The ownership of memories

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorFernandez, J.
dc.contributor.editorGarcia-Carpintero, M.
dc.contributor.editorGuillot, M.
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractIs there such a thing as experiencing a memory as one’s own? I argue that the phenomenon of disowned memory gives us a reason to believe that memories carry a sense of mineness. I challenge the view that the sense of mineness for a memory is the feeling of being identical with the witness of the remembered scene, and I put forward an alternative proposal. According to it, the sense of mineness for a memory is the experience of the memory as matching the past. I argue that the alternative proposal makes better sense of the available reports of disowned memory. I conclude by offering some considerations on how the proposed account could accommodate other cases of disowned conscious states.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityJordi Fernández
dc.identifier.citationSelf-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness, 2023 / Garcia-Carpintero, M., Guillot, M. (ed./s), Ch.15, pp.343-362
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0015
dc.identifier.isbn019880539X
dc.identifier.isbn9780198805397
dc.identifier.orcidFernandez, J. [0000-0002-4502-1003]
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2440/137509
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherOxford University Press
dc.publisher.placeOxford
dc.relation.granthttp://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/FT160100313
dc.rights© Jordi Fernández 2023
dc.source.urihttps://academic.oup.com/book/45423
dc.titleThe ownership of memories
dc.typeBook chapter
pubs.publication-statusPublished

Files

Collections

Philosophy publications