Epistemic generation in memory
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2015
Authors
Fernandez, J.
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Journal article
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015; 92(3):620-644
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Jordi Fernández
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Abstract
Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, memory can produce justification for belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role.
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First published: 8 May 2015
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© 2015 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC