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Type: Book chapter
Title: Imagination
Author: McMahon, J.
Citation: Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure, Reflection and Accountability, 2018 / McMahon, J. (ed./s), Ch.4, pp.66-87
Publisher: Routledge
Publisher Place: New York, US
Issue Date: 2018
ISBN: 1138553263
Statement of
Jennifer A. McMahon
Abstract: The standard cognitive theory of art claims that art can be insightful while maintaining that imagining is motivationally inert [Walton 1990] even when some epistemic advantage is claimed for it [Currie 1995]. However, if we assume art as art can be insightful, we also assume that the imagining it occasions has a lasting impact on belief. In this chapter, I argue that imagining of the kind occasioned by art can be held non-occurrently [Schellenberg 2013] without delusion (cf. Egan [2010]) and can motivate behaviour [Gendler 2000, 2003, 2006a/b; Langland-Hassan 2016]. As such, certain features of imagination can be appreciated in a new light.
Rights: © 2018 Taylor & Francis
RMID: 0030085811
DOI: 10.4324/9781315148496
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Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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