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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/2166
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model |
Author: | Barreto, R. |
Citation: | European Economic Review, 2000; 44(1):35-60 |
Publisher: | Elsevier Science BV |
Issue Date: | 2000 |
ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Raul A. Barreto |
Abstract: | The following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent. The model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income, consumption, and growth are identifiable. Bureaucratic red-tape is then added to the model. The results suggest that, a priori, corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution. |
Keywords: | Endogenous Growth Corruption |
DOI: | 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00052-X |
Description (link): | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/505541/description#description |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00052-x |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 2 Economics publications |
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