim Australians were being vilified on a daily basis and that Muslim women were particularly subjected to racist violence (Dunn 2003). Similarly Scott Poynting (2002, p.45) recognises the rise in gendered Islamophobia at the time of the Gulf War, arguing that '…the brunt of racial

attacks was disproportionately borne by…Muslim women and girls wearing the hijab'. Perceived by some in the community as a symbol of the 'Arab enemy', the visibility of the veil was placed under greater public surveillance. According to Poynting and Mason (2007), there were many incidences of abuse and assault by everyday vigilantes of the cultural 'mainstream', against Muslim women who wore the veil. Women '…were abused and assaulted in public places, by strangers, often but not always men, trying to tear their headscarves away' (Poynting and Mason 2007, p.72). Hage (1998) highlights the formation of racist practices against Muslim women wearing religious dress during the period of the 1991 Gulf War. The focal point of Hage's (1998) discussion was to show how the relation between power and national space was congruent with racist attacks towards Muslim women. Underlining the incidences of 'the tearing off of scarfs' as the most common occurrence registered in the 1991 report from *National Racial Violence in Australia* (NIVRA)[13], Hage (1998) is concerned with the way in which an assumption of power propelled the 'hand' to tear off the scarf (Hage 1998). Hage (1998) notes that while the dimension of racism allows expressions of stereotyping and essentialsing of 'Others', power is a distinctive dimension of racism as it allows '…the dominant to act out their prejudice, while the dominated cannot' (Hage 1998, p.35). Drawing on predominant responses from interviewees concerning the presence of Muslim Australians, during the Gulf war period, Hage (1998) argues that a frequent response was that there were 'too many' invading the idealised image of the national space. Moreover, with the increase of Asian immigration, the visible presence of the 'Middle Eastern' population accelerated a panic within the Anglo Celtic community, who had perceived a 'bodily register' of one or two Arabs as tolerable, but when there were 'too many' it became unbearable (Hage 2003a). The presence of 'too many' women wearing the veil, considered undesirable and a threat to spatial management by the 'inspecting gaze', resonated within the discourse of what the national space 'ought to be'.

Christine Asmar (1992, p.57) has argued that the unprecedented level of hostility that was directed toward Muslim Australians, '…produc[ed] in many a sense of alienation and vulnerability'. Moreover, many Arab Australians born and bred in Australia experienced a crisis of identity. Asmar (1992) noted one of the immediate consequences to emerge during the onset of the Gulf War, was the simultaneous emergence in Sydney and Melbourne of a new hyphenated identity of 'Arab-Australians' (Asmar 1992, p.58). This terminology, which was immediately adopted by media, bureaucracies and government, had broad ramifications for the Muslim Community, as it reflected a unifying simplistic

stereotypical misconception that masked the diversity within the 'Arab-Australian' population. Asmar (1992) discerns that in view of the fact that the categorisation of 'Arab-Australians' circulated as a heterogeneous stereotypical descriptor, it cemented a generalised assumption that all Muslims must be 'Arabs' or Iraqi and thus 'terrorists' (Asmar 1992, p.62). This postulation had far reaching ramifications for Muslim women wearing the veil; they were often violently harassed and accused of being an 'Iraqi terrorist' (Asmar 1992). As the ubiquitous stereotypes and representation of 'the Iraqi terrorist' became constructed within a framework of veil discourse, the degree of public antagonism escalated towards Muslim women wearing the veil, who '…suffered many attacks…whether or not they were Arabs' (Asmar 1992, p.64). Tanja Dreher (2006) has stated the impact of international events such as the 1991 Gulf War resulted in an increase in physical and verbal violence against Arab and Muslim Australians. Dreher (2006) highlights a Report by the *Committee on Discrimination Against Arab Australians* (1992) that documented racist incidents against Arabs and Muslims in Australia for the period 1990-1991, where the increase in physical violence against women wearing the hijab was most common. As the abuse and attacks against the veiled bodies became an almost 'legitimising' function aimed to regulate the membership of Australia's imagined community, many Muslim women became afraid to leave their homes (Asmar 1992). In 2003, the then acting Race Discrimination Commissioner, Dr William Jonas (2003) stated that:

> The Gulf War was simply the trigger for violence - not the sole cause. [There were] deeper, long-term underlying tensions as the root cause of discrimination and vilification (Jonas 2003).

HREOC (1992) ascertained that many of the underlying tensions, as identified by Jonas (2003), may have been attributed to the ill considered remarks about 'Arab Australians' promulgated by '…community leaders, politicians and media personalities…which inadvertently give the impression that racism is somehow condoned in Australian society' (HREOC 1992 cited in Asmar 1992, p.66). The dissemination of hegemonic discourse frames by politicians and media personalities assisted in perpetuating interpretive constructs of shared memories and myths about Australia's national identity. The framing of Muslim cultural practices, as unacceptably offensive and the antipathy of Australia's cultural norms, gave '…license [to the] amplification of racial violence and repressive measures across all levels of state organisations, cementing a neo-assimilationist ethic of social exclusion' (Poynting et al. 2004, p.14). As misconceptions about Muslim Australians were perpetuated, Islamic militants became the public image of all Muslims (Ryan and McKinney (2007).

The Media and Racialised Framing

As one of the core institutions exerting powerful hegemonic influence over social and political issues, the mass media acts as a formidable force in its productive capacity to influence 'public opinion' and in their portrayal of 'Arab-Australians' during the Gulf War (Saniotis 2004). As the Australian mainstream media re-entered white paranoia into the sphere of public debate it promoted itself as the 'national gate keeper' (Saniotis 2004, p.52). In their documentation of cases relating to violence, abuse and harassment against Arab-Australians and in particular Muslim women during the period between November 1990 and July 1991, David Fraser, Moha Melhem and Mirna Yacoub (1997, p.78) argue the most salient point to recognise is the '…role played by the mass media in the racist portrayal of Arab Australians'. Poynting and Mason (2007) have also suggested that the Australian mainstream media, in particular commercial radio and television, constantly perpetuated destructive and negative images of Muslims. Similarly Hage (2003) highlights the way in which '…deviant and enemy images of Muslims' that were framed through Australian media talk back radio hosts, such as John Laws and Alan Jones, were internalised by many of '…the traditionally better off Australians' (Hage 2003, p.61), whose economic situation had gradually deteriorated since the late 1980s. In the realm of those conceived as the 'different Other' and 'out of place' in the national space of the Australian nation, the inspecting gaze became a legitimate pretext for systematic practices of racist violence and exclusionary practices. Fraser et al. (1997, p.77) argue that one of the key factors that determined incidents of violence against Arab Australians during the Gulf war was that they could be identified as a 'visible minority'. According to Stuart Hall (1980) the manner in which the process of a group's differentiation is always already demarcated, requires the distribution of visual codes constituted by a set of dominant operations. Reproducing homogenised stereotypical visual codes that embody certain specific negative characteristics in a manner where they appear as legitimate and 'natural,' enables racism to be both expressed and sustained.

The practices of Islamophobia that occurred during the 1991 Gulf war did not emerge in a vacuum. As Entman (2004, p.9) has noted 'dominant frames' that are generated through media reporting and political actors, generate a 'cascading activation model', where nodes of knowledge that connect to ideas stored in a person's prior beliefs, act to reignite racially based fears, anxiety and animosities among the broader community. Moreover as the dominant fames were materialised through the process of 'racialised framing', anxieties solidified around the materiality of the veil. In this way the veil became the

tangible object that needed to be 'captured' and 'excluded' (Poynting et.al 2004, p.235). By selecting and highlighting certain characteristics and aspects of Muslim Australians during the Gulf war, the media, various politicians and prominent public figures framed the way stories were told, using ongoing myths and histories formulated in Orientalist discourse.

Greg Tiffen warned in 1992, that although the extent of racist violence engendered towards Muslim Australians during the Gulf war was not substantially widespread in Australia, '...its impact must not be minimised or its potential for increase ignored' (Tiffen 1992 cited in Asmar 1992, p.63). As the resentment towards the recognition of plurality, diversity and difference that was reasonably encouraged under the Hawke–Keating federal Labor Government from 1983-1996 began to smoulder, the appropriateness of the warning by Tiffen became evidenced during various flashpoints between the 1991 Gulf War and September 11 2001 (Manne 2002; Brett 2005). By the middle of the 1990s, the discomfort and growing anxiety regarding the increased presence of 'Middle Eastern Others' in Australia, helped shift the political discourse to the right, '…a process cemented with the election of the Liberal–National Coalition federal government in 1996 under John Howard…' (Noble 2005, p.109). The next section provides an examination of the way in which John Howard's 'reshaping' and cultivation of an almost 'sacred' discourse of Australian white homogeneity, set in motion an escalation of anti Muslim sentiment in Australia in the lead up to September 11 2001.

The Howard-Hanson Factor: Reframing White Australia

In 1996, the Liberal Coalition Government came to office under the leadership of John Howard (Farr 2002). The 1996 election win for the Coalition, was fought under the ambiguous slogan 'for all of us' which was largely a reaction against the enormously destabilising wave of change sweeping through Australian society. In claiming to represent 'us' as a whole, he effectively sent a message '…but not for them' (Pearson 1996 cited in Brett 2005, p.31). Part of Howard's agenda was aimed at rejecting the Keating government's concept of 'political correctness'[14]. Howard's framing of Labor polices as dividing the Australia nation and effectively eroding the 'Australian way of life', was highlighted in his speech at the Menzies Research Centre in 1995, when he stated:

> There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which see government decisions increasingly driven by the noisy, self interested clamour of powerful vested interests with scant regard for the national interest…Increasingly Australians have been

> exhorted to think of themselves as members of sub groups. This focus so often has been on where we are different – not what we have in common. In the process our sense of community has been severely damaged. Our goal will be to reverse this trend (Howard 1995 cited in Brett 2005:23).

Leigh Dale (1997) determines John Howard's pre-election political rhetoric as sending a potent message that the national stability and interest rested on a return to the myth of cultural homogeneity and if special interest groups opinions differed from those of the mainstream, then they were '…intrinsically un-Australian' (Dale 1997, p.15). A core strategy of John Howard's 1996 election speeches was to tap into the nationalist and xenophobic constituency, where resentment towards the '…visible diversity of Australian culture and of the enhanced presence of the 'Other' had been festering' (Burke 2001, p.189). A speech given by John Howard in the House of Representatives during October 1996 provides an insight into the underlying ideology that predominated the 'reshaping' of Australia between 1996 and 2007 (Manne 2002). Prefacing his discussion about the 'natural' anxiety caused by some members of the community regarding the increased levels of immigration, John Howard's (1996) focus was to portray a selective ownership of Australia's historical past when he stated:

> …I profoundly reject with some vigour what others have described, as I have adopted the description, as the black armband view of history…I think there is a yearning in the Australian community right across the political divide for its leaders to enunciate a more pride and sense of achievement in what has gone before us. I think we have been too apologetic about our history about our past…I do believe that in recent times there has been a tendency towards excessive political correctness in political debate in this country (Howard 1996).

The Prime Minster's rejection of multiculturalism[15], the idea of Aboriginal self determination and the dismissing of the ideology of 'political correctness', was aimed at 'middle Australians' (Dale 1997; Manne 2002; Brett 2005). In the context of a political act, Howard's framing of a nostalgic version of Australian history made up of '…brave white pioneers' (Langton 2001, p.518), fuelled a political climate, which was seized by Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party. Pauline Hanson created a political phenomenon, evoking a groundswell of support from those who shared her right-wing populist views on immigration, Indigenous issues and economic rationalism (*The Age* 2002). Standing as an Independent Member for Oxley in 1996, Pauline Hanson won the former safe Queensland Labor seat with the biggest single swing in any of the 148 electorates in the House of Representatives (*Federal Election Results for Oxley*, 1996). Part of Hanson's maiden speech, which she delivered to the House of Representatives on September 10 1996, stated (in part):

> Most Australians and I want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by

> Asians…They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. Abolishing the policy of multiculturalism will save millions of dollars and allow those from ethnic backgrounds to join mainstream Australia, paving the way for a strong united country… (Pauline Hanson's Maiden Speech, 1996).

Pauline Hanson's opposition to multiculturalism provided a convenient and timely vehicle for certain sectors of 'mainstream Australia', who were disillusioned with major political parties, to legitimately support her proposals (Jackman 1998). Dale (1997) asserts from the point of view of Hanson, Australian national culture as a unitary and homogenous white Australian nation, needed to be re-established to the centre of social and cultural life and thus enable the sweeping aside of '…the debris of difference'(Dale 1997, p.9). Hanson's racialist discourse can be seen as a form of new racism where the concept of the incompatible cultural and religious difference of Asians is perceived as a threat to the emblematic representation of Australianness.

According to Jon Stratton (1998) one of the most salient points to be recognised in Hanson's political rhetoric is her framing of cultural difference within a religious paradigm. Her reference to Asians having their own religion was prefaced with the assumption that all Asians were non-Christian, which acted to '…threaten the integration based on similitude that is underpinned by a moral order based on shared Judaeo-Christian beliefs' (Stratton 1998, p.59). Stratton (1998) further suggests that it is the distinction between the 'moral', as in the sociological idea of society as being founded on shared norms, values and attitudes, and the 'cultural', as in lived practices, that is crucial to Hanson's classification of Asian culture and the concept of multiculturalism. Pauline Hanson's vision for one nation and one people within the context of multiculturalism can been seen to apply only to the diversity of white European cultures whose religious affiliations mirror 'true' Australian identity.

In his 1998 analysis of how contemporary Australians understood and experienced Australian identity, Tim Philips (1998, p.291) has stated that findings from various research fields reflected '…religion to be an important source of views about Australian identity'. Philips (1998) further explained that many of the respondents, who affirmed the relationship between Christian religiosity and inclusive Australian identity, were most likely to be xenophobic and reject those who represented the 'enemies' of traditional Australia (Philips 1998, p.291). The outcome of these 1998 findings is important to consider in relationship with the Howard/Hanson political agenda, as it gave strength and acceptability to their endorsement of the mythical Golden age of Anglo Christian

Australian society. Furthermore, this ideological representation of Australian identity effectively created an uneasiness and hostility towards those of diverse non-Christian ethnic origins. John Howard's response was not to censure Pauline Hanson but to legitimise her views. In September 1996, Howard spoke at the State Council of the Queensland Liberal Party where he stated:

> The election of his government had released Australians from the grip of political correctness, to speak a little more freely and a little more openly about what they feel (Howard cited in Ward 1997, p.216).

Mungo MacCallum (2002) suggests Howard's stance sent a signal that it was now perfectly defensible to hold racist views and also to air them publicly and proudly. Within the media forum, Hanson was either reported as the advocate for the silent majority's publicly neglected views or the ugly face of resurgent racism. Hanson was often represented as a feminised battler in the context of the privileged masculine world of politicians (Probyn 1999). In her speech at the launch of the One Nation Party in April 1997, Pauline Hanson stated that her intention was to purge the ideology of political correctness from Australian politics and to:

> Stand against those who have betrayed our country, and would destroy our identity by forcing upon us the cultures of others….What of your dream for Australia? Do you want it to be like another place? Indonesia perhaps, Cambodia or Vietnam? How about Iran or Iraq or maybe Lebanon? (Hanson 1997).

Hanson's political rhetoric, which ascribed an exclusive conception of a homogenous Australian identity and the fear of its loss by the cultures of others, sent a potent message to those who had concerns and a sense of dislocation about the rapid and unsettling change in the political and social landscape. In January 2002, after a political career spanning just more than five years, Pauline Hanson resigned from politics[16] (Balogh, Crosweller and Hickman, 2002). Peter Gale (2005) has argued that despite Pauline Hanson fading from the media spotlight and being consigned to the fringes of political irrelevance, '…Hansonism as a politics of race and in particular 'anti-Asian' and 'anti Muslim' sentiment remains an ever present feature of contemporary Australian politics' (Gale 2005, p.132). Similarly Chandran Kukathas and William Maley (1998, p.9) have argued that '…Hansonism ha[d] let a malevolent genie escape from its bottle and returning it to its former place would not be an easy task'.

Pauline Hanson's championing of a reestablishment of the (mythical) 1950s Australian Anglo-Celtic European cultural homogeneity promoted an image of 'too many' non-white non-Christian 'Others' permeating the geographical spatiality of Australia. The ideology

of ‘too many’ resonated in the realms of the everyday, as the visible presence of Muslim women wearing religious dress increased. In 1996 the number of Muslim women entering Australia had dramatically increased, ‘…numbering in excess of 95,000 and by 2001 had reached 133,132’ (Yasmeen 2007, p.44). The proportion of Australian born Muslim females also rose during this period. In 2001, 37.5 per cent of the total Muslim female population was born in Australia (Yasmeen 2007). Victoria Mason (2004) suggests that despite the fact that a large number of Muslims had been born in Australia, they were perceived as ‘strangers’ and a threat in their own country. Sara Ahmed (2000a) has argued that embedded within forms of community living, the concept of the ‘stranger’ is always ‘*…already recognised as not belonging, as being out of place*’ (2000a, p.49 emphasis in original). The concept of not belonging and being out of place formed a constitutive part of the underlying knowledge schemas perpetuated about veiled Muslim women by the former Prime Minister John Howard. Between 1996 and 2001 the federal Liberal–Coalition government’s agenda to reshape ‘white’ Australia formed an integral part of the ‘normative’ social order that was not abruptly introduced but rather constantly in play within governmental processes. The government’s project was to endorse and impose a particular construction of the national identity on Australian citizens, one that ‘Others’ were expected to integrate (Johnson 2006).

The implementation of this form of governmentality that marginalised those who were represented as a threat to the ethos of Australian culture, came to prominence when various disconnected events that occurred prior to September 11, were interlinked with Australian Arabs and/or Muslims. This mobilised a racialised framing regime, which focused on visuality (Pugliese 2006). The next section provides an analysis of the interconnection between political and media racialised discourse frames and the increase of physical and verbal violence against the visuality of veiled bodies during the so called ‘Sydney gang rapes’ and the ‘*Tampa* affair’.

Rapists of ‘Our’ Daughters

From 2001 daily tabloid newspapers, radio and television extensively reported the trials of a group of ‘Lebanese Australian’ men[17] accused of sexual assaults on ‘Australian’ [meaning white] women in western Sydney (Deen 2003). Hage (2003) states the intensity of the debate was heightened by reports of ‘…Lebanese gangs…raping our daughters…in which all Lebanese/Arabs/Muslims became the new threat to Australia’s Western civilization’ (Hage 2003, p.6).



Fig. 67
Albrechtsen, 2002
'Blind spot allows barbarism to flourish-Cultural divide', *The Australian*, 15 July
c.f *ABC 'Media Watch'*, 2002.

Reporting by the majority of mainstream media inferred that all Australian women of Anglo-Celtic heritage were potential targets for predatory Muslim men by presenting the assaults as racially motivated gang rapes against white girls (Deen 2003). The substantial media coverage describing the victims as 'Australian' acted to repeat the myth that the victims of the gang rapes were 'Anglo–Saxon'. However, as argued by Dagistanli (2007) the victims came from a variety of cultural backgrounds including one victim who was from the same cultural background as the perpetrator.

For several weeks Australian television and radio news bulletins ran with 'Muslim rape gangs' in their headlines, as did the tabloid press (Poynting, et.al 2004; Warner 2004). During the trial of the youths, much of the media commentary focused on the 'racial symbolism' of 'Lebanese assaulting Australian women', which outraged many Australians' (Kampmark 2003). Alan Jones, a talkback host for the Sydney radio station 2UE, was amongst those in the media whose inflammatory comments were enmeshed with anti-immigration rhetoric, contributed to the anti Muslim sentiment, when he provocatively asked:

> Are the Muslim rapes of Australian women in the Bankstown area the first signs of an Islamic hatred towards the community that welcomed them here years ago? Have we now, because of multiculturalism, created an Islamic community in Australia that's more aligned with Islam than it is with Australia? (Jones 2001cited in Burke 2001).

The 'racialisation' of the gang rapes by Jones acted as a powerful agency in the formation of fear and anti-Muslim sentiment (Gale 2005). Adding to the rise of Islamophobia was a journalist with the *Australian* newspaper, Janet Albrechtsen[18], who published a story on the gang rapes. Drawing on the work of a French psychotherapist and a Danish criminologist to support the report, Albrechtsen stated that '…[p]ack rapes of white girls is an initiation rite of passage for a small section of…Muslim youth' (Albrechtsen 2002). In 2002 ABC program *Media Watch* revealed that Albrechtsen's core argument had been

lifted from an article in *The Times*, written by Adam Sage in 2000 (Fig 67 c.f *ABC Media Watch* 2002). However, Albrechtsen had severely distorted the evidence, '…adding the words 'white' and 'Muslim' to the French and Danish argument' (Deen 2003, p.305). Albrechtsen's claim of rape as a 'common phenomenon' for young Muslim youth contributed to the ongoing fear and the perpetuation of Islamophobia within a large section of the Australian community (Warner 2004).

According to van Dijk (2006) the exploitation of fear, transformed by dominant discourse framing involves processes of 'manipulation', which are most often hidden by political and media elites (van Dijk 2006). Van Dijk (2006) puts forward the perspective that the processes involved in 'manipulation' require special attention in Critical Discourse Analysis '…because it implies discursive power abuse' (van Dijk 2006, p.359). In addition van Dijk (1992, p.59) has noted, that the manipulation process produced by dominant white political and media discourse is a strategy that '…persuasively affects the attitudes of the white population at large'. The discursive and communicative reproduction of 'white' dominance in political and media discourse plays a specific role in the reproduction of racism. Van Dijk (1992, p.47) contends, however, that accusations of reproducing racism are most often mitigated or denied by the elites, who focus on formulating a 'moral order' by exposing the 'threat' of the 'Other', promoting a rhetoric of 'good' versus 'evil' and the 'intolerant nature' of those who are perceived to be opposed to the country's values and society. van Dijk (2006) asserts that once people's attitudes are influenced through the processes of manipulation '… little or no further manipulation attempts are necessary for people to act according to these attitudes' (van Dijk 2006, p.369). This ultimately plays a very specific role in the reproduction of racism in the realms of everyday conversation and vilification. Ralph Grillo (2005, p.14) notes that the 'back lash against diversity' and the continuum of disquiet amongst the 'white' population about the erosion of society's 'core values', '…are typically associated with Christian, Western, European liberalism'. These representations are routinely contrasted with those representative of Islamism, including the veiling of women, and are often perpetuated by implicit and explicit forms of Islamophobia from mainstream and extreme right commentators and politicians.

The recurring themes of the rapes as a 'threat' by the 'Other' against white Australia women, perpetuated a representation of all Muslim Australian males as potential rapists. The categorising of a minority group's differences as 'unusual', 'deviant' or 'threatening'

through processes of political and media manipulation, the boundaries between the categories of Iraqi/Arab/Muslim became conflated and the demonization of those perceived of 'Middle Eastern appearance' became progressively entrenched (Poynting and Mason 2007). One Nation Party leader, Pauline Hanson called for the rapists to be flogged stating '…a lot of these people are Muslims, they have no respect for the Christian way of life that this country is based on' (Doherty, and Jacobsen 2001; Barkham 2001; Warner 2004). Jock Collins (2001 cited in Jacobsen and Kennedy 2001) suggested Hanson's use of broad ethnic labels such as 'Muslims' contributed to the debate being shifted from issues concerning criminality of individuals to the criminality of a culture (Jacobsen and Kennedy 2001). *ABC Media Report* journalist Nadya Stani (2001) has pointed out the way in which the gang rapes were sensationally reported over several weeks in August and September 2001, making a direct links to 'race' and religion, created a backlash of violence and harassment against the Muslim community. Stani (2001) stated among the most alarming reports:

> [wa]s an allegation of a revenge rape attack against a young Muslim woman who has been afraid to report it to the police, [and] a Muslim woman being dragged out of a coffee shop by her veil, by a group of young men (Stani 2001).

Stani's (2001) statement highlights the way in which most vilification against the Australian Muslim community was directed towards women wearing the veil. The racialised framing of the 'Muslim gang rapes', sensationalised by tabloid newspapers and talk back media, resulted in many Muslim women in the community encountering assaults and racial abuse for not removing their headscarves (Stani 2001). Keysar Trad, spokesperson for the Lebanese Muslim Association (2001), stated that following police reports that blamed Middle Eastern men for the gang rapes of European women, Muslim women and girls '…ha[d] been receiving threats of rape…and some women in the community had been spat on in the street' (Trad 2001 cited in Kennedy 2001). This type of racial profiling perpetuated by the media and police reports constructed the 'evil Other' as arising from a particular religious or ethnic culture. This influential referent, which drew on the systematic reframing of Orientalist discourse, positioned Australian women as violated by a '…virulent Islam…carried out by its agents in the form of Lebanese Muslim gangs' (Kampmark 2003, p.88). The Orientalist stereotypical images of the uni-dimensional Muslim woman as 'backward' and 'oppressed' that overflow in Western discourses in any discussion of the Islamic 'Other', became redefined as the stereotypical 'barbaric Other' (Zine 2006). As these events were manipulated by the processes of political and media discourse framing, 'preconceived expectations' about people of 'Middle Eastern Appearance' were generated. These expectations arose from modes of

knowledge framed by Orientalist dogma. This was most notable during the *Tampa* crisis where the linking of the Sydney gang rapes and refugees by hegemonic discourse framing evoked a pattern of vilification directed towards veiled bodies (Poynting 2002).

Tampa: Tilting the Frame on Refugees

> …an image of a relentless tide of otherness [that was] carried easily into the imagination of Fortress Australia…[which] reappears seamlessly in the fears of our way of life being swamped by the appearance on the horizon of a few hundred Muslim refugees (Perera 2002).

Poynting (2002) has stated that throughout 2000 and up to August 2001, the media in Australia presented an image of refugees as a stream of 'Middle Eastern boat people' arriving on Australia's northern coastline. This representation perpetuated an emerging unease within the Australian community. According to Stani (2000) in the reporting of the arrival of refugees, the media relied upon and accepted the information provided to it by the federal government ministers. This pattern of representations was amplified with the arrival of the *MV Tampa* on August 26 2001, when Arne Rinnan, the Captain of the Norwegian freighter *MV Tampa*, rescued 438 mostly Afghan asylum seekers from a sunken boat, the *KM Palapa* , on en route to Australia (Ginnacopoulos 2007; Marr and Wilkinson 2003). On August 27 2001, at a joint Parliament House press conference, the Howard government announced that the *Tampa* would be denied entry to Australian shores (Ward 2002). Prime Minister Howard and then Minister for Immigration, Philip Ruddock argued that it was in the 'national interest' to refuse the landing of the *Tampa* in Australia or any Australian territories (Ward 2002). On August 29 2001, the government organised Australian SAS troops to board the ship to prevent the refugees from disembarking (Marr and Wilkinson 2003; Ward 2002). According to MacCallum (2002) this sent a message that the Prime Minister was protecting the Australian borders against the 'invading' Muslims aboard the *Tampa.*

The government's campaign against the refugees aboard the *Tampa*, waged in the name of defending 'the national interest', became a focus of political and media attention. Suvendrini Perera (2002) has stated when the image of subversive refugees aboard the *Tampa* sailed into Australia's national consciousness, the frames through which the government transmitted the image of 'illegal' 'queue jumping' and 'unauthorised' disease carriers' drew on a '…older storehouse of images, narratives and representations' (Perera 2002, p.26). The historical Western representations of Muslims, as violent and fanatical

invaders, were actively cultivated by the federal government and various mainstream media, who disseminated the concept of the refugees as the new collective enemy invading Australian shores (Perera 2002). As the repertoires about the invasion of 'Muslim' asylum seekers became salient in the vocabulary of the everyday, a growing fear and panic about the 'Muslim Other' began to escalate (Gale 2005). Despite various critics[19] voicing their opposition to the federal government's 'hard line' on the so called 'illegal' asylum seekers aboard the *Tampa*, the dominant discourse frames gained widespread public adherence (Manne 2002; Burnside 2002). Poynting and Mason (2007) and Marr and Wilkinson (2003) have argued that one of the most poignant features of the *Tampa* affair was that communications were strictly limited by the Australian military. The enforcement of a tighter control of information operated at a level of censorship, which prevented the Australian media from presenting 'personalising or humanising images' of the refugees (Marr and Wilkinson 2003, p.135). As refugees were not allowed to be seen '…as human beings as individuals with life stories', these refugees were portrayed as faceless violent queue jumpers (Poynting and Mason 2007).

Marc Steinberg (1998) has suggested that when certain interpretive repertoires become ubiquitous and compelling; they act to '…delegitimise the meanings proffered by opposing repertoires' (Steinberg 1998, p.857). According to Entman (2004) this occurs because the framing of information often neglects to provide explicit evaluations of the event or related event or issue. When framed in this way, the audience does not have the opportunity to develop 'counterframes' and thus 'schemas of interpretation' are developed from an individual's prior beliefs and interpersonal communication (Entman 2004, p.25).

Kieran O'Doherty and Martha Augoustinos (2008) have argued that as the event of the *Tampa* crisis was made to fit into the framework of national interest, it flowed into the 'ordinariness of the everyday', to be debated and held in consciousness until the next drama was narrated through the channels of hegemonic discourse frames. The discourses of the nation, national interest and identity that became a prevalent feature formulated by political elites during the *Tampa* crisis, acted to perpetuate negative characteristics about refugees in 'everyday talk' (van Dijk 1992). Through the mobilisation of binding discursive media reporting and political discourse the manipulation of fear was transformed into local utterances. Media reports that appeared a few weeks before and

during the arrival of the *Tampa* formulated various 'interpretive packages' (Gamson and Lasch 1981), which conflated the characteristics of 'ethnic gangs' with refugees.

For example, on 29 July 2001, Sydney's *Sun Herald* reported '70 women lured and pack-raped - Brutal sex assaults linked to race gangs – Investigation' by John Kidman. This article emphasised that the 'frightening new crime' associated with 'race', maybe 'culturally institutionalised', and identified those charged with the offences as 'of Middle Eastern extraction' and the rape victims as 'Caucasian'. Joining the main story was an accompanying report headed, 'Terror in the Suburbs Parramatta Road, Camperdown', which described the 'savage assault' of two girls at Homebush Bay. On 18 August 2001, the report in Sydney's *Daily Telegraph*, 'Commissioner warns on rapes', featured statements by Police Commissioner Peter Ryan, who argued that the gang rapes were 'racially motivated'. Ryan (2001) further stated that the attacks on 'Aussie' women by men of 'Middle Eastern' background could become entrenched. During July and August 2001, reports about the Sydney rape cases were intertwined with reports about refugees. Terminology in the headlines, such as 'terror', 'illegal, 'influx', 'wave', 'floods', 'hordes', 'attack on fortress Australia', were common themes used to create a moral panic about the refugees arriving in Australian territorial waters and in particular those who were deemed as 'Middle Eastern'. On 17 August 2001, a week before the *Tampa* arrived; *Gold Coast Bulletin* featured a headline 'Hordes of Illegals Land'. Similarly on 23 August 2001, Michael Madigan's report in the Brisbane *Courier Mail* featured the headline 'Boat People Flood Turns to Torrent'. During the week of the *Tampa* arrival, on Tuesday 28 August 2001, a report in Victoria's *Herald Sun* titled 'Racial Strife Warning' by John Masanauskas, drew on the warning given by the neo-conservative historian Geoffrey Blainey twenty years earlier, about the problems arsing from an 'influx' of Asian migrants. The report framed the presentation of data from a study regarding the disadvantage of low skilled Asian migrants, by using terminology such as 'Asian Influx' and 'ethnic solidarity gangs', to reinforce negative stereotypes about the Asian 'Other'. The day after the *Tampa* arrived on 27 August 2001, a report in *The Australian* newspaper by Christopher Dore and Vanda Carson led with the headline 'New wave of 1000 illegals - Dossier: Fortress Australia under attack'.

The racialised framing of these reports typified much of the tabloid reporting during this period (Poynting 2002). The process of racialised framing, around certain events concerning the purported link between the 'Arab Other', crime and refugees within media

representations and Australian political discourse, acted to engender a moral panic about the presence of the 'Muslim Other'. One of the most striking examples of the media using racialised discourse framing was a report about the 'gang rapes' by Peter Charlton which appeared in Queensland's *Courier Mail* on 25 August 2001, the day before the arrival of the *Tampa.* The headline 'A gang rape in Sydney has caused ethnic tensions to boil over amid claims of cultural payback in the suburbs of Australia's biggest city' drew on various other reports that linked the rapes to men of 'Lebanese' background. The 'lenient' sentencing of the men who pleaded guilty to the rapes was the focus of the article. According to Charlton (2001) when the reporting of the sentences for men involved in the rapes was made available to the public, '…callers flooded Sydney talk back radio condemning the judge' (Charlton 2001). The then Premier of NSW Bob Carr was also quoted as being 'shocked' and disappointed' at the 'light' sentences given the 'gang' element. Carr (2001) argued that he had the right to state that certain gangs did recruit membership from specific ethnic communities and he was not going to get into a '…paroxysm of political correctness' about identifying the gangs (Carr 2001 cited in Charlton 2001). The report also included a statement by Detective Superintendent Rob Smith (2001) of the NSW Police Service, who argued that similar offences had been identified in Sydney's south western suburbs '...with a heavy concentration of Lebanese Muslims'. Smith (2001) further stated in several of Sydney's western suburbs, which were once 'quintessentially Australian working class areas', are now virtually 'Lebanese and Vietnamese ghettos'. 'Mosques have now replaced churches; shops feature signs where Arabic prevails over English and women dress in traditional purdah' (Smith 2001 cited in Charlton 2001).

In the first instance this report acted to marginalise the 'Asian Other' via '…oppositions of 'us' and 'them' good and bad, victims and villain, right and wrong' (Poynting et.al 2004, p.14). Carr's (2001) reference to the 'paroxysm of political correctness' echoed the attack on 'political correctness' proffered by Pauline Hanson and promulgated by John Howard. Significantly, however, the report drew on the notion of whiteness as a form of binary opposition between what is identified as Australian and the 'Other' (Gale 2005). Peter Gale (2005) has identified how:

> …the discourse of whiteness is represented as a point of reference in the discourse of national identity. Such discourse of belonging continues to shape thinking and writing, editing and broadcasting on issues of race. Whiteness discourse continues to inform the symbolic boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in contemporary Australia (Gale 2005, pp.151-152).

Conceptualising issues of white identity construction around the notion of space and place, Smith (2001) used the concept of the 'familiar' (e.g. Christian churches, English signs) as part of belonging, and 'difference' as assigned to the 'Othered' space, where those who do not 'look', or 'behave' like 'us' are perceived as a challenge to the rhetoric of white cultural space. Most significantly Smith's concept of 'difference' was connected to the 'aesthetics of dress' (Maynard 2004), as he perceived women wearing purdah as a dislodgment of the natural order of behaviours and practices which constitute 'Australianness'. As the certainties of the perceptions of the reassuring self enclosed white cultural space appeared to become undermined, the visible presence of veiled corporealities was presented as a fissure to the logic of an unproblematic identity of whiteness.

John Howard's political rhetoric, which focused on differences between 'us' (meaning white) and 'them' (as Other than white), was highlighted in a report by Andrew Clennell and Sarah Crichton in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 29 August 2001. Leading with the headline 'They're intimidating us; PM', the report highlighted the Prime Minister's lack of concern for the refugees aboard the *Tampa* who required medical attention. Howard (2001) suggested that the boat people were faking their sickness as a way of '…trying to intimidate us with our own decency' (Clennell and Crichton 2001). John Howard's framing of the refugees as dishonest and dangerous and an anathema to 'our' decent way of life became embedded in the vocabulary of the everyday, creating an unease about nationhood, identity, and the 'Other, which set in motion reoccurring 'phobias' and 'hatreds' (Gale 2005; Perera 2002; MacCallum 2002).

Following Entman's (2004) concept of frames in political and media discourses, as 'knowledge networks', the connection between the news coverage generated by the dominant media frames that were initialised by political leaders during the *Tampa* crisis, tapped into a node of associated ideas and feelings stored in the wider communities' prior beliefs concerning the Muslim 'Other' and invasion narratives. Several of the reports that appeared in the *Herald Sun* during the week of the *Tampa* arrival, constructed framing processes that associated criminogenic elements with immigration.

The ramifications of media and political framing during the week that followed the *Tampa* crisis can be illustrated by a *Voteline* poll conducted by Melbourne's *Herald Sun* on 29 August 2001, which asked if 'illegal immigrants' aboard the *Tampa* should be

allowed to land. According to the results published on 30 August 2001, of those who replied 615 agreed, while 13,572 thought they should not (*Herald Sun* 2001). Poynting (2002) has stated that within the incoherence of the racist imagination, all non-white 'Others' became joined ideologically:

> …so Arabs can become conflated with Muslims, Muslims with terrorist, 'boat people' with Middle Eastern, Middle Eastern with Arabs, Arabs with terrorists and so on by interminable permutations (Poynting 2002, p.59).

The framing of the non-white 'Other' during the decade prior to September 11 became increasingly represented by an inference of causal connections. After the event of September 11 the defining specificity of the Muslim 'Other' became categorised as a '…rapist of daughters, unlawful queue jumper, hijacker of planes and the suicide bomber of innocents' (Goldberg 2006, p.346). These events, although unique and unrelated, were instrumental in creating a magnitude of Islamophobia drifting across Australia. As these unrelated events became linked in people's minds, the visual presence of the veil was perceived as representing a 'common denominator' – a symbol of the 'common enemy' (Deen 2003, pp.272-273).

Summary

This chapter has explored the way in which the motif of colonial constructs of 'Arab' and 'Muslim' subjects as the feared, foreign 'Other', has been echoed in particular moments of crisis in the decade prior to September 11 2001. In addition it has considered the way in which whiteness discourse is in constant play within Australian social and political processes, functioning to maintain the 'Other' at the margins of Australian society. The racialised knowledge frames that have been a constituent part of power knowledge constructs have most often been inscribed with the politics of 'race' and gender. Through sets of discursive practices, Orientalist representations of veiled Muslim women, as the symbol of the monolithic 'Other', have had the ability to shape a conscious and unconscious xenophobic potentiality within the parameters of public discourse in various flashpoints prior to September 11. The next chapter examines the way in which representations of veiled bodies, framed through the narrow discursive parameters of Orientalist discourse, gained positional superiority and prevalence during various flashpoints in the aftermath of September 11 2001. In addition it considers how the dominant production and reproduction of veil, as a category of identification upon which, racial, religious and gendered cultural notions of 'Otherness' were framed, became a site of contention and fear in everyday expressions.

Notes

[1] While the central tenet of this thesis is to critique Western representations of the veil and veiling practices, in particular how the 'visibility' of veiled bodies have been represented as an monolithic 'Orientalist' perspective in contemporary media, political and cultural realms, a recognition that not all Muslim women are 'visible' or identifiable because of their various forms of religious dress choices needs to be acknowledged. The heart of this statement is to point to a rejection of the homogenisation of Muslim women and an avoidance of perpetuating a concept of a unitary and monolithic 'visible' Muslim reality. It is also important to note that identity is relative and circumstantial, constantly shifting and adapting to evolving social environments. Muslim women therefore carry layers of identity dependent on differences in social backgrounds, where ideas of Islam and thus veiling can diverge markedly

[2] Using the term 'Arab-Australians and Muslim Australians is not an attempt to present the many communities that fall under this umbrella term as a homogenous group. Rather the use of this term refers to a cultural group of shared language and heritage, a term that has been utilised by the communities themselves from the time of the 1990-1991 Gulf war as a unifying definition.

[3] The Gulf crisis began on 2 August 1990, although fighting did not actually begin until January 1991. On 2 August, Iraqi troops occupied neighbouring Kuwait and refused to leave. On August 28, Iraq declared Kuwait its nineteenth province. In response to these actions, America decided to send troops into the Gulf. For a variety of reasons, Australia decided to follow suit, despite objection from some sections of the community. See Goot M and Tiffen, R 1992, *Australia's Gulf War*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria.

[4] During 2000-2001 front-page headlines in daily tabloid newspapers reported the trials of a group of Lebanese Australian men accused of sexual assaults on Caucasian women in Western Sydney in 2000. See Poynting S, Noble, Tabar and Collins 2004, *Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab Other*, Sydney Institute of Criminology Press, Sydney.

[5] On 26 August 2001, Arne Rinnan, Captain of the Norwegian freighter *MV Tampa*, rescued 438 mostly Afghan refugees from the sinking ship *Palapa,* en route to Australia. The Australian government rejected the *Tampa* entering Australian shores and sent troops onto the ship to prevent the refugees from disembarking. See Marr, D and Wilkinson, M 2003, *Dark Victory*, Allen & Unwin, NSW.

[6] *NewsBank* is an electronic database that provides access to a comprehensive output of content from Australian and world-wide newspapers. The research also noted the way in which Australian media frequently relies on Australian Associated Press (AAP) for most of its international news and resources from Reuters Group Ltd. Reuters has a team of several thousand journalists who cover up-to-the minute global news coverage for print, broadcast and online newsrooms. It provides global information and news services to the world's newspapers, websites, television networks, radio stations, as well as direct to business professionals. Data collected in regards to the Sydney gang rapes a search using key terms (e.g. Sydney, Lebanese, Muslim and gang rapes) reported in Australian newspapers, resulted in a total of 281 reports cited during 2001 and in 2002, national Australian newspapers included 88 reports. A search using key terms (e.g. *Tampa*, asylum seekers and refugees) during the *Tampa* Affair revealed 330 in 2001 with September having the highest total (163).

[7] Under the Western Australian *Aboriginal Act, 1905*, marriage between Afghans and Aboriginal women became illegal. See Kabir, N 2006 'Muslims in a 'White Australia': Colour or Religion', in *Immigrants and Minorities*, Volume 24, Number 2, July, pp.193-223. See also Rajkowski, P 1995, *Linden girl: a story of outlawed lives*, University of Western Australia Press, Nedlands, WA.

[8] *The Immigrations Restriction Act 1901*, commonly known as the White Australia Policy, was the first Act inaugurated after Australian Federation. The restrictive policy that controlled who could and could not immigrate to Australia, was introduced at a time when nationalism and racism were endemic to European society and political thought, and was tied to racial purity under the apparently irrefutable conclusions of Social Darwinism. See Irving, H. 1997, *To Constitute a Nation: Cultural History of Australia's Constitution*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. See also Hollinsworth, D 2006, *Race and Racism in Australia*, 3rd edition, Social Science Press, NSW.

[9] All 'coloured aliens' who attempted to enter Australia had to submit to a medical examination and a fifty word Dictation test. The test could be administered in any language chosen by the Immigration officer,

which was unlikely to be understood by the applicant. This ensured that the applicant failed the test. This resulted in a rapid decline of 'non-white' people, including Muslims to Australia. The Dictation test remained until 1958. See Kabir, N 2006, 'Muslims in a 'White Australia': Colour or Religion', in *Immigrants and Minorities*, Volume 24, Number 2, July, pp.193-223.

[10] *Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* was founded in 1968. Runnymede is independent and voluntarily funded and its mandate is to promote a successful multi-ethnic Britain. During the early 1990s, when a Commission on Anti-Semitism was established, a distinguished Muslim scholar argued there were many parallels between anti-Jewish prejudice and anti-Muslim prejudice in modern Britain. His comments lead to the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia being set up by the Runnymede Trust in1996. Its first report, 'Islamophobia: a challenge for us all', was published in 1997 and was launched at the House of Commons by the Home Secretary, Jack Straw MP.See *Runnymede: Intelligence for a multi-ethnic Britain* 2004-2009,
< http://www.runnymedetrust.org/>.
See also Vakil, A 'Is the Islam in Islamophobia the same as the Islam in Anti-Islam, Or, When is it Islamophobia Time?' Thinking Thru' Islamophobia Symposium Papers, *CERS e working papers* 12,
<http://www.sociology.leeds.ac.uk/research/ethnicity-racism/cers/working-papers.php>.

[11] In 1988 the then Opposition leader John Howard voiced opposition to the ideology of a multicultural Australia and argued that a reduction in Asian immigration was needed. On 22 August 1988 he launched an immigration policy titled *One Australia*, which included a rejection of multiculturalism and Aboriginal Land Rights. See Markus A 2001, *Race: John Howard and the remaking of Australia*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW.

[12] Andrew Markus (2001) argues that the ideology of Australia as a multicultural society, the increase in Asian immigration and the issues regarding Aboriginal Land rights that were a distinctive part of the Hawke Labor Government's policies during the period 1983-91, was vehemently opposed by many in conservative circles. This group, which Markus (2001) and Gale (2005) amongst others identify as the New Right, gained media attention regarding their views on anti-Asian immigration and criticism of issues surrounding Aboriginal Land Rights. Key players in the mobilisation of 'neo-conservatism' were Hugh Morgan, executive director of Western Mining Corporation and Professor Geoffrey Blainey. Through an extensive national media campaign Morgan was effectively able to challenge issues related to Aboriginal Land rights. When Blainey gave his speech to Warrnambool Rotarians in March 1984, arguing that Labor's immigration policy had led to the 'Asianisation of Australia' and that Asians were becoming the 'favoured majority', it became the spotlight of media attention, in particular by conservative talk back radio hosts who were influential in fuelling the anti-Asian immigration debate. Blainey and Morgan's views were supported by a number of conservative figures including one prominent public controversialist. See Markus A 2001, *Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW and Gale, P 2005, *The Politics of Fear: Lighting the Wik*, Pearson Education Australia, NSW. See also Asmar C 1992, 'The Arab-Australian Experience' in *Australia's Gulf War*, M Goot and R Tiffen (eds), Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, pp.57-81.

[13] According to NIRVA, while there were widespread reports of Muslim women having their hijab pulled off in the street, more serious acts of violent physical abuse against Muslim women were common. See Hage, G 1998, *White Nation: Fantasies of White supremacy in a multicultural society*, Pluto Press, Annandale NSW. See also Cunneen, C Fraser, D and Tomsen, S (eds) 1997, *Faces of Hate: Hate Crime in Australia*, Hawkins Press, Annandale, NSW.
[14]

[13] 'Political correctness' as an accepted opposition to racism was opposed by John Howard who considered a 'democratic debate' to be a more favourable way to view issues relating immigration and 'race'. See John Howard's Fourth Headland Speech, *Politics and Patriotism: A Reflection on the National Identity Debate'*, 13 December 1995, Grand Hyatt Hotel Melbourne,
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/SMN20/upload_binary/smn205.pdf;fileType%3Dapplication%2Fpdf>.
Also see Middleton, H 1997, 'Racism in Australia' in *Australian Marxist Review*, Number, 37, <http://www.cpa.org.au/amarch/37race.html>.

[15] In 1999, in an Address at the Launch of the national Multicultural Advisory Council Report, *Australian Multiculturalism For A New Century: Towards Inclusiveness*, at Mural Hall, Parliament House, John Howard stated that he preferred to use the adjective 'Australian' instead of Multicultural. The reason for this, Howard contended, was that because despite the successive wave of migrants who have come to Australia, they have acquired a common overriding commitment to the Australian way of doing things and

the common values of the Australia nation. Howard's referent implies that all immigrants need to conform to the racialist ideals of assimilation.

[16] In 2007 Pauline Hanson announced she would re-enter politics. She stated that her concerns regarding the 'flow of Muslim immigrants' was one of the main reason for her return to the political scene. In 2009 Hanson stood for the Queensland seat of Beaudesert but was defeated, recording just 21.7 per cent of the vote. See Hurst, D 2009, 'I'll Quit Politics Says Hanson', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 March, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/ill-quit-politics-says-hanson-20090321-953o.html>.

[17] Although the gang rape of young, white Anglo-Saxon women in Sydney's Bankstown area in 2001 were depicted by the media as indicative of the anti-Western values of the Muslim religion itself, the victims of the Sydney Gang rapes came from a variety of Australian cultural backgrounds. See Dagistanli, S 2007, 'Like a pack of wild animals: Moral panics around 'ethnic' gang rape in Sydney', in *Outrageous! Moral Panics in Australi*a, S Poynting and G Morgan (eds), ACYS Press, Hobart, pp.181-196.
Disregarding denials from the local police commander and the state's statistician that multiple sexual assaults had any connection with Bankstown, race or religion, Sydney's tabloid newspapers deliberately falsified information to represent the gang rapes as crimes motivated by allegiance to Islam. The group involved in the in the rapes were most often identified in the media as 'a gang of Muslim/Lebanese rapists. See Poynting S 2004, 'Race Religion and Rhetoric, Conferences Report, Forum on *Australia's Islamic Relations* (FAIR), Sydney. See also Patterson, H 2009, 'Australia: How governments and the capitalist media marginalise the Muslim community' in *Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal*, <http://links.org.au/>.

[18] Janet Albrechtsen is a conservative columnist for *The Australian*, published by News Limited, a subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. In February 2005 she was appointed by the Howard government for a five year term to the board of the public broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

[19] Opinions about Howard's handling of the refugees aboard the *Tampa* were sharply divided between the so called 'elites' and 'the mainstream'. Those who opposed the manner in which the asylum seekers were treated included Ministers of religion, artists, academics, welfare agencies, doctors and psychiatrists and some journalists. See Manne, R 2004, 'The Howard Years: A Political Interpretation' in *The Howard Years*, R Manne (ed), Black Inc, Melbourne, Victoria, pp.3-53.

Chapter Five:

A Veil of Terror in the Wake of 9/11

In the post 9/11 era Muslim women navigate between both racialised and gendered politics that variously script the ways their bodies and identities are narrated, defined and regulated (Zine 2006).



Fig 68 AES -The Witness of the Future 1996
c.f Bailey and Tawadros 2003

Introduction

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, the safeguarding of national space from potential threats (both internally and externally) was routinely promulgated by hegemonic political and media discourse frames in Australia, the USA, and the UK (Poynting and Mason 2006; Dreher 2006; Entman 2004). Mohammad Waseem (2002), Simon Adams (2004), Francis Fukuyama (2002), have all asserted that in most of the official quarters of the West it has been claimed that the world changed after 9/11. Jasmine Zine (2006), Tanja Dreher (2006), Sarah Ahmed (2005) and Faegheh Shirazi (2003), along with many others have asserted, however, that the most significant

change has been for people identified as 'of Middle Eastern appearance', especially those who are Muslims, as they have been collectively the target of suspicion and hostility. In the immediate wake of 9/11, images of women wearing the veil became prevalent via varying media including the internet. The image of Statue of Liberty wearing a burqa[1] (Fig 68 c.f Bailey and Tawadros 2003), became one of the most widely known images circulated on the internet (Rantanen 2005). As the interpretive framing of Muslims as the suspicious and feared terrorist 'Other' emerged as a transnational phenomenon, images of veiled women were commonly used as a visual representation to maintain Orientalist conceptions of spectacular 'Otherness' (Imtoual 2006). Anne Aly and David Walker (2007) contend that the practice of using Orientalist descriptors as a continuum for embedding essentialsing repertoires regarding veiled bodies was implemented after 9/11 to suit particular political and media agendas. In Australia, Arab and Muslim communities were subjected to increasing expressions of racism and abuse, which was built on existing tensions and prejudices that had been smouldering in the prior decade (Dreher 2006; Poynting 2002). As discourses of race, gender and religion became scripted in terms of terrorism, women wearing the veil became the main recipients of a heightened level of physical and verbal aggression (Dreher 2006; Poynting and Mason 2006; Zine 2002).

Waleed Aly (2007) has suggested that in Western conversations, the veil or headscarf has been constructed as the antithesis of Western self image. While most often it has been represented as an 'exotic symbol' of 'erotic mystique', Aly (2007) argues that since 9/11, 'perceptions of the veil – the very same article of clothing – now symbolises oppression [and] even extremism and terrorism' (Aly 2007, p.106). MacMaster and Lewis (1998) have argued that the characterisation of the veil, as a signifier of 'political danger' and 'terrorism' has assumed an almost universal representation in contemporary Western media. This was most decisive in Australia in the aftermath of September 11 2001, as the linking of the Orientalist tropes of Muslim women's subjugation and terrorism in certain sections of tabloid media reporting and political discourse, galvanised the veil as a symbol to be *feared* and thus excluded (Poynting 2002). This chapter examines the way in which the visual trope of the veil and veiled bodies formed a central part of the dominant representation of the feared 'Other' in the immediate wake of September 11 2001, the Children Overboard affair in 2001 and the war in Afghanistan in 2001. The first part of the discussion situates the veil within the materiality of dress. It highlights the way in which the discourse of dress, as part of the visibility of women's bodies, has played a

significant role in either challenging or reinforcing power relations. The purpose of this discussion is to explore and map how the meanings of dress, discursively imposed upon veiled subjectivities in the West, have become located at the centre of racial stereotyping and gendered Islamophobia since September 11 2001 and the 'War on Terror'.

In the second part of the discussion, texts and images that are most representative of political and media discourses during the abovementioned events have been examined. As indicated in Chapter Four, data gathered from media reports were assembled by using the electronic database *NewsBank.* Following the key words 'veil and Muslim women' in 2001[2], there was a yield of 105 articles, with the highest number (26) in September. The examination of this data has provided a process to develop the argument contingent with the thesis. It has guided an understanding of the way in which racialised knowledge frames, circumscribing the veil as a symbol of fear, have been produced in collusion with hegemonic media and discourse frames.

The Veil and Dress Discourse

In his treatise on fashion systems, Roland Barthes (1989) argued that the study of clothing is above all an object of *appearance.* Embedded in the politics of appearance is the standards of normalcy, in which the 'permitted' and 'prohibited' serve as a non-verbal medium of communication. According to Hoodfar (2003):

> ….[C]lothing has historically been a potent tool for both rulers and the ruled…[and] is probably the most silent of expressions used by human societies to demarcate social boundaries and to distinguish 'self' from 'other' at both the collective and individual levels (Hoodfar 2003, p.3).

In historical macrostructural practices, clothing styles have been instrumental in the reproduction of specific statuses in different periods and places and have '…simultaneously communicated and constituted gender and ethnic identities' (Huisman and Hondgneu-Sotelo 2005, p.46). In his hermeneutic investigation into the governance of appearance Peter Goodrich (1998) states:

> The regulation of dress and other forms of 'presentation of the self' were crucial aspects of the formation of the social order and most specifically played a vital role in the identity and identification of the 'imagined communities' and moods of nation, class and gender (Goodrich 1998, p.709).

Rose Weitz (1998) notes that throughout history, the discourse of dress as part of the visibility of women's bodies has played a significant role in either challenging or reinforcing power relations. Defined within cultural, social and religious historical settings, dress as an adornment of the body has been established in ways acceptable

within a particular cultural milieu. As Donald Quataert (1997, p.404) notes '…for more than two millennia, rulers and governments across the globe have promulgated clothing laws in order to modulate gender, communal, political and social relations'. Fadwa El Guindi (1999) draws on her fieldwork and analysis of religious text to present an historical study that frames veiling in terms of 'dress'. In her investigation of the anthropology of dress, El Guindi (1999) notes that dress is a salient component of a person's identity, which is seen as a symbolic code that simultaneously denotes belonging and exclusion, '…mark[ing] what groups share and the boundary around them' and has been crucial part of the construction of gender distinctions (El Guindi 1999, p.57).

Considering not only styles of dress, but also taking into account the bodies wearing the clothing, Huisman and Hondgneu-Sotelo (2005) suggest gender becomes central to this process, as women's bodies '…serve as a vehicle to maintain the collective identity of groups' (Huisman and Hondgneu-Sotelo, 2005, p.47). Thus, paying attention to gender allows recognition of how women's dress and bodies create boundaries between particular ethnic and religious groups through their symbolic representation of codes of apparel. Building on El Guindi's (1999) analysis of dress, Anne Secor (2002, p.8) seeks to go beyond viewing dress as a situated embodied practice, but works towards a consideration of dress as '…always subject to shifting interpretations across space and time'. Engaging with interpretations of dress in a sociohistorical context, Huisman and Hondgneu-Sotelo (2005) demonstrate how distinct discourses of dress are embedded in historical particularities of nations, constructed through formal state policies and informal mechanisms by dress code enforcers at the micro level of social interaction.

Locating the veil as part of dress discourse at the precipice between East and West, Huisman and Hondgneu-Sotelo (2005) argue that the 'deveiling' of Muslim women has and continues to be a key aspect of the Western ideal of modernity, and has '…become a target in projects to define and reshape the barbarity within and in doing so re garb the nation itself in the cloak of 'progress' (Huisman and Hondgneu-Sotelo 2005, p.48). As part of the historical specificity of clothing practices, deveiling of women has most often been situated as a central motif in narratives of progress in the West. However, as Margaret Maynard (2004, p.4) points out, a politics of dress that is gaining force in the transnational realm is the 'global homogenisation' of dress. Within this discourse, the veil has become framed in regimes of representation governed by wider political and cultural imperatives and is constructed as a mode of clothing that challenges global 'sameness'.

Dress and Globalisation

Clothing as a sign system is a form of informational exchange, acting as a marker of status, region, sexuality, class, ethnicity and religion. Maynard (2004, p.3) suggests that in cross cultural engagements the embodied messages and the aesthetics of dress '…form a more complicated material social practice than a language system'. Maynard's (2004) theorising of dress in a global framework, proposes that the present 'global homogenisation' of dress is caught up in fundamental paradoxes between global 'sameness' of appearance and disjunctures '…in ever shifting and incomplete processes of identity formation' (Maynard 2004, p.18). Similarly, in his account of 'disjuncture and difference' in the globalisation of culture, Arjun Appadurai (1990) has considered how:

> The globalisation of culture… involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization (armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies and clothing styles… only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty… (Appadurai 1990, p.307).

As Appadurai (1990) suggests, woven into the globalisation of culture is the homogenisation of clothing styles that strives towards connecting, bringing together and solidifying a global 'sameness' of dress. Extending Benedict Anderson's (1991) notion of 'imagined communities'. Appadurai (1990) argued that today's world is not just made up of imagined communities but 'imagined worlds', which '…characterise international capital as deeply as they do international clothing styles' (Appadurai 1990, p.297). Appadurai (1990) discerns that within a globalised framework, narratives used by political elites have been composed from elements of the Enlightenment world view. These constellations of narratives and images, which Appadurai refers to as 'ideoscapes', have the ability to shape national and transnational cultural processes within the infinitely varied contestations of 'sameness' and 'difference' (Appadurai 1990, p.308). Drawing upon aspects of Appadurai's (1990) concept of ideoscapes, Maynard (2004, p.53) examines the relationship between dress, globalisation and politics, to reveal how clothing is implicated in the functioning of political structures at every level of social practice. Referring to power and knowledge structures, which function in relation to dress, place and space, Maynard (2004, p.110) suggests that the headscarf/veil within the 'politics of recognition' is inevitably implicated in global political manoeuvrings and has been located at the centre of Western condemnation and racial stereotyping especially since September 11 and the 'War on Terror'. In a global sense, the veil as a form of dress has circumscribed the way differences between West and East have been polarised. In her analysis of the politics of dress, Alison Donnell (1999, p.489) suggests '[d]ebates

concerning the veil and veiling…draw attention of the way in which dress can play a central role in struggles over the production of identity'. Donnell (1999) opines that the dominance of the visual in contemporary culture provides a decisive link between gender identity and clothing. Donnell (1999, p.490) suggests that within the tropes of visualisation the veil has become the visual shorthand for a dress code emblematic of oppression. However, these tropes are recursively linked to the taken-for-granted knowledge formations established in literary and visual representations characterised by Orientalist discourse (Donnell 1999). The core of this process became dramatically interconnected and mutually formative in the aftermath of September 11 2001.

September 11 2001: A Veil of Separation

> We exist in a time when fear has taken hold of almost every area of our lives, where racism has become so pervasive and popular – where it has been shown such democratic respectto the extent that we seem to be failing to recognise the dangerous signs (Kattan 2004).

The September 11 2001 World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks initiated by so called 'Islamic extremists' triggered a geopolitical 'war against terrorism' and circumspection of Islamic culture (Waseem 2002). During the first few weeks after 9/11, utterances that framed Muslims as 'evildoers' and 'enemies of freedom' that 'dwell in dark corners of the earth', '…hating and killing Americans and Christians', were constantly repeated by the then President of the United States, George W Bush[3] (Bush 2001). In an *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, on 20 September 2001, Bush declared '…every nation in every region now has a decision to make; either you are with us or you are with the terrorists' (Bush 2001a). Depicting a particular representation of 'us' (civilised-White-Christian-Americans) and 'them' (evil-non-white-non-Christian terrorists), the discursive rhetoric used by Bush was consistent with dualisms formulated through what Said (2003) has exemplified as Orientalist notions of the 'West and the Rest' (Zine 2006). This type of racialised knowledge production tapped into a node of perceived ideas, interpretations and concepts already stored within an individual's knowledge networks (Entman 2004). The drawing of a fault line between historically constructed notions of 'us' and 'them' put forward by Bush, made it almost impossible for most people not to choose the side of 'us'. This acted to silence any form of 'counterframes' as even the mildest dissent was condemned (Entman 2004; Burns 2003). Fadwa El Guindi (2005) has argued that the racial profiling, targeting Muslims and Arabs that had begun before September 11, gained legitimacy through the speeches and various

Acts[4] inaugurated by President Bush. El Guindi (2005) further suggested that the framing of the events by President Bush as perpetrated by '…evil forces of Arab and Muslims, lurking in the shadows, to take revenge on good Christian Americans', became linked to patriotism and 'American values' (El Guindi 2005, p.254). Anne Aly and Mark Balnaves (2003) have proposed that the framing of 9/11 by Bush (2001b), as a battle between 'us' and 'them', which drew on distinctions between the West and its 'Others', '…motivate[ed] a collective identity based on the construction of 'us' as 'victims' and 'them' as objects of fear concern and suspicion (Aly and Balnaves 2003). El Guindi (2005) noted that as these recurring themes gathered momentum and reverberated throughout the Western world, they became understood as a code for legitimising assault against women wearing head coverings. In the immediate wake of September 11, the selectively framed political speeches presented by President Bush, were echoed in Australia. The then Prime Minster John Howard, who was in Washington DC on the day of the attacks, '…was right at the epicenter of the emotional firestorm that engulfed US politics' (Summers 2007). Howard committed 'full support' to President George Bush in any action required to bring justice to the terrorists responsible for the attacks (Summers 2007). Mirroring the words of Bush (2001b), Howard (2001) stated 'you are either a close ally of the United States or you are not' (Forbes 2001). Howard (2001) further affirmed that '…what happened in the US could happen in this country [and] that it was possible that bin Laden cells were active in Australia' (Forbes 2001). As noted in the previous chapter, the backdrop of media and political discourses that had acted to conflate criminality and asylum seekers with Muslims during 2000-2001, created a rise in Islamophobia in Australia. Samina Yasmeen (2007) asserts, however, that after the attacks of September 11, the emphasis of Australia as a possible target of Islamic militants, introduced '…a sudden shift in the national discourse within Australia on the place of Muslims as citizens' (Yasmeen 2007, p.48). In the arena of post September 11 Australia, the formulation of the 'evil Muslim Other', fuelled by certain sections of the Australian federal government, elites and mainstream media, about an assumed 'threat' posed by Arab and/or Muslim and/or Middle Eastern communities and cultures, ignited a climate of fear and panic (Poynting 2002; Gale 2005). Because there was no clear geographical place that the 'enemy' could be found, except as Bush (2001b) had claimed in '…the dark corners of the earth', the surveillance against those who most symbolised the perceived 'enemy within' intensified (Humphrey 2005).



Fig 69 Akerman. P 2001
'Opening our doors to a wave of hatred'
Daily Telegraph, 18 September
c.f *ABC Media Watch* 2002

The veil, most often represented in the Western Orientalist discourse as either exotic or symbolic of women's subjugation, became the visible symbol synonymous with terrorism and hence the target of prejudicial suspicion and hostility (Dreher 2006; Abood 2003). Two days after the attacks, President of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Abbas Ahmed, appealed to the Australian people to 'act rationally' as '…bomb and other threats had already been made against Australian mosques and schools' and some Islamic Women's Associations had received threatening phone calls (Wenham and Yallamas 2001).

During the month after the September 11 attack, the level of discrimination and vilification against women wearing the veil dramatically increased (Dreher 2006). Nahid Kabir (2004) has revealed that the backlash against women wearing the veil that occurred all over Australia was far more injurious than the racist backlash during the 1991 Gulf War. Kabir (2004) stated that in Melbourne and Western Australia some Muslim students were spat on, and '…direct threats were made to women wearing Islamic dress' (Kabir 2004, p.315). As the racialised and gendered dimensions of the war on terror manoeuvred insidiously within hegemonic discourses, the veil became a focal referent. For example on 18 September 2001, one week after the 9/11 attack, a report in the *Daily Telegraph* by Piers Akerman titled 'Open Our Doors to Waves of Hatred' (Fig 69 c.f *ABC Media Watch* 2002), was accompanied with an indexical drawing, by Eric Löbbecke[5]. What is presented here is not a photograph or cartoon but an indexical drawing in which various elements assist in visualising, indexically, the accompanying statement. This image works at an indexical level through the use of symbolic elements, the veil and the brick wall, which are causally related to Islam and borders. The veil represents the cultural boundary of the feared 'Other' that needs to be prohibited from the territory and body politic of Australia. The brick wall (in place of a face) represents a borderline denoting exclusion of

the undesirable ‘Other’. In addition, the brick wall inserted in place of a face dehumanises the Muslim woman and functions to invoke the racist generalization that Muslim women are so deeply immured by their faith that they are rendered silent and unreachable. As previously mentioned, the inclusion of indexical images used in conjunction with news articles, depend for their effect on the symbolic value of the image (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold 1998). Moreover by framing and linking expectations about a particular topic, indexical images function at a level of signification, giving credibility to a seemingly self evident truth. As Hansen et al. (1998) have noted that indexical images most often communicate racist cues. The performativity of an image, in this case the veil, when transposed into an indexical drawing, has the ability for a layering of both ambiguity and certitude. Akerman’s (2001) article, which accompanied the image, focused on concerns about multiculturalism by drawing on visual symbols including ‘a beard and a headdress’ as sites representing ‘difference’ from that of the dominant culture. As discussed in Chapter Two, the framing of racialised news reports after September 11 gained widespread public support, because they were activated through associations between information highlighted by news frames (e.g. Islamic extremists, Muslims, evildoers, uncivilised) and by interpretations and connected ideas and feelings stored in a person’s prior beliefs. The indexical representation of the veil used in the media report by Akerman, linked the veil as the primary referent and ‘ultimate equifinal avatar’ (Raju 2002, p.173) of Muslim women, with words such as ‘waves’ and ‘hatred’. This assisted in giving credibility to the production of the seemingly self-evident ‘truth’ of a link between the veil and terrorism. The agenda-setting used by Akerman in this article was to promote the veil within the format of a ‘problem frame’. This contributed to the discourse of fear against the veiled ‘Other’, pervading public discourse (Altheide 1997). The framing of this veil in this way worked to shape public opinion by emphasising certain negative aspects of the veil, ‘priming’ the target audience to think and decide about the veil in certain ways (Entman 2007). Activating schemas of interpretation that ‘primed’ the audience to assert a degree of concern and fear about the veil, placed the issue on the public agenda and that public agenda was adopted as an agenda by the then Howard government.

In the wake of 9/11 both documentary and non- documentary images including photographs, drawings and cartoons depicting women wearing the veil became prevalent via different media (Rantanen 2005; Imtoual 2006). The inclusion of veiled images used

in the media to maintain stereotypical conceptions of symbolic 'Otherness' will be discussed subsequently in this chapter.

News reporting that engenders racist cues has the ability to influence opinions in the broader community. Documenting the key findings of experiences of racism received from callers to a Hotline set up by *Community Relations Committee For a Multicultural New South Wales* (CRC) from 12 September 2001 to 11 November 2001, Tanja Dreher (2006) reported that there was evidence to support an association between assaults and incidence of abuse and news reporting. According to Dreher (2006), reports of assaults came predominately from Arab, Muslim and Sikh Australians. Most of the physical assaults were against females, with the highest proportion of assaults occurring in public places. The research indicated that there was a strong link between visible markers of 'difference', such as wearing the hijab or turban and experiences of assault. These assaults included '… physical attacks on women wearing the hijab, including incidents in which the attackers ripped off the hijab' (Dreher 2006, p.12). Discussing the discriminatory practices that were reported in Sydney in late November 2001, Kabir (2004) has noted how many Muslim women became the target of hate mail, which included threatening notes in their letter boxes. Furthermore, '…some women were forced to remove their scarfs because of men's abusive comments' (Kabir 2004, p.317). In some of the extreme cases women were '…beaten with sticks and suffered cuts, bruises and broken limbs' (Dreher 2006, p.12). These findings are consistent with reports from various organisations during the same period. According to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) (2004) in the month after the 9/11 attacks, the Australian Arabic Council recorded '...a twenty five percent rise in reports of discrimination and vilification'. HREOC further stated that the Muslim Women's Association of South Australia had received a significant number of reported incidences of harassment mostly involving offensive verbal abuse of women. This corresponded with the reports from the Al Zahra Muslim Women's Association in Sydney who noted a '…phenomenal increase in discrimination and vilification' (HREOC *Isma*ع*-Listen, National Consultation on Eliminating Prejudice Against Arab and Muslim* 2004). Scott Poynting (2002) has argued that as the veil became targeted and despised as a symbol for 'uncivilised barbarism', it is reasonable to form a conjecture about the causal connection between the assaults and articles, talkback radio such as those written by Piers Akerman that appeared in tabloid newspapers.

As had been the case with the asylum seekers aboard the *Tampa*, after September 11, the Australian government consistently repeated the claim that Australian borders needed to be protected against 'queue jumping', 'illegal' refugees (Gelber and McDonald 2006). During October 2001, the fear and suspicion of Muslim women wearing the veil heightened as a result of misinformation promulgated by senior government Minsters in the then federal government about asylum seekers throwing their children overboard (Marr and Wilkinson 2003). The events and reports of the 'Children Overboard incident[6]' as it came to be known, was centred on a group of asylum seekers on board an Indonesian fishing boat en route to Australia, identified as the SIEV IV, (Suspect Illegal Entry Vehicle), who had reportedly thrown their children overboard in attempt to gain access to Australian soil and the right of refuge (Marr and Wilkinson 2003, Hage 2003).

On 8 October a report by Anna Cock and Mark Ludlow appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, which led with the headline, 'Sink or Swim - Boat people Throw Children Overboard - Australia's Refugee Crisis'. Cock and Ludlow's (2001) report aimed to highlight how 'desperate parents threw their children overboard'. The report included a statement from the then Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock, who had described the incident of 'jumping ship' and 'throwing youngsters overboard' as a clearly 'planned and premeditated' bid to reach the Australian territory. On the same day a report in *The Australian* by Ian Henderson, Megan Saunders, Jeremy Roberts and Colleen Egan (2001), 'Boat Children overboard - Howard Hard Line Poll Focus', included a statement from Prime Minster Howard who argued that Australia was a 'humane nation' but '…not a nation that was going to be intimidated by [that] kind of behaviour'. Similarly the on 8 October 2001, the *Herald Sun* quoted John Howard as stating that 'I don't want people like that in Australia…there really is no place in Australia for people who do that…to me that is the end' (Ludlow and Hamilton 2001). Despite the information given to the Minister for Defence and Prime Minster two days before the federal election that asylum seekers had not thrown their children overboard, this information was not provided to the general public until after the election[7] (Manne 2002).

Alia Imtoual (2006) has asserted that the way in which the terminology was framed concerning the asylum seekers in the Children Overboard incident, presented the refugees as 'unfit' to be accepted as 'decent Australians'. Poynting (2002) has argued that this assertion was repeated many times by the Prime Minister and the then Defence Minister Peter Reith and '…echoed in tabloids and talkback…across the continent' (Poynting



Fig 70 Miranda, C 2001, 'Terror Australis: Bin Laden Groups in Our Suburbs' *Daily Telegraph* 12 October c.f *ABC Media Watch* 2002a

2002, p.48). The 'spreading activation of knowledge' about the Children Overboard incident can be recognised as being effective through what Entman (2004) has identified as a 'cascading activation model'. Within this model, the spreading activation of nodes of knowledge about the Children Overboard by the political elites, cascaded downward to influence other elites, including news organisations, the text they produced and ultimately the public realm (Entman 2004). This was reflected in the *Community Relations Commission For a Multicultural New South Wales* (CRC) report, which identified many of the reports of hostile comments recorded on the Hotline, referred to Muslim and Arab Australians 'as not belonging in Australia' (Dreher 2006). Comments such as '…'you Muslim', 'you terrorist' go back to your own country …we don't want you in Australia', were indicative of many of the verbal attacks (Dreher 2006, p.35).

On 12 October 2001, less than one month before the federal election, a report written by Charles Miranda with the headline 'Terror Australis: Bin Laden Groups in Our Suburbs' appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* (Fig 70 c.f *ABC Media Watch* 2002a). This report alerted the Australian public to the danger of a terrorist attack from home grown terrorists living in 'our' suburbs. The racialised framing of this article, acted to promote fear about perceived suspicious strangers who may be lurking in the realm of everyday social space. According to Sara Ahmed (2000) the construction of the stranger is always linked to suspicion and danger and is established as a figure who is partly concealed, who hides in 'dark places', and is ready to pounce on good citizens living their legitimised lives. Determining the 'Other' as a figure of the stranger ultimately '…brings into play relations of political and social antagonisms that '*mark some others as stranger than other others'* (Ahmed 2000, p.25 emphasis in original). Ghassan Hage (2004) has suggested the concept of '…bin Ladens taking over our neighbourhoods …raping our women …invading our shores and infiltrating our suburbs', ultimately led to every 'strange'

'suspicious' Arab 'Other' becoming a threat, especially if she was 'a veiled one' (Hage 2004, p.x). The discourse framing processes used in this report had the ability to influence, directly and obliquely, public dialogues concerning issues relating to Arabs/Muslims and terrorists. The consequence of this was that the media ran the risk of being unable to contain fears and anxieties. As the links between criminality, terrorism, lack of civilisation and of humanity became linked to the 'Muslim Other' in the wider social discourse, the materiality of the veil was instantiated as the ultimate aesthetic of the feared 'Other', which needed to be eliminated. Scott Poynting (2002) Peter Gale (2005) and Ghassan Hage (2003) amongst others have pointed out that the panic over ethnic gangs, the *Tampa* crisis, the Children Overboard incident and the September 11 attacks, developed conterminously with hegemonic political and media discourse frames linking Muslims with terrorists. The *Tampa* affair and the Children Overboard incident had occurred in the months leading up to a federal election. Poynting (2002, p.56) has argued that '…Australian politicians of both major parties as well as One Nation, linked asylum seekers with terrorism and crime during and after the 2001 election campaign'. The monitoring of Australia's borders, under the regime of national security, both geographical and cultural, propagated by Howard's discursive rhetoric, became a constant narrative in the ongoing debates about the war on terror, Australian identity and belonging and exclusion.

Bordering Whiteness

> A time of sovereignty asserted as diffuse, of borders transgressed, questioned and enforced, of violence that is exercised with uncertain justice and legal foundation but is exercised nevertheless
> (Burke 2002).

The strategy of the federal Coalition government to adeptly create a climate of fear and panic during the 2001 federal election campaign relied on the historical and timeless notion of protecting the white nation's borders from the foreign non-white 'Other'. The defining historical and political aspects that have characterised the imaginary, unified, white, 'spatial container' image of Australia, and the fear of the invading non-white 'Other' were fortified by the campaign pledge by Prime Minister John Howard in 2001, who stated 'we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances under which they come' (Howard 2001, cited in Charlton 2002, p.79). Hage (2003) has suggested that in Australia, the defence of the nation or community is always engendered in the national 'we' '…as in we decide who enters our borders' (Hage 2003, p.33). Poynting et al. (2004) have argued that:

> [The]…'we' was a message that deliberately went beyond words…it silently but successfully promised barriers against the unassimilable, the irrevocably different races or cultures – non-Christian, non-white, non-Western ['Others'] (Poynting et al. 2004, p.153).

Framing the election campaign around the protection of Australian borders against the perceived unassimilable 'Muslim Other', engendered a spectre of Muslim incompatibility with Australian society. Howard's commitment to ensuring the integrity of Australia's borders and to the effective management and control of the movement of people to and from Australia ensured his election victory. Rick Kuhn (2003) has suggested that the success of the election campaign was due to:

> The *Tampa* and 'children overboard' affairs [as] key episodes in the Coalition's strategy for the 2001 election...The Government used the 9/11attacks to intensify public anxiety and promote its own ability to defend the country.... (Kuhn pp.59-60).

As border policing became central to Government's election mandate, '…the border was bound to proliferate across social relations and spaces' (Mitropoulos 2006, p.15). Robert Williams (2003) has argued that spatial structures in a society are influenced by social relations, including relations of power, which promote a certain interpretation of the values and norms in a society. Williams (2003) has advocated that public spaces are intended to foster certain political values and are constituted by what '…lies outside the perceptual and signifying boundaries' (Williams 2003, p.277). Similarly, Hage (2006) has attested that cultural identity, whiteness, nationalism, and symbols, are implicated within the 'anthropology of space and spatial power'. In a political climate where the 'familiar' was fostered as part of belonging, 'the unfamiliar' was assigned to the 'Othered' space. The establishment of borders, tangible, symbolic or ideological to appropriate a 'national normalcy', had the potential to be internalised by individuals. As a result, a sense of a communal collective identity was determined by the exclusion of the perceived 'alien non-white 'Other' (Balibar 2002, p.78). The framing of Australia's border became more than a peripheral demarcation of the 'edges' or confines of the national territories but was '…proliferated across social relations and spaces, and in circumstances both casual and administered' (Mitropoulos 2006, p.15). At the border, whether geographical or symbolic, the need to protect and defend the nation or community often '…unleashes aggression, hatred and mistrust' (Hage 2003, p.31). The depictions of Australia's borders being under threat and needing protection from the 'evil Other', was discursively promoted by the Howard government as a justification for Australia to join the US led war against Afghanistan (Adams 2004).

Framing the Afghanistan War

In October 2001, John Howard announced that he had committed a one thousand five hundred and fifty strong military contingent to assist in the US-led war in Afghanistan (Marris 2001). Making the announcement one month before the 2001 federal election, Howard's role was to act as America's 'deputy sheriff' in '…retaliation against the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks' (Adams 2004, p.126). A report in *The Australian* newspaper on 18 October 2001, headed 'PM sends in the Troops', quoted Howard (2001) as stating his decision to deploy defence personal was designed:

> …to achieve the capture and bringing to justice bin Laden and all those responsible for the terrorist attacks on the United States and also the broader extermination of people who would launch terror attacks on other people around the world (Howard 2001 cited in Marris 2001, p.1).

Fundamental to John Howard's (2001) statement was the idea that the protection of Australian borders from terrorism would be achieved through acts of 'extermination'. Etienne Balibar (2005) has argued that the processes of extermination and elimination that mark the victim as a 'superfluous person', which take place within the realm and the time of 'legality and normality', occur most often when a political supplement allows the conditions of the extermination processes to become a possibility (Balibar 2005, p.33). Most significantly Balibar (2005, p.31) asserts that processes of extermination, are often manifested in acts of 'internal exclusion', in which victims from wide range of socio-cultural groups, including refugees and migrants, are imbued with a collective identification that '…implies that the individual can be identified to others as the totality of the community or the society' (Balibar 2005, p.34). The act of 'internal exclusion' as described by Balibar (2005), brings into focus how processes of exclusion, concerning veiled bodies that have come into play since 9/11, has most often been signified as the 'internal enemy' representing the totality of war, terror, refugees and crime.

The assertion and inference of the veil representing the 'internal enemy' has been dependent, in part, on the framing of images in news reports. Media frames, which allow readers to '…locate, perceive, identify and label meanings' (Goffman 1974), gain deeper structural messages when combined with visual symbolic images. Furthermore as world events change over time, images included in media frames become '…flexible to accommodate new content and perspectives and to rearrange what is already in a [immersed] within the frame' (Knight 2001, p.74). According to Emmison and Smith (2000), linking visual frames to text, genres, identification, promote a particular definition that assist in deploying conventions and common sense understandings about a

certain topic. An example of the framing of an image to promote a particular definition and understating about a topic is demonstrated by the photograph of then Prime Minsters' wife Janette Howard with Nazra Ibrahim which accompanied the abovementioned *Australian* (2001) news report 'PM sends in the Troops' (Fig. 71 c.f *The Australian* 2001, p.1). The caption added to the image stated '…covered from the world in all but her eyes Nazra Ibrahim whispers to Janette Howard about family and children'. This photograph, which was taken at a mosque as part of the 2001 Federal election campaign, was framed to represent a certain concept of social reality about the veil and Muslim women to the wider community. According to Ali Imtoual (2005):

> This particular image presented Muslim women in Australia as heavily veiled in black, as focused solely on personal familial and domestic issues, as being too oppressed and subordinated to even speak above a whisper and as inferior to Janette Howard who was presented as the embodiment of 'liberal', tolerant, sophisticated and liberated 'western' women (Imtoual 2005).

Imtoual (2005) has suggested that the way in which the image and accompanying caption was framed to represent a concept of backwardness and oppression, angered the women she interviewed during her research regarding representations of Muslim women in mainstream newspapers. The consensus from the response of the interviewees was that this type of representation impacted on the way non-Muslims treated Muslim women in Australia. Following Balibar's (2005) concept of exclusion and extermination, it could be argued that the particular image framing of a veiled woman accompanying the report in which 'war', threat of 'terrorism' and 'extermination' were interweaved in the text, had the ability to conceptualise the idea that the nation was under threat by both the external and internal 'enemy'. Ghassan Hage (2006) contends when the idea that something or someone is competing or is threatening against 'us' an exterminating impulse begins to emerge.

As the certainties and foundations of the reassuring self-enclosed white cultural space appeared to become undermined by the presence and ongoing threat of the perceived terrorist 'Other', borders between places, cultures and identities became areas of potential antagonism (Ang 1996). The veil, as the central obsessive fixation by which the 'suspicious Other' was framed, evoked the essence of the 'stranger' at the threshold of the nation's cultural border and became reified as a symbol of disconnection that needed to be excluded. Sara Ahmed (2000) has argued that:

> '…the 'we' of a nation is affirmed through the difference of the 'stranger cultures'. The establishment of a national imaginary presupposes those who are already recognisable as strangers (Ahmed 2000, p.95).

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Media
WITH FULL WEEK'S TV



The Singleton and Willesee Show
How two mates plan to change TV



Shier straits
Errol Simper on the ABC chief's fate



Last action heroes
Hollywood after the horror
FEATURES

PM sends in the troops

Ian Henderson
Sid Morris

AUSTRALIA'S elite SAS troops could be fighting in Afghanistan within weeks after John Howard committed a 1550-strong military contingent to the US-led war against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister revealed yesterday that some defence personnel would leave within days, and warned that in the war against bin Laden's terrorist network and its Taliban defenders "the potential danger will be much greater than turned out to be the case in East Timor".

Australia's commitment guarantees that the month before polling day will be studded with official farewells to departing members of the Australian Defence Force — but could also be clouded by reports of Australian deaths in action.

The announcement came as Peter Costello revealed the election-year budget surplus had fallen to a mere $900 million, a positive result held up only with last-minute cost-shifting following more than $1 billion of extra spending.

However, the Treasurer said the additional military deployment would not send the budget into deficit and there would be no need for any special tax — along the lines of the once-mooted, but never introduced, Timor tax — to pay for the new deployment.

Although Australian Brigadier Ken Gillespie will formally command the Australian forces, they will be under US strategic control. "The overall calling of the shots will obviously be in the hands of the Americans," Mr

War on terror
More reports – Pages 2, 9
Editorial – Page 12
Opinion – Page 13

Election 2001
NEWSPOLL

Marginals (Percentage support)	Jul-Sep 2001	Oct 2001
Coalition	43	50
ALP	40	37

Newspoll – Page 6
Campaign Barometer – Page 8
Full election coverage – Pages 4-8

existing defence budget, originally bolstered to pay for new strategy under the defence white paper.

Mr Howard's decision to increase Australia's commitment from the 5000 men and women pledged a fortnight ago, to begin deploying overseas almost immediately, and to have almost the full military commitment deployed by mid-November, are certain to daily overshadow most other election campaign events.

However, his decision was quickly endorsed by Kim Beazley after the Prime Minister briefed him.

"We in the ALP stand shoulder to shoulder with George Bush, Tony Blair and all the members of the international coalition in our determination that the scourge of international terrorism should be sought out and destroyed," Mr Beazley said.

Mr Howard unveiled the



Howard orders up a war election

STANDING quietly to one side of the pack gathered

Surplus squeeze

Cash surplus under Howard ($m)	
96/97	+$8281
97/98	$1171
98/99	$4190
99/00	$12,671
00/01	$5625
01/02 (old est)	$1900
01/02 (new est)	$902
02/03 (est)	$991
03/04 (p)	$1776
04/05 (p)	$3855

NB.: (est) estimate; (p) projection

Costello's paper-thin surplus

Sid Morris
❑ Economics correspondent

LAST-MINUTE fiddling has seen the Coalition scrape together a thin election-year surplus, but the frittering away of future budget profits has left it unable to deliver any sizeable tax cuts for several years.

Releasing the mid-year economic and fiscal outlook yesterday, Treasurer Peter Costello declared the economy remained resilient in the face of difficult circumstances. He cautioned that the budget surplus might end up greater than the mere $900 million forecast.

Opposition Treasury spokesman Simon Crean said the budget and the economy had been left vulnerable by

Fig 71 ' PM sends in the troops'
c.f *The Australian* 2001, p.1

Ahmed's (2000) analysis of the concept of the stranger not only highlights how the representation of the stranger becomes recognised as a body 'out of place', but how it is always already recognised as not belonging. Ahmed (2000) further explains that the knowledge that informs what is 'familiar' also produces the stranger as a category within that knowledge (Ahmed 2000).

As mentioned previously the demarcation of spaces of exclusion through the notion of the unreconciled stranger, occurred through the creation of what Said has identified as Orientalism. Said (2003, p.7) argued that the idea of '…a collective notion identifying 'us' against all 'those' non-Europeans' created a space of belonging for the 'we' against the strange 'them'. Within the post 9/11 discourse of border protection and inclusion/exclusion, the emphasis on the differentiation between the 'familiar' and the 'strange' was constructed by the reframing of strangers, foreigners and 'alien others', knitted together with Orientalist discourse (Said 2003; Ahmed 2000). As the categories disseminated by hegemonic discourses depicting the terrorist, illegal immigrant, and refugee became indistinguishable, the marking of boundary lines through the assumption of strange bodily images of veiled women, became not just dividing lines, but areas of potential exclusion (Perera 2002a; Ang 1996). The next section examines the way in which an identifiable international image of the veil emerged as a constant metaphor for the legitimisation of the US military involvement in the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In particular it highlights how the imperative to 'unveil' Afghan women[8] promulgated as a defensive and necessary measure to 'save' civilization from the forces of the 'enemy', was informed by Orientalist discourse.

Saving Afghan Women: A Veil of Mass Deception

In October 2001, the first military engagement in the 'War on Terror' started with the invasion of Afghanistan (Ware 2006). On 17 November 2001, the then First Lady Laura Bush, made a radio address to the nation and the world, an address normally given by husband President George W Bush (Hussein 2005). On 19 November 2001, Cherie Blair, wife of the then Prime Minster of Britain participated in a parallel event (Chakrabarti 2001). Attacking the repression and cruelty of the Taliban regime, Blair (2001) stated the Taliban had denied 'basic human rights' to the women in Afghanistan (Woolf 2001). In addition Blair (2001) denounced the wearing of the burqa, claiming that '…nothing more symbolises the oppression of women than the burqa, which is a very the visible sign of the role of women in Afghanistan' (Fig 72a c.f Woolf 2001).



Fig 72a Blair C 2001,
'Nothing more symbolises the oppression of women than the burqa',
c.f Woolf 2001.

In an attempt to gain world wide focus on the 'brutal oppression' of women under the control of the Taliban regime, Laura Bush (2001) stated (in part) that:

> ….The plight of women and children in Afghanistan is a matter of deliberate human cruelty, carried out by those who seek to intimidate and control. Civilised people throughout the world are speaking out in horror - not only because our hearts break for the women and children in Afghanistan, but also because in Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us. Fighting brutality against women and children is not the expression of a specific culture; it is the acceptance of our common humanity. The fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of Afghan women (Ross 2001).

While not disputing Bush's statement about the brutality that women endured under the Taliban regime, Shakira Hussein (2005), Carol Stabile and Deepa Kumar (2005) amongst others have argued that the speech given by Bush was '…part of an attempt to broaden the focus of American retaliation for September 11 to include the Taliban as well as al-Qaeda[9]' (Hussein 2005). Similarly, Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain (2005) have suggested that the radio address given by Bush located the cause of Afghan women's oppression not only in the rule of the Taliban but more specifically on the threat of terrorism and al-Qaeda in particular. Examining the interconnections between media, gender and war, Elizabeth Klaus and Susanne Kassel (2005) have argued that the need to convince the public that an armed operation is necessary, if there is no immediate threat or no direct attack from an enemy, is to justify the participation in a war on strong moral grounds. In the context of the 'paramount importance' of protecting the rights of women in Afghanistan, the armed intervention was legitimised by the '…construction of an opposition between civilization, represented by the USA and its allies, and the [uncivilised] barbarian, represented as the Taliban and al-Qaeda' (Klaus and Kassel 2005, p.340). Ayotte and Husain (2005) have noted that because the speech Bush implied that Afghan women needed saving:

> …an enormous amount of governmental and media effort was extended in reframing US military intervention as securing Afghan women from the ravages of the Taliban (Ayotte and Husain 2005, p.122).

Miriam Cooke (2002) has stated that the political agenda behind much of the posturing about 'saving' and rescuing Afghan women was comparable to the civilisational binary that constructed the logic of Empire. Advancing a similar point of view, Lila Abu-Lughod (2002), Shakira Hussein (2005) and Ayotte and Husain (2005) have identified the ideology of 'saving Afghan women' from the uncivilised barbarian, as slipping too easily into the legacy of Orientalist discourse. Abu-Lughod (2002) discerns that what was offered by the speeches given by Bush and Blair was an Orientalist ideology, one which:

> …artificially divides the world into separate spheres – of the West versus East, an 'us' versus Muslims, [and between] cultures in which first Ladies give speeches versus Others where women shuffle around silently in burqas (Abu-Lughod 2002, p.784)

The positioning of women such as Blair and Bush as 'saviours' of 'oppressed' Afghani, Iraqi and Muslim women, was scripted in terms of the assumption of a global white universality, that revitalised the Orientalist tropes of backward oppressed women in need of liberation and rescue (Puar 2007; Zine 2006). According to Leila Ahmed (2006), the speech given by Laura Bush, suggesting that the liberation of women during the war in Afghanistan, would be achieved by removing their veils '…was a replay of what the British Empire did in Egypt 100 years ago'. Ahmed (2006) contends that the nineteenth century belief that the veil symbolised the oppression of Muslim women, has been continually echoed in the West. Moreover, '…the veil in the West in relation to Islam became the emblem of how uncivilised Islam was' (Ahmed 2006). This representation has been continually reframed in hegemonic discourses, as demonstrated in the speeches delivered by Blair and Bush. The transnational production of these speeches had the ability to gain significant representational currency in the West, as they acquired 'consensual formalism' (Louppe 1996, p.1). White women's superiority was perpetuated by the dominant values of the white centre, where white knowledges were presented as being '…neutral and based on merit' (Moreton-Robinson 1999, p.33).

The reporting of the war in Afghanistan by the Australian media, mirrored the dominant discourse promulgated by the US assumption of a white identity and the superiority of the West, reducing Afghan women to a simplistic discussion about the burqa (Ware 2006). For example, on 10 September 2001, Paul McGeough's report in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, led with the headline, 'The Face of Fear Hidden Behind a Veil of Tyranny - Taliban's War on Women'. McGeough (2001) stated:

> …the ubiquitous burqa – a cumbersome and billowing head to toe veil …through which women only have a fuzzy view of the world …is kept tightly wrapped around them as they ooze fear and uncertainty (McGeough 2001).

After the 9/11 attacks, the same article appeared on 22 September 2001 in Brisbane's *Courier Mail* under the heading 'Veiled Tyranny'. A report on the same day in *The Australian* (2001a*)* newspaper, 'Afghan Women Throw Off Burqa – Out from Behind the Veil', stated that after the collapse of the Taliban women had thrown off their burqas in a symbolic protest to demand respect for women. The above media reports are illustrative of the pattern of framing used to vilify the practice of veiling. This form of representation, according to Ayotte and Husain (2005), '…offers little opportunity for women to *choose* to veil out of personal preference or cultural tradition' (Ayotte and Husain 2005, p.119). Moreover, Ayotte and Husain (2005) assert that the desire for 'unveiling' that pervades so many Western media accounts of Afghan women's oppression, implicitly recalls a voyeuristic Orientalist frame with its '…promise to uncover women's bodies' (Ayotte and Husain 2005, p.121).

Framing the veil as the main identifying symbol of women's oppression, has promoted a particular interpretation, through what van Dijk (1980) has identified as 'a *representation* of social reality'. By reducing Afghan women's oppression to a piece of clothing, a representation of them as weak, covered and defenceless and in need of 'saving' is continuously promoted. Abu-Lughod (2002), following Chakravorty Spivak (1988) has argued that what was most revealing about the narratives concerning the 'saving' of women as the justification for a recue mission by the US, was the haunting resonances of colonial ideology in which 'white men' were required to 'save brown women from brown men' (Abu-Lughod 2002, p.784). As highlighted in Chapter Four, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, colonial ideologies that functioned to justify the attack on colonised cultures, were premised on the notion of the superiority of the civilised Christian West, against the backwardness of the non-Christian uncivilised East. Within Orientalist discourse, the imperative of the Christian white 'race' was to rescue and liberate Muslim women from Muslim men. Central to the British and French colonial rescuing mission was the de-veiling of the women. Klaus and Kassel (2005) have suggested that in the context of both Orientalist and Neo-Orientalist discourse, the symbol of the unveiled woman has functioned '…as both a sign of victory and as evidence for doing the 'just' thing' (Klaus and Kassel 2005, p.341). Ratna Kapur (2002, p.213) has asserted that when the 'civilised' US led forces, '…in the guise of B52 Bombers and

bunker blasters', rescued the women from the 'uncivilised' Taliban regime in November 2001, an assumption prevailed that 'good' would triumph over 'evil' and the veil/burqa would be removed as a metaphor for the liberation of Afghan women. Kapur (2002) has stated that this was superficially assumed by the dissemination of media images capturing women smiling with their veils partly removed. Kapur (2002) further argued that:

> …as incomprehensible as it may have seemed to those whose mission and civilisational strategy was based on the unveiling of Afghan women…they remained veiled (Kapur 2002, p.225).

The focus on concern for women in the War on Terror, based on the rhetoric of rescuing women from barbarism and the tyranny of evil, served to position Afghan women as the 'Other' which effectively disregarded the concerns of the women's human rights (Kapur 2002; Barakat and Wardell 2002). This view is also reflected by Sonali Kolhatkar (2002) who maintains that changes for Afghan women should not be enforced from the perspective of a Western agenda. Detailing her encounters with various American and British feminists, Sonali Kolhatkar (2002) has argued their idea of 'saving Afghan women', is to '…approach the women of the Global South with short sighted preconceptions of feminism and their superiority'. The power relations that are used to perpetuate dominant ideology are frequently sustained by framing whiteness discourse in a way that establishes meanings about social reality. Kolhatkar (2002) has noted that using the burqa as a symbol of Afghan women's oppression is effective in '…promoting horror and fear mixed with an ugly fascination amongst the wider community'. Kolhatkar (2002) has suggested that the representation most often used by feminists, portrays Afghan women as '…mute creatures covered from head to toe', with a patronizing disregard for the political priorities of these women. Puar (2007, p.6) suggests that within the framing of human rights, 'gender exceptionalism' works as a missionary discourse to 'rescue' Muslim women from their male counterparts.

Within this interpretation, the blue burqa, as representative of the ultimate symbolism of women's oppression in Western discourse, was used by the Feminist Majority's[10] 'Gender Apartheid' campaign to 'save' Afghan women (Ware 2006; Kolhatkar 2002). The campaign involved selling postcards on which a swatch of mesh cloth, similar to that used in the traditional Afghan burqa was attached. The slogan on the postcard stated 'Wear a symbol of Remembrance for Afghan Women'. Kolhatkar (2002) implied that by using the veil as a symbol of women's oppression, this campaign ultimately supported the US political agenda of 'saving' Afghan women as a justification for the invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, Puar (2007) has argued that:

> The ranks of hegemonic US centric feminists, enamoured with the plight of Afghan women under the Taliban rule, including the Feminist Marjory Foundation with their…'Gender Apartheid' campaign…were perfectly poised to capitalise on the missionary discourses that reverberated after the events of September 11 (Puar 2007, p.6).

The dominant perception of Western feminist discourses regarding Muslim women, which sustain the missionary imperative to 'rescue' Muslim women from their male counterparts, most '…often leaves uninterrogated a West/ Islam binary' (Puar 2007, p.7).

As one the most frequent images of Afghan women appearing in Western mainstream media, the '…shapeless blue clad forms of women covered with a burqa' have been framed as symbol of women's oppression (Kolhatkar 2002). The distribution of these images has a strong correlation with the circulation of images depicting veiled women as subjugated and silenced during the colonial period. During the war against the Taliban and in the enduring war against 'the terrorists', the prolific circulation of images depicting Afghan women covered with a blue burqa, has dominated Western media (Kolhatkar 2002). This was most evident in the images included with the 2001 *BBC News* reports that detailed the speech given by Cherie Blair (Fig 72b) and the radio address presented by Laura Bush (Fig 73). These images depicted women identified only by their blue burqas. In both images the women were accompanied by a child. The inclusion of children in these images can be viewed as an attempt to elicit empathy from the public and subsequently, sympathy for the war. In particular, it resonated with statements by Bush who claimed that '…the plight of women and children in Afghanistan is a matter of deliberate human cruelty' (Bush 2001 c.f *BBC News* 2001) and with Blair's (2001) speech who argued that 'the women in Afghanistan are as entitled…to have the same hopes and aspirations [as] for ourselves and for our daughters…' (Blair 2001 c.f *BBC News* 2001). Moreover, Blair's noted use of the terminology of 'ourselves' and 'our' children, added an extra frame to the image, as it acted to circumscribe the women as 'Other' than 'us'.

Ayotte and Husain (2005) have claimed that although the image of the Talban-imposed burqa is just one among many versions of veiling, its monolithic image is most often the homogeneous portrayal of Islam in Western media. In their analysis of the coverage of the Afghanistan war, Elizabeth Klaus and Susanne Kassel (2005) have argued that the circulation of images of veiled women reached 'epic proportions'. Many of the images portraying images of women wearing the blue burqa were framed to symbolise 'radical

Islam'. In addition most of the images of veiled women were used for their symbolic value and had no relation to the text they accompanied (Klaus and Kassel 2005). As mentioned in Chapter Two, photographs of Afghan women during and after the Taliban regime were intimately linked with Western portrayals of the Orient (Fahmy 2004). The framing processes used to construct images of 'shapeless blue clad forms of women' tapped into a pattern of prior knowledge schemas. Orientalist discourse was utilised as an effective tool for articulating ideological messages in accordance with hegemonic political and media discourse frames (Poynting et al. 2004). This general portrayal of Afghan women, whether intentional or unintentional, engendered the inevitable implications of subtle and indirect racism (Fahmy 2004).

A search for images of women wearing blue burqas published on the internet since 2001 has revealed a vast number of images. The image of a large group of Afghan women lining up for food during the Taliban regime (Fig 74 c.f Evans 2009) is a quintessential representation of anonymous burqa clad women, as framed and circulated by the media, during and after the US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In their attempt to measure the impact of reoccurring media frames in the wake of September 11, Jill Edy and Patrick Meirick (2007) conducted a survey to gauge how consistent war frames, engendered by the media during the war in Afghanistan, could be associated with support for the military action by the US led forces. Edy and Meirick (2007) stated that taken as a whole, their analysis suggested a complexity of framing phenomenon. Significant to the findings was that:

> Respondents seemed not to have simply adopted the frames presented in the media, [but] they have cobbled them together with [other] frames to build stories of their own (Edy and Meirick 2007, p.135).

The findings by Edy and Meirick (2007) bring into view the way in which frames circulated by news media can be influenced by frames that activate associations between concepts already stored in the audience members' memory (Entman 2004). This has been most decisive in the framing processes associated with concepts of veiling that have been produced through historical and contemporary visual images. Public interaction with dominant media frames is highlighted in social media networks where users are able to circulate images and share opinions. In these public, participatory, 'unofficial' media spaces, images are redeployed, reiterated and reframed. Five years after the US led invasion of Afghanistan, Bush and Blair's dominant discourse framing of the veil, was reiterated in an image of Afghan women with the caption 'Prisoners aren't always behind bars' (Fig 75 c.f violinsoldier). This image, posted to the internet by a US soldier via a



Fig 72b Afghan women and child
BBC News, 2001b



Fig 73 Afghan woman and child
BBC News, 2001a



Fig 74 Afghan women lining up for food during the Taliban regime
UNHCR, n.d. c.f. Evans, J 2009



Fig 75 Prisoners aren't always behind bars
Posted to flickr by 'violinsoldier', US Army, Afghanistan, 2006
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/violinsoldier >.



Fig 76 A young woman shows her face in public for the first time after 5 years of Taliban Sharia law as she waits at a food distribution center in Kabul
Behrakis, Y/Reuters 2001 c.f. Taylor, A 2009

social photo sharing site, depicts the veil as an enduring symbol that continues to be linked with dominant war frames, long after the fall of the Taliban. In the public spaces of the everyday on the internet, the image of the veil is dynamically re-framed in a complex array of meanings, emanating from patterns of prior knowledge, that remain in the background of public consciousness. Zine (2006) has claimed that this type of imagery representing:

> …the archetypal image of the deprived and debased Muslim woman was resurrected to perform her duty as a signifier of the abject difference of Muslims, the barbarity and anti –modernism of Islam and its essential repression of women and most importantly as a camouflage for U.S. Military interventions (Zine 2006, p.8).

The blue burqa became a universal visual synecdoche signifying the segregation of women and the backwardness of Islam in the aftermath of September 11 and during the US led war in Afghanistan. Visual frames of reference, that cast Muslim women as static, abject and oppressed 'Others', reinforce essentialised constructions within the realms of Orientalist Western male imagery and form a '…complex nexus of desire and disavowal' (Zine 2006, p.9).

The concept of unveiling women in Afghanistan, employed as a metaphor for liberation and freedom, has been actively promoted by hegemonic discourses. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the US led forces, the theme of showing images of unveiled women as a symbolic representation of 'good' triumphing over 'evil', was embraced by Western media (Kapur 2002). Zine (2006) has argued that:

> Strategically, images of burqa clad Afghan women permeated the media to assuage any misgivings that the American public or the world community might have about military intervention (Zine 2006, p.8).

The circulation of images of 'unveiled' women thus became a necessary and powerful tool to reinforce the ideology that 'saving' Afghan women was ultimately manifested through the symbolic act of de-veiling. The photograph showing an unveiled young women waiting at a food distribution centre in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 is representative of images that were circulated (Fig 76 c.f Taylor 2009). This photograph has an identifiable resemblance to the one showing a large group of women lining up for food depicted in Fig 74. Both images exist on a discourse continuum, where the unveiling of Afghan women is framed as the symbol for a successful military campaign and the triumph of Western values.

Summary

The focus of this chapter has been to explore the connections between specific moments of national panic in Australia that were fuelled by the transnational effect of September 11 and a sanctioning discourse of exclusion for members of the population who were targeted as 'suspicious Others'. In this context, it has attempted to highlight how hegemonic political and media discourse frames perpetuated connectivity between asylum seekers, Muslims, 'veiled bodies' and terrorists. Moreover, it has brought into view how the frenzied fixation with unveiling women in the immediate post 9/11 era, was grounded in the Orientalist tropes of 'civilised' Christians 'rescuing' and 'saving' oppressed women from 'uncivilised' non-Christian male Others. In particular, it has emphasised how the vastness of images depicting 'women in blue burqas', distributed by Western mainstream media, unfurled as a point of reference through which veiling in general could be recognised as a symbol of conspicuous otherness. The following chapter examines the way in which the veil became a malleable construct constantly redefined to suit particular political, cultural and ideological purposes after the bombings in Bali in 2002. Building on the concept of hegemonic framing processes, it highlights the way in which political and media discourse frames acted as an interlocking nexus of power to maintain dominant ideologies about gendered national ideals. In doing so it includes a selection of images depicting mostly unnamed veiled women that were utilised as a communication device for articulating ideological messages in accordance with hegemonic discourse frames during the above mentioned events.

Notes

[1] The digitally produced image of the Statue of Liberty draped in a burqa carrying a copy of the Qur'an, is the work of artistic trio known as AES Group. AES is an acronym for the last names of Russian Jewish art collaboration from Moscow: Tatiana Arzamasova, Lev Evzovitch and Evgeny Svyatsky. Their work formed part of Iniva touring exhibition titled *Veil* in the UK. Although the work had been in circulation and widely exhibited since 1996 after 9/11 this image as part of the travelling exhibition *Veil*, was removed by various curators from the exhibition. See Bailey, D and Tawadros, G (eds) 2003, '*Veil: Veiling, Representation and Contemporary Art*, Institute of International Visual Arts, MIT Press, Cambridge. See also Nafas Art magazine 2003, 'Veil',
<http://universes-in-universe.org/eng/nafas/articles/2003/veil>.

[2] The data collected for 2001 revealed that some of the reporting acknowledged the rise of assaults towards Muslim women that had occurred since the event of 9/11. However, some headlines were repeated in various papers during 2001 and 2002, adding a tag which gave the idea of a link between Muslim Australians and terrorism. For example an article by Chloe Saltau in *The Age* on 15 September 2001, led with the headline 'Call for Calm after rise in attacks on Muslims – War on America – Australia – Religious Assaults'. This headline was repeated in the *Sydney Morning Herald in* 2002, but had inserted the tag 'war on terrorism' in the title. See Morris, L 2002a, 'Call for calm after Sydney Muslims Suffer Attacks- War on Terrorism', 29 October, *Sydney Morning Herald*,
<http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezlibproxy.unisa.edu.au/iwsearch/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=1053AC93CFD01959&p_docnum=1&p_queryname=2>.

[3] See *Pentagon Library*, 2009, 'September 11 Terrorist Attacks 2001', for a comprehensive view of speeches given by President George W Bush following September 11 2001.
<http://www.whs.mil/library/9111.htm>.

[4] See for example 'The Homeland Security and II Patriot Acts I and II,' *Pentagon Library*, 2009, <http://www.whs.mil/library/9111.htm>.

[5] Eric Löbbecke is a cartoonist and caricaturist, who has worked for *The Australian* (News Ltd) and the Sydney *Daily Telegraph. See Dictionary of Australian Artists* online [viewed 23/02/08]
<http://www.daao.org.au/main/read/4114>.

[6] For a comprehensive view of the 'Children Overboard incident' see *Parliament of Australia: The Senate Committee* 2002, 'A Certain Maritime Incident ' 23 October
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/maritime_incident_ctte/report/>.

[7] Two days before the 2001 federal election, navy Chief Vice-Admiral David Shackleton had informed the government that no children had been thrown overboard. In addition the photographs of the incident released by the government were a total misrepresentation of the event. The vessel that the refugees and their children were on sank and they had to be rescued from the water. See Manne R 2002, 'How Tampa Sailed into 2002, *The Age*, 30 December.
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/12/29/1040511254630.html>.

[8] The term 'Afghan women' has been included in context with its use within political and media discourse to describe Muslim women in Afghanistan. The discursive constructs of this terminology, however, posits Afghan women as a single homogeneous group and does not reflect the significant differences between urban/rural, educated/uneducated, rich/poor and between different ethnic groups that reflect the complexity of women within the community. See Barakat, S and Wardell, G 2002, 'Exploited by Whom? An Alternative Perspective on Humanitarian Assistance to Afghan Women' in *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 23, Number 5, pp. 909-930. See also Kapur, R 2002, 'Unveiling Women's Rights in the War on Terrorism' in *Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy*, Volume 9, pp.211-224.

[9] al Qaeda is a Sunni Islamic organisation that developed during the last three decades of the twentieth century. Its core leadership is centred in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The September 11 attacks have been reliably attributed to al Qaeda. See *Australian Government*, 2008, 'Australian National Security: What Governments are Doing', [viewed 20/6/09]
<http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_are_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Al_Qa&apos>.

[10] The Feminist Majority, which was founded in 1987, is a non-profit US based organisation that promotes the 'freedom of Afghan women' through the development of various projects. See *Feminist Majority Foundation*, 2009, < http://feminist.org/>.

Chapter Six

Bombs and Burqas

> To be an object of collective fears is to become afraid of what the collective fear will do; hate stares, name calling or other forms of verbal abuse, physical harassment violence or even murder (Ahmed 2005).

Introduction

The atmosphere of Islamophobia that had been lingering diffusely since the occurrence of the gang rapes in Sydney, the *Tampa* crisis and the terrorist attack of September 11, became increasingly intensified when suicide bombers attacked a nightclub at Kuta beach in Bali Indonesia, killing eighty-eight Australians and injuring many others (Mason 2004). The bombings, which occurred at one of Australia's well-known tourist locations, gave a reality to the much politicised idea that Australia could be a target for terrorists (Poynting and Mason 2006). As a result of the bombings, official policies of surveillance were authorised by the Australian government, which amplified the racial profiling of Muslim Australians (Maddox 2004). The government's recruitment of citizens as 'foot soldiers', urging them to spy on neighbours and watch out for anything suspicious, resulted in the escalation of acts of vandalism and vilification directed toward Muslim Australians (Giroux 2004; Maddox 2004).

As the historically framed Orientalist representations of the veil and veiling became recursively looped between political and media discourse, those who experienced the most vilification were women wearing the veil (Poynting and Mason 2006; Maddox 2004). The idea of a veiled woman, as someone to fear as a potential terrorist suicide bomber, became part of a rising crescendo of rhetoric, promulgated by various political elites (Stephen 2003; Philips 2002). Sue Edelbi (2003 cited in Stephen 2003), has stated that against a politically and emotionally charged background where the veil had become increasingly blurred with issues of terrorism, the stereotyped image of the veiled, bomb making, oppressed woman, became extremely difficult to escape. After the Bali bombings, the ubiquitous visual images of a 'veiled Muslim woman' included in Australian mainstream print and electronic media, were framed as either a threat or an object of concern. The frequent addition of these images acted to perpetuate the veil as a

symbol of the quintessential despised 'Other' and a target for anti-Muslim sentiment (Bedar & El Matrah 2005; Dreher 2002; Imtoual 2006).

This chapter examines the way in which the enduring 'war on terror' scripts acted to frame the veil within a gendered security discourse as regimes of surveillance and the 'normalisation' of bodies increased in the aftermath of the 2002 bombings in Bali. Through an analysis that draws on political speeches, media representations (both print and electronic) including texts and images this chapter highlights a sequel of events that added to an increase of gendered Islamophobia between 2002 and 2005. In addition this chapter considers the management of veiled bodies in relation to Foucault's (2003) concept surveillance and the gaze. This consideration assists in enabling a critical analysis of the ways in which the regulation and control of veiled bodies effectuated what was deemed to be 'normal' and therefore 'familiar' and what was perceived as 'strange' and therefore feared. As indicated in Chapters Four and Five data gathered from the media reports was assembled by using the electronic database *NewsBank.* Following the key words 'the veil and Muslim women' in 2002, the number of articles recorded was 116, with the highest (29) in November[1].

Bali Bombings: A Threat to the 'Australian Way of Life'

On 12 October 2002, bombs exploded in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing two hundred and two people, including eighty-eight Australians. Those involved in the bombings were members of a South East Asian Islamic group, Jemaah Islamiyah (West 2008; Poynting and Mason 2006). Brad West (2008) has asserted that as the Bali bombings were an unprecedented event in Australia's history it became framed as '…an Australian disaster, primarily narrated though national mythologies and concerns and conceived as a threat to the Australian way of life' (West 2008, p.342). This was illustrated by the Prime Minster John Howard's address to Parliament on 14 October 2002, in which he stated:

> …[w]e fight terrorism because we love freedom, because we want to preserve the way of life this country has, [and] because we share values of other countries that are in the war against terrorism... (Howard 2002, cited in *Sydney Morning Herald* 2002).

Declaring that the Bali bombing was carried out in an 'indiscriminate, evil and hateful fashion', John Howard (2002) vowed to 'get the bastards' responsible for the bombings (Howard 2002 cited in Allard and Baker 2002). One of the Prime Minster's first priorities was 'to fight the war on terrorism at home…with his first concern being our backyard'

(Howard 2002 cited in Allard and Baker 2002). The government's focus to protect 'our home' and 'our backyard', reconstructed the symbolic icon of middle Australia, the treasured backyard, as allegedly under threat from terrorism, in a similar way to how it was used in the reporting on Mabo[2] to incite fear of land claims by Indigenous Australians (Gale 2005).

As the concept of 'evil' terrorists invading 'our' backyard became circulated in dominant discourses and transformed into the wider social realm, Australian Muslim women wearing the veil became '...the targets of tirades of abuse' (Lipari 2002). An article in the *Daily Telegraph* on 28 October 2002, reported that since the Bali bombing Muslim women wearing traditional dress have been terrified to walk the streets (Lipari 2002). The article included a statement by the President of the Muslim Women's Association in NSW, Maha Krayem Abdo (2002) who claimed that the hate mail that had been choking their mail systems since September 11 2001 '...had increased at frightening levels since the Bali bombings' (Krayem Abdo 2002 cited in Lipari 2002). Reports of alarming escalations of attacks directed toward Muslim women after the Bali incident included violent verbal and physical abuse of an extreme nature (Lipari 2002). These attacks were not confined to NSW. Many occurrences of violence were reported Australia wide (Saniotis 2004). For example Liam Houlihan reported in the *Herald Sun* on 21 October 2002, that Muslim women in Melbourne were enduring a '...a rising wave of violence and intimidation', with most of the women accused of being 'terrorists' (Houlihan 2002). The targeting of women wearing the veil was again heightened when calls were made by some politicians to ban the Muslim headscarf or hijab (Houlihan 2002).

In November 2002, the issue of bombs and terrorism was elided with narratives about the veil when NSW One Nation Party, David Oldfield MLC and leader of the Christian Democrat Party, Reverend Fred Nile MLC called for the banning of head to toe Islamic veils in public (Hornery and Wyld 2002; Philips 2002). In his speech during Question Time in the Legislative Council on 21 November 2002, Oldfield (2002) stated (in part):

> ...we must come to terms with the fact that a woman is as deadly a terrorist as any man...The dress of a Muslim woman can be easily used to mask the tools of death carried by terrorists, and unless we accept this and are prepared to deal with it we will suffer the consequences... (Oldfield 2002 cited in *One Nation Question Time* 2002*).*

In an interview that was reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2002) Oldfield stated that he wasn't calling for a total ban of the veil, he claimed, however, that as '...the terrorists we are dealing with are Muslims...Muslim women should accept the fact that

they need to be prepared for body searches' (Oldfield 2002 cited in Hornery and Wyld 2002). Similarly Fred Nile (2002) urged the New South Wales Parliament to ban Australian Muslim women from wearing the chador[3] as a security precaution, as it could be used by terrorists to conceal weapons and explosives (Leone 2002; Philips 2002). Nile (2002) also called for a ban on wearing the hijab by students attending state schools '...to discourage divisiveness and promote unity and tolerance' (Nile 2002 cited in Stephen 2002). The racialised discourse frames imposed by Oldfield (2002) and Nile (2002) that made a connection between weapons, terrorism and the veil were easily internalised by sections of the wider Australian community who were already immersed in a climate of fear and anxiety about terrorists invading their backyard. In a response to Nile's call to ban the chador, John Howard (2002) stated:

> I don't have a clear response to what Fred has put...I mean I like Fred and I don't always agree with him, but you know that Fred speaks for the views of a lot of people (Howard 2002 cited in Riley and Burke 2002).

The ambiguity of the Prime Minister's response to Nile's comments sent a signal that not only was it perfectly defensible to hold racist views against Muslim women but also to air them publicly. Moreover, failure to condemn Nile's comments served to further legitimise the 'Othering' of women wearing the veil and also brought to the fore debates about whether such dress should be acceptable within Australia (Mason 2004). Commenting that it would '...obviously be better if Muslim women were less conspicuous at this time' (Riley and Burke 2002), Howard's political rhetoric perpetuated a powerful subtext that associated veiled Muslim women with terrorism.

In response to Nile's call for Muslim women and girls to be prohibited from wearing the veil, activist/artist Deborah Kelly used a widely known Christian religious icon - the Sacred Heart of Mary - to represent the 'original veiled woman', as a reminder of the veil's historical significance in Christian culture (Webb 2004). Kelly (2004) stated that:

> I closed my eyes and I saw Mary. And I thought, 'she's a woman in Christian culture who was veiled.' I wanted to close the chasm, to breach that gulf of misunderstanding, and to say to Christians in particular, to remind them that there was a revered woman in their own culture who was always depicted in a veil (Kelly 2004 cited in Webb 2004).

Kelly's 'Veiled Woman' project included a cut and paste 'Rile Nile' matchbox home craft kit, with the words 'Veiled Woman' and 'Contains 50 Concealed Incendiary Devices' (Webb 2004). Kelly's (2002) craft 'recipe' was posted online for anyone to download to make their own 'Veiled Woman' matchbox kits (Fig 77a and 77b c.f *Refugee Action Collective* 2004).



Fig 77a Kelly, D
'Rile Nile Home Craft Kit'
c.f *Refugee Action Collective* 2004



Fig 77b Kelly, D
'Rile Nile Home Craft Kit'
c.f *Refugee Action Collective* 2004

In her examination of the iconography of the Sacred Heart, Heather Höpfl (2008) has stated that the image of the Virgin Mary used by Kelly '...takes up the image of the Sacred Heart in a way which is consistent with its historical use as a political character as a symbol for resistance' (Höpfl 2008, p.234). Kelly's political activism draws attention to the way in which the image of a veiled Mary has been understood as 'familiar' through a set of conventions established by 'primary frameworks' and 'schemata of interpretations' (Goffman 1974, p.21). The character of such framing has secured the predictability, reliability and legibility of the iconic imagery of Christian veiling. By presenting a deliberate confusion of the image, Kelly's (2002) work functioned to challenge the taken for granted 'frames of reference' with the image of the Christian veil, by invoking an alternative meaning of 'normality' that associates the veil with the 'strange'. Kelly's (2002) project, which attempted to subvert the representation of the veil as synonymous with terrorism, coincided with the mounting security initiatives that were put in place by the federal government after the Bali bombings.

The Panic of the Visual

In the wake of the Bali bombings the federal government implemented a series of national security measures in an attempt to counter terrorism. These measures allowed the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to detain people without charge or suspicion on the basis that they may have some terror related information (Poynting and Mason 2006; Maddox 2004; McCulloch 2002). According to Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason (2006) these security measures included raids on the homes of people who were suspected of having associations with terrorists. The raids that were carried out in Sydney, Perth and Melbourne by ASIO were all on the homes of Muslim citizens, who were subjected to vigilante–style harassment. According to Marion Maddox (2004) the government's authorisation for ASIO agents to use violent acts of intimidation when searching the homes of people suspected of having connections with terrorists, meant they became highly public events. The violent images of armed men breaking into the homes of sleeping families, however, did not evoke opposing comments from the wider public as opinion polls taken during that period supported Howard's strong standing on security measures (Maddox 2004). The findings of a research into racist attitudes in Australia undertaken by Kevin Dunn, James Forrest, Ian Burnley and Amy McDonald (2004) during the post Bali period, revealed that there was a substantial degree of intolerance toward Muslim and Arab Australians as they were deemed unable to fit into Australia society. Building on a pilot study conducted by Kevin

Dunn and Amy McDonald (2001), the findings supported the evidence that '...Muslims suffer quite dramatically from the stereotypes of Islamic misogyny and sexism' (Dunn et al. 2004, p.416). Generally, the results of the survey indicated that there appeared to be an expanding rate of 'Islamophobia', which was most likely the result of '...geopolitical events, international media and local moral panics' (Dunn et al. 2004, p.426).

McCulloch (2002) has suggested that the draconian security measures that were initiated by the government were contrary to human rights and civil liberties. In view of Australia's democratic traditions, McCulloch (2002) claims that the introduction of these security measures in less emotional times would have been rejected. However, in the pervasive climate of fear and insecurity that became increasingly prevalent in Australia after the Bali bombings, the erosion of 'bedrock principles' of human rights and civil liberties were promoted as the '...price to be paid for increased security measures' (McCulloch 2002). In response to public and official criticisms regarding the raids, Howard (2002) stated that:

> There are reasons for those raids and I defend 100 percent what ASIO has done... I find it amazing that people could seriously question the national need for this to occur... These raids are 'not targeting Muslims' ...but are necessary in the national interest (Howard 2002 cited in Riley, Moore and Daley 2002).

Poynting and Mason (2006) and Maddox (2004) have suggested that despite Howard justifying ASIO's tactics as necessary in the 'national interest', the raids were counter productive as neither charges nor convictions for terrorist offenses against the 'suspects' had been made. Poynting and Mason (2006) have claimed that the main function of the raids was:

> ...to reassure the white Christian 'mainstream' that something was being done about these terrorists or terrorists sympathisers in our midst and to frighten the targeted communities into keeping a low profile (Poynting and Mason 2006, p.379).

What the raids did promote, however, was an even greater sense of suspicion against Muslim Australians, in particular women wearing traditional dress. The government's unrelenting surveillance tactics perpetrated a view that security measures were necessary to protect Australia from terrorists and secured the acquiescence of the wider population. This resulted in an even greater number of veil tearing assaults and verbal abuse against women wearing the veil (Poynting and Mason 2006).

In 2005, the Howard government introduced the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2005)[4], which gave new powers to the government to detain those suspected of posing a terrorist risk (Rix

2006). The framing of anti-terrorist raids in mainstream newspaper articles during 2005, most often featured photographs of veiled Muslim women as the focal point of the report. For example, the front page report by Elissa Hunt, Mark Dunn, Paul Anderson and Ellen Whinnett in *The Advertiser* 10 November 2005 that led with the headline 'Office Tower Terror Target' included a photograph of two women with the caption 'Wives stand by their good men' (Fig 78 c.f *The Advertiser* 2005). As with most of the images of Muslim women used in mainstream newspapers, the women in the photograph are unnamed and only referred to as 'wives'. Although the report included a statement from the Prime Minster John Howard (on page six) that '...there is nothing in our laws, nor will there be anything in our laws, that targets an individual group, be it Islamic or otherwise,' (Howard 2005 cited in Hunt, Dunn Anderson and Whinnett 2005), the framing process depicting the two veiled women accompanying a text about 'terror targets', provided an assumption of a causal link between terrorists and the veil. Similarly the photograph accompanying the front page report by Natalie O'Brien in the *Weekend Australian* 10-11 December 2005, with the headline 'New Swoop on Terror Fugitive's Home', shows the accused terrorist's mother, Amina, in her home in south west Sydney (Fig 79 c.f *The Weekend Australian* 2005). The photographs of the women that appeared in both *The Advertiser* and the *Weekend Australian* were included with articles that were written about Muslim men, (husbands and a son), yet there were no images of them included with the reports. As the women were not given a 'voice', the veil became the focus for representing the link between terrorism and Muslims, rather than the women.

Judith Butler (2006) has stated that since 9/11, the fear of foreigners (the unfamiliar) has been to some extent perpetuated by the use of certain images, which have the power to keep citizens in a state of shock and fear. Butler (2006) contends that these images have had the ability to influence people in predominately white and secular countries to give up the practice of thinking and critique. In this regard, Butler (2006) argues that with the dominance of the need to impose security against this fearful new 'enemy' '… we are rendered docile and subject ourselves to live in an ethos of xenophobia'. This 'ethos of xenophobia' or more specifically Islamophobia, that surfaced after 9/11 and resurfaced after the Bali bombings, was most often linked to images of women wearing the veil, as they were perceived as the identifiable 'enemy' (Kabir 2004).

The introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005, formed part of the ongoing surveillance strategies implemented conjointly with the federal government's 'Terrorist Threat'



Fig 78 'Wives stand by their good men'
c f *The Advertiser* 2005, P.1.



Fig 79 O'Brien, N 2005, 'New Swoop on Terror Fugitive's Home'
c.f *The Weekend Australian*, P.1.

campaign (Bossio 2005). This resulted in intensified suspicion of women wearing the veil, who became the targets of racially motivated violence (Dreher 2006).

Be Alarmed and Afraid

In December 2002, John Howard announced a fifteen million dollar 'Terrorist Threat' campaign comprising of television, radio and newspaper advertisements encouraging the public to report 'suspicious behaviour' (Bossio 2005). In February 2003, a letter from the Prime Minster, a 'Look Out for Australia' booklet and a fridge magnet, were distributed to every Australian household, to help the government combat terrorism (Figs 80a, 80b, 80c and 80d c.f *Commonwealth Government* 2003). The booklet's cover presented images of the government's concept of 'the Australian way of life,' including a beach scene, a gathering of people at a barbeque and images of seventeen smiling children from various cultural backgrounds. It also included a photograph of a police officer with a woman. According to Linda Morris (2002) and Diana Bossio (2005) the booklet images, replaced the balaclava-clad SAS troops storming houses and police look-outs on the Harbour Bridge used in the television advertisements, as concerns were raised over the alarming tone of the images. The distribution of the 'terrorist kit' ran parallel with both electronic and print media advertisements (Fig 81 c.f *Australian Government* 2003). In a press conference announcing the 'public education campaign' to combat terrorism, the Prime Minister, John Howard (2002) stated that the Australian people would be able to identify what constituted 'suspicious behaviour':

> ...as Australians are very commonsense practical people. If [they] see something that in the circumstances is clearly out of phase, out of sync, is clearly something that is suspicious in the environment and the circumstances then quite obviously that's the kind of thing to be reported (Howard 2002).

As the notion of 'suspicion' was fraught with ambiguity, deciding what and who constituted a 'risk' to the nation was bestowed upon the nation's citizens. The campaign's central motif was for Australian citizens to report anything that they deemed 'looked' suspicious (Bossio 2005). In this context, the identification of 'suspicious bodies' became dependent on the practice of 'looking' and 'seeing' (Hall 1999). Within this realm, the influence of dominant schemas of interpretation that acted to naturalise some bodies as 'normative' and others as 'suspicious', became bound up with the politics of security and surveillance. The implication of the government's ambiguous communication strategies was that it encouraged Australians to adopt a regulatory role over those who were considered a visible threat to the 'Australian way of life' (Hage 2003).





Fig 80b 'Let's Look out for Australia: Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat', Booklet
c.f *Commonwealth Government*, 2003



Fig 80a 'Let's Look out for Australia: Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat', Booklet
c.f *Commonwealth Government*, 2003



Fig 80c 'Let's Look out for Australia: Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat', Booklet
c.f *Commonwealth Government*, 2003



Fig 80d 'Let's Look out for Australia: Protecting our way of life from a possible terrorist threat', Booklet
c.f *Commonwealth Government*, 2003



Fig 81 'Help Protect Australia from Terrorism' Advertisement
c.f *Australian Government, 2003*

The technique of using ‘common sense’, as suggested by the Prime Minister (2002) to define what ‘we’ denote as signifying suspicion (that is, what is normalised as already known as the given), also involves ‘...the normalisation of ways of ‘seeing’ the difference, between common and uncommon’ (Ahmed 2000, p.29). The government’s legitimising of citizens to monitor and act upon any activity or persons they deemed looked ‘suspicious’, was initiated without providing information to clarify the concept. According to Ahmed (2000) any clarification of ‘suspicious’ was perceived as unnecessary, because those citizens whose ‘normalisation’ was conferred by the dominant discourse, knew already what they were looking for because ‘...difference had already been ‘sensed’ through a prior history of knowing what was ‘common’ and what had departed from the common’ (Ahmed 2000, p.29).

The government’s authorisation of surveillance techniques that gave permission for the containment of anyone who was considered suspicious and therefore dangerous had serious consequences for those whose visuality was considered beyond the realms of normativity. This is brought to view by the personal experiences described by Sara Ahmed (2005) and Joseph Pugliese (2003). Sara Ahmed (2005) has revealed that she has encountered measures of surveillance when her ‘Muslim name’ has been enough for her to be treated with suspicion. According to Ahmed (2005)

> A Muslim name means suspect genealogy; you are marked as a threat...and the suspicion [of others] becomes your fright. ...The measures that treat you as a security threat are measures that in turn threaten your security. ...To be an object of collective fears is to become afraid of what the collective fear will do; hate stares, name calling or other forms of verbal abuse, physical harassment, violence or even murder (Ahmed 2005, p.2).

When surveillance is enacted as a regulating mechanism sanctioned by the state, ‘...it sticks to particular bodies – slowing them down, blocking and containing them’ (Ahmed 2005, p.2). Similarly Joseph Pugliese (2003) has encountered regulatory measures of surveillance because of his ‘Middle Eastern appearance’, which he has argued immediately circumscribes him as suspicious. Noting how the regulatory forces systematised in the discourse of *Orientalism,* have been unleashed post 9/11, Pugliese (2003) argues that his ‘corporeal graphism’ – its images, projection and figure is designated by the sign ‘of Middle Eastern Appearance’ (Pugliese 2003, p.3). Before embarking on a journey to the Statue of Liberty on Ellis Island, Pugliese (2003, p.4) armed with his ‘cultural baggage’, was made to ‘…remove shoes, belt, wallet, watch, coat, scarf, jacket and shirt’. Pugliese (2003) states that this ‘act of divestment’ and ‘exfoliation’ by the security officials ‘…literal[ly] and metaphorical[ly] functions to

constitute the very substance of being already naked to the point of surplus' (Pugliese 2003, p.4). For Pugliese (2003) the mobile and contingent categorisation of this heterogeneous racially stereotypical descriptor, has situated him within the geographical position of '...the locus of the non' (Pugliese (2003, p.5). Situated within the 'non' location of a post 9/11 geographical space, Pugliese (2003, p.5) argues that the regimes of visual surveillance have produced a '...synthetic illusion of the subject [that functions to] script by default' his identity. According to Pugliese (2003):

> As an ethnic descriptor mobilised and deployed by juridico-govermental-media apparatuses, the figure of Middle Eastern appearance…has assumed a new and urgently topical role...in the context of the biometrics of racial profiling and the global search for terrorists (Pugliese 2003, p.8).

Through the processes of biopower, Pugliese's metonymic figure 'of Middle Eastern appearance' is already scripted as synonymous with terrorism. The insidious nature of biopower allows it to become circulated, adapted and individualised throughout the entire social body. Manifested through dominant discourses, biopower becomes a constituent part of the classification and comparison of visual representations (Foucault 1980). The federal government's 'Look out for Australia' campaign, which was enacted for the containment of 'strange' bodies, induced a perpetual state of 'alert' in an era already saturated with insecurity and fear about the suspect 'Other'. Despite John Howard (2003 cited in Wakim 2003) claiming that the campaign '...would not cause Muslims to be made Scapegoats', insecurity about the suspicious 'Other' inevitably focused on Muslim Australians. This was highlighted by reports from Arab and Muslim organizations indicating that the number of Arab and Muslim Australians experiencing various forms of prejudice had significantly increased in 2003 (Jonas 2003a). Adding to the escalating fear directed toward Muslim Australians was the warning given by One Nation MP David Oldfield (2003) who stated that '...most Muslims refuse to integrate into Australian society...and most terrorists are Muslims' (Dunn 2003). Oldfield also assisted in setting up a website *muslimterrorists.com* where his racist comment that '...not all Muslims are terrorists, but nearly all terrorists are Muslims' was reiterated (Tamhane 2003). Oldfield's statement that most Muslims were terrorists who refused to integrate into Australian society, acted to confirm the widely promulgated view that Muslims, in particular women wearing a veil, were not only suspicious, but were a danger to the values, beliefs and cultural meanings of the imagined 'white' Australian nation (Bossio 2005).

On 21 March 2003, the federal government authorised Australian troops to join the US-British forces in Iraq (Megalogenis 2003). The government justified the war of 'pre-

emption' (an invasion without a threat of attack from the other side) based on the need '...to deprive Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction' (Howard 2003 cited in Kelly 2003). In March 2003, the then Prime Minister John Howard stated in Parliament that:

> [The] possession of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons by terrorists would constitute a direct and undeniable lethal threat to Australia and its people...The disarming of Iraq was necessary for the long term security of the world and is therefore manifestly in the national interest of Australia (Howard 2003 cited from the *House of Representatives: Official Hansard* 2003, p.12506).

John Howard's discourse of a 'threat' to Australia, by enemies identified only in generic terms as 'terrorists', became internalised and articulated in everyday conversations, perpetuating an already deepened fear and anxiety about anyone who 'looked' suspicious. On 21 March 2003, the same day as the government had announced Australia's commitment to the war in Iraq, it also officially declared 'Harmony Day', as part of the world wide International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Grimm 2003). In a report on the significance of Harmony Day by *ABC World Today* program, acting Race Discrimination Commissioner, Bill Jonas stated '...that Arabic and Muslim sectors of our community are feeling isolated and under threat' (Grimm 2003). The report also included a statement by Omeima Sukkarieh, a community liaison officer outlining some of the experiences she had encountered during the week when Howard announced his commitment to the war in Iraq. Sukkarieh (2003) stated that racial discrimination and vilification against her included a question from a '...well suited stranger on a train who asked if Saddam Hussein[5] was her father' (Grimm 2003). Sukkarieh (2003) also claimed that during that week:

> ...someone directly refused to get into the same elevator as [her]...her mother was accused of stealing potatoes from a major supermarket and her brother was refused registration into a soccer club because he was Arabic (Sukkarieh 2003 cited in Grimm 2003).

The report also highlighted that the racially motivated attacks against Arab and Muslim Australians was particularly targeted at women wearing the veil (Grimm 2003). In 2004, when the federal government conceded that Australians may have been sent to war on flawed information, the fear and anxiety that he had perpetuated about unidentified terrorists threatening Australia with chemical weapons, was not readily dispelled (Dodson 2004). According to George Megalogenis (2003), despite the growing dissent regarding the invasion of Iraq, both internationally and nationally, the Howard government's fear campaign about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) resulted in many Australians remaining fiercely patriotic.

National Identity, Values and Gender

A prominent theme of the federal government's justification for the introduction of the 'alert' campaign and sending Australian troops to Iraq, was that it was done in the 'national interest'. Joseph Camilleri (2003) has asserted that when John Howard promoted the 'national interest', it was ultimately defined in terms of the amorphous notion of 'our' national interest. This was especially prominent with the government's anti-terrorism strategies, where the 'national interest' was transposed into notions of 'national character', 'Australian values' and the 'Australian way' (Camilleri 2003, p.449). Placed in this context, the national interest became a legitimate code for reflecting a deep sense of 'our' white Australia's cultural identity and values. As the concept of the national interest became a persistent and strengthening linguistic device for conveying the ideology of a homogenous white cultural nation, it brought into play an assumption of sameness and about identifying what was considered familiar and also what was distinguished as different (Spencer and Wollman 2002). When national identity is constructed through a political discourse of difference, it facilitates a process of categorising 'us' and 'them' that resonates within a discourse of 'our' values and 'their' values. Carol Johnson (2007), following Foucault's concept of governmentality, has asserted that the government's emphasis on the relationship between national interest and values attempted '...to impose particular stereotypes of acceptable identity, beliefs and behaviour on citizens' (Johnson 2007, p.195), which cultivated an almost sacred discourse of white homogeneity. Johnson (2007) has maintained that underpinning John Howard's concept of national identity was a relationship between religious and socially conservative values, underpinned by gender discourse. For example, in a National Press Club Address to mark the anniversary of September 11 2001, John Howard (2002a) argued that:

> …there are some common, accepted Australian attitudes and values. They clearly include free and open expression; they include a respect for the equal roles of men and women in our community... (Howard 2002a).

Prime Minster John Howard's (2002a) reference to the equality, respect and equal roles of men and women in the context of a speech that related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, articulated an underlying message that purported to express the inherent differences between Australian and Muslim gender roles and values.

The concept of gender equality underpinning Australian values can be identified in an interview with Sydney 2UE radio talkback host John Laws in 2002.

When questioned about Nile's idea to ban the chador John Howard (2002) stated that:

> ...we have a long Judeo Christian tradition and ethic...I want everybody in this country to live according to the modalities of Australia...People coming to this country, whether they're Islamic [or not] must understand that when they come to Australia they can't cherry pick the Australian way of life...In Australia we do respect very strongly equality of men and women. I think that's very important. And I think any practices of any religion that don't meet that expectation will inevitably draw some disapproval and some criticism (Howard 2002 cited in Maddox 2004, pp.11-12).

This statement was discursively framed around notions of Australian Christian values and gender ideologies. The reference to 'practices of religion', which was used as a code for Islamic religious practices drew on Orientalist concepts about the Islamic practise of veiling, engendering it as a concept of oppression and an anathema to gender equality.

As noted in the previous chapter, the Liberal Coalition's mantra was to reject the Hawke-Keating policies of multiculturalism, by placing an emphasis on migrant groups 'integrating' and adopting 'Australian values' and the 'Australian way of life'. In the aftermath of September 11 2001, the concept of integrating was given a greater emphasis particularly for Muslim Australians. Reporting on the outcome of a summit held in Canberra in 2005 between the Prime Minister and various Australian Islamic leaders, John Howard (2005) stated that:

> There is a problem [and] a concern that a small section of the Islamic community of this country could be a source of terrorism...To tackle the problem...we all need to work together...An important understanding of course was our loyalty to Australia and our commitment to the traditions, the values and the institutions of the Australian nation...I believe that is the proper basis to work together into the future (Howard 2005, cited in *AustralianPoliltics.com,* n.d).

The government's management of 'difference' in the context of containing the 'sameness' of white Australian values, became central to discussions about the nation, values and gender discourse. In particular, when debates about nation, values, and the war on terror became increasingly linked to discussions about the veil and veiling, a reframing of the Orientalist tropes of the West and the 'Other' became a central feature in defining differences between 'our' morals and 'their' barbaric and oppressive values concerning women. The concepts of nation, identity and values that were increasingly reframed within Orientalist discourses were not only germane in Australian dominant discourses but also resonated in a Western global context.

In February 2004 the French government passed a law '...prohibiting from public schools any clothing that clearly indicated a pupil's religious affiliation' (Brown 2007, p.1). Although the law was presented as being applicable to the visibility of conspicuous

'religious signs', including headscarves, yarmulkes and overtly large crosses, John Brown (2007, p.1) has claimed that '...everyone understood the law was to be aimed at keeping Muslim girls from wearing the headscarves to school'. As noted in Chapter Two, the concept of France as a secular society (laïcité), developed primarily in reaction to the power of the Roman Catholic Church prior to the French revolution (Thomas 2006). In 1790, during the French Revolution, the *Civil Constitution of the Clergy* was passed, resulting in the destruction of monastic orders (Brown 2007). Nuns who refused to renounce their vocation were subjected to violent acts (Kuhns 2003).

Since the French idea of freeing the state from undue religious influence was conceived, the concept of laïcité has been reshaped and moderated many times (Balibar 2004). In the context of the law surrounding the banning of 'visible' and 'conspicuous' signs of religious belonging, Etienne Balibar (2004) argues that it was indicative of historically inspired ideologies of a 'Christian'-'Muslim' divide. Protest against the proposed legislation occurred both within and outside of France, eliciting debates and contention within the French government and media news reporting (Thomas 2006).

Brown (2007) has suggested that despite the growing division in pubic opinion about the law, polls in France during 2003 reflected 65 percent approval rating for the ban. Brown has further suggested that the rise in negative perceptions about the veil within public opinion was because of '...the heightened post 9/11 fears about Islam' (Brown 2007, p.93). Supporters of the law suggested that the ban was necessary to protect the secular state from the perceived threat of religious fundamentalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism (*Human Rights Watch* 2004). Balibar (2004) has argued that debates surrounding the banning of the veil were demarcated into two main groups:

> ...those which fought ethnic discrimination, cultural racism, the hegemony of the old imperial nations, and those which fought the subordination of women and the violence and denial of equality to which [they appeared to be] subjected (Balibar 2004, p.359).

The notion that the veil signified a denial of women's equality, voiced by those who supported the banning of the veil in French schools, was echoed in Australia in 2005 by federal Liberal backbencher Bronwyn Bishop and supported by Victorian Liberal, Sophie Panopoulos (Yaxley 2005). According to Bronwyn Bishop (2005):

> [the veil]...was being used by the sort of people who want to overturn our values as an iconic emblem of defiance and a point of difference...it was...not about the headscarf per se, but it's about a clash of cultures where there are extremist Muslim leaders who are calling for the overthrow of the laws that indeed give me my freedom and my equality as defined by the society in which I live (Bishop 2005 cited in Yaxley 2005).

Framed within a racialised discourse, Liberal MP Bronwyn Bishop (2005) comments engendered an interpretation of the veil that was articulated in the dualistic terms of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. Moreover, Bronwyn Bishop's concept of the veil as an 'act of defiance' against 'our freedoms' and 'our values', reinforced the Orientalist view that Islam poses a threat to the cultural foundations of Western freedoms and values. When the idea of banning the veil by politicians such as Bishop and Panopoulos is raised it is most often coded within arguments of 'social cohesion' (Lloyd 2005). Responding to Bishop's comments, author of *Does my Head Look Big in This,* Randa Abdel-Fattah has stated 'How would Bronwyn Bishop like it if she were told she had to go about her business in the nude?' (Abdel-Fattah cited in Lloyd 2005, p.4). With this rhetorical question, Abdel-Fattah deploys humour to disrupt Bronwyn Bishop's discourse and reframe the argument. According to Abdel-Fattah, '…Muslim women are often suspicious that feminist ideologies are a front for Western cultural imperialism.' Retrieving the veil from Bishop's frame, Abdel-Fattah declares that '…we not only deny that we're oppressed, we insist that we are liberated.' (Abdel-Fattah cited in Lloyd 2005, p.4).

In a political climate already charged with fear of the suspicious veiled 'Other', Liberal MP Bronwyn Bishop's statements about the practice of veiling acted to generate a form of racism that Ash Amin (2008, p.3) has identified as 'phenotypical racism'. This form of racism, Amin (2008) contends, builds on older forms of racism, predicated on biological and cultural difference, but relies on bodily summations that continually accommodate new attributes. Amin (2008) further asserts that:

> As judgements are not constrained by the limits of cultural racism...any marker of difference on the body of the other will do as a proxy. The result is the racialization of everything without any need for explanation or accuracy...Biology, inheritance, bodily marking, behavioural traits and cultural practices are rolled together in a culture of blame that reads the body from a single observation (Amin 2008, p.3).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Bali bombings when the 'veiled stranger' had come to be imagined as a threat to Australia's security and 'white' Australia's way of life', Bishop's (2005) divisive view acted as a cipher from which particularities regarding 'our' women and 'their' women could be articulated. This was demonstrated by the response that Bishop received in support of her comments. Bishop (2005) stated that many people are relieved that they are allowed to talk about the veil. Bronwyn Bishop (2005) further added that from the emails and the phone calls she had received, many '...people had felt that in their own country they were being disadvantaged' (Bishop 2005, cited in Landers 2005).

Responding to Bishop's comments, Prime Minster John Howard (2005) stated that although he didn't support the ban because it was 'not practical', he argued that Bishop and Panopoulos were entitled to express their views as freedom of speech was part of Australian values (Landers 2005). Most significantly John Howard expressed a view that 'extreme' forms of veiling including covering the face would be unacceptable for most Australians to live with (Landers 2005). What is of significance about the abovementioned debates regarding veiling practices is that whiteness is situated as the governing force in the construction of a civilised democratic 'us' and an uncivilised barbaric 'them'. Moreover, discursively framing the veil as an antithesis to Australian values of freedom and democracy, contributed to the increase of Islamophobia directed toward veiled Australian Muslim women.

In response to the rise in Islamophobia occurring in Australia, *Australians Against Racism* (2006) launched the 'Sisters Daughters Australians' Billboard Project in Melbourne and Sydney in 2004 (Fig 82a c.f *Australians Against Racism* 2006). The Billboard project emerged as a result of a pilot study undertaken by Oxfam[6] in 2001, that found fear and ignorance played a major role in perpetuating negative views toward Muslim Australians. In particular, it found that a negative association had been made with the arrival of refugees in 2001. The aim of using the medium of billboards was that they would reach people from all social and political groups in the realms of the everyday (*Australians Against Racism* 2006). Posters and postcards were also circulated as part of the campaign (Fig 82b c.f *Australians Against Racism* 2006). By creating a sense of identification and familiarly with people from a Muslim background, the project attempted to invite a positive response to Muslims and '...by association all Australians and refugees of Arab and Middle Eastern origin' in their everyday life (*Australians Against Racism* 2006). The image used on the billboards, posters and postcards, incorporated two women wearing the veil. In this way the project was framed within the parameters of gender and the veil, providing a distinct subtext that confirmed that antagonism toward Muslim Australians, was most often directed toward women wearing the veil in the space of the everyday. The purpose of the billboard project was not necessarily to '...change peoples' minds', but to assist in alleviating negative attitudes toward Arab and Muslim Australians by encouraging debate at grassroots level (*Australians Against Racism* 2006). The intention of the billboard project was to disrupt the agenda of dominant discourse frames that had perpetuated the association of crime, border protection and terrorism with Muslim Australians.



Fig 82a Sisters Daughters Australians
AAR Billboard Project, Billboard
c.f *Australians Against Racism* 2005



Fig 82b Sisters Daughters Australians
AAR Billboard Project, Postcard
c.f *Australians Against Racism* 2005

The billboard images offered a visual representation of veiled Muslim women that strategically intervened and challenged the dominant modes of visual representation of Muslim women. The text accompanying the image 'Sisters, Daughters, Australians', reframed the concept of 'Australianness' in an 'unqualified' representation which acted to project the veil as familiar within the realm of Australian culture. Kate McFarlane (2004) has highlighted how using modes of visuality '...strategically intervene in dominant visualities of national culture' (McFarlane 2004, p.177). The interventionist visualities and accompanying text used on the billboards, operated as a 'visualising back' in an attempt to challenge the scopic regimes of an 'ethnic gaze', that have operated to objectify, denigrate and marginalise 'veiled' Muslim women within the exclusionary norms of nationalist subjectivity and culture (McFarlane 2004). The dominant regimes of visual framing embedded in the matrix of essentialised 'Muslim identity' have and continue to have transnational connectivities in the aftermath of 9/11. This framing process, which focuses on an established field of vision within the modalities of seeing the 'Other', gathered momentum in the aftermath of the London bombings in 2005.

On July 7 2005, four bombs exploded in various parts of the London transport network (Crabb 2005). After the bombings, surveillance teams were dispatched to monitor a series of 'suspect' areas across London (Seamark 2005). This heightened surveillance on 'suspect' areas and 'suspicious' citizens resulted in the shooting of an innocent Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell station on 22 July 2005 (Seamark 2005). According to Joseph Pugliese (2006), the regime of surveillance that became operational in the West after 9/11 and the war in Iraq, systematically imposed a 'visual regime' of racial profiling. The shooting of de Menezes, Pugliese (2006) argues, was a result of a racially infected vision that was fused with the images of '...Orientalist spectre, terrorist phantom and suicide bomber'. The statement by Pugliese (2006) illuminates how the surveillance and shooting of a 'suspicious' Other was enacted, not with any reliable visual identification, but with concepts of 'terrorist' that were framed within an Orientalist discourse and reframed in the aftermath of September 11 2001 as an attribute connected to terrorism.

In a response to the fatal shooting of de Menezes, John Howard (2005) defended the actions of the British police and furthermore stated that Australia had 'similar policies' (Button 2005). Also attempting to justify the killing of an innocent man John Howard claimed that the dominant consideration should be that '...thousands of innocent people

have been murdered by terrorists' (Button 2005). In the first instance, John Howard's statement suggested that Australia had 'similar policies', which endorsed the killing of innocent people based purely on the visualities of what constituted 'suspicious'. Secondly, he inferred that the shooting of one innocent suspect was a side issue in light of the thousands of people murdered by 'terrorists'. This identification of 'terrorists' as a generic homogenous group of 'Others', was based primarily on the politics of visuality.

The visual regime employed as part of the racial profiling of terrorists was enhanced in Australia in October 2005, when three suicide bombers launched Bali's second terrorist attacks in Jimbaran Bay and Kuta, killing twenty people including four Australians (*ABC News Online* 2005). This was highlighted in a report titled 'The Innocent Face of Blame' which appeared in the Adelaide *Sunday Mail* in October 2005 (Fig 83 c.f Bauer 2005). The title page of the article featured a photograph of Yasmine Ahmed, a South Australian Lawyer who stated that after the second bombing attacks in Bali, Muslim women '...braced themselves for a new burst of vitriol' (Ahmed cited in Bauer 2005, p.52). The report stated that following the debates over asylum seekers, September 11, the first Bali bombings and the London bombings, members of the Muslim Women's Association of South Australia were amongst those who experienced severe vilification and discrimination. Women, who were targeted the most due to their distinctive headscarves, experienced discrimination on a daily basis when undertaking:

> ...simple activities such as shopping at the local supermarket, going to the bank, catching a bus to work or school, which attracted shouts of 'bloody terrorist', 'murderer' or 'go home' (Bauer 2005, p.52).

Ferial Al Khil Khali, an agricultural engineer, has lived in Adelaide with her children since 2001, after spending time in Woomera Detention Centre. The visual regime of racial profiling has been experienced by Al Khil Khali, who stated that:

> [When] I wanted to rent a house for myself and my children...I did a phone interview and told the lady about all our references and she said it would be OK. But when she saw my scarf she said no you can't have the house...because Middle Eastern people are dirty (Al Khil Khali 2005 cited in Bauer 2005, p.52).

Al Khil Khali (2005) suggests that stereotypical images of Muslims represented in the media have contributed to an increase in discriminatory practices, intolerance and racist threats and taunts. Moreover, the international terror incidents have fuelled suspicion of women wearing the traditional dress, which has been intensified though a racialised regime of vision and visualisation.



Fig 83 'The Innocent face of Blame' Adelaide *Sunday Mail*, October 2005
c.f Bauer 2005

Summary

From the statements made by Australian Muslim women in this and previous chapters, a distinct theme emerges, which connects their experiences of discriminatory practices, intolerance and racists threats, to hegemonic discourses that framed Muslim Australians with terrorism. Much of this representation has been produced through Orientalist paradigms, framing the veil in ways that straddle the past and the present. Thus, the veil exceeds its materiality in a visual context, but represents a symbolic demarcation between the West and its 'Others'. As the overlapping concepts of nation, identity, values, gender, and dress codes became incrementally linked to crime and terrorism in dominant discourses, it perpetuated a growing anxiety and antagonism against those who were perceived as needing to be excluded. The persistent discursive rhetoric that emphasised 'national identity' within the defined limits of 'Australian values' was underpinned by a nationalistic and moralistic discourse regarding 'our values' and 'our women' versus 'their values' and 'their women' (Ho 2006). The next chapter examines the way in which the linking of border protection, 'national identity and 'values' with gender ideologies in official discourses, perpetuated a collective hysteria and outpouring of racial tensions that left a 'footprint' on a beach in Cronulla on 11 December 2005.

Notes

[1] The data collected from *NewsBank* for the month of November 2002, revealed that a higher number of reports emerged in regard to the veil and Muslim women due to the debates about banning of the veil offered by various political elites during that period.

[2] Mabo refers to the Mabo v Queensland court case. On 3 June 1992, the High Court of Australia made irrelevant the declaration of *terra nullius*. This decision sparked attacks by media and mining companies, with some claiming that the Mabo High Court judgment would weaken the unity of the Australian people and the icon of the 'backyard' would be under threat. See Gale, P 2005, *The Politics of Fear: Lighting the Wik*, Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest, NSW.

[3] The term chador in Australia generally refers to a garment that covers the hair, comes under the chin and is floor length. It is also known as the abaya.

[4] See *Parliament of Australia*: *Department of Parliamentary Services* 2005, 'Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005', 3 November, for an overview of the Bill. < http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/BD/2005-06/06bd062.pdf>.

[5] Saddam Hussein was the president of Iraq from 1978-2003. He was deposed during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by a US led Allied Coalition. See Ray, E and Schaap, W (eds) 2003, *Covert Action: The Roots of Terrorism*, Ocean Press, Melbourne.

[6] Oxfam Australia is part of a global movement that has been working for over fifty years to fight poverty and injustice. See *Oxfam Australia*, < http://www.oxfam.org.au/about-us>.

Chapter Seven

Bikinis, Burqinis and the Beach

> It has been pointed out, by some, that the events in Cronulla may be related to specific local issues. Others have pointed out that alcohol was a contributory factor or that talkback media inflated tensions in the lead up to the events. These factors may have been present but the events were more deep-seated than local factors or the impact of alcohol or the media *(*Gopalkrishnan and Swee-Hin 2006).

Introduction

On December 11 2005, a crowd of over 5000 'Anglo' Australians gathered at Sydney's North Cronulla beach after being urged by a mobile phone message to '...get down to North Cronulla to help support a Leb and wog bashing day…' (McMahon 2005). This message was sent with the premise to protect 'their' beach and 'their' women against those perceived as being of 'Middle Eastern appearance' (Murphy 2005; Abdel-Fattah 2007; Ho 2006; Inglis 2006). The events that took place at Cronulla were an explosion of racial violence by 'Anglo' men and women towards a group who were attacked on the basis of their religion, dress and appearance (Gopalkrishnan and Swee-Hin 2006; Cunneen 2006). Among the crowd were members of white supremacist groups including the Australia First Party, the Patriotic Youth League and Blood and Honour (Ben-Moshe 2006).

In the aftermath of the riot, politicians, media and public commentators offered various reasons for the eruption of violent attacks at Cronulla, and much academic research has produced detailed analysis of the racialised discourse around these events (Kabir 2007a). Numerous reports and images from the mainstream media were generated, some focused on the 'thuggish hooliganism' of alcohol fuelled 'Aussie blokes' and their behaviour toward those deemed to be of 'Middle Eastern appearance'. Media reports such as the ones from *The Age* 'Making sense of a black day' by Michael Gordon (2005) and the *Sydney Morning Herald* 'Thugs ruled the streets and the mob sang Waltzing Matilda' by Damien Murphy (2005), provided a broader view of the intense xenophobia and racist violence that erupted under the premise of revenge for a fight between a group of Lebanese-Australian youths and a pair of surf lifesavers that occurred a few days earlier. Sporadic coverage, however, was given to the attack of a young veiled woman who was

chased into the sand dunes, where her head scarf was ripped off and that of two girls identified as of 'Middle Eastern appearance' who were pushed to the ground and pelted with bottles (Inglis 2006; Murphy 2005). Inflammatory comments by Sydney 2GB radio talkback host Alan Jones, in the week prior to the riot, was also considered to have inflated tensions in the lead up to the event (Marr 2005).

Scott Poynting (2006, p.85) has argued that the riot '...was prompted by the culmination of a campaign of populist incitement waged in the media and by the state'. Similarly Peter Gale (2006) has stated that the riot at Cronulla was an effect of the politics of fear, which had been prominent in both media reporting and political discourse during the decade prior to the riots. Echoing Gale's (2006) argument Chris Cunneen (2006) has stated that the depth of racism underpinning the Cronulla riots was a result of ten years of a federal conservative government continually playing wedge politics around 'race'. Cunneen (2006) argued the young people on the beaches of Cronulla were the sons and daughters of John Howard's Australia. Mungo MacCallum (2005) has also maintained that the federal government's political agenda influenced the racially motivated riots at Cronulla. MacCallum (2005) has suggested that as most of those taking part in the riots were aged about 20 years of age, they have spent their entire adolescence – their formative years, under the leadership of John Howard (MacCallum 2005).

Although differing opinions have been offered as to what initiated the riot, Christine Ho (2006) has suggested, however, that the debates about Cronulla can't be understood without adding gender into the mix. This chapter seeks to extend Ho's (2006) statement by arguing that the outpouring of racial violence at Cronulla beach can only be properly analysed by mapping the intersections between whiteness, space, gender and the veil as part of dress discourse. In doing so it extends the concept of frames and framing, in particular the layeredness of framing – that is, the way a frame is built upon a frame, constituting a recognisable structure of relevancies (Lee, McLeod and Shah 2008). It highlights the way the transformational framing processes encouraged individuals to weigh existing attitudes/beliefs derived from opinions and values already 'known' and believed, to make value judgments about the 'ownership' of the beach and gender ideologies (Lee, McLeod and Shah 2008).

As argued in preceding chapters, during various flashpoints from 2000-2005 the politics of fear perpetuated by politicians and media populists that connected crime, borders and

terrorists with Muslim Australians was insidiously framed within gender discourse. The racialised framing processes that were underpinned by concepts of nation, identity, values, gender and dress codes, operated to circumscribe the veiled Muslim woman as an all encompassing signifier of the barbarity and 'problems of Islam' (MacDonald 2006, p.7). This concept, which was discursively framed by the myths of Orientalist ideologies, situated the veil as an anathema to the Australian way of life and values. The coerciveness of this transformational framing process, perpetuated by governmental and mainstream media discourses, manifested a common narrative that reiterated the binaries between 'white' and the specific 'Othering' of non-white 'veiled subjects' (Osuri and Banerjee 2004). The discursive utterances that generated a growing anxiety about the need to 'protect' Australia's borders, 'way of life 'and' white women', became a catalyst for a powerful force of white nationalist pride, which ignited with patriotic fervour on the beach at Cronulla in December 2005. Before theorising the event of the riot, it is deemed worthwhile to foreground various events that transpired a week prior to the riot.

Tensions Rising: The Week before the Riot

In early December 2005, when being interviewed for a forthcoming book, John Howard commented that some Muslims were antagonistic towards Australian society and a small minority held extremists views. John Howard (2005) added that he was particularly concerned about 'some attitudes towards women' (Robertson 2006). Christine Ho (2006) and Marianna Leishman (2007) have argued John Howard's concern about Muslim women and the eradication of misogynist behaviour was very selective, however, as it did not extend to the countless Australian Muslim women who had been abused and had their hijab pulled off by Anglo-Celtic Australians. Comments about the oppression of Muslim women, which had been a constant theme, reiterated by government elites, in particular since 9/11, sent a message that the wearing of the veil operated to destabilise the lifestyle and values of the white Australian community. The manifestation of this discursive rhetoric brings into focus the way in which the systematic knowledge pattern of Orientalism has been constantly reframed and incorporated into discourses of Western concepts of values, freedoms and lifestyle choices. The framing of the veil as a primary signifier for the suppression of women, acted to facilitate an antagonism and aura of fear toward Muslim women into the wider parameters of public debate, which became most notable during the Cronulla riot.

On 5 December 2005, the major Sydney commercial television stations led with the news report that on 4 December two volunteer lifesavers were assaulted at Cronulla by a group of men identified as of 'Middle Eastern' appearance (*ABC TV: Four Corners* 2006). The bashing of the lifesavers elicited an outpouring of outrage from residents living in the Southerland Shire. Angry comments about the incident were aired on talk back radio and website blogs, many calling for vigilante action (Marr 2005). Television reports sparked an eruption of racist statements from Sydney's 2GB talkback radio host Alan Jones and his listeners. Among the many comments Jones made, one in particular was specifically connected to the Sydney gang rapes. Jones stated:

> ...we don't have Anglo-Saxon kids out there raping women in Western Sydney. So lets not get carried away with all this mealy-mouthed talk about there being two sides, I can tell you. Because my correspondence here, from mums and dads, I am inundated and I don't hear people complaining about Catholics and Protestants and Anglicans. I'm sorry, but there's this religious element in all of this and we've got to make sure that we welcome people into our community but we welcome them in on certain terms and certain standards, and those standards are not being met (Jones 2005 cited in Alberici 2007).

The discursive rhetoric used by Jones (2005) was framed within a conception of the nation based on what Tamar Mayer (2000) has identified as a 'fictive ethnicity'. Perpetuating the idea of a white Christian Australian identity as the ideal for 'proper' and 'moral' behaviours to be sustained, Jones encouraged a concept of the 'Other' as being out of place and 'alien' to the concept of an idealised Australian national identity. The foundational narrative used by Jones (2005), which was underpinned by Orientalist knowledge schemas, acted to perpetuate misinformation about Islamic culture. Nam Jim Lee, Douglas McLeod and Dhavan Shah (2008) have asserted that what needs to be considered in the processes of strategically framed media discourse, is that when one 'frame induced consideration' of a topic has been accentuated, it 'suppresses' other opinions, which are likely to be diminished. This encourages individuals to make judgements about issues derived from prior message exposure (Lee et al. 2008). By framing particular aspects of the issues surrounding the 2001 Sydney gang rape case with the assault of the lifesavers, Jones (2005) effectively sent a message to his listeners that both of these incidents were ultimately connected, which justified retaliative measures. The issues concerning the protection of 'our' women, from the perceived 'deviant immoral 'Others', was a persistent theme that was used by the rioters to justify their behaviour at Cronulla (McMahon 2005).

According to Damien Murphy (2005a) during the week leading up to the riot, major newspapers had numerous articles relating to the assault on the lifesavers, including

news stories, letters to the editor and editorials. The local newspapers of the Cronulla area, the *St George* and *Sutherland Shire Leader,* also ran the assault story during the week leading up to the riot. On 10 December 2005, the day before the riot, the *Sydney Morning Herald* published an article 'A Lesson in Beach Etiquette and Good Manners – Shire Style' by Neil McMahon. The report was accompanied by a photograph of a 24-year old Cronulla local, Shaun Donohoe, posing as a sentinel protecting 'his' beach (Fig 84 c.f *Sydney Morning Herald* 2005). Donohoe (2005 cited in McMahon 2005) stated that a showdown between the Shire boys and the visitors '...had been a long time coming [because] they look down at our women [and] they don't assimilate to our way of life'. These comments were echoed by the Federal MP Bruce Baird who was reported as stating '...the visitors are aggressive and come armed with their 'anti female attitude' (Baird 2005 cited in McMahon 2005).

The article published in the *Daily Telegraph* on 10 December 2005, led with the headline 'A Line in the Sand' (McIlveen and Lawrence 2005). Stating that Cronulla was a suburb under siege, the report claimed that a crowd of many thousands of local shire community members were expected to defend 'their' beach and 'their' women the following day. During the week leading up to the riots the local paper reported the news that an SMS campaign had urged 'Aussies to attack Lebs and Wogs' at Cronulla on Sunday 11 December (Fig 85 c.f Murphy 2005). The defensive imperative that was aggressively mobilised to defend Cronulla beach opens up critical questions about 'ownership' of the beach within social/geographical Australian space (Giannacopoulos 2007).

Defending Cronulla Beach: The Birthplace of 'White' Australia

Leading up to and during the riot, the reoccurring phrase of protecting of 'our beach' was directed towards those who were perceived to be 'out of place' within the imaginative geographical 'white' spatial milieu. At the border, whether geographical or symbolic, the need to protect and defend the nation or community often '...unleashes aggression hatred and mistrust' (Hage 2003, p.31). At Cronulla beach, the need to protect both the external and internal borders of the beach was used as justification for violent acts and racism. According to Angela Mitropoulos (2006) as an iconised Australian space, the beach is perceived as Australia's eminent utopia. Providing a boundary that separates Australia's island continent geographically from a myriad of cultures, the beach also acts as a contact zone for anxieties and a mechanism for border control (Mitropoulos 2006).

A lesson in beach etiquette and good manners - Shire-style



Fig 84 Cronulla local, Shaun Donohoe, protecting 'his' beach
c.f McMahon 2005



Fig 85 SMS campaign: 'Aussies to attack 'Lebs' and Wogs'
c.f. Murphy 2005



Fig 86 Howard's Battlers
Leak, c.f *The Australian* 2005

Exploring the history of the beach and culture contact, Leone Huntsman (2001) asserts that a '...beach is the boundary between cultures'. As a contact zone, the beach provided a space for the early European explorers to engage with Indigenous Australians. Maria Nugent (2005) has indicated that Cronulla, as a beachside suburb that lies south of Sydney in New South Wales, forms part of the Kurnell Peninsular, the geographical location where Captain James Cook's first landing on Australian soil took place in 1770 (Nugent 2005). In 1770, when Captain James Cook landed on the beach at Kurnell in New South Wales, he failed to obtain consent from the Indigenous peoples and proclaimed the beach as a dictum for the territorialisation of white cultural space (Hollinsworth 2006). The Kurnell region has been effectively circumscribed as Australia's birthplace (Nugent 2005). This concept has been imagined through foundation stories '…which has served to provide an explanation for the communities, local and national, and those who tell them' (Nugent 2005, p.4). The privileging of certain historical interpretations over others reinforces structures of forgetting in which absences and invisibilities become embedded in the historical discourse regarding the concept of place and space.

Speaking at a Northern Sydney Region Reconciliation Network forum after the Cronulla riot, Kerrie McKenzie (2006) stated that:

> ...it was ironical that Anglo-Celtic Australians were defending 'their' beach and 'their' land which was in fact still Aboriginal land which their British forebears had invaded and occupied over two hundred years with arrogant disregard for the rights of the Traditional Owners of the same beach and land (McKenzie 2006).

Responding to the concept of 'ownership' and the Cronulla riot, writer/director Grant Leigh Saunders produced a film titled *Black Beach*. The film provides a satirical view of the beach, rites of passage and ownership from the perspective of an Aboriginal surfer (Saunders 2006). Made with the assistance of the Lester Bostock Indigenous Mentor scheme, Saunders (2006) stated that '...the film asks the question...who really has the right to own the beach and the surf or the land for that matter' (Saunders 2006).

Geoffrey Gray (1999) has argued that Howard government's continued rejection of a 'black armband view' of Australia's history, provided an interpretive matrix that effectively reproduced the concept of a white 'us' as central to Australia's ownership of the landscape and its borders. Hurriyet Babacan (2005) has asserted that structures and meanings of identities, which are entwined within the discourse of space and place,

enable an association between lived experiences, myths, images, memories and the notion of a common origin.

The link between space, identity and social action, in the context of the beach, has been investigated by Bethan Benwell and Elizabeth Stokoe (2006) who have asserted that identity is not bound up in 'talk and text' but in practices of interaction such as movements in 'physical space'. Drawing on a range of approaches to present the concept of space and identity, they provide an analysis of 'the beach' to form the framework for their argument. Benwell and Stokoe (2006) have suggested that '...physical space is not an objective neutral phenomenon but inescapably socially constructed by human agents' (Benwell and Stokoe 2006, p.208). Territorial spaces of the beach are established by using emblematic markers such as physical, facial and dress clues (Benwell and Stokoe 2006). Despite the beach usually being a highly populated area, people locate themselves in small separate clusters, distancing themselves from people they wish to avoid. In this way those considered as new arrivals to the beach are perceived as intruders of the already established space (Benwell and Stokoe 2006).

As questions about who belonged in Australia and who was perceived as threatening Australia's social cohesion proliferated, a concept of the 'nation-as-a-possession image' emerged (Hage 2003, p.33). The need to protect the beach and its internal borders expressed by those involved at the Cronulla riot mirrored the imperative to protect Australia's borders that was central to federal government's 2001 election mandate. Angela Mitropoulos (2006) has argued that the concept of protecting borders was bound to proliferate beyond the peripheral demarcation of the 'edges' or confines of Australia's national territory, but '...across social relations and spaces of identity' (Mitropoulos 2006, p.15). Cartoonist for *The Australian* newspaper, Bill Leak linked the attacks at Cronulla to John Howard's 2001 election campaign statement by depicting the rioters at Cronulla as 'Howard's Battlers' (Fig 86 Leak c.f *The Australian* 2005). Responding to Leak's cartoon, Executive Director of the Sydney Institute, Gerard Henderson (2005) argued that there has been a '...tendency by some left wing activists, commentators, journalists and cartoonists to blame the Prime Minister for Sydney's discontents'. Henderson (2005) stated that cartoonists such as Bill Leak using their artistic licence to rework Howard's election slogan was unwise because the riot was facilitated by criminality not wide scale racism. Contrasting Henderson's argument was the Coordinator of the Lebanese Muslim

Association, Eman Dandan (2005) who asserted that the outpouring of racist attitudes at Cronulla was intrinsically linked to the issues of refugees and border protection:

> ...promulgated by John Howard's close the borders mandate which effectively conveyed a message that 'we can decide who comes, if we don't like you, you are not allowed here' (Dandan 2005).

The aspiration of dominant political discourse to reframe the concept of Australia as a unified white 'spatial container' provided an imperative for the rioters at Cronulla to protect their space from the looming, invading 'alien'.

Within any discussion of the elements of 'anthropology of space' and 'spatial power', Ghassan Hage (2006) has suggested, that there is a need to recognise the discourse of 'domestication'. Through the domestication of space, one has the ability to control one's environment through the wielding of power. The essence of domestication is to identify what is harmless and what is harmful and who has the power to be the classifier of these categories (Hage 2006). Within the realms of domestication a shift is often made between what is seen as inferior and what is perceived as a threat. Once something or someone is competing against 'us', in domesticating space, an exterminating impulse begins to emerge. Hage (2006) has argued that:

> ...we are always born in domesticated spaces, and the domesticator takes on the notion of 'interpellation', which assumes one is called on to take a position as an 'interpellator' that is, as the domesticator of his/her society (Hage 2006).

In addition Hage (2006) has asserted that in Australia most racism has been racism against 'non-interpellation people', who are never called upon to take up the position of interpellator, as they have no space or place with which to identify. Hage (2006) further suggested that the second generation of young Lebanese Muslim Australians visiting Cronulla beach were subjects of mis-interpellation, as they considered that they had the right to belong to the beach and that the beach belonged to them. Instead they found that they had become victims of the dynamics of domestication, and therefore classified as harmful and a threat to the axis of beach space.

The concept of mis-interpellation is highlighted by Yvonne Abraham, (2005) who has stated that as a child growing up in Australia the imperative for her family was to 'blend in'. When her family went to the beach in Sydney, they gathered on the grassy embankment, they did not venture onto the sand at Cronulla, as they 'knew their place' (Abraham 2005). The younger generation of Lebanese Australians, however, reject the idea of '...being a guest in someone else's home and have a sense of having the

entitlement of birthright as a citizen …and resent it when [they] have that entitlement denied' (Abraham 2005). The imperative to protect the exclusive 'white possession' of the beach, from an internal threat of 'Lebs and wogs' brought together a flag-draped, rampaging crowd of 5000 youths whose only socially binding generic marker was the conceptualisation of 'whiteness' (Giannacopoulos 2006). According to Michelle Grattan (2005) one of the most appalling and startling images at the riot was of the 'Anglos' wrapped in the Australian flag. Such a statement needs an unpacking of the cluster of issues associated with the flag as a symbol of whiteness and a boundary marker between inclusion and exclusion.

Veils, Flags and Nationalism

In March 2006, a group of young Muslim women, with the support of Melbourne's Northern Migrant Recourse Centre (NMRC), wore Australian flag hijab to celebrate Harmony Day (NMRC 2006). This was a reaction to the way in which the flag was used as a symbol denoting a specific representation of 'white' Australian culture at the Cronulla riots. The young women, Sadi Ali 20, Natasha Ali 15, Sara Ali 15, Idil Mohamud 12, and Isir Mohamud 10, stated that they wished to demonstrate that they were just as 'Australian' as other young people (Fig 87a and 87b c.f NMRC 2006). Sadi Ali (2006) discerned that although during the riots the Australian flag had been hijacked '...to make it look like theirs not ours'...every one had the right to carry the flag' (*Sydney Morning Herald* 2006). The images of the young women reached a wide audience as their photographs appeared in both national and local newspapers (NMRC 2006). The young women's idea to problematise the Australian flag as a symbol of inclusion/exclusion displayed at the Cronulla riot, needs to be analysed first and foremost by considering which groups were associated with the inclusive symbolism of the flag and how this symbol was exploited politically.

Pål Kolstø (2006) has suggested that flags are most often used by state leaders in symbolic nation building processes. Flags, like anthems and other emblems, play a crucial role in nation maintenance and are used as part of the national identity construction process. National identity, Kolstø (2006, p.676) argues, '...is not an innate quality in human beings...it has to be learnt'. The re-invention of Australia's flag as intrinsic to Australian identity and values was an integral part of the then federal government's agenda (Holmes Hughes and Julian 2007). In 1992 when the then federal Labor Prime Minster Paul Keating, expressed his idea for changing the Australian flag in light of



Fig 87a Muslim women wore Australian flag hijab to celebrate Harmony Day in March 2006
c.f *Northern Migrant Resource Centre* (NMRC) 2006



Fig 87b Muslim women wore Australian flag hijab to celebrate Harmony Day in March 2006
c.f *Northern Migrant Resource Centre* (NMRC) 2006

Australia's changing population, it was vehemently rejected by the then federal Liberal Coalition Opposition (*Parliament of Australia* 2004). When the 1996 federal election was won by the Liberal-Coalition Party, the imperative was to dismiss the ideas put forward by the Keating government and re-establish the Australian flag as a symbol of Australia's 'traditions' and 'values' (Kwan 2004).

Michael Billig (1995) has stated that in the establishment of nations there is a continual flagging or reminding of nationhood. The concept of nationhood, which provides a constant background for political discourse, is presented to citizens on a daily basis in ways that appear so familiar that it is not consciously registered. This type of 'banal nationalism' Billig (1995) asserts:

> ...is not a flag, which is being continuously waved with fervent passion...it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building (Billig 1995, p.8).

Adrian Fisher and Christopher Sonn (2002), following Billig (1995), have argued that common symbols are often unconscious constructions that are not given overt attention but are '... evoked at times of high emotion to indicate what must be 'saved' in order for current ideas to survive' (Fisher and Sonn 2002, p.598). Dominant cultural images and symbols, however, have an exclusionary function often used against those who are identified as outsiders. The federal government's promotion of the flag as a symbol of Australian identity, values and freedom, became inherently associated with a particular narrow historical concept of 'white' Australian identity and values. Billig (1995) has noted how:

> National histories tell of people passing through time – 'our people', with 'our way of life' and 'our culture'. Stereotypes of character and temperament can be mobilised to tell the tale of 'our uniqueness'. In this way 'our culture' is framed as if it were a precious inheritance, to be transmitted uncontaminated and un-weakened (Billig 1995, p.71).

Central to the government's representation of Australia as a nation was the reaffirmation of whiteness as a key concept by drawing on what was commonly regarded as the values, traditions and accomplishments of the 'old Australia' (Howard 2006). Judith Brett (2005) has argued that association of the flag with Australia's military past (particularly at Gallipoli[1] during World War I), was continually fostered by the federal government, in particular in the countless addresses on Australia Days and Anzac[2] Days. These speeches were articulated with extensive foundations in both historical and contemporary experience (Brett 2005). Drawing on the enduring values of Australia's past to inspire patriotism and to unify Australian identity, the commonality of whiteness was implied to

evoke a national ‘we’ which acted to exclude the non-white ‘them’ (Lake 2005; Brett 2005).

The federal government’s agenda to generate the notion of Australia’s ‘white’ culture-shared identity, by couching it as ‘common sense’ knowledge of historical Australian values, can be categorised as a form of ‘discourse framing’, as it gave shape to the concept of an Australian identity by perpetuating myths and histories, which assisted in shaping public attitudes (Poynting, Noble, Tabar and Collins 2004). The type of discourse framing engendered by the government acted to marginalise Muslim Australians via oppositions of ‘our’ values as good and ‘their’ values as an antithesis to white Australian culture and way of life (Poynting et al. 2004). The discourse of whiteness and the histories and iconographies of exclusion, deployed in this way, produced a specific effect in the population that contributed to the racial violence at Cronulla beach. Suvendrini Perera (2006) has stated that those perceived to be of Middle Eastern appearance who were chased by the rioters through the streets of Cronulla, had already been essentialised as:

> [the] sexual predator, the already suspect Muslim/oriental terrorist, the invader of the homeland, the criminal and the racial other, who had come together in the figure of an overdetermined non-white ‘Other’ (Perera 2006).

In a determined attempt to preserve the ‘Australianness’ and white ownership of the beach, rioters unfurled the Australian flag from its latent nationalist potency and deployed it as an unapologetically racist symbol to designate who belonged to the beach and who needed to be excluded (Rutledge 2007). Through a deployment of ‘counter frames’, the young women who wore the flag as hijab, attempted to problematise the powerful interpretive framing processes that had constructed a ‘fixed conceptual schema’ (Lee et al. 2008) by selectively encoded the flag as a symbolic marker belonging to white Christian Australians. The next section brings into view the way in which the flag as part of dress discourse was circumscribed as a sign of white homogeneity and also as a form of apparel that resonated in what was perceived as the ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ dress code.

Dress Matters.

Suvendrini Perera (2006) has indicated, the dominant discourse that had framed the Australian flag as representative of particular Australian values, went beyond the waving of the blue ensign but was circumscribed as a distinguishing boundary marker on bodies

and as part of dress discourse (Fig 88 c.f *ABC TV: Four Corners* 2006). Perera (2006) notes how the symbolism of the flag inscribed on bodies in multiple forms, was

> ...blazoned on bikinis and backpacks, tattooed on to arms and torsos, painted on faces like war paint, wrapped around shoulders like a trophy: a performance of native-ised territoriality that echoes other enactments of territorial ownership: We decide who comes on to this beach and the manner in which they come (Perera 2006).

The concept of ideological notions about the Australian flag as a part of 'normal' dress apparel was reflected by one of the women who attended the riot. In an interview conducted by *ABC TV's Four Corners* programme 'Riot and Revenge' (2006), Sarah stated that she wore the flag wrapped around her bikini because:

> …I basically shouldn't feel like I'm not allowed to wear the flag ...because I might get shot ...This is Australia I shouldn't feel like that I can't go to the beach, normally, and wear what I'd usually wear. Because when I do, I feel as though I'm getting targeted. Like, people saying to me, like, just names and stuff, that I'm being called for wearing a bikini in my own shire. Like, I've grown up here. And I'm a local at the beach. And I just don't think I should feel like that. It's just been getting worse and worse and worse (Fig 89 c.f *ABC Four Corners* 2006).

These comments, which resonated within discourses of terrorists, war, borders, nation, gender and dress codes, were based on a logic that linked together the articulations promulgated by hegemonic discourse framing processes that all Muslims are terrorists, invading the Australian nation, are antagonistic to Australian values and oppressive to women. Rhanda Abdel-Fattah (2007) has argued that the debates about Australian norms and values articulated by the federal government, were not a general values debate but one that '...primarily focused on 'normalising' women's dress and attitudes to certain social norms, such as a day at the beach or sexuality' (Abdel-Fattah 2007, p.52). The concept of what constituted 'Australianness' within the paradigm of dress, difference and gender, became particularised and salient to the Cronulla riot, where the discourse of dress in the context of 'covering' and 'uncovering' was constructed as a borderline denoting inclusion and exclusion, self and 'Other'.

Scott Poynting (2006) has stated that one of the main concerns from the local residents of the Cronulla area was that 'the outsiders' dressed inappropriately for the beach because they wore too many clothes. One of the rioters who identified as 'Steeley' made the justification for the riot by linking contemporary issues of gender and dress discourse with Australia's military past, stating that:

> …these bastards come here and stand around the sea baths 'cos their women have got to swim in clothes and stuff, or they see those saying filthy things to our girls. That's not Australian. My granddad fought the Japs to see Australia safe from this sort of shit, and that's what I'm doing today (Murphy 2005).



Fig 88 Rioters wrapped in the Australian flag
c.f *ABC Four Corners* 2006



Fig 89 Rioters wrapped in the Australian flag
c.f *ABC Four Corners* 2006

The theme of regulation and normativity, rationalised around concepts of 'acceptable' dress codes became a central dynamic underpinning the rioters' validity in claiming to protect and defend the rights of the 'white' women and the apparel that they chose to wear.

Leonie Huntsman (2001) has suggested that arguments over what constitutes suitable beach apparel has been a vexed issue in Australia since the 1900s, when the state of 'undress' became a concern for moral conservatives. In her analysis of the history of beach apparel, Huntsman (2001) provides an account of dress regulations that have and continue to pervade Australian beach culture. Huntsman (2001) refers to an article in the 1906 S*ydney Morning Herald* that advised that women's bathing costumes '…needed to meet certain standards…[and to be made from]…dark material of serge, flannel or flannelette that extended over the shoulder and the knee' (Huntsman 2001, p.61). Loitering on the beach was forbidden during this period and bathers who did not make their way directly to and from the water were instructed to wear a Macintosh, overcoat or cover-all robe. In 1935 a proposal to regulate beachwear to cover most of the body was rejected by the majority of beach goers (Huntsman 2001, p.64).

In the 1950s the urge to regulate beach costumes lingered. Women who wore two-piece suits were forbidden to leave the beach '…unless they wore a jumper or buttoned up cardigan or dressing gown' (Huntsman 2001, p.64). During this period, when the political imperative was to assimilate immigrants into Australian culture, the shaping of Australian values began to be configured around the beach and dress discourse (Huntsman 2001). This is highlighted in a report in the Sydney *Morning Herald* on 13 November 1950 that states:

> Two men 'new Australians', had been ordered off crowded beaches for wearing …very brief swimming customs' A Bondi surf club official had complained of the way the men kicked, pushed and struggled with life savers, and expressed his irritation over their ignorance of both safety rules and acceptable dress. [He stated] they're a menace – they don't know our customs (Huntsman 2001, p.213).

Negative attitudes towards those viewed as 'new Australians' in the 1950s, with their perceived disregard for accepting the appropriate dress code of covering, has turned full circle in contemporary Australian beach culture, as the concept of 'covering' (the hijab) is perceived as a symbol of resistance to the dominant Australian culture, and 'uncovering' (the bikini), is deemed as an iconic symbol of Australia's national identity. The salience of this discourse was most notable in *The Great Australian Bikini March* (Lane 2006).

The Great Australian Bikini March



Fig 90 *SBS Television: Insight*, 2006, 'Asking for It'

In September 2006 during a Ramadan[3] sermon, Sydney-based Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali made a statement alluding that immodestly dressed women who refused to wear Islamic hijab were responsible for being preyed on by men (Lane 2006). In his statements Hilali had likened unveiled women to abandoned 'meat' and implied that dress was a contributing factor to the cause of rape[4] (Lane 2006). His sermon outraged many Muslim women and community leaders who were offended by his remarks. Hilali's statements were debated on *SBS Television Insight* programme in November 2006. An image of two Barbie dolls, one in a bikini and the other in a hijab was used as the promotional image for the *Insight* program (Fig 90 *SBS Television Insight* 2006). Given that the debate on the *Insight* program was about the Hilali's statements concerning the veiling and unveiling of Muslim women, the inclusion of an image of a Barbie doll in a bikini, juxtaposed by a doll in hijab, effectively reframed the lingering potency of Orientalist ideologies projecting the idea of the Western freedoms accorded to women versus the oppression imposed on Islamic women through veiling practices.

In protest to comments made Sheik Hilali, Christine Hawkins (2006) who identified as a Melbourne grandmother, planned *The Great Australian Bikini March* (GABM) to be paraded past Melbourne's Brunswick Mosque on 12 December 2006 to commemorate the anniversary of the Cronulla riot (Lane 2006; Dunn 2006). Hawkins (2006) stated that the bikini was '... an iconic image for Australia…and it's a statement about maintaining our way of life…which is strongly associated with our beach culture' (Lane 2006; Michaels 2006). Hawkin's (2006) statements suggested that those who did not embrace

'normalised' beach dress codes, were defiantly opposing integration and the acceptance of Australian 'values'.

Claiming to defend the right of women to wear apparel of their choice, Hawkins (2006) argued that '...our fathers and forefathers fought to have the freedom we enjoy' and as a bikini wearer she wanted her children and grandchildren to be able to enjoy the freedom to do the same (Fisher 2006). The comment by Hawkins brings into view the way in which the concept of ANZAC legend was framed to link the geographical marking and protection of the nation's borders with the concept of Western freedoms and democracy based around the perceived ideals of normative dress codes.

In a response to the proposed Bikini March, a member of Victoria's Islamic Council, Waleed Aly (2006 cited in Lane 2006), stated that the comments concerning women's dress by growing numbers of white supremacists was a '...toxic kind of ideology coming into the social mix that was potentially very dangerous and divisive' (Lane 2006). The dominant discourse framing that promoted a pernicious normalising agreement of what legitimated Australian dress codes, generated opposing voices from various groups. For example, the Islamic Information and Support Centre and the Socialist Party Australia organised a counter rally at the Brunswick mosque in an attempt to circumvent any potential confrontation resulting from the Bikini March protesters (*Melbourne Independent Media Centre* 2006). However, according to *The Great Australian Bikini March* (2006) website, the march was cancelled due to 'irresponsible journalism', including '...increasing smear campaigns to sensationalise and discredit the march' (*Great Australian Bikini March* 2006). The website also stated that due to misrepresentations promulgated by one 'shock jock', that the protesters were marching against the hijab, verbal abuse and threats were levelled against the organisers and their families.

Given the mainstream media's obsession with issues concerning the veil, veiling and unveiling it was inevitable that veil would be the focus of the media coverage about the GABM. It could be argued that the decision to hold the pro-bikini rally on the anniversary of the Cronulla riot, highlights how the discourse of dress was situated as a formidable part of the pogrom of the Cronulla riot, where the right to wear too many clothes such as the hijab, was perceived as a threat to Australian culture and values.

The proposal for the GABM was strongly supported by white supremacist groups who claimed to be guardians of women's rights (Lane 2006). Issuing suggestions to supporters that they should protest by following legal and democratic avenues, Hawkins (2006) recommended making 'dress' an election issue (G*reat Australian Bikini March* 2006). Echoing the sentiments of those involved in the GABM, the political populism that had articulated 'dress' as upsetting the status quo of Australian culture and values was incorporated into part of the 2007 election campaign for the extremist right wing *Australia First Party* (91 c.f *Australia First* 2007). The promotional flyer stated:

> To Preserve Cronulla Vote 1 John Moffat...A candidate who puts Australia and Australians first, a candidate who is proud of his Euro-Australian identity...a candidate who believes Australian women should be able to dress as they please and go as they will without fear... (*Australia First 2007).*

The notion of 'appropriate' beach apparel as a definitive part of belonging, identity and values, was not confined to comments made by extremist right wing political party members. Christine Ho (2006) has asserted that former federal Treasurer, Peter Costello argued for the right of women to wear the bikini at the beach and not be harassed for how they chose to dress. Rayann Bekdache (2006) has suggested that while various politicians and public commentators have professed to embrace the rights of women to wear the apparel of their choice, this view has not been extended to Muslim women, who have been subjected to increasing scrutiny, intimidation and aggressive behaviour, with the hijab typically being the rallying symbol (Bekdache 2006). The next section analyses the way in which dress discourse was a foundational thread in the debates about the 'protection' of women.

Protecting 'Our' Women

As noted previously in the chapter, an underlying tension that was considered to be the main impetus fuelling the Cronulla riot, developed around concerns about 'Muslim' Australian men engaging in unacceptable behaviour on the beach. Much of this anxiety stemmed from Australian political and media commentary regarding the 'Sydney gang rape case' in 2000, which had circumscribed 'white' Australian women as vulnerable, potential victims of Muslim Lebanese males (Poynting 2006; Deen 2003). Poynting (2006) has stated that concerns about young 'Aussie' women being insulted and made to feel unsafe on the beach by an 'essentially misogynist' and 'un Australian culture' had been circulating in local folklore. Poynting (2006, p.87) has argued that according to this story, the locals of Cronulla, an exceptionally white Anglo area,



Cronulla 2007:
Vote 1 John Moffat

To Preserve Cronulla!

A candidate who puts Australia and Australians first, a candidate who is proud of his Euro-Australian identity, a candidate who is Green without the Red, a candidate who believes Australian women should be able to dress as they please and go as they will without fear, a candidate who offers tireless representation if your send him to parliament.

December11 2005 saw the Civil Uprising of the Australian people at Cronulla. This was the signal for a new community-based politics to reclaim Australia and defend people's rights.

Since December 11, politicians, multiculturalist propagandists, journalist-liars and others, have misrepresented what occurred at Cronulla. They have prattled about 'violence', 'racism', 'white supremacism', 'hatred'. They lie and they know they lie with these verbal weapons of mass distraction! Australia First regarded the popular protest as *correct* and while the party does not condone any 'violent acts' at the rally, *does not condemn* the activists either. It is the overall perspective that counts. Hence we coined the term 'Civil Uprising' to describe the popular rally and the other events. This expression has obtained some popular usage. While we noted the spontaneous nature of much of the nominally illegal parts of the December 11 events, *we observed the ruthlessly cold, malicious and organised nature of the days of 'retaliation',* criminal rampages the police refused to confront. Did the political regime cynically consider the 'retailiation' punishment for Australians who had broken with the multiculturalist lies?

Now we are engaged in a special electoral and public campaign. We rely upon the Australian people for our support. We have no capitalist money-bag developer, or bank, or multinational, to support us - as do the Lib/Lab crew. We have only those people who think as we do.

We are saying to voters in Cronulla and to the public of New South Wales that we are on the ground in the fight for Cronulla in the 2007 State Election.

We urge a vote for John Moffat for Cronulla, *because we aim to break the back of the populate-Australia-project and its multiculturalist propaganda.* This fight has many aspects and key elements lie in the Cronulla programme.

Campaign News updated regularly.

Fig 91 John Moffat 2007 Australia First NSW State election campaign flyer for the seat of Cronulla'
c.f *Australia First 2007*

had been '...putting up with outsiders...affronting 'their' women' for years. In addition 'these outsiders' were perceived as having been '...uniquely involved in 'boisterous behaviour' [and were] responsible for littering the parks and the beaches' (Poynting 2006, p.87). Similarly Andrew Lattas (2007) has stated that local residents in the Cronulla area perceived 'Muslims' as 'aggressive', 'hostile' and 'angry'. According to Lattas (2007, p.303), the construction of Muslims as 'argumentative and belligerent' is a '...everyday form of Orientalism'. The threads of Orientalism that have continued the essentialised binaries between the 'civilised West' and the 'uncivilised East' were reframed in the modalities of the Cronulla riots, where the battle between 'us', the superior good white Christians as 'victims' of the evil, licentious and violent 'them', was played out (Sardar 1999). Moreover, the Orientalist tropes that have posited Muslim men as inherently misogynist and oppressive to women provided justification for the 'Anglo' men to protect 'their' women against the Muslim male 'Other' on the beach.

The persistent discussion about the protection of 'our' women prompted Christine Ho (2006) to question when women had regressed to being the property of men. The apparent need of paternalistic men to protect 'their' women from the perceived misogynist Muslim 'hordes' is according to Wron Ware (1992), a legacy of one of the most commonly recurring themes of 'cultural difference' in the history of colonialist ideology. Ware (1992) contends that the threat of real or imaged violence from an 'evil male other' became a symbol of the most '...dangerous form of insubordination' (Ware 1992, p.38). As noted in Chapter Four, during the late nineteenth century in Australia, the imperial ideology of protecting white women was embedded with issues of 'race' and nation (Featherstone 2001, p.4). The preoccupation of Australia's colonial nation builders was the fear of the deterioration of the Australian white 'race' due to racial intermixing. Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was wide scale political debate on issues of 'race', in particular the definition of the national character. These debates included the promotion of images of what Australia might become if the influx of the 'inferior' races continued (Grimshaw, Lake, McGrath and Quartly, 1994, p.181). During this period, the decline in birth rates, which was achieved by the use of various forms of birth control including abortion, became a major concern in political and public discourse (O'Brien 1988). The concept of white women as the lynchpin reproducers of the white 'race' and guardians of its purity continues to hold resonance in contemporary Australian political discourse. For example, Liberal Party back bencher Dana Vale (2006) claimed that high abortion rates could lead to Australia becoming a 'Muslim' nation (Phillips 2009).

Vale's (2006) concerns over what Australia might become if Muslim Australian birth-rates increased, links directly to the comments made by some of those involved in the Cronulla riot who stated that they were in fear of Australia becoming an Islamic state as '...Muslims will…probably outbreed 'us' (*ABC TV: Four Corners* 2006). The expressions of a sense of national crisis around the prospect of Australia's white nation becoming a Muslim state became the impetus for many of the men involved in the Cronulla riot, to act as 'guardians' of 'their' women's safety.

Christine Ho (2006) has proposed that the issue gender equality that circulated in political and public debate, produced all kinds of conservative male public figures who perceived themselves 'Australia's new feminists', posing as defenders of women's rights. While purporting to defend gender equality in Australia and oppose negative attitudes towards women, comments by politicians, media and public commentators have been implemented as a way of '…articulating anti-Muslim nationalism (Ho 2006). Underpinning much anti-Muslim sentiment was the rhetoric of ten years of a federal conservative government, whose defence of gender equality was often enmeshed with the aim to fully assimilate Muslims into Australian culture, by requiring them to learn to speak English and by treating 'their' women as equals (Ho 2006). According to Ho (2006):

> The connection between women's rights and an anti-Muslim agenda suggests that Islam is a misogynist religion that oppresses women, [who] are forced to wear the hijab…and non-Muslim women are oppressed by Muslim men raping and harassing them on the street and at the beach. This misogynist behaviour is seen as part of an alien backward culture that threatens Australian social cohesion (Ho 2006).

Hegemonic discourse framing processes that acted to position Muslim culture as being 'utterly antagonistic' to 'our' kind of society gathered into a collective narrative that affirmed a perception that Muslim men are misogynist and that this Muslim misogyny is un-Australian and a threat to Australia's liberal and egalitarian traditions (Ho 2006; Cunneen 2006). As mentioned previously, just prior to the Cronulla riots John Howard perpetuated a widespread axial stimulus to the negative view of gender relations amongst Muslim Australians. The then Prime Minister John Howard (2005) stated that '...some sections of the Islamic community had an attitude towards women which is out of line with mainstream Australian society' (Robertson 2005). These comments provoked condemnation from a coalition of women from politics, academia and a wide range of community organisations including Women and Reform of Migration (WARM).

Taking issue with the former Prime Minister's remarks, they stated that the accusation regarding 'poor attitudes to women' was the same rhetoric used by Anglo Australian settlers to attack Aboriginal communities from the earliest days of colonisation (Goodall, Ho and Germanos- Koutsounadis 2006). They further argued that:

> Extreme attitudes towards women are not unique to Muslims, or to any other group for that matter. To say so is playing tawdry politics. Respect for women in both the public and private sphere has never been high in any society, and Anglo Australia is no different. The ongoing Islamophobic views being expressed through the media via politicians like John Howard directly feed and propel the attacks on the Australian Muslim community, the Cronulla race riots being the end result (Goodall, Ho and Germanos-Koutsounadis 2006).

The articulations and rearticulations that circumscribed a category of people by their dress codes and behaviours prompted a perception of 'abnormality' that threatened the 'normativity' of Australian culture and values.

The eruption of violence at Cronulla can be read as a ramification of the layeredness of discourse framing processes that increasingly linked Muslim Australians to various events from 2000-2005. According to local Liberal MP Bruce Baird (2005), events including the 'Lebanese rape cases', *Tampa,* September 11 and in particular, the Bali bombings, changed the atmospherics of Cronulla (Skelton 2005). Linking the riot to the Bali bombings, Baird (2005) stated that:

> [T]he riot was …revenge for the Bali bombings. Many local residents of the primarily Caucasian areas were angry particularly after [the] young women from the neighbourhood were killed in the 2002 Bali nightclub. Where the riot took place is actually the site of the Bali memorial for these women (Baird 2005 cited in *Sydney Moring Herald* 2005).

Of the eighty-eight Australians killed in the Bali bombings, seven were women who had lived in the Cronulla area. As a tribute to these women, a memorial was erected at Cronulla North beach in 2003 (*Sutherland Shire Council*, n.d). In the speech delivered by the Mayor of the Sutherland Shire Council, Phil Blight, to acknowledge the loss of 'Our girls' he stated that:

> In these troubled times we live in, the bonds that bind us together become ever more important – community, family, friendship and tradition (Blight 2003, cited in *Sutherland Shire Council* n.d).

The commemorative structure of the memorial to the seven women highlights what Kirk Savage (2006) has described as a 'therapeutic monument'. Savage (2006) has stated that the impulse to erect such memorials in public places has increased since the events of 9/11. This type of commemoration, Savage (2006) asserts, invokes a mode in which the political is always already present. Similarly Daniel Sherman (2006) has argued that the

naming and the creation of places of commemoration '…actively [and] continually …appropriate the personal on behalf of the political' (Sherman 2006, p.123). As a visual document, monuments have the ability to be symbolic reminders of past events. The act of 'monumentalisation' conveys messages to the particular group of individuals for whom it serves as an explanation of the world they inhabit (Hamilton 1990). In the public space, the physical object of the monument, where text records the names of those who died, is encountered and implanted in some form or other in the collective memory (Hamilton 1990). The naming of the women as 'our girls' and the spatial dimensions of the memorial positioned at the beach, evoked particular political overtones cast within the collective affirmations of 'our' white 'values' and 'traditions'. While the incident of the Bali bombings in many ways saddened the nation, the commemorative form and the spatial realm of the memorial that recognised a tragic loss of seven young women in the Cronulla area, added a racist dimension to the outpouring of violence at Cronulla, masquerading under the banner of patriotic nationalism to protect their beach and their women.

The Veil and the Aftermath of the Riot

On the Monday after the riots, reprisal attacks took place 15-20 kilometres away from Cronulla in Brighton-le-Sands (Matthews 2006). Rumours that warnings sent via SMS to 'Middle Eastern' Australians that their suburbs would be invaded and mosques would be bombed and that a young Muslim woman had died as a result of some injuries she suffered during the Cronulla riot, fed into the already angry emotions felt by many Muslim Australians, inciting retaliation. (Trad 2006; *ABC TV: Four Corners* 2006). According to a member of the Islamic Friendship Association of Australia, Keysar Trad (2006), the retaliation attacks by some 'Middle Eastern' youths, including the smashing of cars and physical violence against members of the community, was appalling and criminal. Most of those who were involved these attacks were arrested (Trad 2006).

When questioned about the racist behaviour that occurred at Cronulla beach, John Howard (2005a) claimed that there was '...no underlying racism in Australia' (Grattan 2005). In a press conference the day after the riots, the former Prime Minster Howard (2005a) stated that:

> It is important that we place greater emphasis on integration of people into the broader community and the avoidance of tribalism within our midst. I don't think Australians want tribalism. They want us all to be Australians. And there should be a constant exhortation of all people irrespective of their background to absorb the fundamental

> values of the Australian community. And they are good values. They're time honoured values... They respect the equal rights and roles of men and women within our community. It means of course that newcomers to this country must embrace our values (Howard 2005a).

The promotion of integration, Australian values and the equality of men and women, once again became the focal point of the discussion. In this way, the topic of racist violence at Cronulla was neutralised by centring the discourse on the importance of embracing 'Australian values'. Embedded in the concept of values was the presumption of whiteness, which acted to signify a 'common sense' notion of what was perceived as 'normal' and what was perceived as 'prohibited' (Dyer 1999, Puar 2007). The persistent theme of gender equality perniciously reaffirmed the veil as a pivotal signifier of Muslim women's oppression and an anathema to the Australian way of life and values. Framed within these discursive formations, the veil became perceived by many at the riot as the all encompassing symbol of un-Australianness.

Responding to the way in which the Australian flag was used as a nationalistic symbol to galvanise the rioters at Cronulla, John Howard (2005) stated that he '...would never condemn people for being proud of the Australian flag' (Grattan 2005). In the weeks directly after the riot, the flag was 'draped around heads' in a silent protest conducted at anti-racism rallies in Sydney and Newcastle (Dreher and Ho 2007). Tanja Dreher (2007) stated that the main objective of promoting an image of 'flag draped heads' was to call into question the way in which the flag was mobilised by seemingly unmarked 'patriotic citizens' as a '...*racial* and *enthonational* emblem of exclusion...' (Perera 2006 cited in Dreher and Ho 2007, p.iv). Dreher and Ho (2007) point out that given the continuous misrepresentation of the veil in dominant media discourse, the aim was to ensure that the flags would not be read as 'hijab'. Despite the best intentions, Sydney's tabloid *The Daily Telegraph* included the caption with the image 'veiled protest' (Dreher and Ho 2007 p.iv). The caption, Dreher and Ho (2007) claimed:

> ...was the mainstream media's obsession with the image of the 'veiled woman' and an inability to recognise the protest directed at white supremacy and musculinist violence at display at Cronulla (Dreher and Ho 2007, p.iv).

According to Christine Ho (2006), the media's fixation on the issue of the hijab, acts to make invisible the diversity and achievements of Australian Muslim women. However, Ho (2006) has stated that meeting Muslims women as part of her research has revealed the depth of strength and pride the women have in articulating their identity and values to the rest of society. The following section outlines the contribution some young Muslim

women made in challenging the misrepresentations about their identity and oppression that was a formidable narrative expressed by the rioters at Cronulla.

Bikini v Burqini

In a response to the events in Cronulla, the Department of Immigration, Sutherland Shire Council, Surf Life Saving Australia, Surf Life Saving NSW and various groups representing the Muslim community, implemented a program titled 'On the Same Wave' in 2006 (Ferguson 2008). The program aimed to provide support to young Australians of all cultural backgrounds, to engage in Surf Life Saving around Australia. (Ferguson 2008). This strategy was promoted as a means to encourage greater harmony between beach users and promote a culture that the beach was for all Australians (Connolly 2007). The announcement of the program triggered an adverse response from *Australia First* candidate John Moffat, who called for the axing of the 'On the Same Wave' initiative, which he declared was a 'monstrosity' (Metherall 2007). As part of Moffat's (2007) state electoral campaign he had distributed leaflets, which stated that the 'multicultural nightmare' afflicting the Cronulla area had been created by 'Lebanese thugs' who were 'the product of incest' and that these bloodlines had lead to 'an underclass of Islamic supremacists' (Moffat 2007 cited in Metherall 2007). Moffat's (2007) comments mirrored those made by Sydney's 2GB talkback host Brain Wiltshire (2006), a few days after the riot. Wiltshire (2006) stated that:

> Many [Muslims] have parents who were first cousins, whose parents were first cousins, because of the culture - it's not a religious thing, it doesn't say this in the Koran - but it's a cultural thing for some part of the world to have parents who are very closely related. The result of this is inbreeding, the result of which is uneducationable people, and very low IQ (*ABC Media Watch* 2006).

The comments made by Moffat (2007) and Wiltshire (2006) implied that 'Muslimness' is a 'racial essence' that is carried in the blood and passed on from birth. Advancing this type of ideology added to the cache of misinformation that had been promulgated by hegemonic discourses in the lead up to the riots, creating a concept that the 'white' Australian nation was in crisis and under threat.

In an attempt to address issues of integration and racism, part of the strategy for the 'On the Same Wave' program was to train young people from various cultural backgrounds, to gain a lifesaving certificate (*SBS TV: Race for the Beach* 2007). Of the seventeen participants in the initial program two were female, Malaak Mourab and Mecca Laalaa (Connolly 2007). Laalaa wore a multi-piece bathing suit, designed by Aheda Zanetti,

which she described as the ‘burqini’. This outfit covered all of the body except the face, hands and feet. A photograph showing Zanetti with a group of young women wearing her burqini design, appeared in a Qantas Australia promotional booklet, *Allofaus Our Spirit in 09*, published by News Limited (Fig 92 c.f *Allofaus Our Spirit in 09* 2009). The traditional colours of the lifesaver’s uniform (red and yellow) were incorporated into the design of the burqini Laalaa wore, which allowed her to fulfil her patrolling duties while still remaining observant of her religion (Fig 93a, 93b and 93c c.f Sernack 2007).

The image of Mecca Laalaa dressed in her burqini lifesavers uniform was reproduced in countless print and electronic media reports (Fitzpatrick 2009; Suganuma 2010). Shanon Fitzpatrick (2009) has asserted that the narrative of the media stories persistently promoted the burqini as a symbol of the dominant culture’s conception of progress and freedom, which was couched in the Orientalist discourse of ‘...Western political and moral rhetoric’ (Fitzpatrick 2009, p.3). Moreover, Fitzpatrick (2009, p.4) has suggested that the SBS Television documentary, *Race for the Beach*[5] framed Laalaa’s burqini as ‘...as an agent of assimilation and a panacea for racial and ethnic tensions’. Similarly, Katsuhiko Suganuma (2010) has argued that in the *Race for the Beach* program:

> Laalaa’s subject position became intelligible only through embodying the existing binary discourses of ‘West’ and ‘Muslim,’ ‘bikini’ and ‘burqa,’...exposing how those pre-existing discourses fail to account for her life experience (Suganuma 2010).

Suganuma (2010) has asserted that instead of invalidating pre-existing discourses, limited gendered, ethnicised, and national discourses were imposed upon Laalaa, delimiting her individuality. Suganuma (2010) and Fitzpatrick (2009) have both attested that despite the way in which the SBS program and the media in general, positioned Laalaa as an easy target for media sensationalism because of her perceived ‘difference’, Laalaa’s own objective, however, was to participate in the lifesaving program in order to achieve her own goals and contribute to public safety. As a young Australian Muslim woman, her subject position acquired recognition against all the forces which undermined it (Suganuma 2010). Significantly, Laalaa's identity and dress code complicated what was narrowly constituted as a formidable part of Australia's national identity during the Cronulla riot, where the utterances by the male rioters were heard discoursing on female bodies (Suganuma 2010).



Fig 92 Muslim swimwear designer Aheda Zanetti and friends on Cronulla Beach
c.f *allofaus, Our Spirit 09,* 2009



Fig 93a Australian Muslims Go for Surf, Lifesaving and Burqinis
c.f *Sernack* 2007



Fig 93b Australian Muslims Go for Surf, Lifesaving and Burqinis
c.f *Sernack* 2007



Fig 93c Australian Muslims Go for Surf, Lifesaving and Burqinis
c.f Sernack 2007

Summary

This chapter has illustrated the way in which the veil has been framed in dominant discourses as an anathema to the concept of an aesthetic gendered normativity and became intrinsically linked to the eruption of racist violence on a beach in Cronulla on 11 December 2005. Through the tracing of the overlapping debates about criminality, immigration and terrorism that were intimately connected to Muslim Australians; it has revealed how the trajectory of Islamophobia became increasingly gendered. Moreover, it has brought to into view how the transformational framing processes that have operated to frame and reframe Orientalist tropes of the West and its 'Others', was ultimately reduced to narratives about veiling and unveiling. Furthermore it has highlighted how the government's discursive constructions of Australian values couched in historical and contemporary ideologies surrounding the Australian flag and the ANZAC tradition of freedom and democracy were surreptitiously embedded in concepts of whiteness and gender equality. Within this paradigm, 'veiled bodies' were persistently represented as discursive sites of contestation in the construction of Australian national identity and values. In addition it has brought attention to the way in which the discourse of 'unveiling', as an agent to signify integration and assimilation became particularly prominent in debates about who belonged and who needed to be excluded in the lead up to the Cronulla riot. The struggle to protect the borders of the beach, went beyond the geographical borders of the nation, but was extended to include a border of demarcation between unveiled and veiled bodies. The reoccurring themes that prevailed in the debates about the cause of the riot, indicated that Australian beach culture as a perceived iconic signifier of Australian identity, needed to be retained by the 'normalisation' of dress codes. The visualisation of the bikini, framed as a symbol of freedom, liberation and Australian values was juxtaposed against the image of the veil, which was perceived as a 'strange' and 'abnormal' visual symbol of both oppression and defiance. It has argued that the imperative to protect the 'normalisation' of beach dress codes that became intimately connected to the protection of 'white' female bodies was a fundamental thread underpinning the racist violence at Cronulla. Most importantly this chapter has revealed that despite hegemonic discourses attempting to silence Muslim women's voices, by promoting a normalising agreement of what legitimates the ownership of the beach, women's rights, and appropriate dress code, Australian Muslim women have been 'speaking back' in various ways to illuminate their own concerns, achievements and diversity.

Notes

[1] On 25 April 1915 Australian troops landed on the Gallipoli peninsula in Turkey. The Gallipoli campaign was the first major battle undertaken by the joint military formation of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

[2] ANZAC Day is held on the 25 April each year. It marks the anniversary of the first major military action fought by Australian and New Zealand forces during the First World War. ANZAC is an anagram which stands for Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

[3] The holy month of Ramadan unites all Muslims in fasting, feasting, worship and prayer. The month of Ramadan thus facilitates as a personal retreat for believers, who are encouraged to better themselves spiritually, physically and socially. Ramadan varies between 29 and 30 days each year, due to the Islamic calendar which follows a lunar cycle. See *Ramadan Awareness Campaign*, 2009, 'About Ramadan', <http://ramadan.com.au/about-ramadan>.

[4] For a more detailed view of the debates surrounding Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali'statements, see *SBS TV: Insight* 2006 'Asking for It', <http://news.sbs.com.au/insight/archive>.
Also see Kerbaj, R 2006, 'Muslim leader blames women for sex attacks', *The Australian*, 26 October, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/muslim-leader-blames-women-for-sex-attacks/story-e6frg6nf-1111112419114>.
A response to Hilali's comments from Prime Minster Howard can be viewed at Roberts, K 2006, 'PM condemns Hilali rape comments', *ABC: PM* 26 October, <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1774556.htm>.

[5] *Race for the Beach* is a documentary commissioned by SBS TV in association with the BBC. It was directed by Alan Erson, the executive producers were Margie Bryant and Roger Graef and it was produced by Aline Jacques. *Race for the Beach* follows the lives of young Australian Muslims training to be lifesavers at Cronulla beach in the aftermath of the Cronulla riot. The focus of the program is on a twenty year old Muslim Australian woman Mecca Laalaa, in her attempt to be the first female Muslim lifeguard. SBS won the Amnesty International Award for Human Rights Program at the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association's Broadcasting Awards for the documentary. See *SBS* 2009, 'SBS Wins Commonwealth Human Rights Award' <http://www20.sbs.com.au/sbscorporate/index.php?id=1242>.

Chapter Eight

Disrupting Frames: A Conclusion

> We must carve out new modes of discourse and means of communication that would enable us to not only to hear but also understand the message, not only to see but perceive the reality and only then we would have attained the ability and the will to know and understand each other…The future of humanity lies in the willingness of all to respect and accept the other – the readiness to feel the pain of the other and the ability to overcome fear, doubt and suspicion of the 'other' (Mahmood 2003).

The veil, as a covering of women's hair and sometimes face and form, can only be understood within the complex and vast differences between the situation of women and how women define and understand their religious practice. This dissertation has advanced the thesis that despite the diversity among women and the adoption of the veil in a multifaceted variance of head coverings, the veiled Muslim woman, as an embodied subject, is always already depicted within an overarching Orientalist frame in Western representations. As stated in the introduction, the aim of this thesis has not been to take a standpoint upon veiling or a prohibition of veiling but to investigate Western representations of the veil. Tracing the historical threads of veiling has revealed that as a practice, it existed long before Islam. A repertoire of images depicting both Christian and Islamic veiling practices has been included to reveal how imagery has and continues to play a significant role in constructing a binary between the Christian veil as 'familiar' and the Islamic veil as 'exotic' and 'strange' and therefore 'feared'.

The concept of frames and framing processes that has underpinned the structure and argument for this inquiry has enabled the study to show that Western concepts about the veil and veiling have been framed through a process of organising principles that have selected and promoted particular interpretations of the veil, which have persisted over time. It has explored the framing processes involved in positioning the Christian veil, as part of the holy habit, as centripetal in the visual imagery represented by the Christian church (Kuhns 2003). The symbolic constructs of the Christian veil, which were framed to guide meaning making and common sense notions about normative religious and cultural practices, were inherently tied to white representations in narrative structural positions. The inquiry has identified that as a symbol of Christian religious identity, the veil became a representational signifier of the political and normative foundations for the West and was utilised as a powerful image to differentiate members of the Christian West

from people of other faiths, in particular Islam. Moreover, the historical legacy of the role of the Christian veil, as providing a metaphor of normative cohesion in the West, has strongly influenced perceptions of the veil in contemporary Western societies. The dominant framing processes that selectively used a configuration of repetitious images in conjunction with printed texts have allowed fluidity of the development of ideas across time in the ways in which ideological representations of the Christian veil have been constructed in Western discourses. This has been brought to focus by examining the interconnections of the veil as a defining symbol of Christian spiritual belief and the imperialistic mission to bring moral and civilising ideals of Christianity to colonised peoples. In addition, the spectrum of veiling practices that evolved from the veil worn by women religious in the West has been examined, including its adaption for nursing, bridal and contemporary millinery configurations. This concept of the veil, as one that has essentially belonged to a fixed white Christian Western identity, has been problematised through the utilisation of Foucault's analysis of structures of power and the history of ideas. The discursive formations and the structures of power/knowledge have perpetuated the image of the veil in dominant Western discourse through transformational frame processes which have projected a continual concept of 'recognisability' and familiarity.

An analysis of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (2003) and various writers who have extended his work, has brought to attention the way in which the imaginative geographical distinction between peoples and culture of the West and East were interlocked with power/knowledge structures. This inquiry has revealed that the stereotypes assigned to the essentialising discourse and visual imagery of 'Oriental' cultures was derived from a cache of texts and imagery that had been reframed as legitimate knowledge over time. These discursive formations were internalised and extended by Orientalist scholars and artists, whose work was always already premised by the conceptualisation of the 'civilised', 'progressive' Christian West and the 'uncivilised', 'backward', Islamic East (Said 2003). The mapping of Western perceptions of superiority over the East has revealed that the assumption of superiority became predominantly focused in debates concerning veiled Muslim women, whose visual trope was perceived as representing the fundamental backwardness of the East. This thesis has proposed that one of the most successful means of conceptualising the veiled woman, as both 'exotic' and as an 'oppressed' victim of a patriarchal society, was through a myriad of Orientalist artistic and photographic imagery. The repetitious themes of the harem and the naked odalisque provided a visual story, which paralleled Western conceptions about 'Oriental' women.

An exploration of the colonising period of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has brought to view how the contest of power was ultimately played out across the bodies of women. The imperative to unveil Muslim women in order to free them from a perceived backward and misogynist society became a central focus of both British and French colonising domination (Fanon 2003). Moreover, the thesis has proposed that the Orientalist ideologies that situated the veil as an all encompassing symbol of oppression was a formidable catalyst for emanating a shift in the perception of the veil from the 'familiar' to the 'strange' and 'suspicious' and therefore feared. The residual influence of Orientalism, a myth masqueraded as fact, has continued as a discursive power in protracting a particular disingenuous interpretation and perception of Islam and the veil.

This inquiry has revealed that within Western cultural contexts, the reframing of the Orientalist inspired images of veiled Muslim women have been manifested at various historical and contemporary junctures in an attempt to justify the criteria of particular political and ideological purposes. In addition it has identified the way in which Islamophobia, as an underlying motif of Australia's white history, has re-emerged from time to time when the nation is perceived to be under threat from the 'alien Other'. It has signalled the 1991 Gulf war as a critical flashpoint when techniques of surveillance and the re-emergence of Islamophobia were manifested in Australia. The thesis has advanced the argument put forward by Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar and Jock Collins (2004) that dominant discourse framing processes, evinced by political elites and mainstream media, had the ability to shape xenophobic attitudes toward Muslim Australians in particular veiled Muslim women during the Gulf war period. In addition it has recognised how the Orientalist tropes that essentialised the category of veiled Muslim women as the oppressed 'Other', became a magnet for disseminating an ideological fault line in the discourse of national identity and belonging in political and media discourses.

The rise of conservative politics in Australia during the mid 1990s has been identified as a formidable key for promulgating ideas about nation, identity and values grounded in whiteness discourse. Moreover, it has presented a view that the strong adherent of reframing the concept of a 'white' Australia by the conservative realms of federal politics, acted as a catalyst for triggering deep seated anxieties about the nation being under threat from non-white 'Other'. Additionally the research for this study has attested that the marginalising of those who were represented as a threat to the ethos of white Australian culture, came to prominence when various disconnected events that occurred prior to

September 11 2001, were interlinked with Australian Arabs and/or Muslims. As the notion that Australia was under attack from an enemy within and without Australia's borders, the veil became perceived as signifying the enemy, increasing the incidence of physical and verbal attacks on veiled Muslim women. A focus on the lived experience of racism encountered by veiled Muslim women, prompted attention to the way in which Orientalist representations of Muslim women was actively cultivated and reframed by the government and mainstream media. This thesis has argued that although 9/11 is often canvassed as the watershed in initiating an Islamophobic gaze through which the veil was perceived as representing despised difference, the tensions had already been smouldering in Australia in the decade prior to the event of September 11 2001.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the utilisation of images of the veil as a signifier of the terrorist 'Other' drew on Western conceptualisations of the veiled 'Oriental' woman, framed by colonial ideologies and inventions. In addition it has proposed that the hegemonic discourse framing processes, that situated the veil as exerting a concept of an antithesis to the codes of perceived normalisation of the Western gendered self, perpetuated a heightened level of physical and verbal aggression toward veiled Muslim women (Dreher 2006; Poynting and Mason 2006).

An examination of dress discourse has demonstrated how the affiliations between political power structures and dress discourse function as a technology of power to conveying particular concepts of 'sameness' and 'difference'. The inquiry has drawn attention to the way in which dominant discourse frames were utilised after 9/11 to accord specific meanings to Australian identity through a concept of dress. These discourses, which were framed within an aesthetic of gendered normativity, were intrinsically linked to an appropriation of Australian identity played out across a binary of acceptable/non-acceptable dress codes. Within this dominant framing process, the veil became an immanent frame scripted in terms of oppression, extremism and terrorism (Aly 2007). Furthermore, the mapping of political and media discourses around issues of border protection, national security and the war on terror, has revealed that a constant narrative perpetuated around the concept of an inclusive white Australian identity, implicitly lead to the concept of Muslim Australians as the internal enemy. In addition it has attested that colonial imperative to 'unveil' Muslim women and thus 'save' them from the 'brutality' of a perceived misogynist 'backward' and 'uncivilised' culture, was discursively recapitulated in the US led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in

2003. It has proposed that the desire of white Western feminists to ‘save’ Afghan women by reducing their plight to the one dimensional narrative of unveiling was consistent with the colonial civilising mission of white Christians ‘rescuing’ and ‘saving’ oppressed women from ‘uncivilised’ non-Christian male ‘Others’.

Additionally the thesis has brought to view the pronounced visibility of the blue burqa, which became the familiar trope symbolising the atrocities committed by the Taliban on Afghan women. The prominent attention to the blue burqa, which prevailed in media representations, discursively reframed the veil as a symbol of oppression and barbarity. Moreover the investigation has revealed that the repeated reproduction of the Taliban imposed blue burqa image, in dominant media and social network spaces, was reinscribed and reframed to represent a homogeneous portrayal of the veil and veiling practices.

This thesis has examined both the contiguous connections made between the veil and terrorism through comments made by various political elites and the ambiguity of the response to these comments. In addition it has illustrated the extent to which surveillance regimes were discursively implemented by state sanctioned polices in an attempt to fight the ‘war on terror’ in Australia after the 2002 Bali bombings. The process of according surveillance strategies to the wider population, was shaped by what was considered as ‘normal’ and ‘suspicious’ social behaviour. The ambiguous scope of the discourse had far reaching consequences for Muslim Australians, in particular Muslim women wearing religious dress codes, who were already stereotypically framed as the suspicious ‘Other,’ through the projected mechanisms of Orientalism. Furthermore, it has shown when debates about ‘national interest’ are framed by a nexus of nation, identity and values, constrained by an assumption of whiteness, it perpetuates a conceptualisation of difference between the ‘white us’ and ‘non-white ‘them’. In addition is has considered the way in which the linking of nation, identity and values with the gender ideologies in official discourse, ensued an assumption of difference based on the concepts of acceptable and non-acceptable dress codes. Furthermore it has proposed that the persistent layeredness of framing and reframing issues of criminality, border protection and terrorism, perniciously interwoven with ideologies about gender equality and dress discourse, was a formidable catalyst for the outpouring of violence that occurred at the Cronulla riots.



Fig 94 Diggers Ready to Take Leading Afghan Role
c.f McPhedran 2010



Fig 95 Mary MacKillop
c.f Crouch 2009

Concluding Thoughts

The image of the veil continues to exercise discursive power of perceptions of Islam and Muslim women. Nine years after the invasion of Afghanistan by US led forces, the blue burqa continues as a persistent motif accompanying reports about the military presence in Afghanistan (Fig 94 c.f McPhedran 2010). Images of the Christian veil in media reporting, however, present a contrastive view. In 2009, the image of a veiled Christian woman, heralded as becoming Australia's first saint, took prominent place in Australian political and media discourses (Fig 95 c.f Crouch 2009). Reports accompanying the images of Mary MacKillop however, did not fixate on the veil as the essence of her subjectivity, maintaining its invisibility and conspicuous absence through its perceived normativity. This thesis has argued that Western representations of the Christian veil as familiar has been informed by the historical relationship between Christian modes of thought and its inherent connection to concepts of whiteness. Additionally it has brought to attention the way in which the residual effects of Orientalism continue as an influencing paradigm in contemporary representations of the Islamic veil. This has been most notable in the post 9/11context, where the veil has been increasingly blurred with ideas of backwardness and issues concerning terrorism. The attributes assigned to the veil that have been framed by Orientalist discourse have persisted to inform and limit Western representations of the veil in contemporary media, political and cultural realms. This representation has portrayed Australian Muslim women as being less empowered than non-Muslim Australian women because of differences in dress apparel. This research has shown that despite the overwhelming Western representation and symbolism of the veil, as inherently oppressive, Muslim women's diversity of voice and self definition continue to challenge and evade the discursive formations of these representations. The photograph from the *Australian Women's Weekly* reveals this diversity (Fig 96 c.f Leigh 2006).



Six faces of Islam
from left: Rhanda Skenderovic
Diana Abdul Rahman
Flora Rahman
Malikeh Michaels
Wajiha Ahmed
Jeena Joyan

Fig 96 Australian Muslim Women Speak Out
c.f Leigh 2006

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