Opie, J.2011-06-092011-06-092010Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science (ASCS09), held in Sydney New South Wales Sept 30- Oct 2 2009, 2010 / W. Christensen, E. Schier and J. Sutton (eds.): pp.270-2769780646529189http://hdl.handle.net/2440/64411It is a mainstay of the philosophy of science that reduction is a relationship between theories pitched at different levels of nature. But the relevant sense of “level” is notoriously difficult to pin down. A promising recent analysis links the notion of level to the compositional relations associated with mechanistic explanation. Such relations do not order objects by scale or physical type; one and the same kind of entity can occur at several levels in a single mechanism. I will sketch this approach to levels and consider some of its implications for our understanding of the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience.enCopyright 2009 by the Australasian Society for Cognitive Sciencereductionexplanationlevels of naturemechanismmechanistic explanationConference paper002010770410.5096/ascs20094130099Opie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]