Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum game

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dc.contributor.authorIqbal, A.
dc.contributor.authorToor, A.
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractIn bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of twoqubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityA. Iqbal and A. H. Toor
dc.description.urihttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106056
dc.identifier.citationCommunications in Theoretical Physics, 2004; 42(3):335-338
dc.identifier.doi10.1088/0253-6102/42/3/335
dc.identifier.issn0253-6102
dc.identifier.issn1572-9494
dc.identifier.orcidIqbal, A. [0000-0002-5221-9384]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/57935
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInt Academic Publ
dc.rightsCopyright status unknown
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1088/0253-6102/42/3/335
dc.subjectQuantum games
dc.subjectEvolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs)
dc.subjectMixed strategies
dc.titleStability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum game
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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