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Type: Journal article
Title: P-Consciousness Presentation/A-Consciousness Representation
Author: Gamble, Denise D.
Citation: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1997; 20:149-150
Issue Date: 1997
ISSN: 0140-525X
School/Discipline: School of Humanities : Philosophy
Statement of
Denise Gamble
Abstract: P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P.
Description: Copyright © 1997 Cambridge University Press
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Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

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