The Zollverein and the formation of a customs union

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dc.contributor.authorPloeckl, F.
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractThe Zollverein, the German customs union of, was the institutional centrepiece of Germany, s economic unification. A bargaining model is applied to analyze the structure of its negotiation process and accession sequence. The existence of negative coalition externalities, the effect of a coalition on non-participants, led Prussia to choose sequential over multilateral negotiations. The nature of these externalities within the areas of financial revenues, trade policy and domestic political economy also explains the observed accession sequence. The choice of a customs union as institutional structure allowed Prussia to extract higher concessions from other states due to stronger coalition externalities.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityFlorian Ploeckl
dc.identifier.doi10.25909/5bc963577e192
dc.identifier.orcidPloeckl, F. [0000-0001-8500-9028]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/115261
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherDepartment of Economic, University of Oxford
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers in Economic and Social History
dc.rightsCopyright status unknown
dc.source.urihttps://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/oxford-economic-and-social-history-working-papers/the-zollverein-and-the-formation-of-a-customs-union
dc.subjectCustoms Union, trade agreements, coalition externalities
dc.titleThe Zollverein and the formation of a customs union
dc.typeWorking paper
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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