Bayer, Ralph-ChristopherBinenbaum, EranAnderson, KymWong, JacobArnold, Anne Jillian2015-10-142015-10-142015http://hdl.handle.net/2440/95230Plant variety rights assist crop breeders to appropriate returns from new varieties and incentivise varietal improvement. Royalties are one form of plant variety rights and this dissertation asks which combination of the available royalty instruments is best from the perspective of consumers, farmers, crop breeders, and the overall economy. We use a game-theoretic approach to model strategic interactions between breeders and farmers. The model allows farmer privilege, whereby farmers save seed one year to plant in the future, and we show a point-of- sale royalty with either or both of the remaining royalties is optimal, whether or not we allow the possibility of farmers under-paying royalties through under-declaring output or saved seed. We also develop a Principal–Agent model, in which risk-neutral breeders share the risk with risk-averse farmers. In this model, the optimum royalty depends on various parameters, including the costs of compliance and enforcement.game-theory; economic model; end-point royalty; point-of-sale royalty; saved seed; farmer privilege; principal–agent modelThesis20150821091837