Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
Type: Journal article
Title: Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem
Author: Chun, Y.
Park, N.
Yengin, D.
Citation: International Journal of Game Theory, 2016; 45(3):699-708
Publisher: Springer
Issue Date: 2016
ISSN: 0020-7276
Statement of
Youngsub Chun, Nari Park, Duygu Yengin
Abstract: The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveler makes a scheduled visit to a group of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveler returns home and waits for the next appointment. We are interested in finding a way of dividing the total traveling cost among sponsors in the appointment problem by applying solutions developed in the cooperative game theory. We show that the well-known solutions of the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, the nucleolus (or the prenucleolus), and the τ -value, coincide under a mild condition on the traveling cost.
Keywords: Fixed-route traveling salesman problem; appointment problem; Shapley value; prenucleolus; nucleolus; τ-value; coincidence
Rights: © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0478-6
Published version:
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
  Restricted Access
Restricted Access284.96 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.