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Browsing Philosophy publications by Author "Bayne, T."
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Item Metadata only Delusion and self-deception: Affective and motivational influences on belief formation(Psychology Press, 2009) Bayne, T.; Fernandez, J.This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives. Some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states. Some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors. And some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured.Item Metadata only Delusion and self-deception: Mapping the terrain(Psychology Press, 2009) Bayne, T.; Fernandez, J.; Bayne, T.; Fernandez, J.Item Metadata only From phenomenology to cognitive architecture and back(Psychology Press, 2009) Gerrans, P.; Bayne, T.; Fernandez, J.Item Metadata only Resisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle(Springer Netherlands, 2005) Bayne, T.; Fernandez, J.Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.Item Metadata only Vehicles of consciousness(Oxford University Press, 2009) O'Brien, G.; Opie, J.; Bayne, T.; Cleeremans, A.; Wilken, P.