CEO stock options and pre-award plan conditions
Date
2006
Authors
Canil, J.
Rosser, B.
Editors
Oxelheim, L.
Rau, P.
Rau, P.
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Type:
Conference paper
Citation
Proceedings of 2006 FMA European Conference, 2006 / Oxelheim, L., Rau, P. (ed./s), pp.www1-www17
Statement of Responsibility
Conference Name
FMA European Conference (2006 : Stockholm, Sweden)
Abstract
We document a structure of pre-effort conditions associated with ESOPs. Since we can observe shareholder returns at award we infer incentive effects in a setting where premium and discounted executive stock options are regularly awarded. Discounted (premium) awards are associated with the highest (lowest) exercise rates, implying a successful incentive (disincentive) effect. Exercise restrictions (comprising hurdles and vesting restrictions) necessarily lower exercise rates, but may be preferred in combination with a discounted or premium award. Typically, a discount choice is associated with hurdles but not vesting restrictions. Empirically, shareholders benefit most from regular awards which are discounted and do not have hurdle price restrictions. Shareholders also benefit from hurdle provisions in irregular awards which may expose shareholders to CEO opportunism.