Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Scopus||Web of Science®||Altmetric|
|Title:||Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model|
|Citation:||European Economic Review, 2000; 44(1):35-60|
|Publisher:||Elsevier Science BV|
|Raul A. Barreto|
|Abstract:||The following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent. The model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income, consumption, and growth are identifiable. Bureaucratic red-tape is then added to the model. The results suggest that, a priori, corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution.|
|Keywords:||Endogenous; Growth; Corruption|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics publications|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.