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The strong versions of embodied cognition: three challenges faced

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dc.contributor.authorKhatin Zadeh, O.
dc.contributor.authorEskandari, Z.
dc.contributor.authorCervera Torres, S.
dc.contributor.authorFernández, S.R.
dc.contributor.authorFarzi, R.
dc.contributor.authorMarmolejo Ramos, F.
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this article is to discuss three challenges to the so-called "strong" versions of embodiment. The strong versions of embodied cognition (SVEC) have been successful in explaining how concrete concepts (e.g., pencil) may be understood based on sensory processes, yet they have failed to offer a comprehensive understanding of abstract concepts (e.g., freedom). In this regard, this article pinpoints three areas where the SVEC face limitations. First, the SVEC fail to fully support the active or passive perspective that an agent may assume when processing abstract concepts via embodied metaphorical representations. Second, the SVEC do not offer a compelling explanation for three different types of mental simulation proposed for the representation of nonactual motion semantics: enactive perception, perceptual scanning, and imagination. Third, the SVEC fail to account for inter-individual, cross-cultural, and context-dependency in the representation of abstract concepts. To summarize, we argue that the findings from the SVEC should be integrated into broader "weak" embodiment theoretical perspectives, which propose that sensory-motor and modality-independent systems are involved in conceptual representations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our core argument in cognitive neuroscience.
dc.identifier.citationPsychology and Neuroscience, 2021; 14(1):16-33
dc.identifier.doi10.1037/pne0000252
dc.identifier.issn1984-3054
dc.identifier.issn1983-3288
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11541.2/29742
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAmerican Psychological Association
dc.rightsCopyright 2021 American Psychological Association
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1037/pne0000252
dc.subjectstrong and weak embodiment
dc.subjectabstract concepts
dc.subjectnonactual motion sentences
dc.subjectconceptual metaphor
dc.subjectcognitive neuroscience
dc.titleThe strong versions of embodied cognition: three challenges faced
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished
ror.mmsid9916660092201831

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