Fernandez, J.2008-03-242008-03-242007Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2007; 85(4):517-5360004-84021471-6828http://hdl.handle.net/2440/41270© RoutledgeIn this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge.enPhilosophyJournal article00200747272008031714500610.1080/000484007016764190002525612000012-s2.0-6114916994946183Fernandez, J. [0000-0002-4502-1003]