Kirman, A.Laisney, F.Pezanis-Christou, P.2023-05-022023-05-0220182203-6024https://hdl.handle.net/2440/138178The paper reports on market-entry experiments that manipulate both payoff structures and payoff levels to assess two stationary models of behaviour: Exploration vs Exploitation (EvE, which is equivalent to Quantal Response Equilibrium) and Impulse Balance Equilibrium (IBE). These models explain the data equally well in terms of goodness-of-fit whenever the observed probability of entry is less than the symmetric Nash equilibrium prediction; otherwise IBE marginally outperforms EvE. When assuming agents playing symmetric strategies, and estimating the models with session data, IBE yields more theory-consistent estimates than EvE, no matter the payoff structure or level. However, the opposite occurs when the symmetry assumption is relaxed. The conduct of a specification test rejects the validity of the restrictions on entry probabilities imposed by EvE for agents with symmetric strategies, in 50 to 75% of sessions and it always rejects it in the case of IBE, which indicates that the symmetric variant of these models have little empirical support.enCopyright the authorscongestion games; exploration vs exploitation; quantal response equilibrium; impulse balance equilibrium; specification test; experimental economicsWorking paper2023-05-02443985Pezanis-Christou, P. [0000-0001-6521-4139]