Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain

dc.contributor.authorO'Brien, G.
dc.contributor.authorOpie, J.
dc.date.issued1999
dc.descriptionCommentary/Palmer: Color and consciousness - see pg 44-45 of the PDF
dc.description.abstractIn restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain – one that liberalizes the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism’s counter-intuitive consequences. In this commentary we rely on Palmer’s earlier work (especially from 1978) to tease out this alternative.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityGerard O’Brien and Jonathan Opie
dc.identifier.citationBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999; 22(6):996-997
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0140525X99452215
dc.identifier.issn0140-525X
dc.identifier.issn1469-1825
dc.identifier.orcidOpie, J. [0000-0001-6593-4750]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/16122
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.rights© 1999 Cambridge University Press
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99452215
dc.titleFinding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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