Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/108322
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dc.contributor.authorVo, T.-
dc.contributor.authorCanil, J.-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Corporate Finance, 2019; 54:168-190-
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199-
dc.identifier.issn1872-6313-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/108322-
dc.descriptionFirst published online 2016-
dc.description.abstractAbstract not available-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityThi Thanh Nha Vo, Jean Milva Canil-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherElsevier-
dc.rights© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.002-
dc.subjectCompensation; options; incentive; CEO power; efficiency; FASB ASC 718-
dc.titleCEO pay disparity: efficient contracting or managerial power?-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.002-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
dc.identifier.orcidCanil, J. [0000-0002-3646-4320]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
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