Engineering confederalism for Iraq

dc.contributor.authorKhan, S.
dc.contributor.authorKirmanj, S.
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractThis article examines Iraqi political developments in the last few years. It argues that unless a constitutional mechanism for proper dispersal of political powers across Iraq's regions and branches of its government is developed quickly, it may become too late for defeating Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, stemming the sectarian and ethnic conflicts, overcoming its perpetual crises of governance or for keeping Iraq united. We suggest that a confederal structure is a better and lasting political solution for Iraq than federal or other structural configurations. We also argue that power-sharing and consensus must be intertwined directly into the constitutional fabric of the political structure.
dc.identifier.citationNational Identities, 2015; 17(4):371-385
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/14608944.2015.1066322
dc.identifier.issn1460-8944
dc.identifier.issn1469-9907
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11541.2/111625
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.rightsCopyright 2015 Taylor & Francis Access Condition Notes: Postprint available after 10 March 2017
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2015.1066322
dc.subjectethno-religious conflict
dc.subjectfederalism
dc.subjectconfederalism
dc.subjectpower-sharing
dc.subjectIraqi politics
dc.titleEngineering confederalism for Iraq
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished
ror.fileinfo12142951600001831 13142962310001831 Open Access Postprint
ror.mmsid9915968509401831

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