A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information
Date
2014
Authors
Iqbal, A.
Chappell, J.M.
Li, Q.
Pearce, C.E.M.
Abbott, D.
Editors
Advisors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Type:
Journal article
Citation
Quantum Information Processing, 2014; 13(2):2783-2800
Statement of Responsibility
Azhar Iqbal, James M. Chappell, Qiang Li, Charles E. M. Pearce, Derek Abbott
Conference Name
Abstract
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying probability set is obtained from generalized Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen experiments. We find that this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.
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Description
Published online: 20 September 2014
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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014