Constructing quantum games from nonfactorizable joint probabilities

Abstract

A probabilistic framework is developed that gives a unifying perspective on both the classical and quantum versions of two-player games.We suggest exploiting peculiar joint probabilities involved in Einstein-Podolsky- Rosen _EPR_ experiments to construct a quantum game when the corresponding classical game is obtained from factorizable joint probabilities. We analyze how nonfactorizability changes Nash equilibria in three well-known games of prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken. In this framework we find that for the game of prisoner’s dilemma even nonfactorizable EPR joint probabilities cannot be helpful to escape from the classical outcome of the game. For a particular version of the chicken game, however, we find that the two nonfactorizable sets of joint probabilities, which maximally violate the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne sum of correlations, indeed result in new Nash equilibria.