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Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

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dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, T.
dc.contributor.authorPezanis-Christou, P.
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractWe report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on bidding behavior and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). We observe an important overbidding in all but the last stage of a sequence, no matter whether supply is certain, and a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain. Yet, the data qualitatively support most stage-to-stage bid predictions and the price trend predictions for risk neutral bidders. © 2006.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityTibor Neugebauer, Paul Pezanis-Christou
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2007; 63(1):55-72
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.011
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.orcidPezanis-Christou, P. [0000-0001-6521-4139]
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/82245
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier Science BV
dc.rights©2006 Published by Elsevier B.V
dc.source.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.011
dc.subjectSequential first-price auctions
dc.subjectIndependent private values
dc.subjectUnit-demand
dc.subjectSupply uncertainty
dc.subjectPrice trends
dc.subjectExperiments
dc.titleBidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis
dc.typeJournal article
pubs.publication-statusPublished

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