Wilkinson, D.2015-03-022015-03-022011Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011; 8(3):390-4141740-46811745-5243http://hdl.handle.net/2440/89424If a disabled newborn infant dies, her parents may be able to conceive another child without impairment. This is sometimes referred to as 'replacement'. Some philosophers have argued that replacement provides a strong reason for disabled newborns to be killed or allowed to die. In this paper I focus on the case for replacement as it relates to decisions about life support in newborn intensive care. I argue (following Jeff McMahan) that the impersonal reason to replace is weak and easily outweighed. I assess and reject several possible ways in which the impersonal reason to replace could be defended. I then address an alternative justification for replacement – as an individual-affecting benefit. The strongest justification for replacement may be the interests of parents. In the latter part of the paper I look at a related question. What role should replacement play in decisions about the funding of newborn intensive care?en© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011Impersonal reasonsNewbornsReplacementUtilitarianismWithdrawing treatmentJournal article003001550910.1163/174552411X5913482-s2.0-80054945545137131