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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/16154
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Dispensing with the dynamic unconscious |
Author: | O'Brien, G. Jureidini, J. |
Citation: | Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 2003; 9(2):141-153 |
Publisher: | Journals Publishing Division, John Hopkins University Press |
Issue Date: | 2003 |
ISSN: | 1071-6076 1086-3303 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Gerard O'Brien and Jon Jureidini |
Abstract: | In recent years, a number of contemporary proponents of psychoanalysis have sought to derive support for their conjectures about the dynamic unconscious from the empirical evidence in favor of the cognitive unconscious. It is our contention, however, that far from supporting the dynamic unconscious, recent work in cognitive science suggests that the time has come to dispense with this concept altogether. In this paper we defend this claim in two ways. First, we argue that any attempt to shore up the dynamic unconscious with the cognitive unconscious is bound to fail, simply because the latter, as it is understood in contemporary cognitive science, is incompatible with the former as it is traditionally conceived by psychoanalytic theory. Second, we show how psychological phenomena traditionally cited as evidence for the operation of a dynamic unconscious can be accommodated more parsimoniously by other means. |
Keywords: | Cognitive unconscious consciousness dissociation dynamic unconscious psychoanalysis repression |
Description: | © 2003 by The Johns Hopkins University Press |
DOI: | 10.1353/ppp.2003.0031 |
Description (link): | http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ppp/summary/v009/9.2obrien01.html |
Published version: | http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy_psychiatry_and_psychology/v009/9.2obrien01.pdf |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 6 Philosophy publications |
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