Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/62761
Citations | ||
Scopus | Web of Science® | Altmetric |
---|---|---|
?
|
?
|
Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects |
Author: | Yengin, D. |
Citation: | Social Choice and Welfare, 2012; 38(1):137-160 |
Publisher: | Springer-Verlag |
Issue Date: | 2012 |
ISSN: | 0176-1714 1432-217X |
Statement of Responsibility: | Duygu Yengin |
Abstract: | We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an efficient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, first we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-deficit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian-equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy. |
Rights: | © Springer-Verlag 2010 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 5 Economics publications |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
RA_hdl_62761.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 286.37 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.