Ghosh, S.Karaivanov, A.Oak, M.2010-05-172010-05-172007Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007; 9(3):425-4501097-39231467-9779http://hdl.handle.net/2440/58220We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-`a-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.enCopyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.Journal article002009687810.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00313.x0002491427000022-s2.0-3424999385434777Oak, M. [0000-0002-7018-8737]