Hill, LisaMacintyre, ClementEvans, Glynn Williams2019-10-172019-10-172019http://hdl.handle.net/2440/121601While all houses of Australian parliaments using proportional representation use the Single Transferable Vote arrangement, district magnitudes (the numbers of members elected per division) and requirements for casting a formal vote vary considerably. Early chapters of this thesis analyse election results in search for distinct patterns of proportionality, the numbers of effective parties and partisan advantage under different conditions. This thesis argues that while district magnitude remains the decisive factor in determining proportionality (the higher the magnitude, the more proportional the system), ballot paper numbering requirements play a more important role in determining the number of (especially) parliamentary parties. The general pattern is that, somewhat paradoxically, the more freedom voters have to choose their own preference allocations, or lack of them, the smaller the number of parliamentary parties. Even numbered magnitudes in general, and six member divisions in particular, provide some advantage to the Liberal and National Parties, while the Greens are disadvantaged in five member divisions as compared to six or seven member divisions. The latter number appears to be the lowest at which no major party group has a particular advantage over the others. Later chapters of the thesis examine rates of independent and female representation in PR-elected houses in comparison to the corresponding house in the same jurisdiction elected via a majoritarian system. It is argued that, contrary to the arguments of some observers; independent candidates have a better success record in single-member houses. Women tend to succeed more in PR-elected houses, (as feminist writers in particular have argued was likely to occur) but in some cases the differences become miniscule once the ability of PR systems to facilitate the election of minor parties (such as the Greens) that are more likely to select women is factored out of the equation.enElectoral systemsproportional representationvoting practiceThesis