Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
Type: Journal article
Title: Self-knowledge, rationality and Moore's paradox
Author: Fernandez, J.
Citation: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2005; 71(3):533-566
Publisher: Philosophy Phenomenological Res
Issue Date: 2005
ISSN: 0031-8205
Statement of
Jordi Fernández
Abstract: I offer a model of self-knowledge that provides a solution to Moore's paradox. First, I distinguish two versions of the paradox and I discuss two approaches to it, neither of which solves both versions of the paradox. Next, I propose a model of self-knowledge according to which, when I have a certain belief, I form the higher-order belief that I have it on the basis of the very evidence that grounds my first-order belief. Then, I argue that the model in question can account for both versions of Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox, I conclude, tells us something about our conceptions of rationality and self-knowledge. For it teaches us that we take it to be constitutive of being rational that one can have privileged access to one's own mind and it reveals that having privileged access to one's own mind is a matter of forming first-order beliefs and corresponding second-order beliefs on the same basis.
Description: The definitive version is available at
RMID: 0020063973
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00470.x
Published version:
Appears in Collections:Philosophy publications

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.