Self-deception and Wilful Ignorance: 'self-induced, purported ignorance?'
Date
2022
Authors
Penhall-Jones, Margaret Leila
Editors
Advisors
Edwards, Natalie
O'Hair, Greg
Gerrans, Philip
O'Hair, Greg
Gerrans, Philip
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Thesis
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Abstract
Self-deception and wilful ignorance each involve professed attitudes involving ignorance which, in the circumstances, are difficult for others to believe. Some recent philosophical discourse considers whether they are the same or similar phenomena, with conflicting results. A clarification of issues, including identifying some conditions conducive to comparison of these phenomena, such as I present here, is aimed at contributing to this debate. Comparison of two phenomena requires a clear concept of each. A review of the literature showed that this is not available for self-deception. Various incompatible theories have been proposed to explain self-deception. In these theories, argument often seeks to derive sufficient conditions from paradigm examples. Theory has reached an impasse between the two leading theories in Analytical Philosophy: Intentionalism and Motivationalism. The first task, then, is to identify the theory of self-deception to be used for comparison. Paradigm examples can also be useful as tools of analysis. This is what I have done here, with the aim of discovering the currently established theory of self-deception with the most explanatory power. Analysing some standard paradigm examples for distinctive features of self-deception, I have derived several ‘desiderata’ that a theory must address. I have added two questions, regarding the reasons for and purpose of self-deception. I then review representative philosophers from three schools of philosophical thought on self-deception. They are: ▪ Existentialism –Jean-Paul Sartre ▪ Intentionalism – Donald Davidson ▪ Motivationalism – Alfred R Mele While each of these philosophers deepens our understanding of self-deception, there are reasons to prefer the theory that Davidson provides, as the one with the most explanatory power. This theory will provide the comparator to wilful ignorance. As a legal concept used to establish mens rea in criminal cases, wilful ignorance is a more clearly defined phenomenon than self-deception. Recent philosophical discussion concerns wilful ignorance in relation to our moral and social responsibilities, locally and as global citizens. Thus its boundaries become less well-defined. As well, normative considerations, whether concerning justice or ethics, seem to be inextricable from the concept of wilful ignorance. In relation to the question of whether self-deception and wilful ignorance are similar phenomena, I conclude that provided a Davidsonian theory of self-deception is accepted, they share many structural and attitudinal features. The reach of each phenomenon is apparently different: self-deception is more personal while wilful ignorance has broader social ramifications. Yet neither self-deceivers nor the wilfully ignorant are seeking insight or change. The purpose of these attitudes is arguably to maintain one’s self-concept or lifestyle when that is challenged. In relation to the second question in this thesis, this is an area of similarity. The state of ignorance in both is self-induced and incomplete. In both, there is an understanding of the matter over which there is a claim of ignorance. Such ignorance is ‘purported’. Wilful ignorance and self-deception both involve self-induced, purported ignorance.
School/Discipline
School of Humanities : Philosophy
Dissertation Note
Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2022
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