Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||P-Consciousness Presentation/A-Consciousness Representation|
|Author:||Gamble, Denise D.|
|Citation:||Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997; 20:149-150|
|School/Discipline:||School of Humanities : Philosophy|
|Abstract:||P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.|
|Description:||Copyright © 1997 Cambridge University Press|
Please see page 149 of PDF for this article.
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy publications|
Files in This Item:
|Gamble_16104.pdf||180.55 kB||Publisher's PDF||View/Open|
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.